Baby Steps: Basic Income and the Need for Incremental Organizational Development

13 Pages·0.198 MB·English

BASIC INCOME STUDIES
An International Journal of Basic Income Research

Vol. 5, Issue 1 RESEARCH NOTE April 2010
Baby Steps: Basic Income and the Need for
Incremental Organizational Development*
Jason Burke Murphy
Saint Louis University
Abstract – Antipoverty movements have generated many “little” or “near” basic
income guarantee (BIG) proposals. Most theorists discussing BIG posit a full-fledged
universal grant that entirely satisfies the core value guiding their theory. Debates are
conducted about feasibility, desirability and rival values. This article looks into
particular considerations that need to be made when debating a little BIG. If a
“status” value, meaning “all or nothing,” is the core value under debate, then a grant
falling short of securing this status will need some other justification. If the core
value is “scalar,” meaning there can be more or less of it, then a lower grant can be
justified if it is an efficient way to add to that value. I offer two reasons that a little
BIG can have merit: 1. Organizations will benefit because the grant provides a clear
target for citizen action. 2. There are reasons to think that a BIG of whatever size will
promote organizational capabilities more efficiently than money coming from an
employer, family member or conditional public entitlement.
Keywords – basic income guarantee, BIG, capabilities, incremental change, Claus
Offe, organization, status freedom, Philippe Van Parijs, Karl Widerquist, Erik Olin
Wright.

* The author wishes to thank Karl Widerquist for indulging him in discussion very early in the history of this
work. He also wishes to thank organizers of the USBIG conference for providing such an important venue for
discussing serious approaches to poverty.
Copyright ©2010 The Berkeley Electronic Press. All rights reserved.
2 Basic Income Studies Vol. 5 [2010], No. 1, Article 7
My purpose here is to bring a core principle in community organizing – the need
for incremental victories – into the discussion surrounding the Basic Income
Guarantee (BIG). Organizers (or policy makers) must show members of the
organization (or the public) that it is possible to succeed. Pursuing smaller
victories forces members to learn how to organize and how to develop their own
capabilities.1 These victories, combined with further organizing, should enable
larger-scale goals to come into play later. Even organizations that seek a large-
scale goal need to have a chain of wins that leads toward that goal. For some
organizations terms like “win” and “victory” are analogies. For example, a
theater company may need to start small before it is ready to approach a more
ambitious project. Each stage of development is marked by a wider range of
capabilities for the organization and its members.
The movement for a basic income has produced many incremental
proposals.2 Most theoretical considerations of BIG posit a grant that is large
enough for the recipients to survive on. Many tie the amount to other standards.3
Little consideration is given to what to do with a “little BIG” that issues less than
the amount mandated by many theories.
In this article, I describe 1. what sets a little BIG and a near BIG apart from
some similar measures; and 2. two sorts of arguments for BIG – some of which
cite scalar value and others cite status value. A “scalar value” is one that can be
more or less the case: the temperature can be high or low or any degree between.
A “status value” is either/or: either the water is boiling or it is not. Political
conceptions can also be scalar or status based. I show why theorists focusing on a
status value have strong reason to explain the benefits of a little BIG. In Sections
3 and 4, I connect a BIG of whatever size to organizational development: I argue
that 1. a little BIG sets up a clear target for organizations to pursue – an increase
(the “targeting” benefit of a little BIG) in the size of the grant; and that 2. this

