Armstrong's Causal Theory of Mind

44 Pages·2017·2.53 MB·English

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DAVID M. ROSENTHAL
I
In the decade or so prior to the 1960s, philosophical work about the mind
was primarily focused, in the English-speaking world, on the problem of our
knowledge of other minds. The emphasis was doubtless due in part to the
continuing concern with epistemic issues that had led to logical empiricism,
combined with a rejection of the restrictive logical-empiricist methodology.
The work of Ryle and Wittgenstein (1953) dominated the 1950s, and both
were concerned to dispel any mystery that might seem to attach to our
knowledge of the mental states of others.
Behaviorist methodology clearly has great utility in explaining our knowl-
edge of other minds, and both Ryle and Wittgenstein extensively exploited
insights based on behaviorist thought. But their preoccupation with the
other-minds problem may help explain why both resisted seeing their own
views as forms of behaviorism. For behaviorism is usually seen as a view
about the way the mental fits in with the overall physical scheme of things,
and not merely an account of how the mental states of others are knowable.
And explanations of how we can know particular things do not require much
commitment concerning the nature of the things known. This consideration,
rather than some positive view about the nature of philosophical inquiry (cf.
1968, p. 55; 1980, pp. 16-18), may also explain Ryle's and Wittgenstein's
resistance to the idea that their discussion advanced any positive theory at all.
By the late '50s, however, the mind-body problem came to share center
stage with the other-minds problem, and shortly supplanted it altogether.
The beginnings of this shift are evident in Wilfrid Sellars' (1956) and P. F.
Strawson's (1958), which present unified discussions of both problems.
But the lively interest in J. J. C. Smart's mind-body identity thesis, first
promulgated in (1959), and in Hilary Putnam's functionalist view, first set
forth in (1960), reflected an intense, growing concern about how mental
phenomena fit in with the rest of reality, rather than about how other minds
are knowable. If one's leading concern is the relation of mind to the rest
of reality, even a merely methodological behaviorism is likely at best to
seem unhelpful.
Armstrong notes that behaviorism is well adapted to a concern with the
other-minds problem (1968, p. 88), though the behaviorism he discusses is
a substantive theory about the nature of mind and not a methodological
approach to explaining our knowledge of other minds (1968 , pp. 54-72;
1980, pp. 4-7). But however one sees behaviorism, it is striking that the
behaviorist-inspired discussions of the '50s are far richer and more revealing
80
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-7
DAVID M. ROSENTHAL
theory that does not assign causal efficacy to such nonphysical states (1968'
p' .48; cf. 1980, P. 34).
More generaliy, the causal analysis of mental concepts entails that all
theories of mind are simply competing hypotheses about the nature of those
states which have the requisite causal properties (1968' p' 89)' Cartesian
dualism will thus be the hypothesis that these states ale modes of unextended
substances. And the attribute theory will maintain that these states are non-
physicalstatesofphysicalorganisms.Neitherviewisverycredible,givenwhat
wq know of the causal workings of the world' It would be astounding to
come upon evidence that nonphysical states interact causally with physical
pro..rr., (1980, pp.33-54).Materialism is clearly the best bet'
This urgu*.ni lrom causal connections dominates Armstrong's discussion
of the ,.uron, for favoring materialism over alternative theories. It is also
somewhat more convincing ihun to*. other reasons he adduces. For example,
Armstrong urges that disembodied mental states are logically possible, even
if empirically they cannot occur (1968, p. l9). And he maintains also that
mental states cannot exist apart from something that is in those states, just
as grins cannot exist without faces (p. 22). Any acceptable theory,he insists,
mu-st reflect these facts. But the attribute theory cannot do so; it makes
disembodiedmentalstates.logicallyimpossible'since,onthattheory,there
would be nothing for disembodied states to belong to fu' a4)' Materialism
avoids this difficulty. For it identifies mental states with brain processes, but
not as a matter of logical necessity. It thus permits the logical possibility of
disembodied existence. And, since unextended substances are likewise logi-
cally possible according to rnaterialism, that view can also concede the logical
po$iuitity that disembodied mental states could belong to such substances,
ihus uroiiing the difficulty that they could not belong to anything (p. 9l).
