assortment of articles from The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, The International History Review, Capitalism Nature Socialism, Journal of Modern Chinese History

298 Pages·2012·1.41 MB·English

by  Robert J. Blyth

Britain versus India in the Persian Gulf: The Struggle for Political Control,
c. 1928-48
ROBERT J. BLYTH
The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol.28, No.l, January 2000,
pp.90-111 PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON
[The Government of India’s] concentration inwards seemed to react
disadvantageously on the more general outlook. There was in fact a sort of
gilded parochialism in some sections of the official world which tended to
obscure the wider setting.1
As the scale and scope of British responsibilities across the Middle East grew
during and immediately after the Great War, the political control of the region
presented a series of formidable challenges to policy-makers in London, Delhi,
and Cairo. Not only did Britain’s interests in the Middle East encompass a vast
swathe of disparate territories and embrace a variety of formal and informal
relationships, they were also managed through a web of overlapping
bureaucratic structures that involved several Whitehall departments and the
British Government of India. Wartime exigencies had produced a very
cumbersome administrative system, but after much deliberation the Masterton
Smith committee streamlined this into a more workable, though still intricate,
mechanism in the early 1920s.2 The mandates of Iraq, Palestine, and
Transjordan, and the Aden Protectorate were under the Middle East Department
of the Colonial Office, whereas Egyptian and Iranian affairs were entrusted to
the Foreign Office. Around the Persian Gulf, the division of duties was further
complicated as a consequence of the long-standing involvement of the Indian
authorities, both in London and in New Delhi. The Colonial Office dealt with
important oil questions and oversaw general Arab policy, including Britain’s
relations with the Nejd; the Foreign Office handled Hejaz matters; and the Indian
government, with its network of treaties and agents, supervised the affairs of the
Gulf states. By the end of the 1920s, however, this arrangement -essentially a
compromise accommodating rival views from within Whitehall and from British
India - required further adjustment and another lengthy struggle over political
control continued through the 1930s until after the Second World War.
The reorganization of political control entailed not only changes in the
administrative apparatus within Whitehall, but a realignment of commitments
within the Gulf itself. Foremost among these was the highly contentious Foreign
Office scheme to relocate the British Political Residency from Bushire on the
Iranian coast to Bahrain. This move came to dominate much of the negotiations
between Delhi and London, and seemed to symbolize the different approaches,
agendas, and aspirations of the imperial and Indian authorities. Progress towards
the transfer and the establishment of a new system of control can conveniently
be divided into three distinct stages. The first, from 1928 until 1933, covers the
collapse of the peacetime compromise over administration, the removal of the
Colonial Office from a central role in the Persian Gulf, and the creation of a new
bureaucratic structure. At this point, the struggle over the future political control
of the region largely became a battle between the Indian authorities and the
Foreign Office. Both were keen to expand the scope of their operations in the
Gulf as part of their individual reactions to the problems presented by the end of
the Iraq mandate and by the growing importance of the Arabian littoral to the
metropole. The second stage, from the early 1930s until 1945, saw increased
efforts by the Foreign Office to remove the Indian authorities from the region,
and the obstruction of the transfer scheme. The final period witnessed the
transfer itself and the development of a new postwar, and post-Indian
independence, mechanism for British control of the Gulf.