1 One of the best treatments of the community organizing tradition in the US is Payne (1995). The most widely
read guide to that tradition is Alinsky (1971). The need for organizations to concentrate on their development is
stressed throughout both works. For a statement on the role intellectuals can play in conjunction with
movement organizations, see Bourdieu (2001).
2 One can find such proposals in any of the news flashes put out by the Basic Income Earth Network
(www.basicincome.org). Some party platforms include small guaranteed incomes or propose programs that
begin as means tested with a stated plan to expand the program. Brazil’s Bolsa Familia now targets food
provisions where there is a diagnosis of need. That program is instituted by a law, which also empowers the
president to expand its provisions, with a BIG stated as its ultimate goal (Suplicy, 2005; 2007).
3 Philippe Van Parijs calls for the “highest sustainable basic income.” This is the largest provision that can be
continued over time, with that provision provided in-kind wherever that is most efficient (Van Parijs, 1995). He
doesn’t describe the differences in options that a little or near BIG would generate. Karl Widerquist seeks a
grant that empowers recipients to be able to exit cooperative arrangements, which he calls “effective control self
ownership” (Widerquist, 2006; 2008). These are not the same as a surviving wage and would likely be greater.
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Murphy: Basic Income and Incremental Organizational Development 3
smaller grant still promotes core capabilities that enable citizens to organize
around their desires and needs (the “organizational” benefit of a little BIG). If
this is right, then a little or near BIG poses an incremental victory for the basic
income movement and makes other movements possible.
1. Little BIG and Near BIG
The definitions of “little BIG” and “near BIG” are easy to anticipate. A little BIG
amount falls below that needed to satisfy one’s account of justice, equality, or
freedom. A near BIG program is income-like but restricted in the range of
spending. I am thinking here of credits or vouchers, which could be spent only
on whatever is judged appropriate by the issuing authority. These could include
child care, education, food, health care, or housing. If the provision renders all
recipients capable of participating in an important market, it merits the title of
“near BIG.” A title that could be applied to all the areas just listed might be hard
to distinguish in its effects from a full-fledged BIG.
When there is a government surplus, or as part of an economic stimulus
package, governments have issued tax rebates or forgiven particular debts.
Recently, President Obama issued a $500 payroll tax credit. This proposal and
many like it are not universal but rather are conditional on drawing a formal
wage from an employer. Such allocations, even if likely to be repeated, are
neither little nor near BIGs, precisely because there is no commitment to continue
issuing these credits.
While most actual proposals for a BIG start small, most theoretical
investigations of BIG do not. Something like the “highest sustainable basic
income” or a “livable basic income” is typically postulated for a discussion. In
some cases, the theory seeks to define an ideal and doesn’t speak of how to
understand nonideal proposals.4
This problem arises only for those who seek to say more about the effects of
a BIG beyond its direct increase in income for the least well-off, the average or
the majority. Many theoretical developments have given us good reason not to
reduce our judgments of policies and societies to calculations of income. Basic
goods, capabilities and opportunities are all distinct from income. Those who use

4 For example, Philippe Van Parijs calls for the “highest sustainable basic income.” This is the largest provision
that can be continued over time, with that provision provided in-kind wherever that is most efficient. He
doesn’t spend time describing the differences in options that a little or near BIG would generate. That said, Van
Parijs, like many BIG theorists, also advocates for gradual policy changes. In numerous interviews, he shows
that he understands that a BIG will be implemented gradually and he offers interesting analyses of ways
different countries may come close to a BIG (Van Parijs, 2002). He doesn’t treat this as a theoretical issue.
4 Basic Income Studies Vol. 5 [2010], No. 1, Article 7
rubrics like these in their political work would find only a small increase in
average or leximin income to be good if it, in turn, promoted these other values
more efficiently than other ways of spending the same amount of money. Later, I
explain why a BIG may have a positive effect on organizational capabilities that
would go beyond the effect an income increase from other sources might have.
My purpose is not to berate the many authors who have given interesting
accounts of what a BIG offers us politically. This is important in its own right,
and such work is separable from the work of laying out specific proposals. I just
want to see some bridge building between the small-scale proposals out there
and the visions offered us. For instance, I agree with Erik Olin Wright that a
sufficiently large BIG would constitute a “strike fund for all” with all the
interesting effects that he accords to such a fund (Wright, 2005). The question to
pose is if a fund half that size is worth the expense. If yes, is that because it
would increase the number of opportunities for people to resist or quit
uncooperative employers?
Claus Offe does more than most theoretical writers do when he lists ways in
which a BIG can start small and grow. He specifies in an earlier issue of this
journal that the term “Basic Income” applies to a “radical program” (Offe, 2008
p. 2) that “assures a secure subsistence that avoids poverty” (Offe, p. 2n2).
Between now and the reaching of this goal, there could be changes in generosity,
conditionality, targeting, and time (moving from old to young); and a program
could be tied to counter-cyclicality (initially an income would be guaranteed to
kick in when the labor market is poor). All five of these “gradients of output” are
only interesting to Offe as midpoints on a path to his endpoint, described as a
“radical program.” What is still missing is a description of how life would
change in a society while it issues a small-scale grant.
In some ways, it is easier to imagine winning the political struggle for a $100
per month BIG than a $1,000 per month BIG.5 If funding a BIG requires cutting
programs that are currently serving to promote capabilities, such as education
and health care, then the plan becomes harder to sell, whatever its size.6 There

