Assessment of the Nuclear Programs of Iran and North Korea PDF
Preview Assessment of the Nuclear Programs of Iran and North Korea
Jungmin Kang Editor Assessment of the Nuclear Programs of Iran and North Korea Assessment of the Nuclear Programs of Iran and North Korea Jungmin Kang Editor Assessment of the Nuclear Programs of Iran and North Korea Editor Jungmin Kang Lee Byong Whi Nuclear Energy Policy Center Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology Daejeon, Korea, Republic of (South Korea) ISBN 978-94-007-6018-9 ISBN 978-94-007-6019-6 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6019-6 Springer Dordrecht Heidelberg New York London Library of Congress Control Number: 2013932647 © Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013 This work is subject to copyright. 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Printed on acid-free paper Springer is part of Springer Science+Business Media (www.springer.com) Foreword During the last two decades, there have been successes but also disappointments in fi ghting against nuclear proliferation. On the positive side, we witnessed the dismantlement of nuclear weapons programs in South Africa, Iraq, and Libya. The Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) was inde fi nitely extended and continues to be the global framework against the spread of nuclear proliferation. There are now 115 Additional Protocols in force, which enhance IAEA’s veri fi cation capabilities. On the downside, the withdrawal of North Korea from the NPT and its subsequent nuclear tests charted a dangerous and negative course. As an additional adverse development, we have seen the emergence of North Korea’s uranium enrichment program. The international community has also not been able to curb Iran’s uranium enrichment and suspected military nature of its nuclear program. We see Iran marching slowly but steadily toward amassing nuclear weapons’ capability. Syria stands in fl agrant violation in its safeguards undertakings. When we are looking at these proliferation cases, there are a number of lessons – positive and negative – learnt. First, facts reported by the IAEA are essential for the international community in assessing the compliance and risks of possible clandestine activities. Second, the IAEA veri fi cation scheme is biting when it fully exercises its veri fi cation rights, and when it is provided with the requisite coopera- tion. Third, when countries face questions raised by the IAEA, those that chose to turn the course and/or cooperated to remove concerns and ambiguities resolved their nuclear dossiers in a satisfactory manner and fairly swiftly. Fourth, when states adopt the course of confrontation, as are currently the cases with Iran, Syria, and North Korea, the situation becomes more complicated and more dif fi cult to resolve. Fifth, dragging non-compliance and challenging of the authority of the United Nations Security Council and the IAEA Board of Governors erodes the international non-proliferation regime. This book addresses two proliferation cases, Iran and North Korea providing extensive snapshots on the currently known nuclear programs, and analyses failures and weaknesses of past veri fi cation activities, and makes innovative suggestions for ways forward. Olli Heinonen v Preface In his chapter on North Korea’s nuclear program, Dr. Siegfried S. Hecker reviews the most important technical and diplomatic developments of the past year. In addition to providing an account of his late 2010 visit to the Yongbyon facility and tour of North Korea’s newly constructed uranium enrichment plant, Dr. Hecker also provides careful analysis of the North’s new Light Water Reactor (LWR) at Yongbyon, as well as updates on the North Korean uranium enrichment program, plutonium facilities, weaponization and ballistic missile development and interna- tional nuclear cooperation. Dr. Hecker’s chapter also provides a detailed analysis of the February 2012 moratorium agreement and outlines possible next steps toward a more comprehensive security arrangement. Speci fi cally, the chapter discusses future prospects and provides recommendations on how the international community might handle the North’s uranium enrichment program, the LWR facility, the Yongbyon plutonium production facility, nuclear weapons and missile development programs, and trade in illicit technologies. Mr. Jin-Soo An’s chapter provides a detailed technical analysis of the North Korean nuclear program and describes strategies for an eventual veri fi cation regime. In granular detail, Mr. An elaborates on Dr. Hecker’s description of the North Korean LWR program and describes possible operational parameters. In addition, Mr. An provides a detailed description and analysis of the DPRK uranium enrichment program. On the issue of veri fi cation, the chapter introduces a comprehensive and highly systematic framework for verifying and characterizing the North Korean nuclear program, progressing from the overarching objectives and governing principles of any veri fi cation regime to a description of speci fi c sites, methods and instruments to be used in the North Korean case. Continuing with the theme of veri fic ation, Dr. Jungmin Kang’s chapter elaborates on a speci fi c technique – called the “Graphite Isotope Ratio Method” – that could be used to estimate the total amount of plutonium produced at the Yongbyon 5-MW graphite-moderated reactor. By sampling and measuring isotope ratios within strategically located sections of the reactor’s graphite moderator and comparing these samples to benchmark measures, we may be able to accurately estimate the vii viii Preface cumulative plutonium production at the reactor without access to operational records. Dr. Kang traces the development of the GIRM technique from its beginnings at the Paci fi c Northwest National Laboratory and provides a technical summary of the process. The chapter also provides a brief operational history of the reactor and details the reactor’s estimated physical characteristics. In a chapter discussing a South Korean perspective on the North Korean nuclear issue, Dr. Bong-Geun Jun applies a formal framework to the current issue of North Korean diplomatic and security crises, negotiations and agreements. Dr. Jun’s analysis describes a multi-step cyclical pattern that de fi nes North Korean negotiating behaviors: First, the North manufactures a crisis. Next, the international community responds to the crisis by initiating negotiations. The cycle ends with the