Austrian Phenomenology: Brentano, Husserl, Meinong, and Others on Mind and Object

339 Pages·2008·1.206 MB·English

by  Robin D. Rollinger

Robin D. Rollinger
Austrian Phenomenology
Brentano, Husserl, Meinong, and Others on Mind and Object
P H E N O M E N O L O G Y & M I N D

Herausgegeben von / Edited by

Arkadiusz Chrudzimski • Wolfgang Huemer

Band 12 / Volume 12
Robin D. Rollinger

Austrian Phenomenology

Brentano, Husserl, Meinong,
and Others on Mind and Object
Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek
The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliographie;
detailed bibliographic data is available in the Internet at http://dnb.ddb.de

North and South America by
Transaction Books
Rutgers University
Piscataway, NJ 08854-8042
[email protected]

United Kingdom, Ire, Iceland, Turkey, Malta, Portugal by
Gazelle Books Services Limited
White Cross Mills
Hightown
LANCASTER, LA1 4XS
[email protected]

Livraison pour la France et la Belgique:
Librairie Philosophique J.Vrin
6, place de la Sorbonne ; F-75005 PARIS
Tel. [phone] ; Fax [phone]
www.vrin.fr

2008 ontos verlag
P.O. Box 15 41, D-63133 Heusenstamm nr. Frankfurt
www.ontosverlag.com

ISBN 978-3-938793-005-7

2008

No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in retrieval systems or transmitted
in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming, recording or otherwise
without written permission from the Publisher, with the exception of any material supplied specifically for the
purpose of being entered and executed on a computer system, for exclusive use of the purchaser of the work

Printed on acid-free paper
ISO-Norm 970-6
This hardcover binding meets the International Library standard

Printed in Germany
by buch bücher dd ag
In memory of my teacher,
Karl Schuhmann (1941-2003)
CONTENTS

PREFACE.................................................................................................................................ix

INTRODUCTION.....................................................................................................................1
1. The Subject Matter of Austrian Phenomenology...............................................................2
2. The Method of Austrian Phenomenology........................................................................11
3. Austrian Phenomenology and Philosophy.......................................................................18
4. Major Figures of Austrian Phenomenology.....................................................................22

BRENTANO AND HUSSERL ON IMAGINATION............................................................29
1. Introduction......................................................................................................................29
2. Brentano on Imagination..................................................................................................30
3. Husserl on Imagination....................................................................................................37
3. 1. Methodological Considerations...............................................................................38
3. 2. Presentations............................................................................................................39
3. 3. Sensations and Phantasms .......................................................................................43
3. 4. The Phantasy Image.................................................................................................44
3. 5. Phantasy Presentations as Intuitive..........................................................................46
3.6. Critique of the Doctrine of Original Association......................................................47
4. Conclusion.......................................................................................................................48

NAMES, STATEMENTS, AND MIND-FUNCTIONS IN HUSSERL'S LOGICAL
INVESTIGATIONS...................................................................................................................51
1. Introduction......................................................................................................................51
2. Manifestation, Meaning, and Reference..........................................................................52
3. Positing Names and Non-Positing Statements.................................................................58
4. Excursus: Inner Perception in the Logical Investigations................................................62
5. Fulfillment of Names and Statements..............................................................................64
6. Concluding Remarks........................................................................................................72

MARTY ON LINGUISTIC EXPRESSIONS AND MIND-FUNCTIONS............................73
1. Introduction......................................................................................................................73
2. Ontological Requirements................................................................................................73
3. Mind-Functions in Correlation with Linguistic Expressions.............................................77
4. Mentalism and Introspectionism.......................................................................................82
5. Conclusion........................................................................................................................86

HUSSERL'S ELEMENTARY LOGIC: THE 1896 LECTURES IN THEIR NINETEENTH
CENTURY CONTEXT...........................................................................................................87
1. Introduction......................................................................................................................87
3. Logic as Theory of Science..............................................................................................89
3. Concepts...........................................................................................................................93
4. Propositions......................................................................................................................98
5. Inferences.......................................................................................................................104
6. Conclusion.....................................................................................................................107

