background information, including actors of protection and internal relocation, Algeria, August

38 Pages·2017·0.39 MB·English

Country Policy and Information Note
Algeria: Actors of protection

Version 1.0
August 2020
Preface

Purpose
This note provides country of origin information (COI) and analysis of COI for use by
Home Office decision makers handling particular types of protection and human
rights claims (as set out in the Introduction section). It is not intended to be an
exhaustive survey of a particular subject or theme.
It is split into two main sections: (1) analysis and assessment of COI and other
evidence; and (2) COI. These are explained in more detail below.

Assessment
This section analyses the evidence relevant to this note – i.e. the COI section;
refugee/human rights laws and policies; and applicable caselaw – by describing this
and its inter-relationships, and provides an assessment of, in general, whether one
or more of the following applies:
• A person is reasonably likely to face a real risk of persecution or serious harm
• The general humanitarian situation is so severe as to breach Article 15(b) of
European Council Directive 2004/83/EC (the Qualification Directive) / Article 3 of
the European Convention on Human Rights as transposed in paragraph 339C
and 339CA(iii) of the Immigration Rules
• The security situation presents a real risk to a civilian’s life or person such that it
would breach Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive as transposed in
paragraph 339C and 339CA(iv) of the Immigration Rules
• A person is able to obtain protection from the state (or quasi state bodies)
• A person is reasonably able to relocate within a country or territory
• A claim is likely to justify granting asylum, humanitarian protection or other form
of leave, and
• If a claim is refused, it is likely or unlikely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’
under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.
Decision makers must, however, still consider all claims on an individual basis,
taking into account each case’s specific facts.

Country of origin information
The country information in this note has been carefully selected in accordance with
the general principles of COI research as set out in the Common EU [European
Union] Guidelines for Processing Country of Origin Information (COI), dated April
2008, and the Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and
Documentation’s (ACCORD), Researching Country Origin Information – Training
Manual, 2013. Namely, taking into account the COI’s relevance, reliability, accuracy,
balance, currency, transparency and traceability.
The structure and content of the country information section follows a terms of
reference which sets out the general and specific topics relevant to this note.

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All information included in the note was published or made publicly available on or
before the ‘cut-off’ date(s) in the country information section. Any event taking place
or report/article published after these date(s) is not included.
All information is publicly accessible or can be made publicly available, and is from
generally reliable sources. Sources and the information they provide are carefully
considered before inclusion. Factors relevant to the assessment of the reliability of
sources and information include:
• the motivation, purpose, knowledge and experience of the source
• how the information was obtained, including specific methodologies used
• the currency and detail of information, and
• whether the COI is consistent with and/or corroborated by other sources.
Multiple sourcing is used to ensure that the information is accurate, balanced and
corroborated, so that a comprehensive and up-to-date picture at the time of
publication is provided of the issues relevant to this note.
Information is compared and contrasted, whenever possible, to provide a range of
views and opinions. The inclusion of a source, however, is not an endorsement of it
or any view(s) expressed.
Each piece of information is referenced in a brief footnote; full details of all sources
cited and consulted in compiling the note are listed alphabetically in the bibliography.

Feedback
Our goal is to continuously improve our material. Therefore, if you would like to
comment on this note, please email the Country Policy and Information Team.

Independent Advisory Group on Country Information
The Independent Advisory Group on Country Information (IAGCI) was set up in
March 2009 by the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration to
support him in reviewing the efficiency, effectiveness and consistency of approach of
COI produced by the Home Office.
The IAGCI welcomes feedback on the Home Office’s COI material. It is not the
function of the IAGCI to endorse any Home Office material, procedures or policy.
The IAGCI may be contacted at:
Independent Advisory Group on Country Information
Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration
5th Floor
Globe House
89 Eccleston Square
London, SW1V 1PN
Email: [email protected]
Information about the IAGCI’s work and a list of the documents which have been
reviewed by the IAGCI can be found on the Independent Chief Inspector’s pages of
the gov.uk website.

