Aviation System Risks and Safety

186 Pages·2019·4.894 MB·English

by  Kuklev E.A., Shapkin V.S., Filippov V.L., Shatrakov Y.G.

Springer Aerospace Technology
Kuklev E.A.
Shapkin V.S.
Filippov V.L.
Shatrakov Y.G.
Aviation
System Risks
and Safety
Springer Aerospace Technology
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Kuklev E.A. Shapkin V.S.
(cid:129) (cid:129)
Filippov V.L. Shatrakov Y.G.
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Aviation System Risks
and Safety
123
Kuklev E.A. ShapkinV.S.
Saint-Petersburg, Russia Moscow,Russia
Filippov V.L. Shatrakov Y.G.
Moscow,Russia Saint-Petersburg, Russia
ISSN 1869-1730 ISSN 1869-1749 (electronic)
SpringerAerospace Technology
ISBN978-981-13-8121-8 ISBN978-981-13-8122-5 (eBook)
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Preface
This monograph is one of the first publications attempting to find a solution to the
“rareeventsproblem”withoutusingdirectlyanymethodsoftheclassicalreliability
theoryandprobabilitytheory.Asabasis,itisproposedtoadoptamethodologyfor
calculatingrisksas a“hazard measure” (InstituteofControl Sciences ofRAS)and
an expert approach to defining system safety indicators through the “hazard con-
dition” within methods using Fuzzy Sets (Fuzzy Sets [1, 2]). In this regard, the
bookproposesanewscientificdoctrinecalled“Reliability,Risks,Safety”(RRS)by
the authors.
The authors are aware that the approaches described in the book should be
considered as the first steps in the chosen direction, and work of this kind can be
continued, especially since the development of “risk models” in various fields of
CA activity has demonstrated very significant results.
The main object of the RRS study are random (rare) events occurring with a
“near-zero” probability and having a negative result (in adverse impact) for the
systemsoperated.Sucheventsareclassifiedinabroadsenseas“catastrophes”,the
number of which is small, but the consequences from them are very significant.
The problem of “rare events” is declared by the International Civil Aviation
Organization(ICAO)asoneofthemostimportantinthedomainofissuesrelatedto
ensuring the flight safety.
The models of catastrophic phenomena proposed in this paper have nothing in
common,exceptthename,withthewell-knowntheoriesofcatastrophesstudiedon
the basis of the V. Arnold’s concept [3], where the concept of a catastrophe is a
characteristic of the bifurcations of dynamic processes arising under special con-
ditions of the connections between elements in structures of the given (known)
systems under study (with some states of homeostatic equilibrium, according to
G. Malinetskiy [4]).
IncatastrophemodelsbyV.Arnold,thenumberofvariables(andprocesses)that
determine the surface of homeostatic equilibrium parameters does not exceed 2–5,
which does not reflect the properties of actual (real-world) systems. Therefore,
different approaches are needed for solving the issues of ensuring system safety
when rare events (with damage) occur in systems with a multitude of
v
vi Preface
high-dimensional parameters and random external influences that determine the
significance of the risks of serious negative consequences, including those in
technical dual-purpose complexes.
According to ICAO statistics [5], the number of catastrophes and accidents
involving Airbus aircraft with various flight experience is 1–2 for 10–15 years of
operation(forvariousaircraftclasses)withatotal“operation”timeofmorethan10
million take-offs and landings. Therefore, for example, such a concept of “risk” as
“theprobabilityofanegativeevent”isalreadyinappropriateregardingthereallife.
Hypotheses about the measurability of random events in the sense of the
axiomatics of probability spaces (according to A. Kolmogorov) cannot be applied
in the strict sense to the solution of “rare events” problems. The values of the
physical parameters that determine the occurrence of catastrophic phenomena are
verysmall and lieintheregionof“heavy tails”oftheprobabilitydensityfunction
(pdf). Probability distribution function (prdf) exact analytic expressions with
“heavytails”havenotbeenfound,and“rare”eventsofthistypeareimmeasurable
(according to A. Kolmogorov). Therefore, the hypothesis of “fuzzy measurability”
of rare events (with a “near-zero” probability) has to be considered the main
working postulate in the RRS doctrine.
