Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies

328 Pages·1995·5.22 MB·English

Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies
September 1985
NTIS order #PB86-182961
Recommended Citation:
U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Ballistic Missile Defense Tech-
nologies, OTA-ISC-254 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, Sep-
tember 1985).
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 85-600586
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402
Foreword
President Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative has kindled a national de-
bate over the roles of strategic offensive nuclear weapons, ballistic missile defenses,
and arms control in U.S. national security policy. It has also underscored the im-
portant ramifications of U.S. military space policy.
At the requests of the House Armed Services Committee and the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee, OTA undertook an assessment of the opportunities
and risks involved in an accelerated program of research on new ballistic missile
defense technologies, including those that might lead to deployment of weapons
in space. Debate over the relevant political, military, and technical issues has been
hotly contested by participants with widely varying assumptions and points of
view. OTA has not attempted to resolve the debate, but rather to try to clarify
the issues and enhance the level of discourse.
This report examines both the “why” and the “what” of ballistic missile
defenses. Why would we want ballistic missile defense weapons if we could have
them? Would the advantages of deploying them outweigh the disadvantages?
What technologies are under investigation for BMD applications? How might those
applications serve our strategic goals? These policy and technology questions in-
teract with one another in complex ways: what seems technologically possible con-
ditions perceptions of policy options, while policy choices shape technological
pursuits.
Closely related to BMD technology issues are questions about the develop-
ment and deployment of anti-satellite weapons. Whether or not the United States
decides to deploy BMD systems in space, the other military uses of space will
continue to be of national importance. How might the United States deal with
the potential threat of current and future Soviet anti-satellite weapons to U.S.
military space activities? After consultation with the staffs of the requesting com-
mittees, OTA decided to prepare a companion report, Anti-Satellite Weapons,
Countermeasures, and Arms Control. The relative role each of those elements (the
weapons, the countermeasures, and arms control) plays will be strongly affected
by the course followed in the development and deployment of space-based BMD
systems.
OTA gratefully acknowledges the contributions of the many individuals, firms,
laboratories, and government agencies who assisted its research and writing for
this report. .
.
#
Director
.
Advisory Panel on New Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies
Guyford Steve, Chairman
President, Universities Research Associates
Solomon Buchsbaum Michael M. May
Executive Vice President Associate Director-at-Large
AT&T Bell Labs Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Ashton Carter H. Alan Pike
Kennedy School of Government Program Manager, Space Stations
Harvard University Lockheed Missiles & Space Co.
Robert Clem Frederick Seitz
Director of Systems Sciences President Emeritus
Sandia National Laboratories The Rockefeller University
Sidney D. Drell Robert Selden
Deputy Director Associate Director for Theoretical and
Stanford Linear Accelerator Center Computational Physics
Los Alamos National Laboratory
Daniel J. Fink
President Marshall D. Shulman
D. J. Fink Associates, Inc. Director
Harriman Institute for Advanced Study of
Richard Garwin
the Soviet Union
IBM Fellow
Columbia University
Thomas J. Watson Research Center
Ambassador Gerard C. Smith
Noel Gayler, Admiral, USN (Ret.)
President
American Committee on East-West Accord
Consultants International Group, Inc.
Colin Gray
Sayre Stevens
President
Vice President
National Institute for Public Policy
System Planning Corp.
George Jeffs
Maj. General John Toomay, USAF (Ret.)
President
Consultant
North American Space Operations,
Rockwell International Seymour Zeiberg
Vice President
General David Jones, USAF (Ret.)
Research and Engineering Operations
Former Chairman
Martin Marietta Aerospace
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Robert S. McNamara
Former President of the World Bank
NOTE: OTA appreciates and is grateful for the valuable assistance and thoughtful critiques provided by the advisory panel members. The views
expressed in this OTA report, however, are the sole responsibility of the Office of Technology Assessment. Participation on the Advisory
Panel does not imply endorsement of the report.
iv
OTA Project Staff on New Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies
Lionel S. Johns, Assistant Director, OTA
Energy, Materials, and International Security Division
Peter Sharfman, International Security and Commerce Program Manager
Thomas H. Karas, Project Director
Michael Callaham
Richard DalBello
Gerald Epstein
Anthony Fainbergl
Robert Rochlin2
Alan Shaw
Contractors
Fredrick Drugan William Green Brian McCue
Administrative Staff
Jannie Coles Dorothy Richroath Jackie Robinson
ISince February 1985.
‘On detail from U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
Workshop on Soviet Military Doctrine and BMD (December 1984)
Raymond Garthoff Stephen Meyer
The Brookings Institution Center for International Studies
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Daniel Goure
Science Applications International Corp. Harriet Fast Scott
David Holloway Edward Warner
Center for International Security and The RAND Corp.