MEINONG ON THE OBJECTS OF SENSATION..............................................................109
1. Introduction....................................................................................................................109
2. Brentano on Sensory Contents.......................................................................................112
3. From Physical Phenomena to Objects of Sensation......................................................115
4. Sensory Objects of Higher Order...................................................................................119
5. The Nonexistence of Sensory Objects...........................................................................120
6. A Priori Knowledge about Sensory Objects..................................................................124
7. Comparison with Stumpf...............................................................................................130
8. Comparison with Husserl...............................................................................................134
9. Conclusion.....................................................................................................................136

STUMPF ON PHENOMENA AND PHENOMENOLOGY................................................139
1. Introduction....................................................................................................................139
2. Phenomena.....................................................................................................................140
3. Phenomenology..............................................................................................................146
4. Conclusion.....................................................................................................................155

BRENTANO AND MEINONG............................................................................................157
1. Introduction....................................................................................................................157
2. Points of Divergence......................................................................................................159
2.1. Theory of Relations.................................................................................................160
2.2. Intensity...................................................................................................................163
2.3. Immediate Evidence of Surmise.............................................................................163
2.4. Feeling and Desire..................................................................................................166
2.5. Content and Object.................................................................................................167
2.6. Judgments...............................................................................................................167
2.7. Presentations...........................................................................................................169
2.8. Time-Consciousness...............................................................................................170
2.9. Assumptions............................................................................................................171
2.10. Object Theory.......................................................................................................173
2.11. Value Theory........................................................................................................179
2.12. Phenomena and Consciousness.............................................................................180
3. Philosophical Affinity....................................................................................................181

HUSSERL AND CORNELIUS: PHENOMENOLOGY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND
EPISTEMOLOGY.................................................................................................................189
1. Introduction....................................................................................................................189
2. Hans Cornelius (1863-1947)..........................................................................................190
3. Husserl's Critique of Attempt at a Theory of Existential Judgments.............................192
3. 1 Various Types of Problems concerning Judgments................................................193
3. 2 Perceiving and Distinguishing................................................................................194
3. 3 Content, Object, and Meaning................................................................................195
3. 4 Phantasms and Sensations.......................................................................................197
3. 5 Memory Images......................................................................................................197
3. 6. Negation.................................................................................................................198
4. Husserl's Critique of Psychology as an Experiential Science........................................199
4. 1 The Principle of Thought Economy........................................................................200
4. 2 Abstraction and General Ideas................................................................................202
4. 3 The Experiential Origin of Universally Valid Judgments......................................205
5. Cornelius' Reply and Correspondence with Husserl......................................................206
5. 1 Psychology and Epistemology................................................................................207
vi
5. 2 Correspondence.......................................................................................................209
5. 3. The Subject Matter of Phenomenology.................................................................214
6. Conclusion.....................................................................................................................219

MEINONG ON PERCEPTION AND OBJECTIVES..........................................................221

AUSTRIAN THEORIES OF JUDGMENT: BOLZANO, BRENTANO, MEINONG, AND
HUSSERL..............................................................................................................................233
1. Introduction....................................................................................................................233
2. Bolzano..........................................................................................................................233
3. Brentano.........................................................................................................................242
4. Meinong.........................................................................................................................248
5. Husserl...........................................................................................................................254
6. Concluding Remarks......................................................................................................261

THE CONCEPT OF CAUSALITY IN STUMPF'S EPISTEMOLOGY................................263
1. Introduction....................................................................................................................263
2. Stumpf’s Epistemology..................................................................................................264
3. The Concept of Causality in British Empiricism...........................................................269
4. Inwardly Perceived Causality........................................................................................271
5. Necessity in Natural Causal Laws.................................................................................275
6. The External World and Causality.................................................................................279
7. Causality in Inorganic Nature........................................................................................282
8. Causality in Organic Nature...........................................................................................287
9. Psycho-Physical Causality.............................................................................................290
10. Psychical Causality......................................................................................................296
11. Conclusion...................................................................................................................298