At each stage of the process, friction arose between the Indian and imperial
governments over their divergent geographical and temporal perspectives, and
over the political, bureaucratic, and financial implications of the various
proposals for the Persian Gulf. The well-established regional outlook of British
India was challenged by the more global view of Whitehall. Similarly, the
generally reactive and short-term planning of Delhi was in sharp contrast to the
arguably more methodical, far-sighted, and flexible approach of the Foreign
Office. The move from Bushire to Bahrain was more than a measure for
administrative convenience, it was part of larger debate on political control and
was a symptom of change in the British connection with the Persian Gulf during
the second quarter of the twentieth century. But beyond the problems of the
Middle East, this episode was also the final stage in a much longer conflict
between Delhi and the metropole over the shape and function of the Indian
government’s external responsibilities around the western Indian Ocean.3
I
The Persian Gulf, athwart the route from Europe to the East, was a natural field
of operations for British India. Beyond strategic interests, the East India
Company pursued trading links, and began the long-term association with
Bushire in the mid-eighteenth century. By the end of the nineteenth century, the
station had become the nodal point for the British trucial system around the Gulf,
and a key component in British India’s sphere of external obligations in the
Middle East stretching from Aden to southern Iran. Gulf affairs were supervised
by the Political Resident from his base at Bushire. The Resident was an officer
of the Indian Political Service and responsible to the Government of India and,
ultimately, the Secretary of State for India in London. Although the Gulf was
primarily a concern of the Indian government, there was a degree of
metropolitan involvement in the region, especially through Britain’s mission in
Tehran under the control of the Foreign Office. Indeed, the Political Resident
was also the British consul at Bushire and, in that capacity, answerable to the
Foreign Office. While this dual function, combined with Britain’s interest in
Iran, meant that the metropole was embroiled in the political control of the Gulf,
in practice, the region remained firmly within the Indian sphere before the Great
War.4
Neither the scope of the Government of India’s external commitments nor the
particular circumstances of the Persian Gulf remained static. In the last quarter
of the nineteenth century, the changing international situation in the western
Indian Ocean brought the region more and more into the orbit of metropolitan
policy. The responsibility for the conduct of relations with territories such as
Zanzibar and the Somali Coast, which had previously been within the British
Indian sphere of operations, was transferred to Whitehall as the scale of imperial
interests came to eclipse purely Indian concerns. While the Indian government
was glad to be relieved of some troublesome peripheral obligations, metropolitan
pressure grew in areas where Delhi was reluctant to withdraw. At Aden, for
example, successive Indian governments were certain of the importance of the
station to India and resisted efforts for greater control by London. But before
1914 the Gulf had not attracted the same predatory attention from Whitehall as
the Red Sea area. Nevertheless, the steady growth of oil exploration introduced a
new dimension to Britain’s connection with the region; and after the war
petroleum and the operation of strategic air routes were to become major factors
influencing the future development of British policy.
During the Great War the range of metropolitan activities and interests in the
Middle East expanded as the conflict spread across the region. Whitehall became
convinced of the need to centralize the military and political control of
operations in London to avoid confusion and delay. To this end, Delhi was
encouraged to relinquish direct involvement in Middle East affairs; and imperial
planners achieved a measure of success.5 But excessive bureaucratic difficulties
and insoluble political problems quickly bogged down Britain’s schemes for the
Middle East; the imperial will to accomplish centralization and the British Indian
willingness to withdraw rarely coincided. Plans for a separate Middle East
Office proved impractical and were shelved. By 1921, and the report of the
Masterton Smith committee, an accord had been reached between the feuding
departments, agencies, and governments involved in the region which
determined the form of British control until the early 1930s. In essence, the
struggle over political control in the Persian Gulf from 1928 until 1948 was part
of the process of amending the Masterton Smith arrangement to create a more
endurable solution to the problems arising from Britain’s presence in the Middle
East.
II
lln the late 1920s a number of developments across the Middle East affected
Britain’s postwar mechanism for the political control of the region and led to
heightened interdepartmental rivalries within Whitehall, and demands for a
review of the British and Indian positions in the Persian Gulf. Three key issues
were at the heart of debate. The first, largely a background problem for the
Indian government, concerned Ibn Saud’s victory over the Hejaz in 1925, and his
‘personal union’ of Hejaz-Nejd the following year. This produced unacceptable
complications in the conduct of Britain’s relations with the new Saudi state.
Although the Colonial Office was responsible for Nejd affairs, the Foreign
Office had to be consulted over policy towards the Hejaz. Neither department
was willing to reduce its role in Arabia and both were anxious to achieve
exclusive jurisdiction; but a long-term solution to this Arabian problem had to
wait until there was a more general settlement in the early 1930s.6 The second
major issue was the future of Iraq. By 1928 it had become clear that Britain’s
mandate over Iraq was drawing to a close and that the country would soon
achieve its independence.7 This development required further changes in the
British presence in the Gulf and in the distribution of departmental duties.
Finally, the entire apparatus for supervising Middle Eastern and Gulf affairs was
shown to be inadequate and excessively cumbersome in light of new factors such
as the promotion of air power and strategic air routes, oil and other commercial
activities.8 With difficulties in the system of control for the Gulf, and the Middle
East more generally, a realignment of the British administration was essential.
Accordingly, a series of discussions began in London and New Delhi, and a sub-
committee of the Committee for Imperial Defence, under Sir Warren Fisher of
the Treasury, was established to report on the problem.9
A period of positioning ensued in Whitehall as each of the departments with a
stake in the Middle East system addressed the question of future arrangements.
