B-52 Crash at Fairchild AFB

30 Pages·2006·2.05 MB·English

Department of
Leadership and Ethics
Academic Year 2001
Syllabus and Readings, Book 1
-
Gen Billy Mitchell Capt Lance Sijan -
Air War College
United States Air Force
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama
Some of this material is copyrighted.
Used by permission for academic use only
during Civil Air Patrol's
National Staff College.
Anv other use is ~rohibited.
(2,OCS) Leadership and Ethics IP 6208
Title: Command Responsibility, Accountability, and Discipline: Part 1-6-52
A man can be selfish, cowardly, disloyal, false, fleeting, perjured, and morally corrupt in a wide
variety of other ways and still be outstandingly good in pursuits in which other imperatives
bear than those upon the fighting man. He can be a superb creative artist, for example, or a
scientist in the very top flight, and still be a very bad man. What the bad man cannot be is a
good sailor or soldier, or airman. Military institutions thus form a repository of moral resource
that should always be a source of strength within the state.
-Sir John Winthrop Hacken, Harmon Lecture
Introduction: Over the past few years a number of incidents reflected unfavorably an the USAF.
These incidents include unauthorized use of government aircraft, promotion board improprieties,
sexual misconduct by senior officers, the B-52 crash at Fairchild, the shoot down of the Black Hawks
in Iraq, and the T-43 accident at Dubrovnik. Only one captain was held accountable under the UCMJ
for his role in the shoot down of the two U.S. Army helicopters in Iraq in April 1994. On 20 June 1995,
he was acquitted of any wrongdoing. You can contrast this finding (and reluctance to assign
accountability?) with the trial of Japanese General Tomoyuki Yamashita following World War II.
General Yamashita was charged with dereliction of duty after his troops committed brutal atrocities
against U.S. soldiers and allied civilians. He was found guilty and hanged even though he had no
knowledge of the crimes at the time and probably would have taken action to stop the atrocities had
he known about them.
This IP touches on issues of law, ethics, morality, leadership, command, and professionalism. General
Foglernan emphasized the Core Values, and that they apply equally to all members of the Air Force
family-officer, enlisted, and civilian. Has the Air Force drifted away from these values over the past
few years? Are we holding each member of the "Air Force family" to the same standards? What
standards of discipline and accountability are appropriate for senior officers today?
The first reading is a synopsis of the Aircraft Accident Investigation Formal Report. The second
reading offers a junior officer's analysis of the accident and the issues surrounding it. Both readings
were re.searchedf rom the same evidence and testimony with somewhat different conctusions
Lesson Objective: Analyze the extent to which senior officers are accountable for incidents taking
place during their command. CV-Integrity, Service before Self, Excellence; PJELA-4,5 (SUPPORTED)
Desired Learning Outcomes:
I.A ppraise the standards of integrity, conduct, and discipline to which senior officers should be held.
2. Assess the senior officer's competing loyalty to the individual versus loyalty to the institution.
3, Contrast the often-conflicting principles of the legal rights of the individual and the professional
responsibility of senior officers.
-
,
4. Assess the leadership responsibilities at the different levels within the chain of command.
5. Apply Air Force Core Values to operational leadership.
Questions for Study and Discussion:
1. What senior leadership and ethical issues are raised by the 8-52 crash at Fairchild? How do we
prevent a recurrence?
2. What USAF Core Values are relevant to the case cited above?
3. Were the disciplinary actions toward the Air Force officers involved in the accident appropriate?
Why or why not?
4. Is this a one-mistake Air Force? If not, should it be? Are there different standards for senior
officers?
5. Where is the traditional military service "belly button" for accountability?
6. The Fairchild B-52 crash illustrates failures of command responsibility, accountability, and
discipline that resulted in a loss of lives, Have other similar command or leadership failures occurred
which, although they may not have involved aircrew personnel or resulted in a loss of lives, did result
in a significant loss of readiness or resources?
Assigned Readings:
1. "B-52 Crash at Fairchild," Case Study, CADRE, Maxwell AFB AL, 1998, 7 pp.
