Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications: First International ICST Conference, AMMA 2009, Boston, MA, USA, May 8-9, 2009, Revised Selected Papers PDF
Preview Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications: First International ICST Conference, AMMA 2009, Boston, MA, USA, May 8-9, 2009, Revised Selected Papers
Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering 14 EditorialBoard OzgurAkan MiddleEastTechnicalUniversity,Ankara,Turkey PaoloBellavista UniversityofBologna,Italy JiannongCao HongKongPolytechnicUniversity,HongKong FalkoDressler UniversityofErlangen,Germany DomenicoFerrari UniversitàCattolicaPiacenza,Italy MarioGerla UCLA,USA HisashiKobayashi PrincetonUniversity,USA SergioPalazzo UniversityofCatania,Italy SartajSahni UniversityofFlorida,USA Xuemin(Sherman)Shen UniversityofWaterloo,Canada MirceaStan UniversityofVirginia,USA JiaXiaohua CityUniversityofHongKong,HongKong AlbertZomaya UniversityofSydney,Australia GeoffreyCoulson LancasterUniversity,UK Sanmay Das Michael Ostrovsky David Pennock Boleslaw Szymanski (Eds.) Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications First International ICST Conference,AMMA 2009 Boston, MA, USA, May 8-9, 2009 Revised Selected Papers 1 3 VolumeEditors SanmayDas BoleslawSzymanski RensselaerPolytechnicInstitute 1108thSt,Troy,NY12180USA E-mail:{sanmay;szymansk}@cs.rpi.edu MichaelOstrovsky StanfordUniversityGraduateSchoolofBusiness 518MemorialWay,Stanford,CA94305USA E-mail:[email protected] DavidM.Pennock Yahoo!Research,111West40thStreet 17thfloor,NewYork,NY10018,USA E-mail:[email protected] LibraryofCongressControlNumber:2009932900 CRSubjectClassification(1998):J.1,K.1,C.2.4,C.3,H.2.8,H.4 ISSN 1867-8211 ISBN-10 3-642-03820-4SpringerBerlinHeidelbergNewYork ISBN-13 978-3-642-03820-4SpringerBerlinHeidelbergNewYork Thisworkissubjecttocopyright.Allrightsarereserved,whetherthewholeorpartofthematerialis concerned,specificallytherightsoftranslation,reprinting,re-useofillustrations,recitation,broadcasting, reproductiononmicrofilmsorinanyotherway,andstorageindatabanks.Duplicationofthispublication orpartsthereofispermittedonlyundertheprovisionsoftheGermanCopyrightLawofSeptember9,1965, initscurrentversion,andpermissionforusemustalwaysbeobtainedfromSpringer.Violationsareliable toprosecutionundertheGermanCopyrightLaw. springer.com ©ICSTInstituteforComputerScience,SocialInformaticsandTelecommunicationsEngineering2009 PrintedinGermany Typesetting:Camera-readybyauthor,dataconversionbyScientificPublishingServices,Chennai,India Printedonacid-freepaper SPIN:12731527 06/3180 543210 Preface These proceedings present the technical cont ributions to the First Conference on Auc- tions, Market Mechanisms, and Their Applications (AMMA), held May 8-9, 2009 in Boston, Massachusetts, USA. The conference was devoted to issues that arise in all stages of deploying a market mechanism to solve a problem, including theoretical and empirical examinations. In addition to more traditional academic papers, the confer- ence placed emphasis on experiences from the real world, including case studies and new applications. The main goal of AMMA was to explore the synergy required for good mechanism design. This includes an understanding of the economic and game-theoretic issues, the ability to design protocols and algorithms for realizing desired outcomes, and the knowledge of specific institutional details that are important in practical applications. We were lucky enough to attract papers and talks from economists and computer scientists, theorists and empiricists, academics and practitioners. The program, as reflected in these proceedings, ranged from fundamental theory on auctions and mar- kets to empirical design and analysis of matching mechanisms, peer-to-peer-systems, and prediction markets. The call for papers attracted submissions from academia and industry around the world, including Asia, North America, Europe, and the Middle East. Each paper was reviewed by at least three Program Committee members on the basis of scientific novelty, technical quality, and importance to the field. The Program Committee se- lected 18 papers for presentation at the conference out of 38 submissions, most of which are published in the proceedings. At the authors’ request, only abstracts of some papers are included in these proceedings. This accommodates the practices of fields outside of computer science in which journal rather than conference publishing is the norm and conference publishing sometimes precludes journal publishing. It is ex- pected that many of these papers will appear in a more polished and complete form in scientific journals in the future. Putting together AMMA 2009 was a team effort. We thank the authors for provid- ing the content of the program. We are grateful to the Program Committee and the external reviewers, who worked