Armor Task Force to Khe Sanh

80 Pages·2008·6.9 MB·English

The Professional Bulletin of the Armor Branch, Headquarters, Department of the Army, PB 17-08-5
Editor in Chief
Features
MAJ MARK A. REEVES
6 Welcome to the Counterinsurgency Century
Managing Editor
by Retired General Donn Starry
CHRISTY BOURGEOIS
11 Sadr City: The Armor Pure Assault in Urban Terrain
Commandant by Captain John C. Moore
BG DONALD M. CAMPBELL, JR.
18 Task Force Iron Dukes Campaign for Najaf
by Lieutenant Colonel Pat White
24 Integrating Armor into Personnel Recovery Operations
ARMOR (ISSN 0004-2420) is published bim onth l y by
the U.S. Army Armor Center, ATTN: ATZK-DAS-A, by Captain Romeo P. Cubas, U.S. Marine Corps
Building 1109A, 201 6th Avenue, Ste 373, Fort Knox,
28 Retaking Sa’ad: Successful Counterinsurgency in Tal Afar
KY 40121-5721.
by Major Niel Smith
Disclaimer: The information contained in ARMOR rep-
resents the professional opinions of the authors and 38 The Roots of Insurgent Warfare
does not necessarily reflect the official Army or TRA- by Captain Christopher L. Center
DOC position, nor does it change or supersede any in-
formation presented in other official Army publications. 47 Armor in Urban Terrain: The Critical Enabler
by Major General Peter W. Chiarelli, Major Patrick R. Michaelis,
Official distribution is limited to one copy for each ar-
and Major Geoffrey A. Norman
mored brigade headquarters, ar mored cavalry regi-
ment headquarters, armor battal ion head quar ters, ar- 53 Platoons of Action: An Armor Task Force’s Response
mored cavalry squadron headquarters, reconnais- to Full-Spectrum Operations in Iraq
sance squadron head quar ters, armored cavalry troop,
by John P.J. DeRosa
armor com pany, and motorized brigade headquarters
of the United States Army. In addition, Army li braries, 59 A Report on the 11th Armored Cavalry in Southeast Asia 1969-70
Army and DOD schools, HQ DA and MACOM staff by Colonel Donn A. Starry
agencies with responsibility for armored, direct fire,
ground combat systems, organizations, and the train- 65 The Battle of Suoi Tre: Viet Cong Infantry Attack on a Firebase
ing of personnel for such organizations may request Ends in Slaughter When Armor Arrives
two cop ies by sending a request to the editor in chief. by First Sergeant Christopher P. Worick
Authorized Content: ARMOR will print only those ma-
71 Armor Task Force to Khe Sanh
terials for which the U.S. Army Armor Center has pro-
by Lieutenant Colonel Carmelo P. Milia
ponency. That proponenc y in cludes: all armored, di-
rect-fire ground combat systems that do not serve pri-
75 The Battle of An Bao II
marily as infantry carriers; all weapons used exclusive-
by Captain Timothy J. Grogan
ly in these systems or by CMF 19-series enlisted sol-
diers; any miscellaneous items of equipment which ar-
mor and armored cavalry organizations use exclusive-
Departments
ly; train ing for all 19-series officers and for all CMF-19-
series enlisted soldiers; and information concerning
2 Contacts
the training, logistics, history, and leadership of armor
and armored cavalry units at the brigade/regiment lev- 3 Letters
el and below, to include Threat units at those levels. 4 Commander’s Hatch
5 Driver’s Seat
ARMOR is published by authority of the Chief of Staff,
U.S. Army; therefore, as a professional bulletin, its man-
uscripts are official works and are cons idered works of
the U.S. Government, which implies, without question,
that the bulletin is owned and controlled by the U.S.
Department of Defense. The contents of ARMOR or
any portion thereof, are not “public domain.” Apart from Periodicals Postage paid at Fort Knox, KY, and additional mailing offi ces. Postmaster: Send address changes to Editor,
any fair dealing for the purpose of study or research ATTN: ATZK-DAS-A, ARMOR, 201 6th Avenue, Ste 373, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5721.
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ARMOR. Inquiries may be directed to Managing Edi-
tor, ARMOR, Building 1109A, 201 6th Avenue, Suite By Order of the Secretary of the Army: Offi cial:
373, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5721.
GEORGE W. CASEY, JR. JOYCE E. MORROW
General, United States Army Administrative Assistant to the
September-October 2008, Vol. CXVII, No. 5
Chief of Staff Secretary of the Army
0819122
Preface
The U.S. Army/U.S. Marine Corps Counterinsurgency (COIN) Center at Fort Leav-
enworth, Kansas, would like to thank the editor and managing editor of ARMOR
for their agreement to publish this special counterinsurgency edition. Several
months ago, the COIN Center and staff of ARMOR agreed that the time was right
to consolidate in a single edition a selection of the most valuable and instructive
recently published articles on the use of armor in a counterinsurgency environ-
ment. These articles will provide units preparing to deploy a quick overview of the
“best practices” associated with the use of armor in a COIN environment and per-
haps lay the groundwork for future doctrinal revisions.
