Atheism & Philosophy

271 Pages·2005·5.12 MB·English

by  Kai Nielsen

ATHEISM
&
PHILOSOPHY
m

Kai Nielsen
ATHEISM
&
PHILOSOPHY
With a new Preface by the Author
Prometheus Books
59 John Glenn Drive
Amherst, New York 14228-2197
Published 2005 by Prometheus Books
Atheism & Philosophy. Copyright c 2005 by Kai Nielsen. All rights
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Nielsen, Kai, 1926-.
Atheism and philosophy / Kai Nielsen,
p. an.
Originally published: Philosophy & Atheism. Buffalo, N.Y. :
Prometheus Books, 1985.
Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN 1-59102-298-3 (pbk.: alk. paper)
1. Atheism. 2. Agnosticism. 3. Religion. I. Title: Atheism and
philosophy. II. Title.
BL2747.3.N49 2005
211'.8—dc22
2005047254
Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper
CONTENTS
Preface 7
Preface to the Paperback Edition 9
1. Introduction: How Is Atheism to Be Characterized? 47
2. The Making of an Atheist 71
3. Does God Exist?: Reflections on Disbelief 79
4. Agnosticism 93
5. In Defense of Atheism 115
6. Religion and Commitment 145
7. The Burden of Proof and The Presumpion of Atheism 167
8. The Primacy of Philosophical Theology 183
9. Religious Ethics Versus Humanistic Ethics 197
10. Religion and Rationality 227
11. The Embeddedness of Atheism 249
To Sidney Hook
our differences notwithstanding
and to whom I stand in intellectual debt
Preface
The essays collected together in this volume were written over a num
ber of years for diverse audiences, on various occasions, and for a
variety of purposes. "The Making of an Atheist" and "Does God
Exist?: Reflections on Disbelief were written for general audiences.
There I try to be very direct and I eschew the protection of the qualifi
cations with which philosophers, when writing principally for other
philosophers, tend to hedge their bets. When philosophical essays of a
more technical kind are the product of a creative and disciplined mind,
such complex accounts are, in spite of the demands made on the
reader, very valuable indeed; but there is also a place in our intellectual
life for rather more simplified and unqualified statements. The latter,
when successful, have a way of speaking directly to a diverse group of
people in a way that more nuanced accounts cannot hope to achieve. I
try to do this in the essays mentioned above and it might be best for
an utter novice in philosophy to read these first; indeed, it might be
better to read them even before turning to my introduction. However,
for those with an equivalent to an introductory course in philosophy, it
would be better, I believe, to read the book in the conventional manner,
from beginning to end.
I would not want these remarks to be misunderstood. I have
sought, throughout all the essays in this volume, to write in a relatively
nontechnical, jargon free manner and to write in such a way that any
reader who can follow my argument will readily come to see its under
lying rationale. Whether it strikes a chord of agreement is, of course,
another matter. But what I am trying to do, the point of doing it, and
the argument for it should be tolerably evident. That notwithstanding,
it is true that in the essays, other than the two mentioned above, I do
make greater demands on my reader.
The essays in this volume were, as I remarked initially, written
over a number of years and while I hope they form a coherent and
integrated whole, it is the case that my views have developed, or at
least in some measure changed, and between some of these essays
there is, at some points, something of a tension. The place where it is
7
8 Atheism & Philosophy
most pronounced is between "Religion and Commitment" (1961), an
essay written two decades ago, and a more recent essay entitled "The
Burden of Proof and The Presumption of Atheism" (1977). "Religion
and Commitment" is resolutely verificationist—too verificationist for
many people's taste—while "The Burden of Proof raises a series of
issues that verificationist accounts in the philosophy of religion need
to meet. I am inclined, though not without a certain ambivalence, to
think that they can be met; and I am inclined to believe, as well, that
such an empiricism is not incompatible with realism but, that notwith
standing, such a verificationist account would need to be more quali
fied than it is in "Religion and Commitment."
Again, I do not want to be misunderstood. I am not in effect
disavowing the core set of claims in "Religion and Commitment," for
they seem to me to press home, though sometimes in too crude a form,
questions that very much need to be faced in thinking about religion.
But for those who think that such verificationist medicine just won't
work, "In Defense of Atheism," "Religion and Rationality," and "The
Embeddedness of Atheism" show how much of the case for atheism
can be conducted without reliance on verificationist assumptions.
The essays are designed to provide an unfolding integrated whole
to which the introduction gives guidance as well as providing a delin
eation of atheism that clearly captures it as not quite the straight
forward conception many have taken it to be. But it is also the case
that each essay (the introductory essay apart) is self-contained and
may be read in any order without reference to the others.
Conversations with many people, including generations of stu
dents, have been of considerable value to me in giving shape to these
thoughts. Indeed, there are far more people who have helped me than I
can even begin to mention, but I would like to acknowledge some of
the individuals to whom I owe the most, namely: Angel Alcala,
William Bean, Rodger Beehler, Pat Brown, Russell Comett, Adel
Daher, Joseph Epstein, Karl Frank, Joseph Gilbert, Jack Glickman,
Sidney Hook, Grace Mariane Jantzen, Tziporah Kasachkopff, George
Kateb, Janet Keating, William Kennick, C. B. Martin, Stanley Malino-
vitch, Hugo Meynell, Robert McKim, James Moulder, George Monti-
cone, Robert Moses, Louis Navia, Elisabeth Nielsen, Terence Penel-
hum, Alfred Prettyman, Neil Rossman, Stanley Stein, Kenneth Stern,
R. X. Ware, and Nettie Wiebe. I should also like to thank Merlette
Schnell and Arlene Thomas for their cheerful and accurate typing of
the manuscript and Shabbir Akhtar for his reading of the proof with
such dispatch and, in doing so, saving me from some blunders.
Kai Nielsen
University of Calgary