AssociationwithFoci by MaziarDoustdarToosarvandani Adissertationsubmittedinpartialsatisfactionofthe requirementsforthedegreeof DoctorofPhilosophy in Linguistics inthe GraduateDivision ofthe UniversityofCalifornia,Berkeley Committeeincharge: ProfessorLineMikkelsen,Chair ProfessorAndrewGarrett ProfessorJohannaNichols ProfessorChristopherPotts Spring2010 Abstract AssociationwithFoci by MaziarDoustdarToosarvandani DoctorofPhilosophyinLinguistics UniversityofCalifornia,Berkeley ProfessorLineMikkelsen,Chair Associationwithfocushas,sinceJackendoff’s(1972)dissertation,beentheobjectofintensestudy. Most researchers, however, have concentrated on explaining the semantic variability of only and even, whose truth conditions vary with the position of focus. I take as my starting point another property of associating expressions. Both only and even restrict the distribution of focus, a prop- erty that, I argue, they share with a range of other lexical items. But, while only and even take a single argument and require there to be a focus somewhere inside that argument, expressions like adversativebut andletalonetaketwoarguments,therebyassociatingwithtwofoci. Associating expressions, of both the one- and two-place varieties, have two things in common. First, they are crosscategorial in their syntax, taking arguments of a variety of different types. Second,theyevokemultiplealternatives—differentpossibleanswertoaquestion.Together,these two independent properties of associating expressions interact with the question under discussion (Roberts 1996, 2004) to give rise to the restriction on the distribution of focus. My approach to association with focus departs from previous ones in important ways. Associating expressions neithermakereferencetofocusintheirlexicalentry(Rooth1985,1992,1996b)nortothequestion under discussion (Beaver and Clark 2008), providing a more satisfying answer to the question of whyonlysomeexpressionsassociatewithfocus. 1 Contents Listoftypographicconventions iii Acknowledgments iv 1 Introduction 1 2 Adistributionalrestrictiononfocus 4 2.1 Whatisfocus? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.2 Thesyntaxofonlyandeven . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.3 Secondoccurrencefocus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2.4 Two-placeassociatingexpressions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 2.5 Asemantictypology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 2.5.1 Additives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 2.5.2 Adversatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 2.5.3 Exclusives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 2.6 Thebigpicture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 3 Theadversatives 24 3.1 Twotypesofbut . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 3.2 Thesyntaxofadversativebut . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 3.3 Amoreabstractanalysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 3.4 EvidencefromPersian . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 3.5 Returnofthepuzzle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 3.6 Thenegativeelement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 3.7 Thesemanticsofadversativebut . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 3.7.1 Exhaustivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 3.7.2 Correction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 3.7.3 Usingadversativebut . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 3.8 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 4 Thescalaradditives 53 4.1 Thesyntaxofletalone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 4.2 Thesemanticsofletalone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 4.3 Aninformationalasymmetry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 4.4 Derivingthe‘secondconjunct’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 i 4.5 Barelyaproblem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 4.6 Lettingnegativepolarityalone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 4.6.1 Downwardentailingenvironments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 4.6.2 Flippingscales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 4.6.3 Puttingtogetherthepieces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 4.7 Extendingtheanalysistoeven . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 4.8 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 5 Atheoryofassociationwithfocus 81 5.1 Wherewewere . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 5.2 Alternativesemanticsforfocus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 5.2.1 TheclassicRoothianpicture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 5.2.2 Astructuredapproach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 5.2.3 An‘intermediate’alternative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 5.3 Questionsunderdiscussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 5.4 GroenendijkandStokhof’ssemanticsforquestions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 5.5 Derivingthesemanticeffectsoffocus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 5.6 Theadversatives’distributionalrestrictiononfocus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 5.7 Thescalaradditives’distributionalrestrictiononfocus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 5.8 Gettingfocussmaller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104 5.9 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 6 Conclusion 109 6.1 Alookback . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 6.2 Semantictheories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110 6.3 Syntactictheories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110 6.4 Pragmatictheories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 References 112 Bibliography 117 ii List of typographic conventions Interlinearglossing 1 firstperson M masculine 2 secondperson NEG negation 3 thirdperson OBJ objectmarker ADJ adjectivizer PAST pasttense F feminine PL plural IND indefinite SG singular Logicalsymbols logicalconjunction ^ logicaldisjunction _ materialconditional ! negation ¬ entailment ) x,y set { } x,y orderedpair h i ? emptyset setmembershiprelation 2 subsetrelation ✓ interpretationfunction JVaKriableconventions w,w,w ,... worlds(types) 0 00 x,y,z,... individuals(typee) p,q,r,... truthvalues(typet) p,q,r,... propositions(type s,t ) h i f,g,h,... one-placefunctionsonentities(type e,t ) h i f,g,h,... properties(type e, s,t ) h h ii R,S,T,... two-placerelations(type e, e,t ) h h ii R,S,T,... intensionaltwo-placerelations(type e, e, s,t ) h h h iii P,Q,R,... generalizedquantifiers(type e,t ,t ) hh i i iii Acknowledgments I have been fortunate to present my work to audiences at the 2009 Linguistic Society of America Annual Meeting in San Francisco, Harvard University, Stanford University, the University of Cal- ifornia,LosAngeles,theUniversityofChicago,andtheUniversityofMassachusetts,Amherst,as well as numerous presentations in the Berkeley Syntax and Semantics Circle. Their questions and comments have spurred major changes in my thinking. I have also had fruitful exchanges, in per- sonandbyemail,withAnastasiaGiannakidou,LarryHorn,MichaelIsrael,RussellLee-Goldman, JohnMacFarlane,JasonMerchant,JoeySabbagh,andOsamuSawada. Throughout my linguistics education, I have had the best teachers. My undergraduate advisor, Lise Dobrin, gave me an early appreciation for data and for integrating it with linguistic theory. Kyle Johnson asked me a bunch of hard questions about gapping my second year, and this thesis is in many ways a product of my attempts to answer them (though, in the end, I don’t think I do). JohannaNicholshasencouragedmetoexaminewhether,andifsohow,myclaimsextendtoother languages.ChrisPottshasbeenaconstantsourceofinspiration,andwithouthisprobingquestions, this thesis would not have been the same. Andrew Garrett has pushed me always to be a better linguist, challenging my assumptions and asking me for more and better data. My advisor Line Mikkelsen has, besides shaping this dissertation in content and form, mentored me intellectually, professionally,andpersonally,forwhichIamgrateful. Iowe ahugedebtto myfriendsandmy family. Theyhavealways believed inme,andwithout themIwouldnothavefinishedgraduateschool. iv Chapter 1 Introduction When we are trying to understand the truth conditions of a sentence, we usually only have to considerthewordsitcontainsandhowtheyarecombined.Forthemostpart,prosody—including stressandintonation—doesnotseemtomatter.Associationwithfocus,aphenomenonintroduced to generative linguists by Jackendoff (1972), comes as something of a surprise, then.1 When a sentencecontainsan ASSOCIATING EXPRESSION,somethinglikeonlyoreven,itstruthconditions canvarywiththepositionoffocus.Since,inEnglish,thecanonicalrealizationoffocusisprosodic, the sentence’s meaning appears to change with just a change in intonation. Why do some lexical itemsassociatewithfocus,butnotothers?ThisisthequestionIamtryingtoanswerhere. I start, though, with a different property of association with focus, one that is somewhat less conspicuous than the semantic interaction with focus. Jackendoff observes that only and even also restrict the distribution of focus. If only adjoins to the subject, then there must be a focus some- where inside the subject. If it adjoins to the verb phrase, there must be a focus somewhere inside the verb phrase. There are, I argue, more expressions that constrain the position of focus than first meets the eye. In particular, there is a class of lexical items that require the presence of two foci, one inside each of their syntactic sisters. These two-place associating expressions include adver- sative but (Anscombre and Ducrot 1977, Lang 1984:238–262, Horn 2001:402–413) and let alone (Fillmore,Kay,andO’Connor1988).Whenadversativebut coordinatestwonounphrasesubjects, there must be a focus inside each of these noun phrases. When it coordinates two verb phrases, thentheremustbeafocusinsideeachverbphrase. The obligatoriness of associated foci is not immediately obvious. A number of confounding factors have led researchers in the past to the spurious conclusion that they are optional. The first half of Chapter 2 is dedicated to establishing that associating expressions do, in fact, restrict the distributionoffocus.Whileonlyandevenontheonehandandadversativebutandletaloneonthe other are unified in this way, they differ in another. The truth conditions of sentences containing a one-place associating expression can vary with just a change in the position of focus. But such semantic variation is not possible with adversative but or let alone. Without modifying the con- tent of the sentence, changing the focus structure of a sentence containing a two-place associating expressionactuallyresultsininfelicity.IntheremainderofChapter2,Ioutlineatypologyofasso- ciating expressions, laying the groundwork for my account of why they all restrict the distribution offocusandyetdifferinsuchanimportantway. 