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Contents
Assessment .............................................................................................................. 6
1. Introduction ...................................................................................................... 6
1.1 Scope of this note ..................................................................................... 6
2. Consideration of issues ................................................................................... 6
2.1 Credibility .................................................................................................. 6
2.2 Exclusion .................................................................................................. 6
2.3 Protection ................................................................................................. 6
Country information ................................................................................................. 9
3. Security apparatus ........................................................................................... 9
3.1 Police and paramilitary forces .................................................................. 9
3.2 Armed forces ............................................................................................ 9
3.3 Intelligence services ............................................................................... 10
4. Security forces’ capabilities ........................................................................... 11
4.1 Effectiveness .......................................................................................... 11
4.2 Response to violence against women .................................................... 11
4.3 Reporting an offence or complaint .......................................................... 12
4.4 Corruption ............................................................................................... 13
4.5 Impunity .................................................................................................. 14
4.6 Avenues of redress and human rights monitoring .................................. 15
5. Arrest and detention ...................................................................................... 17
5.1 Legal rights ............................................................................................. 17
6. Human rights abuses by security forces ........................................................ 18
6.1 Police abuses ......................................................................................... 18
6.2 Arbitrary arrest and detention ................................................................. 19
6.3 Enforced disappearances ....................................................................... 21
6.4 Extra-judicial killings ............................................................................... 22
6.5 Torture and ill-treatment ......................................................................... 22
7. Rule of law and the judiciary .......................................................................... 23
7.1 Criminal code and procedure ................................................................. 23
7.2 Organisation ........................................................................................... 24
7.3 Independence ......................................................................................... 25
7.4 Fair trial .................................................................................................. 26
7.5 Death penalty ......................................................................................... 28
Terms of Reference ................................................................................................ 29
Bibliography ........................................................................................................... 30

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Sources cited ........................................................................................................ 30
Version control ....................................................................................................... 32

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Assessment
Updated: 27 August 2020
1. Introduction
1.1 Scope of this note
1.1.1 Whether, in general, a person at risk of persecution and/or serious harm
from non-state actors and/or rogue state actors is able to obtain effective
state protection.
Back to Contents
2. Consideration of issues
2.1 Credibility
2.1.1 For information on assessing credibility, see the instruction on Assessing
Credibility and Refugee Status.
2.1.2 Decision makers must also check if there has been a previous application for
a UK visa or another form of leave. Asylum applications matched to visas
should be investigated prior to the asylum interview (see the Asylum
Instruction on Visa Matches, Asylum Claims from UK Visa Applicants).
2.1.3 Decision makers should also consider the need to conduct language
analysis testing (see the Asylum Instruction on Language Analysis).
Back to Contents
2.2 Exclusion
2.2.1 Decision makers must consider whether one (or more) of the exclusion
clauses applies. If the person is excluded from the Refugee Convention, they
will also be excluded from a grant of humanitarian protection. Each case
must be considered on its individual facts and merits.
2.2.2 For further guidance on the exclusion clauses and restricted leave, see the
Asylum Instructions on Exclusion under Articles 1F and 33(2) of the Refugee
Convention, Humanitarian Protection and Restricted Leave.
Back to Contents
2.3 Protection
2.3.1 Algeria has established a legal framework, including the Penal Code, the
code of criminal penal procedure and the code of civil procedure, for
penalising and handling criminal acts against individuals and groups (see
Rule of law and the judiciary).
2.3.2 The National Gendarmerie, which operates in rural areas, and the
Directorate General for National Security (DGSN) (the civilian national police
force) which operates in urban areas, with a total of over 330,000 personnel
are responsible for maintaining law and order. Algeria’s armed forces, the
Algerian People's National Army, is primarily responsible for the country’s
external security but is also responsible for some domestic security and is
reportedly the most influential political actor in Algeria. The Director of
Security Services is responsible for the country’s intelligence services and

