Arthur Balfour and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1894-1923

381 Pages·2014·1.34 MB·English

A Matter of Imperial Defence:
Arthur Balfour and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance,
1894-1923

Takeshi Sugawara

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

University of East Anglia
School of History
November 2014

© “This copy of the thesis has been supplied on condition that anyone who consults it is
understood to recognise that its copyright rests with the author and that use of any
information derived there from must be in accordance with current UK Copyright Law.
In addition, any quotation or extract must include full attribution.”

1
Abstract

This thesis investigates Arthur Balfour’s policy towards Japan and the Anglo-Japanese
alliance from 1894 to 1923. Although Balfour was involved in the Anglo-Japanese
alliance from its signing to termination, no comprehensive analysis of his role in the
alliance has been carried out. Utilising unpublished materials and academic books, this
thesis reveals that Balfour’s policy on the Anglo-Japanese alliance revolved around two
vital principles, namely imperial defence and Anglo-American cooperation. From the
viewpoint of imperial defence, Balfour emphasised the defence of India and Australasia
more than that of China. He opposed the signing of the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902
because it was not useful in the defence of India. The Russo-Japanese War raised the
concern of Indian security. Changing his lukewarm attitude, Balfour took the initiative
in extending the alliance into India to employ Japanese troops for the defence of India.
Moreover, as an advocate of Anglo-American cooperation, Balfour made every effort to
maintain good Anglo-American-Japanese relations. However, imperial defence and
Anglo-American cooperation began to clash within the alliance during the Great War.
Although the Siberian intervention was useful Japanese military assistance in the
defence of India, America, who was not interested in India, hesitated to support it due to
her suspicion against Japan. After the war, the alliance was still instrumental in
defending India and Australasia, but its existence damaged the relations with America.
Balfour tried to achieve both imperial defence and Anglo-American cooperation by
developing the alliance into an Anglo-American-Japanese trilateral agreement with a
military clause to revive a bilateral defensive alliance. But America and Japan did not
support Balfour’s plan at the Washington Conference, and he had to accept the
Four-Power Treaty without any military commitment.

2
Contents

Acknowledgements 4

Introduction 6

1. Emergence of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1894-1905 79

2. Testing of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1905-1918 196

3. Managing the Termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 280
1918-1923

Conclusion 356

Select Bibliography 370

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Acknowledgements

In the course of this research, I have incurred numerous debts of gratitude to many
people. I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Professor Thomas Otte, who
showed me the proper course of my research and gave me constant encouragement and
support. His comments on drafts of my PhD thesis were meticulous and enabled me to
correct many errors which I could not detect by myself. Professor John Charmley
supervised my MA dissertation and his lesson about how to read handwriting sources
was valuable to me. I also owe a particular debt to Dr Antony Best, who gave thoughtful
advice in many academic conferences and a party at his house. Professor Ian Nish
kindly discussed Balfour at the Washington Conference with me. I am grateful to Dr.
Geoffrey Hicks, Dr. Larry Butler, Dr. Steven Cherry, Dr. Laurence Cole and Dr.
Seung-young Kim for their many kindnesses. The responsibility for any deficiencies
rests with me alone.
I have been blessed with many Japanese, British and international friends since I
began studying diplomatic history in Britain. Their friendship is invaluable. In particular,
I would like to thank Richard Gerrard. If I had not seen him, my life in Britain would
become totally different.
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Finally, I owe a special debt of gratitude to my family. I want to thank my parents,
Hiroshi and Fumie, my sister Chiharu and my brother Yosuke. Without their
inexhaustible support, I could not have completed the research and finished writing the
thesis. This PhD thesis is dedicated to my family as a token of affection and gratitude.

Takeshi Sugawara

Norwich and London
November 2014

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Introduction

I.

At the end of the nineteenth century Britain was paying a great deal of attention to the
defence of her Empire. While she still possessed enough economic, military and naval
might to safeguard her global interests, her growing rivalry with European powers such
as Russia, France and Germany had spread from Europe into Africa and Asia. The rise
of newcomers such as America and Japan complicated political alignments among the
great powers. British statesmen had to consider how Britain should protect her interests
across the world in this complex and uncertain situation. As one of their solutions,
British global diplomacy fastened on the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which was signed in
1902 and continued until 1923. British policymakers, both those who supported it and
those who did not, discussed its management for more than twenty years.
Arthur Balfour played an important role in British policy on the Anglo-Japanese
alliance. In 1921 he boasted that ‘for 20 years I had been an advocate of close relations
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between Great Britain and Japan’.1 There is room for examining whether he was really
a proponent of cordial Anglo-Japanese relations. However, it is clear that he was
involved in British foreign policy towards Japan for about twenty years. He dealt with
the signing of the alliance as a senior member of the Cabinet, and undertook its revision
and renewal in 1905 as Prime Minister. He tackled the problem of Japanese naval and
military assistance to Britain as Foreign Secretary during the Great War, and coped with
the end of the alliance as head of the British delegation to the 1921-1922 Washington
Conference. Only Balfour was involved in each of these significant turning points in the
alliance as the pivot of British government. Therefore, he provides a unique prism
through which to investigate how senior British politicians regarded the Anglo-Japanese
alliance in its entirety.
Arthur Balfour (1848-1930), 1st Earl of Balfour from 1922, was born into a wealthy
landowning family at Whittingehame House in Scotland. His father, James Balfour, died
when he was seven years old and thereafter the 3rd Marquis of Salisbury, his maternal
uncle and a prominent Conservative statesman, assumed his care. He was educated at
Eton College and then at Cambridge University, where he studied philosophy and moral
science.2 Supported by Salisbury, he became a Conservative Member of Parliament in