Such a compendium is needed in many areas, but perhaps especially with regard
to the use of armor. As the professionals reading this journal understand, it has
been an historical pattern that we suffer generational amnesia and tend to forget
hard-won lessons, only later to pay in blood and treasure to relearn them. Among
such lessons in need of reinforcement is the importance of armor in modern com-
bat and the contemporary operational environment. The United States has had to
relearn this lesson in Korea, Vietnam, Panama, and Somalia. It is a lesson that we
have again had to relearn in Iraq and Afghanistan, where in the face of growing
insurgencies, lightly protected vehicles became the target of choice for improvised
explosive device (IED) attacks to be exploited in the world media by our enemies.
In 2006, the U.S. Army and Marine Corps published U.S. Army Field Manual (FM)
3-24, Counterinsurgency, a comprehensive strategic/operational-level guide for
dealing with insurgencies. The analysis and historical perspectives outlined in
FM 3-24 — in so far as they go — have proven extremely useful guiding Soldiers,
Marines, and leaders how to think about insurgencies and approaches to defeat
them. However, as useful as FM 3-24 has been, it has not filled all doctrinal re-
quirements for those directly operating against insurgents at the tactical level.
Our goal is that this compendium will in some meaningful way both provide a
practical tool for addressing a void in tactical doctrine with respect to the use of
armor in counterinsurgency, as well as encourage further contributions from pro-
fessionals like you who are dedicated to our Army’s ongoing efforts to learn, adapt,
and win.
DANIEL S. ROPER
Colonel, FA
Director, USA/USMC COIN Center
Points of Contact
DSN prefix – 464-
Commercial prefix– (502) 624-
ARMOR Editorial Offices U.S. Army Armor Center
Editor in Chief Commanding General (ATZK-CG)
Major Mark A. Reeves 4087 BG Donald M. Campbell, Jr. 2121
E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected]
Managing Editor
Christy Bourgeois 4582 Deputy Commander (ATZK-DCG)
E-mail: [email protected] COL David A. Teeples 7555
E-mail: [email protected]
Editor
Vivian Oertle 2610 Chief of Staff (ATZK-CS)
E-mail: [email protected] COL Peter D. Utley 1101
Art Director E-mail: [email protected]
Mr. Jody Harmon 3923
E-mail: [email protected] Command Sergeant Major (ATZK-CSM)
CSM John W. Troxell 4952
Editorial Assistant
E-mail: [email protected]
Kathy A. Johnson 2249
E-mail: [email protected]
Command Sergeant Major to DCG (ATZK-DCG-CSM)
CSM Clarence J. Stanley 7091
E-mail: [email protected]
ARTICLE SUBMISSIONS: Articles can be submitted as e-mail attach-
ments to [email protected]. Articles can also be submit-
Special Assistant to the CG (ARNG) (ATZK-SA)
ted on CD or floppy disk with a double-spaced hard copy. Mail to ARMOR,
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Directorate of Training, Doctrine, and Combat Development
* * * COL Michael N. Smith (ATZK-TD)
SUBMISSION POLICY NOTE: Due to the limited space per issue, we E-mail: [email protected] 8247
will not print articles that have been submitted to, and accepted for pub-
lication by, other Army professional bulletins. Please submit your article
TRADOC Capability Manager for Heavy Brigade Combat Team
to only one Army professional bulletin at a time.
COL Jeff B. Swisher (ATZK-TS)
* * * E-mail: [email protected] 7955
GRAPHICS AND PHOTOS: We will accept conventional photo prints
and electronic graphic and photo files in no less than 300 dpi format. TRADOC Capability Manager, Platform Battle
(Please do not send photos embedded in PowerPoint and Word.) If you Command/Combat Identification (ATZK-PBC-CID)
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photo submissions, call Vivian Oertle at the phone number above.
* * * Office, Chief of Armor (ATZK-AR)
UNIT DISTRIBUTION: To report unit free distribution delivery prob- Aubrey Henley 5155
lems or changes of unit address, e-mail us at knox.armormag@conus. E-mail: [email protected] FAX 7585
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official dis tribution list should be in the form of a letter or e-mail to the Soldier - Mounted Soldier System (ATZK-ATS)
Editor in Chief. Larry Hasty 3662
* * *
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EDITORIAL MAILING ADDRESS: ARMOR, ATTN: ATZK-DAS-A,
Bldg 1109A, 201 6th Avenue, Ste 373, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5721.
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REPRINTS: ARMOR is published by authority of the Chief of Staff, U.S.