Arms Control
Stanford University
Participating Members of Advisory Panel
Marshall D. Shulman
Sayre Stevens
H. Guyford Stever
Contents
Chapter Page
I. Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Introduction... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3. Ballistic Missile Defense Then and Now . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
4. Deterrence, U.S. Nuclear Strategy, and BMD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
5. BMD Capabilities and the Strategic Balance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
6. Crisis Stability, Arms Race Stability, and Arms Control Issues . . .119
7. Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......139
8. Feasibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...197
9. Alternative Future Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .221
IO. Alternative R&D Programs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .239
Appendix
A. Ballistic Missile Defense and the ABM Treaty. ..., . . . . . . . . . .......263
B. Texts of the 1982 ABM Treaty, Its Agreed Interpretations,
and Its 1976 Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .272
C. Effects of BMD Deployment on Existing Arms Control Treaties . .283
D. Defense Requirements for Assured Survival . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...285
E. Defense Capability Levels and U.S. Strategy Choices . .............290
F. BMD and the Military Budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .292
G. Studies of the High Frontier Global Ballistic Missile Defense I. .. ....294
H. Excerpts From Statements on BMD by
Reagan Administration Officials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............297
I. List of Reagan Administration Statements on BMD, . . . . . . . .. ...308
J. Articles by Critics of the Strategic Defense Initiative. . .............310
K. Excerpts From Soviet Statements on BMD ., ., . . . . . . ..........312
L. References on Strategic Nuclear Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...,316
M. References on Soviet Strategic Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..320
N. Glossary of Acronyms and Terms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . .321
vi;
Chapter 1
Executive Summary
Page
The Presidential Challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
The BMD R&D Debate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Technical Feasibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Arms Control.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Alternative BMD Research Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Soviet BMD Research and Comparison With U.S. Research . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Issues for R&D Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1. Maintenance of the ABM Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2. Requirements for Arms Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3. Anti-Satellite Weapon Arms Control . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4. R&D/Deployment Coupling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5. Technology Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6. Research and Development of Offensive Forces . . 15
‘7. Relations With Allies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
8. Technology Transfer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Deployment Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
&it&ion 1: Potential Role in U.S. Nuclear Strategy 17
Criterion: Crisis Stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Criterion: Arms Race Stability and Arms Control. 22
Criterion: Diplomatic Stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Criterion: Feasibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Criterion: cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Concluding Remarks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Debated Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
OTA Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..,. . . . . . . . . . . 32
Table
Page
Table No.
I-I. Hypothetical Multi-Layered BMD System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Chapter 1
Executive Summary
THE PRESIDENTIAL CHALLENGE
President Reagan’s speech of March 23, missile defense technologies. This research
1983, renewed a national debate that had been program was called the “Strategic Defense
intense in the late 1960s but much subdued Initiative” (SDI).
since 1972. Wouldn’t the United States be
If there were a national consensus on the
more secure attempting to defend its national
role, if any, ballistic missile defense (BMD)
territory against ballistic missiles while the
should play in our national strategy, assess-
Soviet Union did the same? Or would it be
ing the likelihood of attaining the necessary
more secure attempting to keep such defenses
capabilities at an acceptable cost would be dif-
largely banned by agreement with the Soviet
ficult enough. There is extensive controversy
Union?
over the potential of various BMD technol-
The President posed the question, ogies and the possibilities for applying them
in affordable weapons systems that would be
What if free people could live secure in the
effective against a Soviet offensive threat which
knowledge that their security did not rest
includes countermeasures to our defenses. But
upon the threat of instant retaliation to de-
ter a Soviet attack, that we could intercept there is also extensive controversy over wheth-
and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before er various levels of ballistic missile defense ca-
they reached our own soil or that of our pability, if attainable, would be desirable. A
allies?’ fair assessment of the technological possibil-
ities must weigh them against a range of stra-
Calling upon the U.S. scientific community
" tegic criteria which are themselves matters of
. . . to give us the means of rendering these
controversy.
nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete, he
announced that he was This report is intended to illuminate, rather
than adjudicate, the BMD debate. It provides
. . . directing a comprehensive and inten-
more questions than answers. But the ques-
sive effort to define a long-term research and
development program to begin to achieve our tions will remain relevant in the years to come,
ultimate goal of eliminating the threat posed because their answers will affect national pol-
by strategic nuclear missiles. This could pave icies with or without ballistic missile defense.
the way for arms control measures to elimi- For the short term, the important questions
nate the weapons themselves. have to do with what kind of research the
United States should conduct on BMD and
After that speech the President ordered
with how future BMD technical possibilities
studies to explore further the promise of bal-
affect current offensive force planning and
listic missile defense, and in 1984 the Depart-
diplomatic activities. For the longer term, the
ment of Defense established an organization
important questions have to do with what
to expand and accelerate research in ballistic
kind of BMD we could reasonably expect to
deploy, whether we would want to, and what
‘Transcript of televised speech, Mar. 23, 1983. For text of
relevant passages, see app. H. the consequences might be.