hard reviewing and providing feedback for authors. We thank Local Chair Peter Coles for making sure everything at the venue went off without a hitch. We thank Conference Coordinator Robert Varga, Finance Chair Gabriella Pal, Publicity Chair Sebastien Lahaie, and Webmaster Micha l Karpowicz. Finally, we thank the conference sponsor, the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social- Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering (ICST). June 2009 Michael Ostrovsky David Pennock Boleslaw Szymanski Organization Steering Committee Co-chairs Imrich Chlamtac U. Trento and Create-Net, Italy Boleslaw Szymanski Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, USA Steering Committee Members Peter Coles Harvard Business School, USA Sanmay Das Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, USA Michael Ostrovsky Stanford GSB, USA David Pennock Yahoo! Research, USA Vincent Conitzer Duke University, USA General Co-chairs David Pennock Yahoo! Research, USA Boleslaw Szymanski Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, USA Technical Program Chairs Sanmay Das Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, USA Michael Ostrovsky Stanford GSB, USA Local Chair Peter Coles Harvard Business School, USA Conference Coordinator Robert Varga ICST Finance Chair Gabriella Pal ICST Publicity Chair Sebastien Lahaie Yahoo! Research, USA VIII Organization Webmaster Michal Karpowicz Warsaw University of Technology and NASK, Poland Technical Program Committee Atila Abdulkadiroglu Duke University, USA Elliot Anshelevich Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, USA Itai Ashlagi Harvard Business School, USA Imrich Chlamtac U. Trento and Create-Net, Italy Peter Coles Harvard Business School, USA Vincent Conitzer Duke University, USA Sanmay Das Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, USA Mathijs de Weerdt Delft University of Technology, The Netherlands Erol Gelenbe Imperial College London, UK Enrico Gerding University of Southampton, UK Nicole Immorlica Northwestern University, USA Kamal Jain Microsoft Research Sven Koenig University of Southern California, USA Sebastien Lahaie Yahoo! Research, USA Kevin Leyton-Brown University of British Columbia, Canada Robin Lee NYU Stern and Yahoo! Research, USA Malik Magdon-Ismail Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, USA Mohammad Mahdian Yahoo! Research, USA Ewa Niewiadomska-Szynkiewicz Warsaw University of Technology / NASK Poland Michael Ostrovsky Stanford GSB, USA David Pennock Yahoo! Research, USA Ariel Procaccia Microsoft Israel R&D Center, Israel Juan Rodriguez-Aguilar IIIA, CSIC Barcelona, Spain David Sarne Bar-Ilan University, Israel Boleslaw Szymanski Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, USA Ioannis Vetsikas University of Southampton, UK Table of Contents Effects of Suboptimal Bidding in Combinatorial Auctions ............. 1 Stefan Schneider, Pasha Shabalin, and Martin Bichler Using Prediction Markets to Track Information Flows: Evidence from Google ......................................................... 3 Bo Cowgill, Justin Wolfers, and Eric Zitzewitz A Copula Function Approach to Infer Correlation in Prediction Markets ........................................................ 4 Agostino Capponi and Umberto Cherubini Manipulating Scrip Systems: Sybils and Collusion.................... 13 Ian A. Kash, Eric J. Friedman, and Joseph Y. Halpern A Centralized Auction Mechanism for the Disability and Survivors Insurance in Chile................................................ 25 Gonzalo Reyes H. Information Feedback and Efficiency in Multiattribute Double Auctions........................................................ 26 Kevin M. Lochner and Michael P. Wellman Impact of Misalignment of Trading Agent Strategy across Multiple Markets ........................................................ 40 Jung-woo Sohn, Sooyeon Lee, and Tracy Mullen Market Design for a P2P Backup System (Extended Abstract)......... 55 Sven Seuken, Denis Charles, Max Chickering, and Sidd Puri School Choice: The Case for the Boston Mechanism .................. 58 Antonio Miralles Turing Trade: A Hybrid of a Turing Test and a Prediction Market ..... 61 Joseph Farfel and Vincent Conitzer A Market-BasedApproach to Multi-factory Scheduling ............... 74 Perukrishnen Vytelingum, Alex Rogers, Douglas K. Macbeth, Partha Dutta, Armin Stranjak, and Nicholas R. Jennings Auctions with Dynamic Populations: Efficiency and Revenue Maximization (Extended Abstract)................................. 87 Maher Said Revenue Submodularity........................................... 89 Shaddin Dughmi, Tim Roughgarden, and Mukund Sundararajan X Table of Contents Fair Package Assignment.......................................... 92 S´ebastien Lahaie and David C. Parkes Solving Winner Determination Problems for Auctions with Economies of Scope and Scale ............................................... 