Armored Combat in Vietnam PDF
Preview Armored Combat in Vietnam
ARMORED COMBAT IN VIETNAM ARMORED COMBAT IN VIETNAM Donn General A. Stariy ARNO PRESS New York •1980 Copyright (c) 1980by Arno Press Inc. All rights reserved. LibraryofCongressCataloging in Publication Data Starry, Donn A 1931- Armored combat in Vietnam. Includes index. — 1. Vietnamese Conflict, 1961-1975 Campaigns. — 2. United States. Army. Armored Force History. 3. Vietnamese Conflict, 1961-1975—United States. I. Title. 11. Series. [DS558.9.A75S73 1980] 959.704'342 80-21035 ISBN 0-405-13699-4 Manufactured in the United States of America , Foreword The United States Army met an unusually complex challenge in Southeast Asia. In conjunction with theotherservices, the Armyfought in support of a national policy of assisting an emerging nation to develop governmental processesofitsownchoosing, freeofoutsidecoercion. Inad- dition to the usual problems ofwaging armed conflict, the assignment in Southeast Asia required super-imposing the immensely sophisticated task of a modern army upon an underdeveloped environment and adapting them to demands covering a wide spectrum. These involved helping to fufill the basic needs of an agrarian population, dealing with the frustra- tions of antiguerrilla operations, and conducting conventional campaigns against well-trained and determined regular units. It is still necessary for the Army to continue to prepare for other challenges that may lie ahead. While cognizant that history never repeats itself exactly and that no army ever profited from trying to meet a new challenge in terms of an old one, the Army nevertheless stands to benefit immensely from a study of its experience, its shortcomings no less than its achievements. Aware that some years must elapse before the official histories will pro- vide a detailed and objective analysis of the experience in Southeast Asia, we have sought a forum whereby some of the more salient aspects of that experiencecan bemade available now. At the requestoftheChiefofStaff a representative group of senior officers who served in important posts in Vietnam and who still carry a heavy burden ofday-to-day responsibilities have prepared a series of books. These studies should be ofgreat value in helping the Army develop future operational concepts while at the same time contributing to the historical record and providing the American public with an interim report on the performance ofmen and officerswho have responded, as others have through our history, toexactingand trying demands. The reader should be reminded that most of the writing was accom- plished while thewar in Vietnam was at its peak, and the booksfrequently refer to events of the past as if they were taking place in the present. All books in the series are based primarily on official records, with addi- tional material from published and unpublished secondary works, from debriefing reports and interviews with key participants, and from the per- sonalexperienceoftheauthor. Tofacilitatesecurityclearance, annotation 111 FOREWORD anddetailedbibliographyhavebeenomittedfrom the publishedversion; a fully documented account with bibliography is filed with the U.S. Army Center of Military History. The story of armored combat in Vietnam was written at Fort Knox be- tween 1973 and 1976 by a task force under the direction ofMajor General Donn A. Starry, thencommanderoftheArmorCenter andcommanderof the Armor School. General Starry has been involved in the planning or direction of armored operations and development since he was graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1948 as a second lieutenant ofcavalry. After serving in command and staffpositions from platoon to battalion in armoredunitsin Europeuntil 1953, hebecame astaffofficerin the Eighth Army in Korea and then an instructor in combined arms and nuclear weapons employment at the U.S. Army Intelligence School. He later served as an armored battalion commander and staff officer in U.S. Army, Europe. In 1966 he assumed duties in the G—3 Section, U.S. Army, Viet- nam, and was a member of the Mechanized and Armor Combat Opera- tions, Vietnam, study group which evaluated armored operations in Viet- nam. Afterservingin assignmentswith the ViceChiefofStaffofthe Army and the Secretary ofDefense, he returned to Vietnam tojoin the plans of- fice ofJ—3, Headquarters, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, and in 1969 assumed command ofthe 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment in Vietnam. In 1970 he returned to the United States and served successively as Deputy Director of the Operations Directorate and Director of Man- power and Forces. After two and one-halfyears as the commander ofthe Armor Center, he assumed command ofV Corps, U.S. Army, Europe, in 1976. Promoted to full general, inJuly 1977 General Starry became com- manderoftheU.S. ArmyTrainingand DoctrineCommand, Fort Monroe, Virginia. JAMES C. PENNINGTON Washington, D.C. Brigadier General, USA 15 September 1977 The Adjutant General Preface This bookis an account ofthe operationsofarmored