2. Kern, Maj Tony, "Darker Shades of Blue: A Case Study of Failed Leadership," 1995, 34 pp.
3. Widnall, Sheila E., and Ronald R. Fogleman, "Core Values," AU-24, p. 73. (Issued separately)
4. Loh, John Michael, "The Responsibility of Leadership in Command," AU-24, pp. 81-82.
(Issued separately)
5. Schmitt, Lt Col Mike, "Six Cardinal Rules of Accountability in the Era of Core Values," The lnspector
General Brief, January-February 1996, pp. 8-1 1.
Suggested Readings:
Builder, Carl H., The lcarus Syndrome (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, ?994), pp. xiii-xix,
pp. 3-37.
Chaloupka, Mel G., "Ethical Responses: How to Influence One's Organization," Naval War College
Review, Winter 1987, pp. 80-90.
Gabriel, Richard A., To Serve With Honor (Westport CT: Greenwood Press, Inc., 1982), pp. 175-205.
Hirschman, Albert O., Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and
States (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1970).
Johnson, Kermit D., "Ethical Issues of Military Leadership," Parameters, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1974, pp. 35-39,
AU-24, pp. 102-105.
Mann, Edward C, Ill., Thunder and Lightning (Maxwell AFB AL: Air University Press, 19951, pp. ix-8.
Reynolds, Richard T., Heart of the Storm (Maxwell AFB AL: Air University Press, 1995), pp. 7 1-94.
Toner, James H., True Faith and Allegiance: The Burden of Military Ethics (Lexington KY: Universir.
Press of Kentucky, 1995), pp. 22-95.
B-52 Crash at Fairchild AFB
Event Description On downwind, the aircraft's landing gear was
extended and then a descending 90 degree turn
On 24 June 1994, Czar 52, a 0-52H assigned to
was executed to a base leg. Another descending
the 325th Bomb Squadron, 92d Bomb Wing,
left turn to a final heading down the runway 05
Fairchild AFB, Washington, launched at approxi-
was completed and the aircraft leveled off at ap-
mately 1400 hrs local time to practice maneuvers
proximately 50-100 feet above the ground. The
for an upcoming base open house and air show.
airspeed for this demonstration was below that
The crew of four was very experienced in the
normally used for final approach, but greater
6-52 and included as pilot the Chief of Wing Slan-
than that for landing. Midfield down the runway,
dardization and Evaluation' (5000 hours in the
the aircraft gear was retracted and a steeply
B-52), as co-pilot the 325th Bomb Squadron
banked (approximately 60 degrees of bank) turn
Commander (2800 hours), as radar navigator the
to the left was initiated. After 90 degrees of this
325th Bomb Squadron Operations Officer (2900
left turn, the aircraft was rolled out and then
hours), and as an observer in the instructor pilot
turned back to the right 90 degrees to a modified
seat the 92nd Bomb Wing Vice Commander
downwind leg for runway 23. The aircraft then
(3200 hours}. Following a maximum thrust (TRT)
turned right to a base leg and then right again to
takeoff on runway 23, the aircraft performed a
set up a low approach to runway 23. The aircraft
climbing 360 degree turn around the control
then accomplished a low speed approach (esti-
tower with flaps down. 45 to 60 degrees of bank
mated at 150 knots airspeed) at an altitude of less
were used. After completing the 360 degree turn,
than 200 feet above the ground. At the end of the
the aircraft turned right to a heading approxi-
runway a large amount of power was added and
mately 30 degrees off the runway 23 heading,
the aircraft made a steeply banked (approxi-
continued to climb, and retracted flaps. The air-
mately 80 degrees), climbing right turn. Part way
craft then turned left and descended for a low alti-
around the turn the aircraft entered a partially
tude (estimated at less than 500 feet above the
stalled condition and began a tail first slide, los-
ground), medium speed (estimated 250-270
ing approximately 100 feet of altitude.
knots airspeed) pass down the runway (runway
As the aircraft rolled out approaching a down-
05) perpendicular to the one used for takeoff. Af-
wind heading the stall was broken and the climb
ter completing this pass the aircraft turned left
to pattern altitude (1200 feet above ground level)
approximately 30 degrees, using 45 degrees of
was continued to set up for a landing approach to
bank angle, to set up for a high speed approach
runway 23. This was to be the end of the planned
to runway 23 (the runway used for takeoff).