Army; therefore, as a professional bulletin, its manuscripts are official U.S. Army Armor School
works and are considered works of the U.S. Government, which implies,
without question, that the bulletin is owned and controlled by the U.S. Director of the Armor School (ATZK-DAS)
Department of Defense. The contents of ARMOR or any portion thereof, COL Jeffrey L. Davidson 1050
are not “public domain.” Apart from any fair dealing for the purpose of E-mail: [email protected]
study or research by U.S. Government agencies, no part may be repro-
duced, reprinted, sold, or distributed by any process without prior written 194th Armored Brigade (ATZK-BAZ)
permission from the author and ARMOR. Inquiries may be directed to COL David Hubner 8736
Managing Editor, ARMOR, Building 1109A, 201 6th Avenue, Suite 373, E-mail: [email protected]
Fort Knox, KY 40121-5721.
* * * 16th Cavalry Regiment (ATZK-SBZ)
ARMOR MAGAZINE ONLINE: Visit the ARMOR magazine web site COL Leopoldo A. Quintas 7848
at www.knox.army.mil/armormag. E-mail: [email protected]
* * *
ARMOR HOTLINE — DSN 464-TANK: The Armor Hotline is a 24- NCO Academy (ATZK-NC)
hour service to provide assistance with questions concerning doctrine, CSM Ray Edgar 5150
training, organizations, and equipment of the armor force. E-mail: [email protected]
2 — September-October 2008
“Cavalry is a State of Mind” missions under enemy fire. Thus cavalry recon thin-skinned reconnaissance and surveillance
grew in size and manpower while shrinking its vehicles (RSVs) that will only report enemy con-
Dear ARMOR, combat power. tact through a default protocol of “last known
My compliments to Major Daniel Davis for his location before all contact lost.” The baseline
Related History
concise assessment of the weakness of the doctrine should also clarify the different mis-
current cavalry recon force in his article, “Fight- Before Division ’86 restructuring, there was sions and roles of cavalry, battalion scouts, and
ing for Information,” in the May-June 2008 edi- an organization called a divisional MI combat technical recon units such as NBC and RSTA
tion of ARMOR. The heavy armored cavalry electronic warfare and intelligence (CEWI) bat- platoons. Finally, the Chief of Armor and Chief
regiment, heavy divisional cavalry squadron, talion. The CEWI acronym still appeared in the of Military Intelligence should develop a com-
and the heavy separate cavalry troop, support- 1997 U.S. Army Field (FM) 101-5-1, Operation- bined arms doctrinal approach for RSTA em-
ing corps heavy division and heavy brigades al Terms and Graphics, though without expla- ployment by heavy brigade and above and al-
respectively, were far more powerful and sur- nation. The 1992 FM 71-123, Tactics and Tech- location to battalion and below.
vivable than any of their current replacement niques for Combined Arms Heavy Forces: Ar-
If armor fails in two or more of the above, then
organizations. Throughout, cavalry employed mored Brigade, Battalion Task Force, and Com-
we will soon have to question the purpose of
standard combat systems. Cavalry’s effective- pany Team, still included the capability, though
retaining armor as a branch in the future com-
ness came from its doctrinal employment and without the specific CEWI title, on page 2-49,
bat force. It would be proper to finally and offi-
combined arms organization, not specialized “The division’s task organization may allocate
cially disband armor, with the mission, history,
equipment. Quite literally, “Cavalry is a state of MI units to the brigade to collect signals intel-
and traditions of tank battalions being absorbed
mind!” Absent convincing evidence to suggest ligence in support of the brigade. If GSR [ground
by a resurrected cavalry branch, if not under MI
otherwise, future cavalry units should be simi- surveillance radar] is part of the MI unit, it is
branch. Not a pleasing prospect, I assure you.
larly organized using future combat system typically sub-allocated to subordinate maneu-
Know where you’ve been; know where you’re
(FCS) equivalents of the tank, infantry fighting ver battalions. However, GSR may sometimes
going; move out!
vehicle, mortar carrier, field artillery cannon, be retained under brigade control.”
command post vehicle, etc. P.S. While able to mix companies to form “bat-
Since then, new technologies and systems
talion task forces” and platoons to form “com-
Major Davis’ criticism of the future cavalry and have become available, but MI never made the
pany teams,” the post-World War II Army had
recon is valid, but I disagree with his propos- absurd claim that it could substitute for scouts
remained a “pure battalion-based” combat or-
als. He merely tweaks what he has already ar- and cavalry. The technology did not exist then,
ganization. Now, the proponents of FCS are
gued to be inadequate. I contend that the cav- nor does it today. Unfortunately, FCS and fu-
very proud of finally achieving the creation of
alry of the future brigade combat team (FBCT) ture cavalry planners have pushed the enve-
CABs. Well excuse me, but armored cavalry
and combined arms battalion (CAB), though in- lope far beyond their areas of expertise while
has had combined arms troops since Division
effective, is also far too large. An FBCT should ignoring the realities of combat support and
’86, and before that, it had combined arms pla-
need only a cavalry troop and a future CAB, at combat service support under fire. RSTA as-
toons (3 tanks, 5 scouts, 1 mortar, and 1 infan-
most, might retain a scout platoon for scout- sets are definitely useful in supporting the
try armored personnel carrier). Hence, my be-
specific missions. Seriously, just how many ech- FBCT and can be deployed as far forward as
musement at the ignorance that passes for
elons of cavalry scouts does it take to lead a the situation warrants, but only in addition to,
“new ideas” in doctrine and combat develop-
combat maneuver unit onto the objective, any- not as substitute for, armored cavalry.