5 Look at Schmitter and Bauer’s (2001) plan to establish a €1,000 per month BIG for every European who makes
less than a third of the average wage. The way to reach this amount is to cut all agricultural subsidies. Al
Sheahan makes a similar proposal for the US (Sheahan 2007). Surely adding a little BIG to the list of
government provisions without challenging such powerful interests would be easier. Of course, if the BIG
competes well over time, these subsidies and others would almost certainly decline.
6 This is the basis for Elizabeth Anderson’s and Ingrid Robeyn’s skepticism about Basic Income (Anderson,
2000; Robeyns, 2008). They both believe that such a provision would cut into the budgets of programs that will
be necessary for countering circumstances faced by those oppressed or denied democratic participation.
Robeyns directly addresses the issue of the effects of BIGs at different levels, “We need to be more specific
about the level of basic income, since different levels of basic income may plausibly have different effects on the
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Murphy: Basic Income and Incremental Organizational Development 5
are different ways to argue for a little BIG. One could say that income is income
and a little BIG is worth supporting just for that reason. Unions fight hard for
increases like $100 a month, and there have been campaigns for similar
minimum wage increases. In Sections 3 and 4, I explain why a little BIG would
go beyond a mere rise in income. There is something very different about being
able to rely on an income over time, independently of a bureaucrat’s
determination of need, an employer’s hope for profit, or a patron’s sense of
charity.
2. Status Value and Scalar Value
Of course, political theorists have many missions, but one of them is to give their
sense of what goals define the purpose of the state. For such theorists, BIG would
be a means by which their political goals are reached. For instance Van Parijs
seeks a leximin distribution of options and Karl Widerquist seeks effective
control self-ownership. Very few theorists have only one goal in mind, and Van
Parijs and Widerquist present more than one. But for both Van Parijs and
Widerquist, the goal defined in much of their work is also the goal that is most
decisive in pressing for a basic income. Their work provides examples here of
distinguishing between status value and scalar value.
Widerquist’s “Effective Control Self-Ownership” (ECSO, defined as “being
able to exit and form cooperative relationships”) is something you either have or
do not have (Widerquist, 2006, Chapter Two; 2008). At a particular moment, one
either has this sort of freedom and can thereby say yes or no to a relationship, or
one does not have this sort of freedom. A value is scalar if there can be more or
less of it. For instance, Van Parijs argues that a set of public policies is fair insofar
as it provides the highest sustainable basic income guarantee. He does not use
the term “scalar,” but we can reckon how fair a society is by assessing how high
this income (including in-kind) is and how high it can be (Van Parijs, 1995, p. 38).
Both Widerquist and Van Parijs offer arguments whereby a basic income
corresponds directly to the political value they hold most dear. An argument that
hangs on a scalar value has particularly strong reasons to address incremental
proposals. When a proposal only offers, say, half of the amount that would
guarantee a status for recipients, there is a problem. The value could be merely