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comprised of the Internal Security Directorate, the Documentation and
Security Directorate and the Technical Intelligence Directorate (see Security
apparatus).
2.3.3 There is limited information about the effectiveness of the police forces. The
USSD noted that the police are generally professional and responsive to
calls for assistance. However, sources report that the police have used
excessive force on some suspects and protestors. There are also low rates
of reporting and prosecution of violence against women owing in part to the
existence of forgiveness clauses (see Security forces’ capabilities).
2.3.4 The police have been accused of sometimes using excessive force in
dispersing protests, as well as arbitrary arrest and detention (most often
against protestors) and ill-treating detainees (see Arrest and detention and
Human rights abuses by security forces). Detainees are allowed to appeal
extended detentions, access a lawyer of their choice and the government
provides legal counsel to those who are destitute. Detainees also have a
legal right to request a medical examination on release (see Security forces
capabilities).
2.3.5 The government has committed to improving policing and has implemented
mechanisms to tackle this. The police and judges have received training
from the International Committee of the Red Cross on human rights
standards relating to arrest, detention, and interrogation procedures. The
National Council of Human Rights was created by the government to
investigate human rights violations within the judiciary and security forces.
However, there are reports that its members are not independent (see
Security forces capabilities). A person can file and report a complaint or an
offence against public officials. Although corruption and impunity for police
and security officials remain problematic, the government have reportedly
taken action against officials who have been accused of committing
violations and corruption – with a criminal prison sentence of 2 to 10 years.
(see Security forces and capabilities).
2.3.6 Algeria has an established legal system, including prosecution, courts,
sentencing and imprisonment, while the government has introduced
measures in recent years to reform and modernise the justice system.
However, the executive continues to exercise broad statutory powers over
the judiciary, including appointing by presidential decree, limiting its
independence (see Rule of law and the judiciary).
2.3.7 Based on the limited information on Algeria, it appears that the government
has taken reasonable steps to establish and operate an effective legal
system for the detection, prosecution and punishment of acts constituting
persecution, which is generally accessible. Where the person has a well-
founded fear of persecution from non-state actors, including ‘rogue’ state
actors, the person is likely, in general, to be able to obtain effective state
protection. Decision makers must consider each case on its facts, taking into
account the person’s background and profile and whether they have
previously sought protection and the outcome of this – noting that a person’s
reluctance to seek protection does not necessarily mean that effective
protection is not available. The onus is on the person to demonstrate why
the state would not be willing and able to provide effective protection.

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2.3.8 For further guidance on assessing the availability of state protection, see the
instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status.
Back to Contents

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Country information
Section 3 updated: 27 August 2020
3. Security apparatus
3.1 Police and paramilitary forces
3.1.1 According to the US State Department Country Report on Human Rights
Practices for 2019 (USSD Country Report for 2019):
‘The 130,000-member National Gendarmerie, which performs police
functions outside of urban areas under the auspices of the Ministry of
National Defence, and the approximately 200,000-member Directorate
General for National Security (DGSN) or national police, organised under the
Ministry of Interior, share responsibility for maintaining law and
order...Civilian authorities generally maintained effective control over the
security forces.’1
3.1.2 The USSD’s Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC) Algeria 2019
report stated:
‘The DGSN is the civilian police force largely responsible for cities and larger
urban areas. The DGSN falls under the Ministry of Interior, and is
responsible for police activities such as maintaining law and order,
conducting criminal investigations, combating terrorism and organised crime,
and routine police functions such as traffic control.
‘The National Gendarmerie force falls under the Ministry of National Defence
and is responsible for maintaining law and order and providing police
services in more rural areas. They play an important role in internal security
efforts in combating terrorism and organised crime. Algerian Customs works
closely with the police and gendarme at border points enforcing import laws
and regulations.’2
Back to Contents
3.2 Armed forces
3.2.1 The CIA World Factbook noted that Algeria’s armed forces consisted of the
Algerian People's National Army (ANP): Land Forces, Naval Forces
(includes coast guard); Air Forces; Territorial Air Defense Forces; and the
Republican Guard3. The USSD Country Report 2019 noted ‘The army is
responsible for external security, guarding the country’s borders, and has
some domestic security responsibilities...’4
3.2.2 Freedom House noted in its annual report, covering 2019 events, ‘Since
President Bouteflika’s resignation [April 2019], the military has maintained its
longstanding influence on decision-making, with army chief of staff General
Ahmed Gaïd Salah playing a key role until his death in December 2019. The