ment.
way, especially given all of the high-tech com-
Up until about 2 decades ago, while technol-
munications and situational awareness archi- CHESTER A. KOJRO
ogy and systems always advanced, our doc-
tecture built into practically every vehicle? LTC, U.S. Army, Retired
trine was solidly based and directly evolved
I see the broader problem — the emascula- from World War II experiences and had changed
tion and concurrent expansion of recon squad- little up to and through “Division ’86.” Since
rons and troops within the FBCT and CAB is then, there has been an explosion of whimsi-
based on doctrinal confusion. It began when cal doctrine writing and revisions to suit emerg-
the Army agreed to give divisional brigade com- ing “future” capabilities. This period included FEEDBACK: A COMBAT MULTIPLIER
manders an added echelon of recon capabil- the emasculation of cavalry noted in Major Da-
ity. Unwilling to resource a heavy separate cav- vis’ article, but also included the many failed Writing letters to the editor is an effective
alry troop, they instead created the utterly inad- Army-wide efforts such as armored family of way of sharing opinions and inspiring oth-
equate brigade recon troop (BRT) of a troop vehicles (AFV), heavy force modernization ers to take action on issues that are of
headquarters and two light scout platoons. (HFM), armored systems modernization (ASM), concern to the armor branch. They also
Without any combined arms capability, the BRT mobile strike force, Force XXI, Army After Next serve as a quick-fire reaction to our arti-
cannot operate independently; with only two (AAN), interim brigade combat team, and now cles. Your letters achieve results because
platoons, it cannot support each of the three or the current FCS. they reach a large audience, are moni-
four maneuver battalions. While brigade com- tored by leaders, bring up information not
To further muddle matters, the armor branch
manders applauded this added unit, the BRT addressed in doctrine, and show wide-
was the proponent for mounted maneuver doc-
had little utility in its intended role and is, as spread support or opposition to an issue.
trine, yet is now only responsible for the caval-
presently organized, a waste of resources.
ry recon portion of FCS. The cavalry branch Armor leaders and other policymakers
In developing the new recon squadron for the was finally and officially disbanded and its role, rely on letters to the editor to gauge the
BCT, work should have started with the exist- history, and traditions officially merged into ar- views of their Soldiers. Letters to the edi-
ing separate brigade cavalry troop as a base- mor by Congress’ passage of the Army Reor- tor inspire leaders to take action that will
line. Instead, the U.S. Army Training and Doc- ganization Act of 1950. It is most ironic to watch truly make a difference in our armor force;
trine Command (TRADOC) and Armor School how under FCS, armor is devolving back into specifically, they inspire new develop-
chose to evolve it from the lighter BRT with all the old cavalry branch. Now, how to fix this ments in doctrine, equipment, weapons,
of its unresolved weaknesses and problems mess: the Chief of Armor needs to reassert vehicles, tactics, techniques, and proce-
mentioned above. Having wished away the proponency for mounted maneuver, not just the dures that save Soldiers’ lives.
threat, and failing to appreciate the value of ar- cavalry and recon portion of FCS. Secondly,
Writing a letter to the editor is a way you
mored cavalry, FCS planners instead piled it the Chief of Armor must deconflict the mud-
can inspire others to take action and
high with military intelligence (MI)-type recon- dled voluminous scraps that pass for “emerg-
make a difference in countless areas. So,
naissance surveillance and target acquisition ing doctrine” and reestablish a functioning base-
when you read about an issue that makes
(RSTA) capabilities. These RSTA assets are line doctrine, which must reassert the true com-
you want to get involved — don’t just sit
technical combat support that may accompa- bat capabilities of heavy armored cavalry regi-
there — write to the editor!
ny forward units when the situation permits, but ments, squadrons, and troops, rather than the
they are generally not suitable for scout/recon grab-bag of techno-wizardry-based soft- and
September-October 2008 — 3
Counterinsurgency
and Core Competencies
by BG Donald M. Campbell, Jr., Commanding General, U.S. Army Armor Center
“On 25 July 2008, Command Sergeant ion maneuver; logistics operations; main-
Major (CSM) Otis Smith, relinquished his tenance, and command and supply disci-
position as the Armor Center’s 20th Com- pline, which have been the cornerstone
mand Sergeant Major after 34 years of of armor for decades. Alas, we must con-
dedicated service to our Nation and our cede that these competencies are slowly
Army. During his time at the Armor Cen- declining as we concentrate solely on
ter, CSM Smith proved to be an exception- counterinsurgency operations focused on
al leader who cares about soldiers. His the will of the people and not the destruc-
departure is certainly a loss to our force; tion of an enemy.