BIBLIOGRAPHY..................................................................................................................301
PREFACE

This book consists of revised versions of papers which were previously
published elsewhere. At the beginning of each one it is indicated where it
originally appeared. The primary sources are German texts, but passages
quoted from them have been translated into English. Unless otherwise
indicated, translations from German are my own. Titles of books and
essays are translated (except in cases where the title in the original
language is so familiar that translation is unnecessary), whereas titles of
journals are left untranslated. Quotations from unpublished material,
however, are given in both English translation and the original German.
In view of the fact that the present volume draws upon more
unpublished material than usual, a word should be said about such sources.
From Franz Brentano’s manuscripts I have made use of material from
sections EL (epistemology and logic), Ps (psychology), Eth (ethics), and
M (metaphysics). Where there is a published text edited from such
material, I have consulted the originals whenever circumstances permitted.
Wherever this was not possible, however, the results must admittedly be
regarded as provisional insofar as they are concerned with Brentano’s
philosophy. Studies of his philosophy, after all, are going through a
transitional period, in which a shift to more reliable sources is being made.
Further information about the particular manuscripts which are cited may
be found in the bibliography. While the originals are located in the
Houghton Library in Harvard, I have used digital facsimiles and microfilm
of the originals and in a few cases typescripts (made in Prague during the
1930s) generously provided by the Forschungsstelle und Dokumentations-
zentrum für österreichische Philosophie in Graz (Austria). From the
Husserl Archives in Leuven (Belgium) I have also sometimes made use of
material from sections Q (consisting of materials from lectures of
Brentano and Stumpf as well as others) and section Y (notes from lectures
of Brentano taken by E. Leisching). Further specifications of these
manuscripts may be found in the bibliography. Wherever texts which
Husserl wrote as the author are cited, however, these are taken from
publications, especially from the Husserliana (the multi-volume edition of
Husserl’s writings in German). I thank the Husserl Archives and the
Forschungsstelle und Dokumentationszentrum für österreichische
Philosophie for giving me access to unpublished material.
As far as translations are concerned, an effort has naturally been made to
make them consistent. Literature is in most cases cited by author (and
editor wherever relevant) and date. However, certain classical texts are
cited in a way that makes them accessible in almost all editions thereof.
Moreover, volumes from the Husserliana are indicated as Hua (for the
main series) or Hua-Mat (for the accompanying series: Husserliana-
Materialien), in each case followed by a Roman numeral to indicate the
relevant volume. Unpublished manuscripts are cited according to the
relevant archival signatures.
In spite of revisions, an attempt has been made to leave enough of the
original essays intact to the extent that each can be read on its own. While
this entails a certain amount of repetition, it seems to be the best way to
publish a set of essays which were not originally meant to appear in the
same volume. The result is a series of interrelated sketches pertaining to
the notion of Austrian phenomenology, as explained in the introduction. In
my opinion this notion is not only of considerable historical interest, but
also one that can very well prove viable in further philosophical
investigations. If any of these sketches should serve in any way to be of
use in such investigations, with either a historical or a systematic focus,
this will be my greatest reward for the labor involved in their composition
and publication.
Since the present volume is the result of more than fifteen years of
research, there are many people who should be thanked for helping me in
various ways. I thank the publishers of the original papers for kindly
granting me permission for republication. The following names should
also be mentioned with the utmost gratitude: Liliana Albertazzi, Mark van
Atten, Wilhelm Baumgartner, Arianna Betti, Johannes Brandl, Denis
Fisette, Rudolf Haller, Carlo Ierna, Dale Jacquette, Sandra Lapointe,
Kevin Mulligan, Roberto Poli, Maria van der Schaar, Peter Simons, Barry
Smith, Richard Tieszen, and Gregory Westwood. If I have forgotten to
mention anyone else whom I should thank, I apologize. Above all, the
moving scholarly force behind the course of research that has resulted in
x