1 USSD, ‘Country Report for 2019’ (Executive Summary), 11 March 2020, url
2 USSD, OASC, ‘Algeria 2019 Crime & Safety Report’ (Police/Security Agencies), 14 March 2019, url
3 CIA World Factbook, ‘Algeria’ (Military and Security), updated 2 June 2020, url
4 USSD, ‘Country Report for 2019’ (Executive Summary), 11 March 2020, url

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military is the most influential political actor in Algeria, thanks to its lack of
accountability and vast resources.’5
3.2.3 Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index (BTI), a think-tank which
assesses the transformation toward democracy and a market economy as
well as the quality of governance in 137 countries, noted in its BTI 2020
Country Report for Algeria, covering the period 1 February 2017 to 31
January 2019, ‘… it is still felt that the “deep state” (i.e., the army and
security forces) seems to take all relevant decisions with little democratic
control. There is a total opacity as to who really governs the country.’6
3.2.4 The CIA World Factbook noted in regard to military conscription: ‘18 is the
legal minimum age for voluntary military service; 19-30 years of age for
compulsory service; conscript service obligation is 18 months (6 months
basic training, 12 months civil projects) (2018).’7 Further information on
National Service, including its definition, exemptions and deferrals, is
available on the website of the Ministry of National Defence. Also see the
Country Policy and Information Note: Algeria – Background Information
including Internal Relocation.
3.2.5 According to the 2020 Global Fire Power Index, Algeria’s military strength
was ranked 28th in the world out of 138 countries. The same source
estimated the total military strength to be 280,000 with 130,000 active
personnel and 150,000 reserves8.
Back to Contents
3.3 Intelligence services
3.3.1 The Department of Intelligence and Security, which was believed to hold the
reigns of power for decades9 was abolished in January 2016 and a new
agency, the Direction of Security Services (DSS), was created under the
control of the presidency10.
3.3.2 According to the BTI 2020 Country Report for Algeria: ‘The dissolution of the
military intelligence department, widely seen to interfere in the governing of
the country, as well as the passage of Constitutional reforms to limit the
Presidency and strengthen the legislature in 2016, was seen to indicate a
step in the right direction for the separation of powers in Algeria.’11
3.3.3 TRT World, the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation, noted in an April
2019 report, ‘According to Saphia Arezki, an Algerian historian, there no
longer exists a single and unified intelligence structure in Algeria, but rather
one that is composed of ‘three branches under the umbrella of the DSS’,
namely the Internal Security Directorate (ISD), the Documentation and
Security Directorate (DDSE) and the Technical Intelligence Directorate
(TRD).’12

5 Freedom House, ‘2020 Report’ (Section B3), 4 March 2020, url
6 Bertelsmann Stiftung, ‘BTI 2020 Country Report Algeria’ (page 16), 29 April 2020, url
7 CIA World Factbook, ‘Algeria’ (Military and Security), Updated 28 April 2020, url
8 Global Fire Power, ‘Algeria Military Strength (2020)’ (Manpower), n.d., url.
9 TRT World, ‘Algeria unseen: how the secret service kept the country hostage’, 8 April 2019, url
10 Reuters, ‘Algeria's Bouteflika dissolves DRS spy unit, creates new agency’, 25 January 2016, url
11 Bertelsmann Stiftung, ‘BTI 2020 Country Report Algeria’ (page 13), 29 April 2020, url
12 TRT World, ‘Algeria unseen: how the secret service kept the country hostage’, 8 April 2019, url

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