air show profile. After rolling out on final to run-
The aircraft then turned further left to line up
way 23, a go-around was executed because an-
with the runway 23, accelerated to approximately
other aircraft was on the runway. The landing
370 knots of airspeed, and at midfield initiated a
gear was raised, but flaps remained down. The
pull up to approximately 60 degrees nose high,
aircraft then turned slightly left to offset from the
This high pitch angle climb was held for 24 sec-
runway and a 360 degree turn around the control
onds until the aircraft reached approximately
tower was requested. The tower acknowledged
9000 feet above the ground where a low-G push-
the request, but did not specifically clear the air-
over was executed. The aircraft then turned to
craft for this rnaneciver. During this go-around
offset to the right before beginning a descending
the aircraft maintained approximately 250 feet
left teardrop to make a pass down runway 05 at
above ground level and 170-180 knots of air-
I200 feet above ground level. At the end of the
speed. As the aircraft passed in front of the lower
runway, the aircraft started a lett turn, extended
a level left turn was begun and a small amount of
flaps, and rolled out on a downwind leg to set up
additional thrust added.
a landing attitude demonstration.
Reprinted from Case Study: 8-52 Crash at Fairchild AFB. 1998, 7 pp. Published 1998 by CADRE, Maxwell AFB AL.
277
As the aircraft rolled into the left turn, the pitch ing the Federal Aviation Administration [FAA) re-
angle was increased, bringing the aircraft's nose stricts aircraft to a minimum altitude of 500 feet
slightly above the horizon. Initial bank angle was above ground level. The Air Force authorizes a
greater than 70 degrees and increased to past 70 lower altitude of 250 feet for flyovers if approved
degrees after accompfishing 60 to 90 degrees of by the FAA and approved by Major Command
the turn. At this point the aircraft again entered a (MAJCOM) headquarters. No approval was re-
partially stalled condition and experienced an- quested or granted by either agency for this
other tail slide, losing 50 to 100 feet of altitude. flight. FAA and AF regulations also prohibits the
The aircraft then relied out to approximately 45 operation of aircraft below 10,000 feet at speeds
degrees angle of bank, which broke the stall and greater than 250 knots indicated airspeed without
arrested the descent. No additional power was waivers and MAJCOM approval. The high pitch
added and the aircraft was now flying slower angle climb performed in the profile is defined as
than the 17&180 knots at the start of the turn. an acrobatic maneuver and such maneuvers are
The aircraft was then again rolled to approxi- prohibited in air traffic control zones without FAA
mately 90 degrees of bank, entering a stalled con- and MAJCOM approval. Aerobatics are also pro-
dition once more, and its nose began to drop. hibited by the B-52 Pilot's Flight Manual.
The pilot did attempt to bring the right wing Immediately following the accident, a letter was
down and roll out. This effort failed and the bank sent by a former associate of one of those killed
angle actually increased as the nose continued to in the accident to the commander of Air Combat
drop. The aircraft impacted the ground at 150 Command alleging a repeated history of flight
knots of airspeed and 95 degrees of bank. 'The co- discipline violations by Lt Col Holland and a re-
pilot attempted ejection but was out of the enve- fusal by senior leaders within the 92nd Bomb
lope and the ejection sequence was interrupted Wing to discipline this pilot. The accident investi-
by ground impact. All four crew members were gation panel then conducted an inquiry covering
killed int he crash. The flight lasted approximately the previous three year period to determine the
18 minutes. veracity of these claims and the extent any prob-
lems. The investigation revealed a continuing
The Crash Investigation
pattern of flight discipline breaches by Lt Col Hol-
The accident investigation eliminated mainte- land. Over the same three year period the wing
nance, weather and crew medical conditions as leadership took no significant corrective action or
factors in this crash. The focus became the air- in any way documented breaches of the rules by
manship and flying behavior of the crew. The Lt Col Holland.