But this criticism of the attribute theory relies on a double standard.
According to Armstrong, the attribute theory is, no less than materialism'
an empirical hypothesis about the nature of states defined in terms of their
causal roles (1968, p. 89). So the foregoing materialist maneuvers with
respect to what is logically possible will equally be available to the attribute
theorist. Armstrong's objection to the attribute theory hinges here on seeing
that theory not as an impirical hypothesis, but as a covert claim about
mental concepts. But Armstrong's own causal analysis of those very concepts
precludes this interpretation of the attribute theory'
Even without assistance from these more questionable considerations, the
argument form causal connections is powerful, and the causal account of
mental concepts thus strongly favors materialism as the correct theory about
82
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DAVID M. ROSENTHAL
to enjoy the benefit of Armstrong's brand of materialism. One can allow, as
Armstrong does not, that laws not needed in physics may nonetheless be
necessary to explain phenomena at the higher levels of organization char-
acteristic of chemistry, biology, and psychology. But as long as such laws
operate by virtue of properties and relations of entities countenanced in
physics, these laws will not violate the spirit of Armstrong's materialism.
Mental states, and the so-called secondary qualities of physical objects,
seem to pose the principal problems for materialism, so conceived (1980,
pp. 157-158). Mental states appear to have properties that are not needed
for physics, but seem unanalyzable in any more basic terms. Most conspicu-
ous among these properties are the intentionality, consciousness, and apparent
qualitative character of mental states. Similarly, the secondary qualities of
physical objects seem unanalyzable, and are unnecessary for physics. But,
if we can give a causal analysis of mental states that does justice to their
intentionality, consciousness, and apparent qualitative character, such states
will pose no threat to materialism. For causal analyses leave unspecified
what properties are responsible for the causal necessitation involved; for
all we now know, those properties will turn out to be among those postulated
by physics. And, if secondary qualities can be identified with physically
respectable proerties, as heat is identified with mean molecular kinetic
energy, they too will cause no trouble. This, in general outline, is the strategy
Armstrong pursues.
II
Most mental states do not actually issue in the behavior that, if it occurred,
would constitute the expression of those mental states, but instead only tend
to cause such behavior. The general formula that guides Armstrong's causal
account reflects this: "The concept of a mental state is primarily the concept
of a state . . . apt for bringing about a certain sort of behaviour." Some
mental states, but only some, must be described also as being"apt for being
brought about by acertain sort of stimulus" (1968, p.82). In addition, we
must describe many mental states also by reference to "their causal relation
to other mental states." And some "can only be described in terms of their
resembhnce to other mental states," which in turn "stand in causal relations
to behaviour." Indeed, Armstrong insists that in every case, "our analysis
must ultimately reach mental states that are describable in terms of the
behayiour they are apt for" (p. 83).
Since some mental states are connected only obliquely with behavior, and
84
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89
DAVID M. ROSENTHAL
those which would in most circumstances result in one's no longer having
that purpose or intention (1968, pp.l32aaa\.
To be purposive, behavior must not merely tend to result in an objective,
but must also adapt to actual circumstances in pursuit of an objective. Such
adaptation requires that one perceive those circumstances. Purposive activity
must be "controlled from beginning to end by perception acting as a feed-
back cause on the [original] mental state" (1968, p. 139). An account of
purposes must therefore rely in part on an account of perception. And on
Armstrong's view perceiving, like intending, is closely tied to behavior.
Perceiving is a mental state that makes possible particular lrinds of discrimina-
tive behavior (p. 2a9\. Discriminative behavior, however, is a species of
purposive behavior. Adequate accounts of perceiving and intending must
accordingly treat the two as inextricably intertwined (pp. 252-253).
Like intending, perceiving is intentional. Indeed, according to Armstrong,
perceptions are "nothing but the acquiring of true or false beliefs concerning
the current state of the organism's body and environment" (1968, p. 209).