For example, in 1928 Hugh Trenchard, Chief of the Air Staff, complained that
the lack of unified control in the area and the continued involvement of the
Indian authorities hindered the development of air communications and the use
of air power in the Gulf. Trenchard advocated administrative centralization
within a single department (he favoured the Colonial Office) and the termination
of any Indian connection with the Gulf.10 This posed a direct challenge to the
Indian authorities. They were, however, reluctant to diminish their formal
interest in Arabian affairs ostensibly for domestic reasons which, while never
fully elucidated, related to Delhi’s well-established sensitivity towards Muslim
opinion." But a more considered response was required to parry the views of the
Air Ministry and other departments.
Through the dialogue between the India Office and the Viceroy’s government, it
was apparent that Delhi’s outlook on the Gulf had changed little from that of
Curzon’s day.12 For Indian officials, the safety of India remained the paramount
British objective in the region; oil and the development of strategic air links
followed as secondary concerns.13 While the desire to maintain Bushire as the
base for its political operations was implicit in the Government of India’s
attitude, it recognized that the discovery and commercial exploitation of oil, the
creation of the Iraq mandate, and the opening of air routes had altered the
balance of Indian and metropolitan interests in favour of London.14 Although
Delhi remained assured of its continued importance in the functioning of the
Gulf system, it had conceded that the region was no longer one of exclusive
Indian interest; metropolitan concerns - strategic, commercial, and bureaucratic -
had grown since the war. Broader imperial factors now appeared to predominate
over many of India’s more local and domestic preoccupations. The Foreign and
Colonial Offices, each keen to centralize control under its own command, were
only too aware of the geopolitical shift both from India to London, and from the
Iranian coast to the Arab littoral. The differences between Britain’s nineteenth-
century connection with the Gulf and the more dynamic contemporary situation
suggested, and perhaps demanded, that Delhi’s role should diminish while
Whitehall’s responsibilities increased.
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The paradox in the Government of India’s policy - recognizing the growth of
metropolitan activities and continuing to advance its own particular self-interest,
despite the danger of conflict - remained until at least 1946. Indeed, contrary to
Trenchard’s reasoning and in reply to the threat posed by his suggestions, the
Indian government indicated that it wished to reverse the prevailing trend and
resume the wider role it held before the Great War.15 But why should British
India be so keen to return to more active involvement in the Gulf? Essentially,
Delhi saw the end of the Iraq mandate in a quite different light from London.
The Indian government had agreed to limit its commitments in the Middle East
during and after the war on the understanding that British power in the northern
Gulf would be guaranteed by a substantial long-term presence.16 For officials in
India, Iraqi independence signalled a worrying decline in British strength. This
not only significantly altered the circumstances which had facilitated the original
Indian retreat, but seemed to require an Indian advance to fill the ‘void’ in the
Gulf. British Indian thinking was far removed from metropolitan views: the idea
of unity of control was pivotal to imperial policy in the Middle East but
centralization under the aegis of the Government of India was anathema to the
Colonial and Foreign Offices. Delhi’s stance meant that reorganizing British
commitments around the Persian Gulf would prove more difficult than
anticipated.
In response to the contradictory positions of Whitehall and the Indian
government, the India Office opted for delay and suggested that a final decision
on the future of the region await Iraqi independence.17 The Fisher Report of
December 1929 warned that ‘radical change’ was required in the Persian Gulf.
Communications were improved through the establishments of two
interdepartmental committees; but, ultimately, the recommendations were
modest. Perhaps of greatest significance to Delhi, the report urged that the
Political Residency be transferred from Bushire to the Arab coast.18
MacDonald’s government accepted the Fisher Report in July 1930 and the wider
question of political control was left for a future Cabinet decision.19 A
compromise was adopted whereby general supervision of Middle East affairs
rested with the Foreign Office while detailed local matters affecting the Persian
Gulf and Aden were dealt with by the Government of India.20 India’s role in the
region was left in the balance.
Despite their hostility towards India’s continued Gulf role, the Foreign Office
and other metropolitan departments had not yet formulated a comprehensive
plan to centralize the British system of control.21 The Colonial Office, for
example, did not relish the prospect of losing its stake in the Gulf to the Foreign
Office and at this stage was not convinced that changes in Iraq necessarily meant
an end to its role.22 The question of the future political control of Iraqi and
Arabian affairs was of secondary interest to the India Office, its prime interest
was to prevent the Government of India being ‘ousted’ from the Gulf.23 Delhi’s
policy now centred upon using the India Office as a conduit for communications
between the Gulf and the Foreign Office. The Indian proposal marked a return to
the pre-1920 mechanism and, interestingly, received some support within the
Foreign Office. George Rendel, the head of the Eastern Department, thought
Delhi’s claim to a stake in the system made practical sense, and did not
strengthen
FIGURE 1 MAP OF THE PERSIAN GULF
India’s material position in the region.24 Rendel’s views seemed conciliatory and
reasonable; but the mood within his department was moving away from any
accommodation of Indian sensibilities.