Thus, it turns out that the RRS is applicable for the study of highly reliable
systems where the high quality required by consumers is guaranteed by
high-standardindicatorslike“reliabilityprobability”withvaluesofabout“one”.But
the“consumercommunity”requires(legislatively)theprovisionofprecisely“high
reliabilityofsystems”.Firstofall,thisrequirementautomaticallyleadstoadecrease
intheprobabilityofundesirablefunctionalfailuresinsystems,whichisexactlywhat
the community needs. But this gives rise to another problem, the occurrence of
hazardous (risk) events in the form of “rare events”. From this follows the need to
study other properties of technical systems as well (except quality), namely the
“probabilities” of loss offunctional properties by systems, even in very rare cases,
butwithgreat“damages”.Thebookshowsthatitismostconvenientandeffectiveto
solvetheproblemwiththehelpoftheabove-mentioned“FuzzySets”approach.But
thenumber ofinvestigations with this new approachis still very small.
The background for the creation of the RRS doctrine and its tools in the form
of the system safety theory (SST) are set out below.
Developmentandimprovementofsafetysystemsforvariouscomplextechnical
systems, and not only aviation ones, should be considered as the main goal for
transportsystems,aswellas,forexample,nuclearpowerplantsandcomplexesfor
the coming decades.
The common difficulty here is the “rare events problem” and the calculation of
risks with insufficient statistics.
The priority of creating highly reliable systems was stated in FAA documents
[6,7],whereA.YounossipointedtotherelationshipbetweenQMSandSMS.The
sameideawastakenasthebasisfortheRRSdoctrinethat,inthismanner,aroseas
a response to the “challenge” of the world aviation community: “to transit to the
provision and monitoring of ATS safety based on the calculation of risks and the
theoretical SST methods” set out, inter alia, in this book.
Preface vii
The NASA materials [8], which the authors of the book managed to get
acquainted with, are of great importance for substantiating the RRS positions. The
fact is that only sufficient NASA resources allowed for large-scale stochastic imi-
tation modeling based on the properties analysis of complex systems, such as pdf
andPrdf.TheseresultspresentedpartiallyinChap.3ofthisbook,madeitpossible
toconfirmthevalidityofthehypothesesregardingtheessenceofthe“rareevents”
problem.Forthis,wehadtorefuse,asfaraspossible,fromprobabilisticindicators
and adopt the “Fuzzy Sets” approach.
In this regard, it can be argued that the “rare events” problem in civil aviation
does not exist anymore, or more precisely, this problem persists only in the PSA.
Similarly,it can be stated that the human factors (HF) problem inits traditional
interpretation[9]canbesolvedmoreeffectivelyiftheideaofseparatestudyofthe
objective technical and economic conditions for the occurrence of “catastrophes”
and the study of the possibilities (or motivation) for operators’ properties is con-
sidered to be true.
Here, it is worth noting that there is a certain similarity in solving issues of the
“rareevents”problemintransport(e.g.,incivilaviationandJSCRussianRailways
(JSCRR)):atransitiontofuzzyindicatorsofnormalizedfrequenciesofoccurrence
of random (hazardous) events in the methodology of calculating risks. But in the
practiceofcivilaviationandJSCRR,itisstated(thereisevena“riskanalysisstep”
in [10] that the probabilities of certain events can be assigned, up to values of
10−7–10−12). GOST R 51901–2002 standard (Reliability Management) states that
events with a probability of 10−6are already next to almost impossible. According
totheTFSprovisionsoftheTSB(accordingtotheRRSconcept),onlyacceptable
levels of risk can be assigned, for example, through the same frequencies (above).
The values of frequencies can be taken from the general statistics (in various
probability spaces, probably), as was shown for the first time in the work of
M. Kumamoto or be assigned, but in a fuzzy way—through the Fuzzy Sets.
Probabilities must be proved and defined in a given probability space on the
basis of the analysis of objective properties of the systems under consideration.
Inthiscontext,thisbookcanbeusefulasthefirststeptofindwaystosolvethe
“rare events problem”, according to the ICAO, but on the ideas of NASA.
The first edition of this monograph was published in the publishing house of
FSUE State Research Institute of Civil Aviation (GosNII GA) in 2013.