however, through his leadership and guid-
While there’s clearly nothing wrong with lease of U.S Army Field Manual (FM)
ance, he leaves our force and its soldiers
focusing on the current fight, I am con- 3-0, Operations, we were reviewing our
better prepared to meet the challenges of
cerned that the majority of our tank com- doctrine, and later this year, we will re-
the battlefield both today and in the fu-
manders have never qualified Tank Table lease FM 3-20.21, the Heavy Brigade
ture. As a warrior, he led, trained, taught,
VIII and that brigade commanders are re- Combat Team (HBCT) Gunnery Manual.
inspired, coached, mentored, and instilled
porting weaknesses in maintenance man- We are also in the process of staffing FM
loyalty and a fraternal brotherhood with-
agement, particularly services and prop- 3-90.1, The Tank and Mechanized Infan-
in the entire Armor community. Thank
erty accountability, at the company level. try Company/Team, and FM 3-20.98, Re-
you, Otis, for keeping our mounted force
connaissance and Scout Platoon.
on the cutting edge of the battlefield, for It is very difficult to meet everyday re-
caring about soldiers, and for the many quirements that increase soldier surviv- Further, we are consistently working to
challenges you faced and conquered for ability and our chances of success on the improve our armored systems, such as the
the greater good of the Armor Force.” battlefield, but we can achieve a healthy Abrams tank, which enable us to remain
balance much easier than one might real- the premier armored force well into the
As we dedicate this current issue of AR-
ize. fu ture. We also continue to explore up-
MOR to the counterinsurgent fight, I must
grades to sights, armor packages, and am-
remind the force of its need to maintain a First and foremost, the Armor School
munition to maintain our systems’ lethal-
balance between what we know as the cur- provides its Soldiers with tough, well-
ity. We are working to improve target iden-
rent counterinsurgency fight and what we rounded courses that focus on full-spec-
tification and prevent fratricide through
foresee as a future of persistent conflict. trum conflicts. Each of the Armor School’s
our work in combat identification.
This issue compiles lessons learned from courses provides the skill-level appropri-
current operations in Iraq and Afghani- ate training on tasks necessary to win the Finally, we have been directed to holis-
stan and past operations in Vietnam. How- fight during counterinsurgencies and ma- tically review our force design updates to
ever, as we learned, specifically, from the jor combat operations. For example, the ensure the survivability, lethality, and ca-
lessons of the Israelis during their battle Master Gunner Course teaches noncom- pabilities of our reconnaissance forma-
with Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon, we missioned officers how to identify and tions and ensure they have the right bal-
must not lose sight of what the armored cor rect for deficiencies in the M1’s fire ance. We have learned from our opera-
force brings to the battlefield during high- control system, and assists company com- tions in Iraq and Afghanistan that armor
intensity operations. In short, we must manders and battalion S3s in planning and cavalry, whether it be Abrams, Brad-
strike a balance between counterinsurgen- gunnery training for their units; the Scout ley, or HMMWV mounted, will always be
cy training and our core competencies. Leader Course teaches scout leaders, from relevant and we must continue to make
staff sergeant to lieutenant, how to be improvements in these systems to main-
The term “core competencies” refers to proficient in reconnaissance operations tain our overmatch.
all the tasks our armored systems, of
across the spectrum of conflict; and the As most of us realize, the current fight
which the tanker and the scout are an in-
Maneuver Captain’s Career Course trains will eventually end; however, there is
tegral part, conduct during high-intensity
6 out of 8 modules on conducting opera- great concern that the force’s institution-
operations. It also includes the tasks our
tions in a major combat environment. But al knowledge base on CMETL tasks have
armored formations must conduct to sup-
the Armor School’s training efforts do atrophied. Therefore, it is important that
port our armored systems, which center
not stop there, we must train to standard we maintain balance and ensure our core
on the protection provided by our armor,
everywhere and we are currently work- tasks do not get lost to the tasks of the
the firepower our weapons systems bring
ing with TRADOC to bring mobile train- day. I am certain the armored force will
to bear, and the maneuverability of our
ing teams to our Soldiers in the field. need these skills in the future to remain
systems. Our core competencies include
the “combat arm of decision.”
operations, such as long-range precision We are also developing new doctrine
gunnery; platoon, company, and battal- that spans the spectrum. Prior to the re- Forge the Thunderbolt!
