Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al-Qaeda

364 Pages·2009·2.13 MB·English

by  John E. Mueller

Atomic Obsession
Atomic Obsession
Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al-Qaeda
JOHN MUELLER
Oxford University Press, Inc., publishes works that further Oxford University’s
objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education.
Oxford New York
Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi
Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi
New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto With offices in
Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece
Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore
South Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam Copyright © 2010
by John Mueller Published by Oxford University Press, Inc.
198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016
www.oup.com
Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a
retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic,
mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission
of Oxford University Press.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Mueller, John E.
Atomic obsession: nuclear alarmism from Hiroshima to al-Qaeda / John Mueller.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-19-538136-8
1. Hiroshima-shi (Japan)—History—Bombardment, 1945.
2. World War, 1939–1945—Japan—Hiroshima-shi.
3. Qaida (Organization)
4. War on Terrorism, 2001–
5. Nuclear weapons.
I. Title.
HV6433.85.M84 2009
355.02’17—dc22 2009012860
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper
To Judy,
to Karl, Michelle, Karen, Erik, Susan, and Kraig,
to Timothy, Samuel, Clara, Kara, Malcolm, Atticus, and Lida,
to Lois and Phyllis
and to the memory of Robert H. Johnson
Contents
Preface
I. THE IMPACT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
1 Effects
2 Overstating the Effects
3 Deterring World War III: Essential Irrelevance
4 Modest Influence on History
5 Apocalyptic Visions, Worst-Case Preoccupations, Massive Expenditures
II. THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
6 Arms Races: Positive and Negative
7 Proliferation: Slow and Substantially Inconsequential
8 The Limited Appeal and Value of Nuclear Weapons
9 Controlling Proliferation: Modest Success
10 Costs of the Proliferation Fixation
11 Reconsidering Proliferation Policy
III. THE ATOMIC TERRORIST?
12 Task
13 Likelihood
14 Progress and Interest
15 Capacity
Epilogue and an Inventory of Propositions
Notes
References
Index
About the Author
Preface
Over the lengthy history of publishing, quite a few books have proven to be
fairly reliable remedies for insomnia. This one, however, may be the first where
that effect is the author’s main intention.
Drowsiness will not be induced, I hope, because the prose is enervatingly
flaccid, dry, confused, convoluted, opaque, or turgid. Rather, the book could
have its desired effect if it fulfills its central purpose. That is to put to rest, or at
any rate to attenuate, an often overwhelming concern that has for decades very
commonly kept policymakers and ordinary citizens from enjoying as deep and
uninterrupted a slumber as they presumably deserve: excessive anxiety about
nuclear weapons.
Ever since the 1945 bombing of Hiroshima ushered in what is often dubbed
the “atomic age” or the “nuclear era,” people have obsessed about the potential
for massive, even civilization-ending, destruction seemingly inherent in the
weapon exploded there. Over the decades this obsession has variously focused
on an endless array of creative, if consistently unfulfilled, worst-case scenarios
deriving from fears about the cold war arms race, nuclear apocalypse, and the
proliferation of the weapons to unreliable states (or even to reliable ones).
For example, in 1960 we were told by a distinguished pundit that it was a
“certainty” that several nuclear weapons would go off within ten years, and a top
nuclear strategist declared it “most unlikely” that the world could live with an
uncontrolled arms race for decades. In 1974, a scientist glumly suggested that
we’d “have to live with the expectation that once every four or five years a
nuclear explosion will take place and kill a lot of people.” In 1979, a very
prominent political scientist proclaimed the world to be moving ineluctably
toward a third world war and added that nothing could be done to prevent it.1 In
the process, there has also often been wild extrapolation when envisioning the
effects of nuclear weapons. The explosion of a single atomic bomb capable of
destroying a few city blocks is taken to portend the demise of the entire city, the
economy of the country, the country itself, the modern state system, civilization,
the planet. Armageddon and apocalypse have continuously been found to be
looming just over the horizon.
Disaster has also been envisioned as the inexorable result if more countries
obtain nuclear weapons. Before China obtained its bomb, the director of the
Central Intelligence Agency prophesied that, with that event, nuclear war would
become “almost inevitable.” Moreover, the rate at which new countries would
obtain the weapons has almost always been wildly off the mark. It was in 1960,
for example, that a presidential candidate insisted that there might be “ten,
fifteen, twenty” countries with a nuclear capacity by 1964. In 1964 itself a high-
level committee asserted that the world was fast approaching a point of no return
on this. And for decades, prominent analysts have prophesied that Germany and
Japan would necessarily soon get nuclear weapons.
Declamations like that very much continue to this day. If Iran or North Korea
gets a nuclear weapon, we are repeatedly told, the result will be a proliferation
cascade (or epidemic or wave or avalanche), and the result of that will be a
nuclear war or, in the words of the esteemed, and imaginative, head of the
International Atomic Energy Agency, “the beginning of the end of our
civilization.” There is, a recent think tank report suggests, “something
approaching a consensus” among experts “both in and out of government” that
we are “on the verge of a new nuclear age” where there will be more states with
nuclear weapons and a much greater chance the weapons will be used. As a
result, the continuously discredited “nightmare vision” of the 1960s, in the
words of another alarmed analyst, “still holds.”2
Following on this grand legacy of impending doom, there has been a
particular fixation since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, on the
potential for a terrorist atomic bomb, and politicians of all stripes preach to an
anxious, appreciative, and very numerous choir when they, like President Barack
Obama, alarmingly proclaim it “the most immediate and extreme threat to global
security.”3
Among those deeply concerned is Governor Thomas Kean, chair of the 9/11
Commission, who has confessed that what keeps him up at night is “the worry of
a terrorist with a nuclear device in one of our major cities.” Bill Keller of the
New York Times has complained about a similar disorder: after finishing a long
article about nuclear terrorism for that newspaper’s magazine entitled “Nuclear
Nightmares,” he remained boldly determined not to evacuate Manhattan, but, he
admitted, “neither am I sleeping quite as soundly.” Like Kean and Keller, FBI
Director Robert Mueller reportedly wakes up in the middle of the night worrying
about an al-Qaeda nuclear strike. Indeed the affliction seems general. Defense
Secretary Robert Gates maintains that, when asked what keeps them awake at
night, every senior leader declares it to be “the thought of a terrorist ending up