The question of how to organize Britain’s control of the Middle East, and the
Persian Gulf in particular, was not discussed within a vacuum; officials were
greatly influenced by external events. Among these, the major Indian
constitutional developments of the early 1930s, and their potential impact on the
very existence of the Raj, were of paramount concern to the Foreign Office. The
adoption of swaraj by the Indian National Congress, the report of the Simon
Commission, the beginning of the Round Table discussions, and the
announcement of moves towards an All-India Federation, excited a sense of
foreboding in Whitehall.25 Fears were expressed within the Foreign Office over
Britain’s future capacity to direct Indian affairs, especially external relations
affecting the Gulf, an issue raised already by Trenchard.26 Given these
uncertainties, a relatively simple adjustment of communications between the
Gulf and Whitehall seemed to present a tangible threat to imperial control.
Rendel was left to concede that the Indian authorities had, perhaps,
underestimated the dangers involved and that the transfer of India’s overseas
responsibilities to London would be
assisted if the Foreign Office now assumed additional duties in the Middle
East.27 With Foreign Office policy fixed on securing this goal, Sir Samuel
Hoare, the Indian Secretary, was eager to clarify matters. He argued, correctly,
that this relatively minor issue had assumed giant proportions through the spiral
of official correspondence. It was merely a question of establishing clear lines of
communication; political control would not be concentrated in a single
department nor would Whitehall’s authority be compromised.28 But the Foreign
Office remained intransigent.
Iraq duly gained its independence in October 1932 and the need to realign the
bureaucratic structure in the Gulf became even more pressing. The decision on
the new arrangement was not to be reached through interdepartmental debate
alone; the Cabinet was to judge the merits of each of the proposals. The end of
the mandate nullified Colonial Office opposition to changes in the system and
the department now supported the Foreign Office line.2'1 Sir John Simon, the
Foreign Secretary, presented a logical argument: the Persian Gulf was neither
part of India nor part of the British Empire and, therefore, ought to be under the
supervision of the Foreign Office. Furthermore, with the department already
heavily involved in the Middle East, it was appropriate to continue the transfer
of duties from India.30 Simon’s memorandum was clearly influenced by the
anxieties within Whitehall and represented a definite step towards confining
official British Indian interests to the subcontinent. Naturally, the India Office
disagreed. Hoare emphasized India’s significant financial and manpower
contribution to the Gulf and he argued that it made sense to concentrate
responsibilities within his department. Herein lay the strength of the India Office
argument. Uneasiness about rapid ‘Indianization’ was dismissed; external affairs
would be controlled by the Viceroy under the new constitution. Indian self-
government was felt to be ‘very far ahead’ and could not affect arrangements in
the Gulf at this stage.31 In other words, the India Office thought Whitehall’s
misgivings to be unfounded. The Cabinet agreed and concluded that the prospect
of the reforms weakening British control was ‘very remote, and against that...
weighed the fact that the India Office had greater experience in the regions
affected’.32 Britain’s relations with Iraq were to be handled by the Foreign
Office, but air routes and day-to-day questions relating to oil were now part of
the India Office remit. The position of the Government of India was
unchanged.33
The victory of the Indian authorities was illusory; the Cabinet decision was
designed to meet the requirements of the moment. None of the arguments in
favour of a transfer of control had been demolished; and the pressure for a
metropolitan advance had not abated. The Foreign Office, with its position only
partly consolidated, continued its bombardment by shifting its focus from
Whitehall procedure to British Indian operations on the spot. Now the future role
and location of the Political Residency became a key weapon in the imperial
assault and a vital bulwark in the defence of the Indian position.
Ill
Whitehall’s desire to limit the Indian government’s involvement in the Gulf and
move the Residency to the Arabian coast was not merely a consequence of
bureaucratic empire-building but a reaction to important developments in the
region. Since the war the scale of British interests on the Arabian side of the
Gulf had increased while the relative value of the connection with the Iranian
coast had diminished. The discovery and exploitation of significant oil reserves
along the Arab littoral between the wars offered new opportunities for British
companies and foreign rivals, especially from the United States. This created
powerful commercial, strategic, and political incentives for strengthening
Britain’s hold over the region.34 Similarly, the expansion of strategic air routes
through the Gulf added to the significance of the Arab coast. Britain was anxious
to maintain friendly relations with Tehran while important oil negotiations were
underway. To appease Iran’s hostility to the existing arrangements, London