4 — September-October 2008
Armor Center Welcomes
21st Command Sergeant Major
by CSM John W. Troxell, Command Sergeant Major, U.S. Army Armor Center
Greetings to all soldiers of mounted war- Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Opera-
fare! I am Command Sergeant Major John tions; FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency Op-
Wayne Troxell, the new U.S. Army Ar- erations; and FM 6-22, Military Leader-
mor Center’s command sergeant major. ship. The more leaders understand about
My wife, Sandra, and I are excited to be the complexities of the modern battle-
on the team and look forward to our tour field and its ever-changing conditions,
at Fort Knox. the more flexible we will be as a force to
derstood that to get to the enemy in rural
deal with those changes. Leaders must
First and foremost, I want to thank Brig- terrain, and around the countless deep
do more than just know these doctrinal
adier General Campbell for selecting me buried mines and IEDs, they had to be-
manuals, they must educate young lead-
to be the 21st command sergeant major come a more agile force. They also un-
ers and soldiers as well. Soldiers, who ful-
for the Armor Center. I am truly humbled derstood that it was a high-risk undertak-
ly understand the atmospherics of the bat-
by the selection and will not take this po- ing to travel the routes on which the en-
tlespace and realize that changes may oc-
sition lightly. Each and every day, I will emy had substantial influence. This deep
cur without warning, are far more flexi-
bring what I call the “4 Es” to this job: understanding of the battlespace led the
ble to battlefield conditions.
energy, enthusiasm, education, and en- squadron to take on a change I had never
forcement. I will be energetic in every- As a force, we have to be open minded seen before. They routinely and comfort-
thing I do and enthusiastic about how I at all times on the battlefields of Iraq and ably began conducting air-assault mis-
conduct business. I will educate the field Afghanistan. Close-minded leaders, who sions and extensive dismounted patrol-
and myself on the challenges we face as use the phrase, “I’ve been deployed be- ling and raids. The squadron’s soldiers
a mounted force and will find solutions fore, I’ve got this figured out,” get soldiers were comfortable on any mounted plat-
to those challenges. Finally, I will learn killed. The fight in Iraq alone differs from form — a tank, a Bradley, a mine-resis-
and enforce all policies and standards province to province; threats in Diyala tant ambush protected (MRAP) vehicle,
both on the installation and throughout Province are not necessarily the same as a helicopter, or all-terrain vehicles to get
the force. those in Sadr City or in Anbar Province. at the enemy in the numerous canal areas
Because of this, we must be flexible and within their battlespace. This squadron
This issue of ARMOR focuses on coun-
acceptable to change and understand that had open-minded leaders and soldiers
terinsurgency (COIN) operations, and as
the way we fight today may not be the who studied the enemy and changed the
an Army, we face a foreseeable future of
way we do business tomorrow. way they did business to defeat him. The
persistent conflict and continuous deploy-
soldiers of the squadron saw the strides
ments. COIN operations will cont inue to I just returned from the fight in Iraq
they were making in taking the fight to
be the type of operation we will face in where I served as the command sergeant
the enemy and morale soared. This squad-
Iraq and Afghanistan. We cannot forget major, 4th Stryker Brigade Combat Team,
ron understands the intent of full-spec-
that all the potential threats we could face 2d Infantry Division, in the northern Bagh-
trum fighters in a COIN environment,
are not necessarily radical terrorists with dad belt and Diyala Province. I would like
which is exactly the type of organization-
a twisted ideology; we must still be pre- to share with you a fine example set forth
al attitude we must have to defeat our en-
pared for full-spectrum, high-intensity by the 2d Squadron, 3d Armored Cavalry
emies, especially in a COIN environment.
con flict, as well as COIN-type operations, Regiment. The squadron’s very dynamic
which is a very daunting task for units in leade rs, LTC Paul Calvert and CSM Mark The Armor Center continues to be the
the field. Horsley, are strict disciplinarians who un- supporting effort to the main effort — our
derstand a straight line can be drawn from units in the fight. We will continue to as-
When units are on a small dwell time,
how soldiers look, act, talk, and think to sist units with challenges and provide
such as 12 months, it is tough to simulta-
their actions on the battlefield. highly trained officers, noncommissioned
neously prepare for imminent and omi-
officers, and soldiers who are flexible to
nous conditions. Because of this, leaders, When the squadron arrived last Novem-
change on the modern battlefield. I look
from platoon leader/platoon sergeant to ber, it basically conducted normal unit
forward to seeing you all on my visits to
battalion commander/command sergeant operations by patrolling in tanks, Brad-
the field.
major, must be thoroughly knowledge- leys, and up-armored HMMWVs. How-
able on three critical publications: U.S. ever, the squadron’s leaders quickly un- Forge the Thunderbolt!
September-October 2008 — 5
W t t
elcome o he
C C
ounterinsurgency entury
by Retired General Donn Starry
As this is written, we are but a few steps into the 21st century. To illustrate the complexity thesis, consider the French experi-
It does now appear that it may one day be characterized as the ence post-1939-1945, as Japanese forces withdrew and the French
“counterinsurgency century.” What might that portend? attempted to reestablish control over their territorial holdings in
what was once called “French Indochina.” It was here that the
The 21st century, even in its infancy, is obviously quite com-
French army was confronted by a considerable and well-devel-
plex; perhaps even far more complex than the worlds of the
oped communist underground who aimed to spread communist
19th and 20th centuries, both of which were characterized by
governance into Indochina, thus beginning counterinsurgent war-
warfare, largely between nation states, in conflicts resulting in
fare against the Viet Minh.
frightening losses in human resources, as well as other national
treasure; indeed the loss of entire nation states, as well as the French army forces deployed to Indochina were far too few and
catastrophic devastation of others — even those said to have not adequately equipped to accomplish their assigned mission.