1JackendoffattributestheobservationtoamanuscriptbySusanFischer. 1 I provide this account in Chapter 5. My approach is fundamentally discourse-oriented. I adopt Roberts’ (1996, 2004) question-under-discussion framework, where discourse is structured by questions ordered on a question-under-discussion stack. In Roberts’ original formulation, these questions are ordered by their relative informativeness. Drawing on Groenendijk’s (1999) logic of interrogation,Iaddadditionalconstraintsonthestructureofdiscourse.Associationwithfocusthen arisesbecauseofhowassociatingexpressionsinteractwiththequestionunderdiscussion.Theyall sharetwoindependentlymotivatedproperties: (i) Crosscategoriality Anassociatingexpressioncantakesubpartsofthesentenceasitsargument. (ii) Multiplealternatives Anassociatingexpressionevokesmorethanonealternative. The first property, crosscategoriality, is syntactic. One-place associating expressions are adverbs that adjoin to various constituents in the sentence. Two-place associating expressions are coordi- nators that can combine constituents of a wide variety of types. The second property is semantic. Associatingexpressionsallevokemultiplealternativeanswerstoaquestion. IintroducethetwopropertiesaboveinChapter2,andIshowhowtheygiverisetoassociation with focus in Chapter 5. These two chapters bookend Chapters 3 and 4, where I draw out the systematicparallelsbetweentheone-andtwo-placeassociatingexpressionsinconsiderabledetail. This is necessary since, while the syntax and semantics of only and even have been extensively treated, their two-place counterparts are less well studied. A large part of the two central chapters isgivenovertoprovidingsyntacticandsemanticanalysesforadversativebut andletalone. In Chapter 6, I draw out the consequences of my account of association with focus for the theory of focus more generally. The generative conception of focus originates partly in Halliday’s (1967b:226) view that the focus of a sentence ‘replac[es] the wh-element in a presupposed wh- question.’2 This is essentially a pragmatic concept, one where focus serves to constrain the dis- course contexts in which a sentence can be used. The study of focus would, under this view, falls outsidethedomainoftruth-conditional,model-theoreticsemantics,asdevelopedbyFrege,Tarski, Davidson, Kripke, Montague, and others—an approach to natural language meaning in which to knowwhatasentencemeansistoknowtheconditionsunderwhichitistrue.Focusdoesnotaffect asentence’struthconditions,onlyitsfelicityconditions. Theseemingexceptiontothis,aswehaveseen,isassociationwithfocus.Withassociatingex- pressions,thepositionoffocuscanaffecttruthconditions.ThedominantapproachsinceJackend- off’sdissertationhasbeentopostulateagrammaticalmechanismforderivingthecorrectmeaning of only or even. In semantic theories of focus, such as Rooth’s (1985, 1992) alternative semantics, information about focus is represented model theoretically as a dimension of meaning that lies, usually invisibly, alongside the ordinary one we are accustomed to. Associating expressions make reference to this alternate dimension so that focus contributes directly to their meaning. Nowhere in the account of association with focus that I propose do associating expressions make reference to focus as part of their syntax or semantics. The distributional restriction on focus arises from 2There are, of course, other information-structural categories, even within Halliday’s framework. These include TOPIC,COMMENT,THEME,RHEME,andnodoubtothers.SeeVallduví1992:28–52foranexcellentdiscussionofhow theseconceptsrelatetoeachother. 2 how two properties of associating expressions—their crosscategoriality and the multiple alterna- tives they evoke—interact with the question under discussion. All focus does, then, is constrain thediscoursecontextsinwhichagivensentencecanappear. Anoteondata WhereverpossibleIhaveusednaturallyoccurringdata.Eachexampleisaccom- panied by the type of source it comes from (either corpus, internet, literature, or periodical), and the sources themselves are provided in the references section. Corpus examples all come from the British National Corpus (version 2).3 They are sourced with a three-character code corresponding tothetextoforiginfollowedbythelinenumberwithinthattext.Forconstructedexamples,English judgments are my own, while Persian judgments come from three native speakers of the dialect spoken in Iran, who reside either in Tehran, Iran or the United States. I have added focus marking toexamplesfromwrittensourcesaccordingtomyintuitions. 3Distributed by Oxford University Computing Services on behalf of the BNC Consortium; all rights in the texts citedarereserved. 3
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