1 Balfour to Lloyd George, 19 Dec. 1921, CAB 30/6/W.D.C.87.
2 Balfour wrote many books on philosophy in his life. For example, A.J. Balfour, The Foundations
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1874. Soon after entering the House of Commons Balfour embarked upon a world tour,
visiting Canada, America, New Zealand and Australia.3 Japan was not included in his
travels, although he landed at Singapore and Ceylon on the way from Australia to
Britain. This indicated that Balfour was not yet interested in Japan.
Balfour’s involvement in British foreign policy began in 1878. Salisbury, who
became Foreign Secretary at that year, appointed him Parliamentary Private Secretary.
Balfour made his debut in European diplomacy at the Congress of Berlin, which aimed
to resolve the Eastern Question caused by the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878.4
Accompanying Salisbury, Balfour had an opportunity to socialise with European
statesmen, including the German Chancellor Prince Bismarck. As Balfour confessed
later, this position brought him into ‘close contact with public affairs, and with those by
whom public affairs were then directed’.5
When Salisbury formed his first Cabinet in 1885, Balfour was supposed to

of Belief: Being Notes Introductory to the Study of Theology (London, 4th edn.1895); A.J. Balfour,
Decadence: Henry Sidgwick Memorial Lecture (Cambridge, 1908); A.J. Balfour, Theism and
Thought: A Study in Familiar Beliefs, Being the Second Course of Gifford Lectures Delivered at the
University of Glasgow, 1922-23 (London, 1923).
3 M. Egremont, Balfour: A Life of Arthur James Balfour (London, 1980), p. 43.
4 For details of the Eastern Question, see R.W. Seton-Watson, Disraeli, Gladstone and the Eastern
Question: A Study in Diplomacy and Party Politics (London, 1962); R. Millman, Britain and the
Eastern Question, 1875-1878 (Oxford, 1979); M. Ković, Disraeli and the Eastern Question (Oxford,
2011). For different views, see J. Charmley, Splendid Isolation?: Britain, the Balance of Power and
the Origins of the First World War (London, 1999); B. Grosvenor, ‘Britain’s “most isolationist
Foreign Secretary”: The Fifteenth Earl and the Eastern Crisis, 1876-1878’ in G. Hicks, (ed.)
Conservatism and British Foreign Policy, 1820-1920: The Derbys and their World (Farnham, 2011),
pp. 129-168.
5 A.J. Balfour, Chapters of Autobiography (London, 1930), p. 103.
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contribute to foreign policymaking. The Prime Minister also headed the Foreign Office
and considered making Balfour Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs.
Indeed, Balfour was in favour of taking this post, informing Salisbury that ‘I would do
anything that most conduced to the smooth working of your arrangements’.6 However,
in the end, Salisbury gave Conservative Member of Parliament Robert Bourke the
under-secretaryship and Balfour served as President of the Local Government Board,
with no seat in the Cabinet. Balfour finally joined the Cabinet during Salisbury’s second
administration from 1886-1892 and was consecutively appointed Secretary for Scotland,
Chief Secretary for Ireland and First Lord of the Treasury. Although he was not
involved in British diplomacy, he succeeded in strengthening his position in the
Conservative party.
In 1895 Salisbury’s third administration was established after the Conservatives
cooperated with Liberal Imperialists who had seceded from the Liberal Party. Salisbury
again also served as Foreign Secretary. Balfour returned to the post of First Lord of the
Treasury and as Leader of the House of Commons, making him a leading figure in
government without departmental responsibilities. However, unlike in Salisbury’s
second Cabinet, Balfour sometimes managed British foreign policy on behalf of his

6 Balfour to Salisbury, 15 Jun. 1885 in R.H. Williams, (ed.) Salisbury-Balfour Correspondence:
Letters exchanged between the Third Marquess of Salisbury and his nephew Arthur James Balfour
1869-1892 (Cambridge, 1988), p. 121.
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ailing uncle. During March, April and August 1898, when Salisbury was ill and
recuperating in the south of France, Balfour became Acting Foreign Secretary and
tackled many international problems such as the great powers’ disputes over China and
Anglo-German negotiations over the Portuguese colonies. Facing the heavy burden of
the departmental work involved, Balfour complained that ‘whenever Lord Salisbury left
him [Balfour] in charge of the Foreign Office, he found himself dealing with a crisis’.7
This demonstrated that his influence in British diplomacy was strengthened even though
he did not occupy a formal post at the Foreign Office.
Salisbury’s diplomacy in the face of many international crises intensified British
policymakers’ dissatisfaction with him, raising Balfour as heir apparent. Indeed, St John
Brodrick, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, hoped that Balfour
would replace Salisbury and ‘do some real big work for the Empire’.8 Although
Balfour did not express his discontent publicly, he was not a loyal follower of
Salisbury’s diplomacy either. In particular, unlike Salisbury, Balfour believed that
Britain needed a reliable ally to survive the growing rivalry between the world’s great
powers. Given his strong faith in Anglo-Saxon solidarity, it was not surprising that his
first choice was America. Even though the new Foreign Secretary Lord Lansdowne

7 B.E.C. Dugdale, Arthur James Balfour vol 1 (London, 1936), p. 250.
8 Brodrick to Selborne, 16 Aug. 1898, Selborne MSS, MS. Selborne 2.
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