“won” the war. Recognition of those inadequacies caused French army com-
manders on the ground to petition the home gov-
ernment for more units, weapons capabili-
ties, and support to match. Their petitions
were largely ignored or outright de-
nied. The best and most relevant histo-
ries of this period are set forth in Ber-
nard Fall’s books, Street without Joy
and Hell in a Very Small Place. Both
have been extensively read by those
attempting to characterize counter-
insurgency warf are in Vietnam, as
they represent preludes to what took
place after the Geneva Accords were
signed in 1954, and, at the time, at
least token U.S. involvements in Viet-
nam began.
Surrendering at Dien Bien Phu, the
French army leadership considered the
rug pulled from beneath them by their
political masters, who, from the sol-
diers’ viewpoint, had neither tried to
understand the situation nor respond
to the entreaties of on-site com-
manders for help. The army literal-
ly withdrew into seclusion in army
schools and colleges to begin the
construct of a relevant counterin-
surgency doct rine — at strategic,
operational, and tactical levels in
an attempt to determine what they
should have done, strategically, op-
erationally, and tactically; what had
gone wrong; and how they might have
done better.
Over the next few difficult years, they fash-
ioned an operational concept titled La Guerre
Revolutionaire, which included concepts for strat-
egy, campaign, and tactical operations. With its new
operational concept, the French army went to war
once again in a French colonial holding where there
was a mounting insurgent movement. It was, how-
ever, an involvement quite different from that in
Indochina. Algeria had in fact been a French colo-
nial holding; however, it was to most French peo-
ple part of the homeland — metropolitan France. It
6 — September-October 2008
was acceptable to give up some colonial involvements, but never units, still in country and fighting, and replace the long-tenure
the metropole. General Paul Auss aresses, in The Battle of the people in those units who had been redeployed as individuals.
Casbah, provides a striking account of what happened as La The inevitable result was an on-station Army in Vietnam con-
Guerre — doctrine went to counterinsurgency war. siderably less combat ready than it had been and needed to be.
Secondly, as redeployment progressed, the U.S. Congress re-
The campaign ended in 1962 when a French government un-
neged and withdrew appropriations programmed to provide ad-
der General Charles de Gaulle signed an agreement with the Na-
equate fire support, transportation, and logistics support to the
tional Liberation Front (FLN) granting Algeria independence
RVNAF once U.S forces were redeployed. Many military mem-
from France. France thereby gave up a vast colonial holding in
bers, and others, serving in Vietnam when this happened were,
North Africa — nearly one million French citizens were forced
and remain, convinced that had the United States lived up to its
to abandon their possessions and flee, there was admission to
commitment; the RVNAF could quite likely have won the fight
the deaths of nearly 30,000 French citizens, and perhaps as
against the NVA intrusion from the north. It was that close. A
many as half a million Algerians died. Once again, French mili-
better description is to be found in Lewis Sorley’s excellent
tary leaders considered the rug pulled from beneath them by po-
book about General Abrams, A Better War.
litical masters, the senior of whom was this time one of their
own. History had been provided a counterinsurgency situation One recurring conclusion from the examples cited above, along
considerably more complex than had been prepared for, despite with many others, is that military forces can perhaps no longer
the fact that French military doctrine in support of national goals cope with more than part of war. Many counterinsurgency re-
had been drawn from the French army’s own bitter experience quirements stem from political, social, demographic, religious,
in Indochina. and other situations not directly resolvable by military opera-
tions. At the outset then, there should be serious consideration of
It is not at all difficult to transfer from the French experience in
precisely what is being attempted, what capabilities are required
Indochina to that of U.S. forces in Vietnam. Once the Novem-
(what are we trying to do), and how might the total capabilities
ber 1968 U.S. elections made clear that there would be a Re-
of the nation be assembled to achieve whatever desired outcome
publican in the White House in 1969, it was also clear that there
has been decided on. However, if one then looks to departments
would soon be a move made to redeploy U.S. forces from Viet-
of a federal government for help and finds employees who re-
nam. Further, it was anticipated in Saigon that by some official
fuse to serve in an expeditionary environment, then what?
means redeployment would be ordered soon after the 1969 in-
stallation of the new government. This particular directive ar-
rived in the form of National Security Study Memorandum 36
in April 1969.
The commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam
(COMUSMACV), General Creighton Abrams, had already as-
sembled a very small group of officers and enlisted and begun
planning for the inevitable. The redeployment was called “Viet-
namization.” There were public pronouncements that U.S. forc-
es would turn over conduct of the war to Republic of Vietnam
Armed Forces (RVNAF). Further, it was announced that funds
would be made available to provide RVNAF with capabilities
which were insufficiently robust in its existing forces to support
its force structure. In the main that meant fire support means —
artillery and air, and logistics support of all kinds. Funds were
appropriated by the U.S. Congress, earmarked for that support.