Some additional important notes from the authors of the presented manu-
script. In the book, the perspective scheme to expose main position of universal
theory of aviation safety and security based on risk is demonstrated—approach of
ICAO & NASA according to Fuzzy Sets (Berkley School). Probabilistically,
positionsofknownPSAaredenotedinthecaseofthesituationwithsystemssoas
the “rare events”. Using of the given probable space is not corrected here. The
famousworkCATS(Causal Model for AirTransportSafety)proposedconception
of cause-and-effect chains based on formal logic rules. It is proposed to conserve
only the matrix (1.4) from the page 13 or 15, named as H or {X} and after this to
find the EQUATIONS of catastrophes possible in systems under danger factors.
Thus Boolean distributive lattice is the foundation of probabilistic conception of
viii Preface
reliabilitytheorythatallowsusingofKolmogorov’saxiomaticbymeansofmodels
of probabilistic spaces. But in case of rare events it is irrational and incorrect.
Therefore the risk-oriented approach based on Fuzzy Sets and non-distributive
Boolean lattice was adopted in safety system theory.
Thereislastpublicationforthetheme:E.Kuklev,V.Zhilinskiy/2018.Accident
Risk Assessment for Highly Reliable Aviation Systems in Emergency Situations//
Transport and Telecommunication Vol. 19, no. 1, 59–63. Transport and
TelecommunicationInstitute,Lomonosova,Latviahttps://doi.org/10.2478/ttj-2018-
0006.
Riga, Latvia Kuklev E.A.
2018
References
1. Orlovskiy SA (1981) Problems of decision making with fuzzy source information.
ScienceFM,Moscow(inRussian)
2. RybinVV(2007)Fundamentalsofthefuzzysetstheoryandfuzzylogic.Studyguide.STU
MoscowStateAviationInstitute,Moscow,p95(inRussian)
3. ArnoldVI(1995)Catastrophetheory.ScienceFM,Moscow(inRussian)
4. MalinetskiyGG,KulbaVV,KosyachenkoSA,ShnirmanMGetal(2000)Riskmanagement.
Risk. Sustainable development. Synergetics. Series “Cybernetics”, RAS. Nauka, Moscow,
431pp(inRussian)
5. Documentsofthe37thICAOAssembly(Oct2011,Montreal)
6. YounossyAM(2012)10thingsyoushouldknowaboutsafetymanagementsystems(SMS).
SMICG,Washington
7. SMM(SafetyManagementManual):Doc9859_AN474—DocFAA:2012
8. ProbabilisticRiskAssessmentProceduresforNASAManagersandPractitioners—Officeof
SafetyandMissionAssuranceNASA.Washington,DC–Aug2002(Version2/2).
9. KozlovVV(2008)Safetymanagement.OJSC“Aeroflot”.Moscow(inRussian)
10. Kuklev E, Zhilinskiy V (2018) Accident Risk Assessment for Highly Reliable Aviation
Systems in Emergency Situations. Transp Telecommun 19(1): 59–63. Transport and
TelecommunicationInstitute,Lomonosova,Latvia.https://doi.org/10.2478/ttj-2018-0006.
About This Book
The paper describes general principles of assessing the operational safety of
complex aviation and technical systems from the perspective of the methodology
for calculating risks of occurrence of negative random rare events, such as crashes
or catastrophes (or serious aviation accidents, e.g., with civil aircraft). For the first
time, a general scheme for solving the problem of rare events is proposed that is
based on approaches using Fuzzy Sets. Such an approach makes it possible to
assess risk appearance of possible consequences and to solve quite reasonably a
numberofproblemsusingtheanalysisofpropertiesofrandomeventswithnearly-
zero or “almost -zero” probability of occurrence. The paper also substantiates the
necessity for developing a new doctrine for assessing the system safety within the
“Reliability, Risks, Safety” paradigm, which in a number of special cases can be
adoptedasanalternativeandcomplementarytothewell-knowntraditionalmethod
of probabilistic safety analysis (“PSA”), which is the main analysis tool in the
classical reliability theory for the system safety under the ICAO concept.1
In the book, so traditional methods such as “Poisson distribution” and “Bayes
approach” are completely denoted because theone is“dubious tool” for extracting
some information from “zero”.
For specialists in aviation activity safety and flight safety.
Kuklev E.A., Professor, Doctor of Technical Sciences
Shapkin V.S., Professor, Doctor of Technical Sciences
Filippov V.L., General Director
Shatrakov Y.G., Professor, Doctor of Technical Sciences
1ICAO—InternationalCivilAviationOrganization(Montreal—Canada).
ix