Auction Theory for Computer Networks

291 Pages·2020·6.047 MB·English

by  Dusit Niyato, Nguyen Cong Luong, Ping Wang, Zhu Han

AuctionTheoryforComputerNetworks
Do you have the tools to address recent challenges and problems in modern computer
networks?Discoveraunifiedviewofauctiontheoreticapplicationsanddevelopauction
models, solution concepts, and algorithms with this multidisciplinary review. Devise
distributed, dynamic, and adaptive algorithms for ensuring robust network operation
overtime-varyingandheterogeneousenvironments,andforoptimizingdecisionsabout
services,resourceallocation,andusageofallnetworkentities.Topicsincludingcloud
networkingmodels,MIMO,mmWavecommunications,5Gnetworks,dataaggregation,
task allocation, user association, interference management, wireless caching, mobile
data offloading, and security. Introducing fundamental concepts from an engineering
perspective and describing a wide range of state-of-the-art techniques, this text is an
excellentresourceforgraduateandseniorundergraduatestudents,networkandsoftware
engineers,economists,andresearchers.
Dusit Niyato is a professor in the School of Computer Science and Engineering at
NanyangTechnologicalUniversity,Singapore,andaFellowoftheIEEE.
Nguyen Cong Luong is a senior lecturer in Faculty of Information Technology at
PHENIKAA University, Hanoi, Vietnam. He is also a researcher in PHENIKAA
Research and Technology Institute (PRATI), A&A Green Phoenix Group JSC, Hanoi,
Vietnam.
Ping Wang is an associate professor in the Department of Electrical Engineering and
ComputerScience,YorkUniversity.
ZhuHanisaJohnandRebeccaMooresProfessorinboththeDepartmentofElectrical
andComputerEngineeringandtheComputerScienceDepartmentattheUniversityof
Houston,andaFellowoftheIEEEandtheAAAS.