So "the intentionality of perception reduces to the intentionality of the
beliefs acquired," i.e., to the possibility that those beliefs may fail to corre-
spond to reality (p. 2ll). Perceiving that something is the case is therefore
the primary form of perceptions; perceiving objects is a special case of propo-
sitional perception (pp. 228, 230-231). A case of one's perceiving that
something is so must be caused by what one perceives (pp. 229-230). In
exteroceptive perception, what one perceives causes the perception by acting
on our sense organs. But Armstrong argues against building this last condition
into a definition of perceiving; for bodily perception - perception of the
*
states of our own bodies involves no special sense organ (pp.2ll-212).
Perceptions are therefore states apt not only for bringing about behavior,
but also "for being brought about by certain physical causes" (p. 231).
If perceiving is the acquiring of beliefs, must we give in turn an independ-
ent account of believing? And can an account of perception in terms of
belief do justice to the apparent sensory qualities of perceptual states?
Armstrong's extended treatment of belief, n (1973), falls outside the scope
of the present discussion. But in any case, we do not, according to Armstrong,
need an independent account of belief to understand perceiving. Perceiving
involves acquiring abilities to discriminate among different current states
"of our body and enyironment" (1968, p.210), thereby enabling the pursuit
of objectives in accordance with those current states. These acquired abilities
are beliefs. Since they are beliefs about current states of one's body and
environment, they are perceptual beliefs. The acquiring of such beliefs is
86
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DAVID M. ROSENTHAL T
processes operate together. When inference figures in our acquiring of a
perceptual belief, the acquiring of it is a mediate perception; when no in-
ference is involved, the perception is immediate. Immediate perceiving is
the acquiring of beliefs about sensory properties, and Armstrong identifies
sense impressions with these immediate perceptions (1968, pp. 233-237).
Bodily sensations all involve sense impressions. Some bodily sensations are
described in terms of physical processes, e.g., sensations of heat, pressure,
and motion. These are just sense impressions of our body's being hot, having
pressure applied to it, or moving (pp. 308-310). Pains, itches, tickles, and
the like are sense impressions of bodily states together with characteristic
mental reactions caused by the immediate perceiving of those states. Pain,
e.g., is a sense impression of a bodily disturbance that causes a peremptory
desire that the sense impression cease (pp.310-317). The discussion of
bodily sensations in (1968) draws heavily on Armstrong's (1962), and very
likely remains the richest and most subtle treatment available.
Introspection, finally, and the consciousness associated with it, are
modeled on perception. Perception is the acquiring of beliefs about our
bodies and environment; introspection is the acquiring of beliefs about our
own mental states. Introspection is thus no more immune from error than
perception. Unlike exteroceptive perception, but like bodily perception,
introspection involves no sensory organ. Just as we do not perceive all the
states of our bodies and environment, we do not introspect all our mental
states; those which we do not are unconscious mental states (1968, pp.
92-115,323-327). And just as perceptions are caused by the objects we
perceive, the mental states we introspect cause our introspective awareness
of them. Not all consciousness is associated with introspection. Minimal iI
consciousness occurs whenever one is simply in some causally active mental i
.t
state (1980, pp. 55-56); perceptual consciousness involves perceiving some- I
:
thing about one's "environment and bodily state" (p.59), even if oneisnot i
conscious of doing so; introspective consciousness implies, in addition, I
awareness of some of one's own current mental states (pp. 59-61). Con-
sciousness is thus not "the essence of mentality," as many have maintained,
but "a special and sophisticated development of mentality" (p. 55). Rather
than follow the Cartesian tradition in conceiving of mentality on the model of
consciousness, we should instead define consciousness in terms of mentality.
The accounts just sketched all ultimately rely on causal connections with
behavior or stimuli. Inference, introspection, and nonperceptual belief are
each defined as the mental effect of purely mental causes. But those mental
causes are in turn defined in terms that capitalize on causal ties with behavior
88