gendered distributions of income, labour market participation, and the intra-household divisions of caregiving”
(Robeyns, 2008, p. 4). In this article, I give some reasons to add general organizational capabilities to this list.
She cites earlier empirical research as confirming the costs that concern her (Robeyns, 2007). In the course of this
article, I cannot confirm or deny the effect funding BIG would have on other programs and their effect on
communication and other capabilities.
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that it sets the stage for a future victory in which this status is attained. This
would make it hard to convince someone to support the policy if they doubt the
next step is possible. If one has a small grant without ECSO freedom, then one
may not have the ability to withdraw from relationships that are costly. Thus,
some people may lose their grant. This is a matter for empirical research.7
A scalar account is understood as choosing the public policy that offers the
most possible amount of a value. This means that a small basic income is only a
problem if the funding could have more efficiently promoted that value
elsewhere. If the goal is to just promote a value as much as possible,
independently of attaining any particular status, then a small amount of progress
is always better than nothing.
This is not an argument in favor of either account. I only argue that there is a
particular concern when evaluating policy consequences in terms of status.
Those who argue for BIG based on a status value have a particularly strong need
to explain the consequences of a lower-than-status BIG.
3. Targeting Benefits of a BIG
Taking a different tack, a small BIG is important organizationally because it
provides a political map for those who seek a larger one – even unto a livable
basic income or the maximum sustainable one. This movement will be composed
of organizations that can fight to raise the BIG just like many now fight to raise
the minimum wage. Such a movement would offer something for egalitarians
who are suspicious of bureaucracy. It would also be open to support from people
with very different ideas of what government should do alongside a BIG. Those
on the right who see BIG as a way to buy out of existing government provisions
would have a different map in hand. An organized movement could seek
amendments to proposals cutting expenditures that would move some of the
saving over to a BIG. All this happens before a BIG is in play that is high enough
to support a livelihood.
Little BIGs and near BIGs keep popping up as policy proposals. For
example, US presidential candidate John McCain proposed a $2,500 annual tax
credit to be spent only on medical insurance. One is tempted to point out how
little coverage such a credit would provide. The question for us ought to be: is
this credit the sort of thing that can be developed into something like a universal

7 A small grant may be understood as increasing the number of instances in which one has the capability of
withdrawing from a relationship. This would make ECSO freedom scalar over time (diachronically), while not
scalar at any one point (synchronically).
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grant? The fact that one can operate with this provision in an important market
independently of a needs test makes it a near BIG. Most theoretical responses
from BIG theorists describe such credits as paternalistic inasmuch as they decide
ahead of time what is good for people. Does that disqualify them as part of a
transitional program? Wherever one of these credits passes, what can we do to
better know its effect on recipient capabilities?
4. Organizational Benefits of a BIG
Much could be said in laying out organizational benefits that could be derived
from a little BIG.8 Many of these benefits are described in the literature that posits
a large BIG. For example, laborers would have more capabilities to sustain
themselves between jobs. As Erik Olin Wright points out, this would mean more
people more often would be able to leave a workplace if they object to conditions
or salary (Wright, 2005).
A BIG would advance citizens’ capabilities in the same way as would a wage
increase. But it would also work beyond those effects by virtue of the fact that is
guaranteed for citizens as such. A little BIG will, to a small extent, lessen the
damage (and the threat thereof) that an employer or head of household can
wreak. Even a good and kind boss or breadwinner ought to be limited in the
negative impacts they could foist on the supervised or dependent. Philip Pettit
makes this point as he presents how important it is that no one have the power to
dominate anyone else. Such power has a corrupting effect on political equality
and liberty even if it is never exercised (Pettit, 1997; 2007).
The other capability benefits can also be seen as organizational ones. So
much of the work of humanity is wrought by organizations that depend on
volunteers who do not work full-time in the formal labor market. Here, I am not
speaking only of political organizations. One should look at the gamut of
organizations – ranging from book clubs, to churches, to Veterans’ Centers, to
feminist consciousness raising sessions. A lot of volunteers come in because they
love the mission of the organization but pull out because they need to find
money. Many workers in the caring and helping fields, such as home health care
workers and teachers, leave simply because the formal labor market doesn’t pay
them enough money. The same applies to those who work in arts or crafts. With
a little BIG, the pool of such workers will increase and more organizations will
either have free labor or be able to get by with paying less.