93 Martin Bichler, Stefan Schneider, Kemal Guler, and Mehmet Sayal Running Out of Numbers: Scarcity of IP Addresses and What to Do about It ........................................................ 95 Benjamin Edelman Author Index.................................................. 107 Effects of Suboptimal Bidding in Combinatorial Auctions Stefan Schneider, Pasha Shabalin, and Martin Bichler TechnischeUniversit¨at Mu¨nchen, Germany {schneider,shabalin,bichler}@in.tum.de http://ibis.in.tum.de/research/ca/index.htm Abstract. Though the VCG auction assumes a central place in the mechanism design literature, there are a number of reasons for favor- ingiterativecombinatorial auction designs.Severalpromisingascending auction formats have been developed throughout the past few years based on primal-dual and subgradient algorithms and linear program- ming theory. Prices are interpreted as a feasible dual solution and the provisional allocation is interpreted as a feasible primal solution. iBun- dle(3) (Parkes and Ungar 2000), dVSV (deVries et al. 2007) and the Ascending Proxy auction (Ausubeland Milgrom 2002) result in VCG payoffswhen thecoalitional valuefunction satisfies thebuyersubmodu- larity condition and bidders bid straightforward, which is an ex- post Nash equilibrium in that case. iBEA and CreditDebit auctions (Mishra and Parkes 2007) do not even require the buyer submodular- ity condition and achieve the same properties for general valuations. In many situations, however, one cannot assume bidders to bid straight- forward and it is not clear from the theory how these non-linear per- sonalized price auctions (NLPPAs) perform in this case. Robustness of auctionswithrespect todifferentbiddingbehavioristhereforeacritical issue for any application. We have conducted a large number of com- putational experiments to analyze the performance of NLPPA designs with respect todifferent biddingstrategies and differentvaluation mod- els.WecomparetheresultsofNLPPAstothoseoftheVCGauctionand thoseofiterativecombinatorialauctionswithapproximatelinearprices, suchasALPS(Bichler et al. 2009)andtheCombinatorialClockauction (Porter et al. 2003). WhileNLPPAsperformedverywellincaseofstraightforwardbidding, wecouldobserveproblemswithrespecttoauctioneerrevenue,efficiency, andspeedofconvergenceincaseofnon-best-responsebiddingbehavior. Under suboptimal bidding strategies, dVSV and CreditDebit auctions havea significantly lower efficiency than iBundle(3). In contrast, linear price combinatorial auctions were robust against all strategies, except collusive behavior which makes it very difficult for anyauctioneertoselectanefficientsolutioningeneral.Whileourresults achieve high efficiency values on average, one can easily construct ex- amples, where linear price CAs cannot be efficient (Bichler et al. 2009). Linear-price designs suffer from the fact that they cannot be 100% ef- ficient, but they have shown to be robust against many strategies and bear a few advantages: S.Dasetal.(Eds.):Amma2009,LNICST14,pp.1–2,2009. (cid:2)c ICSTInstituteforComputerSciences,Social-InformaticsandTelecommunicationsEngineering2009 2 S. Schneider,P. Shabalin, and M. Bichler – Only a linear numberof prices needsto be communicated. – Linear prices, if perceived as a guideline, help bidders to easily find interesting items and bundles and allow for endogenous bidding (Kwon05). – The perceived fairness of anonymous prices might be an issue in some applications. – The numberof auction rounds is much lower. Overall, robustness of combinatorial auction formats against different biddingstrategies is,asidefromefficiency,fairness, andspeedofconver- gence, an important topic auctioneers need to care about. References Ausubel,L.,Milgrom, P.:Ascendingauctionswithpackagebidding.FrontiersofThe- oretical Economics 1, 1–42 (2002) Bichler, M., Shabalin, P., Pikovsky, A.: A computational analysis of linear-price iter- ative combinatorial auctions. Information Systems Research 20(1) (2009) deVries,S.,Schummer,J.,Vohra,R.:Onascendingvickreyauctionsforheterogeneous objects. Journal of Economic Theory 132, 95–118 (2007) Kwon, R.H., Anandalingam, G., Ungar, L.H.: Iterative combinatorial auctions with bidder-determinedcombinations. Management Science 51(3), 407–418 (2005) Mishra,D.,Parkes,D.:Ascendingpricevickreyauctionsforgeneralvaluations.Journal of Economic Theory 132, 335–366 (2007) Parkes, D., Ungar, L.H.: Iterative combinatorial auctions: Theory and practice. In: 17th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI2000) (2000) Porter, D., Rassenti, S., Roopnarine, A., Smith, V.: Combinatorial auction design. Proceedings of theNational AcademyofSciencesof theUnitedStatesofAmerica (PNAS)100, 11153–11157 (2003)
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