question remained, why did four very experi- The failure to document any of the actions
enced crew members fly a fully mission capable against or problems with It Col Holland meant
B-52H into the ground? The accident investiga- that in a period of great transition in the wing
tion established that the pilot was flying the air- (four wing commanders, three vice wing com-
craft at time of impact and that the air show manders, three ops group commanders, and five
profile flown violated regulatory provisions, flight sql~adronc ommanders in a three year period)
manual guidance and directions from the wing .there was no "memory" by which to measure the
commander. During the accident profile, restric- repeated flight discipline violations. In addition,
tions on bank angles, altitude minimums, air- the wing leadership was unfamiliar with regula-
speed restrictions, and aircraft aerobatics were tions concerning air shows as well as the basic
violated. The Pilot's flight Manual for the 5-52H flight procedures contained in the 0-52 pilot's
specifies that the maximum bank angle for cir- manual and appropriate ACC regulations. This ig-
cling or visual approaches in the pattern to be 30 norance of the rules and procedures prevented
degrees. Bank angles greater than 30 degrees are the wing leadership from recognizing air disci-
considered to be "steep turns." Steep turns pline violations and in several cases led to wing
should not exceed 50 degrees angle of bank jeadership apparently approving illegal maneu-
maximum and will not be accomplished at alti- vers and profiles.
tudes less than 1000 feet above ground level ac-
cording to Air Combat Command Regulation 51-
50 Volume 22, B-52 Aircrew Training and Air
Combat Command Regulation 55-15 2,B-52 Op-
erating Procedures. Except for takeoff and land-
Background proval. Col Ruotsala testified he believed the ex-
hibition to be in compliance with applicable
Events Related to tt Cot Holland's
MAJCOM policies. However, the wing assistant
Airmanship and Flight Discipline deputy commander for operations (Col Capo-
In May 1991, Lt Col Holland flew the 8-52 exhi- tost I) saw the exhibition and was concerned with
bition at the 1991 Fairchild AFB air show. During the profile. Seven days later, Col Capotostl be-
this show high-banked turns (excess of 30 de- came the 92nd Ops Group Commander and
grees of bank) and a high pitch angle (over 45 de- called Lt Col Holland into his office. At this meet-
grees) climb were executed. In addition, part of a ing Col Capotostl told Lt Col Holland that he was
high-bankedt urn was flown over the crowd. Nei- never going to fly in another air show as long as
ther the wing commander nor the ops group Col Capotostl was the ops group commander.
commander (equivalent)w ere aware that this ex- Col Capotostl also told Lt Col Holland that any fu-
hibition profile violated FAA regulations, ture violation of flying regulations would result in
MAJCOM directives, and flight manual proce- permanent grounding. Col Capotostl communi-
dures. cated this position to his deputy Lt Col Harper.
Two months later, in July 1991, Lt Col Holland But Col Capotostl did not comrnurricate this deci-
flew a B-52 fly over for a 325th Bomb Squadron sion or his opinion of the air show profile to Col
change of command ceremony. The aircraft flew Ruotsala. Nor did he document any of these deci-
over the ceremony formation at a height of less sions or opinions in Lt Col Holtand's records.
than 500 feet above ground. One observer esti- In April 1993, Lt Col Holland was mission com-
mated that the pass was between 100 and 200 mander for a two aircraft Global Power mission
feet above the ground. Earlier in the day several to the bombing range located in the Medina De
passes were practiced that also appeared to be at Farallons, a small island chain off the coast of
an altitude of less than 500 feet. One pass in- Guam. During the mission, close visual formation
cluded a steep banked turn (over 45 degrees of was .flownt o take pictures. This type of formation
bank) and another ended with a high pitch angle was prohibited by Air Combat Command for
climb followed by a wingover. Scheduling a fly 6-52s. Later in this mission Lt Col Holland permit-
over at a change of command required Vice Chief ted a crew member to leave the main crew com-
of Staff of the Air Force approval. It was not re- partment and take up a position near the bomb
quested. The bank, pitch angles and wingover bay access door to take a video of the bomb bay
maneuvers violated pilot manual guidance and while live munitions were released on a target.
the passes below 500 feet disobeyed FAA regula- The 92nd Bomb Wing commander, Brig Gen
tions. Both the wing commander and the ops Richards was never informed of the actions that
group commander (equivalent) were present at occurred during the flight. Col Capotostl did not
the fly over and though their testimony to the ac- recall being made aware of these events. How-
cident investigation board indicated some con- ever his deputy, Lt Cot Harper, did become aware
cern over the very low altitude of the fly over, no of the flight's events sometime aherwards and
further investigation was conducted, no actions believes he did discuss them with Co4 Capotostl.