General Abrams’ instructions were quite clear, “We have been
directed to do this. There is considerable pressure from Wash-
ington to just cut and run. We must therefore very carefully ex-
amine the situation — the enemy’s and our own, and propose
redeployments that do not jeopardize the Vietnamese army’s
ability to continue successful combat operations against regu-
lar NVA forces attempting to infiltrate into South Vietnam, and
infiltrations to support the remaining Viet Cong infrastructure
in the south.”
The first redeployment increment of 25,000 troops departed
Vietnam in the summer of 1969. Subsequent increments for re-
deployment were planned beginning in late 1969, all pursuant
to General Abrams’ guidance. However, two significant obsta-
cles were thrown into the works by directives from Washington.
First, General Abrams and his planners had developed a plan to
redeploy by unit rather than by individual.
Despite brisk exchanges of traffic on the matter, General West-
moreland, U.S. Army Chief of Staff, overrode General Abrams
“Surrendering at Dien Bien Phu, the French army leadership considered
and redeployment was to be done by individual. General West- the rug pulled from beneath them by their political masters, who, from
moreland’s decision meant that once redeployment began, there the soldiers’ viewpoint, had neither tried to understand the situation nor
would be a constant readjustment in Vietnam to fill the ranks of respond to the entreaties of on-site commanders for help.”
September-October 2008 — 7
“The campaign ended in 1962 when a
French government under General Charles
de Gaulle signed an agreement with the
National Liberation Front (FLN) granting Al-
geria independence from France. France
thereby gave up a vast colonial holding in
North Africa — nearly one million French cit-
izens were forced to abandon their posses-
sions and flee, there was admission to the
deaths of nearly 30,000 French citizens,
and perhaps as many as half a million Al-
gerians died. Once again, French military
leaders considered the rug pulled from be-
neath them by political masters, the senior
of whom was this time one of their own.”
volume, from places far distant from one
another to far more people than truly have
a “need to know.”
Advances in information technology have
created an information glut that defies de-
scription, as well as inhibits intelligent de-
cisions based on analysis of available in-
formation. There is more information avail-
able than can be digested in a reasonable
amount of time, enabling a decision that is
Photo courtesy ECPAD FRANCE relevant to the situation. In other words,
there is not time to sort out and think about
what all that information conveys. Fur-
General Eisenhower, during his time as President, created an ther, the media — print as well as video — now has a parallel
undertaking titled Project Solarium. It was an attempt to focus information glut to that in “official” channels. There is “in-
the U.S. Government executive branch’s resources on a select vestigative reporting” by people who are neither qualified “in-
agenda of likely situations with which the President could be vestigators” nor good reporters.
confronted and postulate coordinated solutions to those situa-
A hand goes up in the back of the room! “Is the peacekeeping
tions. If, however, it is considered that the military forces of the
function considered a mission for counterinsurgency forces? If
nation are the only resource available for deployment — in a
so, is doctrine for such operations to be found in an appropriate
counterinsurgency or any other situation demanding action on
field manual, or elsewhere?”
the part of the United States — then there must be a defining
statement in the National Security Strategy that stipulates this Several fairly recent events prompt such question. Most dra-
fact. It is only out of defining statements that force structure, matic, although now a matter of tragic, but nearly “ancient” his-
manpower, and equipment capability requirements statements, tory, is the United Nations’ Assistance Mission that deployed to
prescribing the size and shape and equipping of the nation’s Rwanda in 1993 and 1994 to referee the confrontation between
armed forces, can materialize. the Tutsi and Hutu. The force commander was Canadian forces
Lieutenant General Romeo Dallaire, a brilliant, brave, and con-
The examples cited above also represent involvement of offi-
cials in national political infrastructures in the conduct of mili-
tary operations in the field, which those political entities had di-
rected be undertaken at the outset. Some who have suffered the
effects of those intrusions would call it “meddling.” And so it is;
unfortunately, it may continue to be. Indeed, the increasing com-
plexity of counterinsurgency operations quite likely invites that
type of intervention. In the United States, the tendency to attempt
to direct operations of a deployed military force in the field from
Washington offices has been a serious problem since the Span-
ish-American War. The problem has been aggravated by the grow-
ing ability to almost instantly move information, in considerable
“General Abrams’ instructions were quite clear, ‘We have been directed to do
this. There is considerable pressure from Washington to just cut and run. We must
therefore very carefully examine the situation — the enemy’s and our own, and
propose redeployments that do not jeopardize the Vietnamese army’s ability to
continue successful combat operations against regular NVA forces attempting to
infiltrate into South Vietnam, and infiltrations to support the remaining Viet Cong in-
frastructure in the south.’ ”
8 — September-October 2008