unitsoftheUnited States Army in the Republic ofVietnam. The term armored units as used here is generic and includes tank and mechanized infantry batallions and companies, armored cavalry squadrons and troops, and air cavalry squadrons and troops — all forces whose primary modus operandiwas to fight mounted. Of necessity the story begins not with the arrival of the first U.S. ar- mored units in Vietnam in 1965 but with armor in Vietnam during the years immediately after World War II. The generally unsuccessful ex- perience of French armored forces in Southeast Asia from the end of World War II to 1954 convinced American military men that armored units could not be employed in Vietnam. It was widely believed that Viet- nam's monsoon climate together with its jungle and rice paddies consti- tuted anenvironment too hostileformechanized equipment; itwasfurther agreed that armored forces could not cope with an elusive enemy that operated from jungle ambush. Thus at the outset of American participa- tion in the conflict and for some time thereafter, Army planners saw little ornoneedfor armoredunitsin theU.S. forcestructureinVietnam. At the same time, however, extensive American aid that flowed into Vietnam after the French left the country was directed in part to developing an ar- mored force for the newly created Army of the Republic of Vietnam. It was not until 1967, however, when a study titled Mechanized and Armor Combat Operations, Vietnam, conducted by General Arthur L. West,Jr., wassent to theChiefofStaffandSecretaryofthe Army, that the potential of armored forces was fully described to the Army's top leaders. — Despite thestudy'sfindings that armored cavalrywasprobably themost — cost-effectiveforceonthe Vietnam battlefield therewaslittlethatcould be done to alter significantly either the structure offorces already sent to Vietnam or those earmarked for deployment. By that time, constraints on the size of American forces in Vietnam had been imposed by Defense SecretaryRobert S. McNamara anddecisionsonforcedeploymentextend- ingwell into 1968 had alreadybeenmade. The armoredforceofthe Army of the Republic of Vietnam, meanwhile had been successful enough in fighting the elusive Viet Cong that U.S. armored units had been deployed in limited numbers, usually as part of their parent divisions. PREFACE vi From early March 1965 until the cease-fire in January 1973, U.S. ar- mored units participated in virtually every large-scale offensive operation and worked closely with South Vietnamese Army and other free world forces. After eight years of fighting over land on which tanks were once thought to be incapable of moving, in weather that was supposed to pro- hibit armored operations, and dealing with an elusive enemy against whom armored units were thought to be at a considerable disadvantage, armored forces emerged as powerful, flexible, and essential battle forces. In large measure they contributed to the success of the free world forces, not only in close combat, but in pacification and security operations as well. When redeployment began in early 1969, armored unitswere not in- cluded in thefirst forcesscheduled for redeployment, and indeed planners moved armored units down the scale time and again, holding off their redeployment until the very end. In almost equal parts this study has drawn from official war records of armored units and personal interviews with men of those units. The book makes no attempt to document every armored unit in every battle. Nor does it list in detail the lessons that maybelearned from the Vietnam con- flict, although it does call attention to some. In so doing it sometimes isolates and focuses on the mounted combat aspects ofoperations that ac- tually included many different American and other free world units. The reader should keep in mind that the author's intent is to tell the story of mounted units, and not to describe battles in their entirety. Documenting this story of mounted combat in Vietnam was not a one- manjob. Of the many people who helped, several deserve special thanks. Lieutenant Colonel George J. Dramis, Jr., director of the task force, developed the first topical outline, assessed the historical significance of each bit ofthewealthofinformationavailable, andranthetaskforcefrom day to day. The members of the task force, Vietnam veterans with firsthand ex- perience, whose collective knowledge contributed to the continuity of the story were armor officers MajorJohn G. Russell, Major Thomas P. Bar- rett, Captain Robert M. Engeset, CaptainJohn L. Hagar, Captain Gerald A. McDonald, Captain Maurice B. Parrish, CaptainJeffreyA. Stark, Cap- tain Clavin Teel, Jr., and Sergeant Major Christopher N. Trammell; in- fantry officers Captain Robert P. Antoniuc and CaptainJohn Strange; J. and Captain Dennis M. Jankowski of the Quartermaster Corps. The con- tributions ofthe Infantry School, particularly those of Lieutenant Colonel Wayne T. Boles, were invaluable. Without the good work of the ad- ministrative staff, Mrs. Pege R. Bailey, administrative assistant, Mrs.
The list of books you might like