were documented, and nothing was annotated in In addition, Lt Col Bullock, the commander of the
the pilot's permanent training or qualification 325th Bomb Squadron at the time, remembers
folders. some discussion of impromptu flight activity;
Ten months later, in May 1992, Lt Col Holland however he did not learn (nor did he attempt to
again flew the B-52 exhibition at Fairchild AFB learn) specifically what happened and who was
open house. A new wing commander, Col Ruot- involved. No action was taken concerning these
sala, was unfamiliar with the previous incidents. events and nothing appears in Lt Col Holland's
The profile for this show included low altitude records. 1
steep turns (greater than 45 degrees of bank) and In May 1993, Cot Capotostl was reassigned and
a high speed pass down the runway followed by left the base before the new 92nd Ops Group
a steep pitch angle climb and a wingover. A Stan Commander, Col Pellerin, arrived in June. Colo-
Eval flight commander who witnessed the exhibi- nets Capotostl and Pellerin were never able to
tion described the maneuvers as "a little bit in- meet and discuss personnel in the group. Lt Cof
sane." At a minimum this profile violated flight Harper, the deputy group commander, did re-
manual procedures and would have required main in his position to provide continuity.
Strategic Air Command [SAC) headquarters ap-
In August 1993, Lt Col Holland again flew the he was not aware ofth e events on the range until
8-52 exhibition for the Fairchild AFB open house. tt Col McGeehen brought them to his attention.
A crew member on the flight described the pro- In explaining his actions to Col Pellerin, Lt Col
file as being flown with extreme aggressiveness. Holland claimed to be demonstrating the capa-
The flight profile included turns with very steep bilities of the aircraft. Col Pellerin verbally repri-
bank angles, over 45 degrees of bank, at very low manded Lt Col Holland, calling the actions at the
altitudes, less than 500 feet above ground level. bombing range a breach of air discipline. Lt Col
The exhibition also included a high speed pass Holland assured Col Pellerin that there would be
down the runway followed by a steeply pitched no further violations of air regulations. Cot Pel-
climb ending with a wingover. The airspeed at lerin denied Lt Col McGeehan's request that Lt
the beginning of the climb was 390 knots and the Col Holland be grounded. Col Pellerin testified
pitch angle was estimated to be between 60 and that he was unaware that another member of the
80 degrees nose high. ACC approval was re- crew had to intervene to prevent an accident and
quired for this exhibition, but it had not been never did see (or ask to see) the videotape of the
asked for or granted. The Bomb Wing com- mission. Lt Col McGeehen did not pursue the is-
mander, Brig Gen Richards, testified that he sue with wing or MAJCOM leadership. However,
looked to his Ops Group commander, Col Pel- tt Cot McGeehen did decide to fly with Lt Col Hol-
lerin, to ensure that the exhibition was in compli- land anytime he flew, rather than expose young
ance with appropriate ACC and FAA regulations. merrlbers of the crew force to his poor airman-
Cot Pellerin testified that he counted on Lt Col ship. Col Pellerin did not inform the wing com-
Holland to coordinate with the appropriate mander, Col (Brig Gen select) Brooks, of Lt Col
authorities. It appears that no one in the wing Holland's actions at the range and nothing was
command structure realized that the profile vio- annotated in Lt Col Holland's records.