Auction Theory for Computer
Networks
DUSIT NIYATO
NanyangTechnologicalUniversity
NGUYEN CONG LUONG
PHENIKAAUniversity
PING WANG
YorkUniversity
ZHU HAN
UniversityofHouston
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www.cambridge.org
Informationonthistitle:www.cambridge.org/9781108480765
DOI:10.1017/9781108691079
©CambridgeUniversityPress2020
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Contents
1 Introduction page1
1.1 ABriefOverviewoftheHistoryofAuctions 1
1.2 AuctionTheoryinComputerNetworks 2
1.3 OrganizationandTimelinessofThisBook 3
1.3.1 Organization 3
1.3.2 TimelinessoftheBook 7
1.4 Acknowledgments 10
2 OverviewofModernComputerNetworks 11
2.1 InternetofThings 11
2.1.1 Definitions 11
2.1.2 IoTArchitecture 12
2.1.3 ResourcesandServicesofIoT 14
2.1.4 WirelessSensorNetwork 15
2.1.5 MobileCrowdsensingNetwork 16
2.2 CloudNetworking 18
2.2.1 GeneralArchitecture 18
2.2.2 CloudDataCenterNetworking 20
2.2.3 MobileCloudNetworking 21
2.2.4 EdgeComputing 22
2.2.5 Cloud-BasedVideo-on-DemandSystem 24
2.3 5GWirelessNetworks 25
2.3.1 MassiveMultiple-InputandMultiple-Output 26
2.3.2 HeterogeneousNetworks 27
2.3.3 MillimeterWaveCommunications 29
2.3.4 CognitiveRadio 30
2.3.5 Device-to-DeviceCommunications 31
2.3.6 Machine-to-MachineCommunications 33
2.4 DataCollectionandResourceManagement 34
2.4.1 DataAggregation 34
2.4.2 TaskAllocation 35
2.4.3 UserAssociation 37
2.4.4 InterferenceManagement 38
vii
viii Contents
2.4.5 WirelessCaching 40
2.4.6 MobileDataOffloading 42
2.5 WirelessNetworkSecurity 43
2.5.1 UsersandAttackersinWirelessNetworks 44
2.5.2 EavesdroppingAttack 44
2.5.3 Denial-of-ServiceAttack 47
2.5.4 InformationSecurityIssues 49
2.5.5 IllegitimateBehaviorsinWirelessNetworks 50
2.6 Summary 51
3 MechanismDesignandAuctionTheoryinComputerNetworks 52
3.1 MechanismDesign 52
3.1.1 Mechanism 52
3.1.2 MechanismDesign 53
3.1.3 RevelationPrinciple 55
3.1.4 IncentiveCompatibility 57
3.1.5 IndividualRationality 58
3.1.6 EconomicEfficiencyandBudgetBalance 59
3.2 OptimalMechanisms 60
3.2.1 SocialSurplusandProfit 60
3.2.2 SocialSurplusMaximizationProblem 61
3.2.3 ProfitMaximizationProblem 63
3.3 AuctionTheoryinComputerNetworks 64
3.3.1 AuctionBasics 65
3.3.2 AuctionTheoryforComputerNetworks 68
3.3.3 BasicTerminologyinAuctionTheory 69
3.4 Summary 71
4 Open-CryAuction 72
4.1 EnglishAuction 72
4.1.1 EnglishAuctionProcess 72
4.1.2 EquilibriumStrategies 74
4.2 DevelopmentofEnglishAuctionforComputerNetworks 78
4.2.1 SystemModelandProblemFormulation 79
4.2.2 WalrasianEquilibrium 81
4.2.3 EnglishAuctionforWalrasianEquilibrium 82
4.3 DutchAuction 83
4.3.1 DutchAuctionProcess 83
4.3.2 RevenueEquivalenceTheorem 85
4.3.3 EquilibriuminDutchAuction 86
4.4 DevelopmentofDutchAuctionforComputerNetworks 87
4.4.1 PreventionofBlackHoleAttacksinMobileAdHocNetworks 87
4.4.2 RelaySelectionintheInternetofThings 91
4.4.3 ChannelAllocationin5GHeterogeneousNetworks 93
Contents ix
4.5 English–DutchAuction 97
4.6 Summary 99
5 First-PriceSealed-BidAuction 100
5.1 Definition 100
5.2 Equilibrium 101
5.2.1 StrategicAnalysis 101
5.2.2 Bayesian–NashEquilibrium 102
5.3 First-PriceSealed-BidReverseAuction 104
5.4 DevelopmentofFirst-PriceSealed-BidAuctionforComputerNetworks 105
5.4.1 IncentiveMechanismforDataAggregation 105
5.4.2 Market-BasedAdaptiveTaskAllocation 109
5.4.3 Market-BasedRelaySelection 112
5.4.4 Denial-of-ServiceAttackPrevention 114
5.5 Summary 117
6 Second-PriceSealed-BidAuction 119
6.1 Second-PriceSealed-BidAuction 119
6.1.1 Definition 119
6.1.2 DominantStrategyandNashEquilibrium 121
6.1.3 Second-PriceSealed-BidReverseAuction 123
6.1.4 DevelopmentofSecond-PriceSealed-BidAuctionfor
ComputerNetworks 124
6.2 Vickrey–Clarke–GrovesAuction 135
6.2.1 Definition 135
6.2.2 Description 136
6.2.3 DominantStrategy 139
6.2.4 Examples 140
6.2.5 Virtues 141
6.2.6 DevelopmentofVCGAuctionforComputerNetworks 142
6.3 Summary 157
7 CombinatorialAuction 158
7.1 Introduction 158
7.2 SubstitutableandComplementaryItems 159
7.3 Single-RoundCombinatorialAuction 161
7.3.1 BiddingLanguage 161
7.3.2 WinnerDeterminationProblem 163
7.4 IterativeCombinatorialAuctions 165
7.4.1 AscendingProxyAuction 165
7.4.2 Clock-ProxyAuction 167
7.5 DevelopmentoftheCombinatorialAuctionforComputerNetworks 170
7.5.1 SpectrumAllocationinCognitiveRadio 170
7.5.2 Virtualizationof5GMassiveMIMO 174