8 See Noguchi and Lewis (2004). This article finds reasons to believe that an increase in leisure time will result in
greater development of important social institutions. The size of the grant is not discussed.
8 Basic Income Studies Vol. 5 [2010], No. 1, Article 7
These claims about capability promotion must be kept modest or they will
seem naïve. Some artists and organizers will be buoyed as a little BIG works
alongside small grants or small profits gained from each work they put out.
Amounts of art-based or organizing-based income that were insufficient could
become sufficient. Artists can commit themselves to business ventures like
galleries and studios with a little more credit than before. Likewise, organizers
will be more capable of pooling resources early in their work. These fields have
always included people who were willing to live very sparely in order to pursue
art, music, political activism, or theater (Payne, 1995). That work has often been
funded by part-time labor, fundraising or family bequests. A BIG would increase
the numbers of those who can take that option and those who would prefer that
option to others now better compensated by markets. Organizations like these do
more than one may initially think. Besides the economic and political roles for
which they get credit, they make communication possible (Warren, 2001). They
provide the locations where people can exchange arguments and narratives.
These conversations and debates make it possible for listeners and participants to
put together their own understanding of the world and how it can be fair or
good.
Also, importantly, this income has a different effect on one’s capabilities
than income that is at the behest of an employer, spouse, other family member,
or a bureaucrat. One can exit a circumstance and know that this income follows.
That is different from employment or family income. Shelters now house people
who have no income. Even a minimal rent taken from a little BIG would increase
their capacities greatly. Shelters would also have an easier time developing their
clients’ capabilities, if those clients will have money without their spouses’
support and before an employer or bureaucrat confers them with funding.
Much of the capability to capture the income of the poor could be trumped
by the organizations that would benefit from a BIG. Tenants’ organizations,
unions, consumer groups, and watchdog organizations are some examples. The
likelihood of capture and the need to prevent this are to be determined
empirically. If such organizations have access to more volunteers and more staff,
those whose power rests primarily on money will have a more difficult time.
This would mean that a little or near BIG would still supplement current sources
of “communication capability” (my term) even as most recipients will need to
compete politically with those who can also mobilize their money. Without there
being a capacity to organize, high amounts of income could be captured through
rents and pricing. This is one reason a BIG cannot wholly replace many public
programs that are cultural, educational, and political.
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I’ve said less about the near BIG in this context. If a voucher covered
something as vital as food or health care, then almost every organization would
be able to hold on to more employees who would be less likely to need to find an
employer that provides more income or health coverage. Income may be more
flexible but a near BIG may be more likely to gain political support. One could
imagine a single credit that can go to many different purposes such as food,
shelter, education, child care, health, etc. Organizations could fight to expand the
range of options as they fight to increase the amount.
If these organizational benefits are sufficient, they can provide answers to
common objections to BIG. There have been many objections, most famously that
of John Rawls, which argue that those who pay into the fund for BIG are
exploited by anyone who lives by that fund without contributing to society
(Rawls, 1996, pp. 181–182n9). Rawls seems to believe that any degree or sort of
exploitation in a public policy disqualifies that policy. Stuart White points out
that there may be instances in which a policy leaves fewer people exploited (and
to a lesser degree) than other policy option or no policy at all. If the “balance of
fairness” is such that fewer people are exploited (or such that the harshness of
exploitation is limited) then a policy could be just despite the exploitation of
some (White, 2006, p. 4-6). Similarly a basic income might “bring society closer to
meeting the demands of reciprocity” even if some people are able to exploit the
income9 (White, 2006, p. 6).
One concern is that those with considerable resources will still be able to
capture the income of low-income BIG recipients. This would render a little or
near BIG much less efficient. This would provide a strong argument for not
supporting a BIG until a status value is obtained. Of course, a large BIG (one that
attains what Widerquist would call “Effective Control Self Ownership”) would
promote the capability to deny bad offers much more than would any lower
amount. The question is whether a little or near BIG is a step forward or a
distraction from the real goal.
The possibility of capture only shows that a government (and a civil society)
is not finished once a BIG is allocated. Protection from force and fraud remain
important. Furthermore, the capabilities needed to assess different accounts of
the fair, good, and true will require more than just economic independence.
Education, free time, and public media will also be important. Some BIG