lated ACC, FAA, and flight manual guidance. Some time in the April-May 1994 time frame the
In March 1994, Lt Cot Holland flew a single ship 92nd Air Refueling Squadron Flight Surgeon, be-
mission to the Yakima Bombing Range to drop came concerned when he heard that Lt Col Hol-
practice munitions and provide an authorized land would be .flying the B-52 exhibition at the
photo opportunity for a freelance author. During 1994 Fairchild AFB open house. 'The flight sur-
this mission the aircraft repeatedly ftew closer to geon had on at least one occasion been informed
the ground than the minimum 500 feet above by a patient that the patient would not fly with Lt
ground level specified in ACC, regulations. The Col Holland because of Lt Cot Holland's overly
aircraft consistently crossed ridge lines at less aggressive flying. The flight surgeon expressed
than this rrlinimum altitude. The lowest crossing these concerns to the Chief of Wing Safety. How-
altitude was estimated at less than 30 feet. A ever, Lt Col Pellerin told the flight surgeon that Lt
member of the crew believed that if he had not in- Col Holland was a good pilot and that the rnaneu-
tervened and demanded a climb, and then as- vers had all been done before. Later, the flight
sisted with the controls, the aircraft would have surgeon discussed his concerns with the wing
hit the ridge. During the low crossovers the air- Chief of Aeromedical services but the issue was
craft ftew directly over people on the ground, not pursued because it had already been dis-
contrary to FAA and AF regulations. Also, while cussed with a wing safety officer.
on the range, the aircraft joined a formation of During this April-May 1994 time frame, plan-
A-10s for an imprpmptu flyby that was not ning for the B-52 exhibltion at the 1994 air show
planned or pre-briefed and contrary to ACC poli- began. Lt Col Holland was assigned this mission
cies and directives. and there is no evidence that any other pilots
After hearing of the events on the range, the were considered or ,objections raised. At a
325th Bomb Squadron commander, now Lt Col 15.June 1994 me'eting, attended by the wing, ops
.McGeehen (whow ould later be the co-pilot killed group, and squadron commanders, the air show
in the crash), asked the Ops Group commander, plans were reviewed and the proposed exhibi-
Col Pellerin, to restrict Lt Col Holland from further tion briefed. During this briefing Lt Col Holland
flying. Two meetings were held in April 1994 con- proposed a profile that included bank angles of at
cerning Lt Cot Holland's airmanship at the Ya- least 60 degrees, a high pitch angle climb of
kima Range and the poor example it set for 50-60 degrees nose high, and a KC-13 5/B-52 for-
younger pilots. Lt Col Holland attended the sec- mation. The proposed formation was rejected by
ond of these meetings. Col Pellerin testified that the ops group commander and KC-135 aircraft
commander. The wing commander, Cot Brooks, good to him; looks very safe, well within parame-
instructed Lt Col Holland that there would be no ters." The wing commander viewed only a small
formation maneuvers, no bank angles greater portion of this flight and remembered nothing ex-
than 45 degrees and no pitch angles greater than traordinary or objectionable about what he saw.
25 degrees. Following the meeting Col Brooks
Conclusion
was still concerned with the proposed profile, so
the ops group commander, Cot Pellerin, said he The accident investigation board discovered a
would talk with Lt Col Holland. The following pattern of repeated flight discipline violations by
morning Col Pellerin reiterated to Lt Col Holland Lt Col Holland. In every case the wing senior lead-
that there would be no pitch angles in excess of ership either did not recognize the seriousness of
50 degrees. the violation and did nothing or chose to deal
No type of approval was requested by the 92nd with it in an unofficial manner. The investigation
Bomb Wing for this planned exhibition. At a mini- revealed much about a "climate" in the wing
mum MAJCOM approval was required for any where junior officers participated in, witnessed,
type of flying exhibition., In addition, an FAA or later learned of flight discipline violations and
waiver was required for the type of exhibition to did nothing. In their testimony to the board some
be flown. No waivers to authorizedf light parame- of these officers felt that Lt Coi Holland was given
ters were asked for or approved. The authorized greater leeway in matters dealing with flight pa-
parameters included a maximum airspeed of no rameters because of his great experience and po-
more than 250 knots below 10,000 feet, no aero- sition in the wing. Another testified that he felt
batic flight maneuvers, no bank angles over 30 "blackmailed" into remaining quiet about activi-
degrees for circling or visual approaches, and no ties in which he participated. Still another de-
steep turns below 1000 feet above ground level scribed Lt Col Holland as quietly desperate,
or greater than 45 degrees of bank. sensing that the closing of 8-52 operations at
On 17 June 1994, the first practice mission for Fairchild was ending his own career.