inevitable collapse of the deal. Dr. Jun, in his paper, dissects this pattern of behavior, offering several insights into why it has dominated the denuclearization process for much of the past two decades and why numerous negotiation processes have failed to reach a sustainable nuclear agreement. The second part of Dr. Jun’s paper discusses contrasting approaches toward denuclearization and argues in favor of a dual-track engagement-negotiation strategy. The paper also examines in detail the speci fi cs of South Korea’s “Grand Bargain” strategy and “pre-steps” requirement, addressing how each initiative would fi t into a strategy oriented around achieving a comprehensive, sustainable and realistic solution to the North Korean nuclear problem. Most importantly, the paper provides a set of suggestions on how future negotiators might take advantage of changing regional political dynamics and correct earlier shortcomings. Turning to the subject of the Iranian program, Dr. Frank von Hippel makes a lucid and convincing argument that a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue could still be within reach. The chapter provides a brief background to the current diplomatic impasse over the Iranian program, including a description of the Obama administration’s failed 2010 Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) fuel swap proposal. Dr. von Hippel subsequently explores several articulations of the U.S. government’s ‘red lines’ related to Iran’s enrichment program, ultimately concluding that the current administration may open to compromise. The chapter also explores the dimensions of a hypothetical diplomatic deal that would accept Iran’s “right to enrich” in exchange for Iran providing the international community with increased transparency into its nuclear program and foreswearing enrichment above a certain level. In the context of this bargain, Dr. von Hippel proposes three scenarios under which Iran might still be able to pursue a nuclear weapon even after a negotiated deal and lists several creative measures that the international community might take in order to protect against each contingency. Dr. von Hippel concludes that Iran would be willing to accept these constraints in exchange for acceptance of its “right to enrich.” In another chapter on the ongoing diplomatic negotiations over the Iranian nuclear issue, Dr. R. Scott Kemp makes the case for continued engagement with Iran over its nuclear program. Dr. Kemp surveys earlier failed efforts, beginning in 2003, to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue with a specifi c focus on Iranian and Western negotiating tactics, concluding with the failed 2010 TRR fuel deal. Dr. Kemp points up the in fl exibility of the P5+1 nations as one of the proximate Preface ix causes of the current impasse; he argues that the U.S. requirement that Iran suspend enrichment is illustrative of the oftentimes “hidebound” and ultimately counterpro- ductive strategy employed by the unwieldy P5 coalition. However there are other impediments that have hampered communication between the U.S. and Iran over the nuclear issue; politics and poor timing have conspired in several instances to undermine outreach by either party. Going forward, he reasons, the international community faces three options. The fi rst is to shift toward a strategy of containment, which, by implicitly accepting the reality of a nuclear-armed Iran, Dr. Kemp considers premature and thus unwise at present. Second, Western nations could choose to continue the status quo, in which Iran’s progress toward a nuclear weapons capability is slowed by a combination of intelligence, sanctions and overt tactical measures such as export controls laws. As the current state of affairs shows, however, this strategy may be of limited utility and ultimately may prove incapable of preventing Iran from acquiring a breakout capability. Finally, the international community could employ what Dr. Kemp terms “aggressive prevention” measures, which includes sabotage and military strikes. This strategy is also imperfect due to the host of unpredictable consequences, not least that an aggressive strategy might increase Iran’s underlying sense of insecurity and validate its decision to acquire weapons. Dr. Kemp warns about the possibility of clandestine gas centrifuge facilities, the existence of which may be especially likely given Iran’s indigenous centrifuge fabrication capability and depth of scienti fi c knowledge. Given this range of sub- optimal, piecemeal solutions, Dr. Kemp reasons that only a sort of ‘Grand Bargain’ between Iran and the international community will suf fi ce: The only sustainable solution to the nuclear issue will be one that takes into account Iran’s fundamental motivations for pursuing a nuclear weapon and addresses its security concerns. Dr. Olli Heinonen, in his chapter, describes the challenges of veri fi cation as it applies to the Iranian case. Veri fi cation efforts, in Dr. Heinonen’s view, are critical to restoring international con fi dence in the peaceful intent of Iran’s nuclear program. However, after nearly 10 years of continuous effort, the IAEA has not been able to verify that nuclear material and activities in Iran are subject to IAEA safeguards. Dr. Heinonen’s account of the challenges faced by IAEA experts begins in the 1990s, when allegations of clandestine nuclear activities in Iran fi rst began to emerge. Dr. Heinonen describes IAEA visits to investigate claims of Iranian impro- priety as having provided a “false sense of security,” due to the fact that IAEA inspectors conducted only super fi cial site inspections. With respect to recent devel- opments, Dr. Heinonen cites contradictory statements made by Iranian of fi cials, including President Ahmadinejad, on the recently discovered Fordow enrichment plant as casting serious doubt on Iranian intentions. Additionally, the November 2011 IAEA report describing possible military dimensions to the nuclear program further implicates Iran. The report describes advanced enrichment research (the so-called “green salt” project), work on high explosives and ballistic missile development – all violations of spirit of the Nonproliferation Treaty’s Article III. Dr. Heinonen emphasizes the importance of IAEA veri fi cation efforts to corroborating the peaceful intent of the Iranian nuclear program and provides an extensive list of steps that Iran could take in the future to increase its credibility.
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