9 White also cites another plausible counter to the exploitation objection – a basic income may exploit no one if it
is drawing from “inherited assets” (White, 2006, p. 8–13). White lays out questions that supporters of BIG need
to answer. Concerns about exploitation lead White to argue that there should be some conditions for a
guaranteed income. To use his example, if school attendance increases equality of opportunity, there are good
reasons to make an income conditional upon it. (White, 2006, p. 15)
10 Basic Income Studies Vol. 5 [2010], No. 1, Article 7
proponents seek to replace these measures with an income guarantee but that
will not do.
Second, much of the capability to capture the income of the poor can be
trumped by the organizations that would benefit from a BIG. This returns us to
the importance of the organizational impact of a BIG. Tenant’s organizations,
unions, consumer groups, and other watchdog organizations are some relevant
examples. If they have access to more volunteers and more staff, those whose
power rests primarily on money will have a more difficult time.10 This would
mean that a little or near BIG would still supplement current sources of
communication capability even as they face those who can mobilize their money.
The capacity to organize is one protection among many against capture through
rents and pricing as well as force and fraud.
5. Conclusion
At the USBIG conference in 2005, Al Sheahan and Karl Widerquist presented the
“Tax Cut for the Rest of Us Act” (Sheahan and Widerquist, 2005). The act was
sponsored by Representative Robert Filmer, who became sympathetic to the idea
of a BIG while working in the US civil rights movement in the 1960s.11 The
beauty of this act is in its incremental character, which would make few
alterations in the forms that US citizens fill out when they pay their income tax.
The act would simply add a line or two to the federal tax form. Instead of the
standard deduction, this credit would grant all adults using the form $2,000 and
all children $1,000. Sheahan and Widerquist (2005) point out that funding could
be covered by reversing the tax cuts implemented by the Bush administration.

10 When talking about organizational development as the prime mission for public actors, I am often confronted
with the fact that many organizations have bad aims. Space only permits the following: 1. Faith in the public’s
capability to form organizations to discover needs, communicate, and develop ways to answer those needs runs
parallel to faith in constitutional democracy. It is hard to imagine a functioning democracy without such
organizations. 2. Capable organizations make demands upon one another that render persuasion a more
attractive alternative to force than would be the case with fewer capable organizations at hand. This makes
money and power more accountable.
11 The act only gained one more sponsor despite hard work on Al Sheahan’s part. A basic income movement is
only beginning to take hold in the US, where no political party wants to be seen taxing the middle class to give
away free money. Also, large organizations that could someday be supporters of BIG have yet to make it a
priority. For a description of Washington’s resistance to BIG, see Sheahan, 2007. Sheahan also documents his
own use of the bill as a means of speaking with around a hundred policy makers ranging from congressional
staffers to political organizations. While Sheahan voices frustration, he shows the value of seeking an
incremental victory. For an explanation of how a basic income was almost implemented and was ultimately
defeated during the Nixon and Carter years, see Steensland (2008).
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