the 1994 air show was flown. This profile was There were contributing factors involved in this
nearly identical to the accident profile, except accident. The rapid turnover of wing leadership
that two complete profiles were flown. Both pro- minimized continuity and prevented command-
files included steep bank angles and a high pitch ers from overlapping each other. The imminent
angle of climb. Though bank angles were not as closure of B-52 operations at Fairchild and its
aggressive as those flown during the accident transition from an Air Combat Command to. Air
profiles, they were contrary to ACC and flight Mobility Command base meant that many senior
manual guidance. Both profiles violated the wing leaders were unfamiliar with B-52 operations and
commander's guidance given at the 15 June applicable regulations and flight manual guid-
meeting. The ops group commander; Col Pel- ance.
lerin, flew on this mission. After this practice he
told the wing commander that "the profile looked
Darker Shades of Blue:
A Case Study of Failed Leadership
Major Tony Kern
United States Air Force
Author's Preface leading up to the tragedy. Secondly, I wish to
analyze leadership and the command climate at
When leadership fails and a command climate
the wing, operations group, and squadron levels.
breaks down, tragic things can happen. This is
This analysis will identify possible errors and pro-
the story of failed leadership and a command cli-
vide lessons learned, for use in academic envi-
mate which had degenerated into an unhealthy
ronments. Finally, I wish to show the positive
state of apathy and non-compliance-a state
side of this episode, for there were many who did
which contributed to the tragic crash of a B-52 at
the right thing, and acted in a timely and proac-
Fairchild Air Force Base, on the 24th of June,
tive manner. Their actions might well have
1994, killing all aboard.
averted the disaster in a more rational command
1 have three purposes with this case study. Flrst,
climate. Their story should be told.
1 hope to integrate the various elements of the
All testimony contained in this report are taken
story into a historically accurate and readable
from the AFR 1 1 0- 14 Aircraft Accident lnvestigga-
case study for all interested parties, to provide a
tion Board transcripts, obtained through the
clearer picture of what actually occurred at
Freedom of Information Act, or through personal
Fairchild Air Force Base in the years and months
interviews conducted by the author. I analyzed
transcripts from 49 individual testimonies, and
M@r Tony Kern is a US. Air Force pilot with operational
conducted 11 personal interviews. Iw ish to make
experience in the Rockwell 6-10 supersonic bomber,
it perfectly clear, that no data was taken from the
kingK C-135 Tanker, and the Slingsby T-3 Firefly. During
his 15-year Air Force career, he has served in various Air Force Safety Mishap Investigation, so the is-
operational and training capacities including the Chief of sue of privilege was not a factor in preparing this
Cockpit Resource Manegernent (CRM) Plans and report. In fact, t intentionally did not read or re-
R'ograms at the USAF Air Education and Training ceive a briefing on the results of the safety board
Command (AETC). While at W C , . he designed and for the express purpose of avoiding even the ap-
implemented a comprehensive, career-spanning CRM pearance of a conflict.
treining system which has radicelly changed Ihe way that
hurnan factors training is offered to all Air Force aviators. Placing blame on individuals was not my in-
Major Kern hes been actively engaged in many areas 01 tention and k not.the purpose of this mono-
military aviation training, including infligh instruction and graph. However, my interpretation of events
evaluation, academic indruclion, and curriculum devel- found potentially significant errors in leadership,
opment. He is e published'author and his most recent book disregard for regulations, and breeches of air dis-
Mei7nhg Aimamhip (Mffiraw-Hill 1997) describes the cipline at multiple levels. As an officer and avia-
traits of historical miation success over the past 90 years.
tor, If ound many of these events personally and
He holds Matilers Degrees in hM'i Administration end
professionaily appalling.' Occasionally, my inter-
Military Hislory, ss well as the Doctorate in Hther
' Education from Texas Tech Uniiitys pecializing in human pretation of events reflects this mood. Although I
factors training and curriculum development. He is have attempted to avoid bias, I make no apolo-
currently the Director of Military History at the United gies for my discoveries. Any errors of omission
States Air Force Academy and lives with his wife Shari or commission are strictly those of the author. I
.
and two sons in Colorado Springs. write this as my contribution to promoting the Air
Reprinted from Darker Shades d Blue: A Case Stucfy of Failedf eadershb, 1995,34 pp. Copyright and published
1995 by Maj Anthony T. Kern.