ARMOR September-October 2003

55 Pages·2010·2.19 MB·English

The Professional Development Bulletin of the Armor Branch PB 17-03-5
Editor in Chief
LTC DAVID R. MANNING Features
Managing Editor 6 “Checkmate on the Northern Front”
CHRISTY BOURGEOIS The Deployment of TF 1-63 Armor in Support of Operation Iraqi Freedom
by Major Brian Maddox
Commandant
11 The View From My Windshield:
MG TERRY L. TUCKER
Just-in-Time Logistics Just Isn’t Working
by Captain Jason A. Miseli
ARMOR (ISSN 0004-2420) is published bi-
month ly by the U.S. Army Armor Center, 1109A 20 Blue Force Tracking — Combat Proven
Sixth Avenue, Fort Knox, KY 40121. by Captain James Conatser and Captain Thane St. Clair
Disclaimer: The information contained in AR-
MOR represents the professional opinions of 24 60 Hours in the Breach
the authors and does not necessarily refl ect by Captain Matthew W. Kennedy and First Lieutenant McKinley C. Wood
the offi cial Army or TRADOC position, nor
does it change or supersede any information
presented in other offi cial Army publications. 26 3d Squadron, 7th U.S. Cavalry Up Front:
Operation Iraqi Freedom Lessons Learned
Offi cial distribution is limited to one copy for
by Major J.D. Keith
each armored brigade headquarters, arm ored
cavalry regiment headquarters, armor battal-
ion headquarters, armored cavalry squadron 32 Tanks and “Shock and Awe”
head quarters, reconnaissance squadron head-
by Captain Jay D. Pellerin
quar ters, armored cavalry troop, armor com-
pany, and motorized brigade headquarters of
the United States Army. In addition, Army li- 35 Field Trains and LOGPACs in an Armor Task Force
braries, Army and DOD schools, HQ DA and by Captain Mike Sullivan and Master Sergeant Tom Pailliotet
MACOM staff agencies with responsibility for
armored, direct fi re, ground combat systems,
organizations, and the training of personnel 45 Reinstating the Combat Tanker Badge
for such organizations may request two copi es by Captain Shawn Monien
by sending a request to the editor in chief.
Authorized Content: ARMOR will print only
those materials for which the U.S. Army Armor Departments
Center has proponency. That proponen cy in-
cludes: all armored, direct-fi re ground combat
systems that do not serve primarily as infantry 2 Contacts
carriers; all weapons used exclusively in these 3 Letters
systems or by CMF 19-series enlisted soldiers; 4 Commander’s Hatch
any miscellaneous items of equipment which
5 Driver’s Seat
armor and armored cavalry organizations use
exclusively; training for all SC 12A, 12B, and 41 Reviews
12C offi cers and for all CMF-19-series enlist-
ed soldiers; and information concerning the
training, logistics, history, and leadership of ar-
mor and armored cavalry units at the brigade/
regiment level and below, to include Threat
units at those levels.
Material may be reprinted, provided credit is
given to ARMOR and to the author, except
where copyright is indicated. Periodicals Postage paid at Fort Knox, KY, and additional mailing offi ces. Postmaster: Send address changes to Editor,
ARMOR, ATTN: ATZK-ARM, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5210.
Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
September-October 2003, Vol. CXII, No. 5 USPS 467-970
Once More Unto the Breach
Recent history has proven that it is very difficult to predict precise- ited visibility conditions, to move rapidly over great distances and
ly who our adversaries will be and when or where they might threat- synchronize their movement, and to communicate both vertically
en the United States. The preliminary lessons learned from Oper- and horizontally over extended distances. In their article, “Blue
ation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) suggest that U.S. forces achieved a lev- Force Tracking — Combat Proven,” Captains James Conatser and
el of combat power that is several multiples greater than even the Thane St. Clair proclaim that during OIF, the Force XXI Battle
enormously capable forces that were deployed during Operation Command Brigade and Below-Blue Force Tracking System gave
Desert Storm over a decade ago. This fact reminds us that we commanders situational understanding unprecedented in any oth-
have yet to realize the full potential of what our forces’ capabilities er conflict in history.
will be in the future. Stabilizing Iraq is not a uniform process and great progress has
During March and April 2003, coalition and U.S. military planners been made in some areas of the country. However, we continue to
crafted a strategy for Northern Iraq worthy of a gifted chess mas- face an adaptive and determined enemy, though conventionally
ter. At stake in this “game” was the defeat of Iraqi forces north of defeated, intent on killing Americans and Iraqis. In his article, “3d
Kirkuk and coalition control of the critically important Kirkuk oil Squadron, 7th U.S. Cavalry Up Front — Lessons Learned During
fields. In his article, “Checkmate on the Northern Front,” Major Bri- Operation Iraqi Freedom,” Major J.D. Keith presents a few of the
an Maddox describes the 1st Battalion, 63d Armor’s role in support lessons learned by the squadron during this latest conflict that oth-
of Operation Iraqi Freedom. During this deployment, task force er divisional cavalry squadrons can capitalize on as they prepare
leaders learned several key lessons for future air deployment of for future missions.
armor forces. Captain Matthew Kennedy and First Lieutenant McKinley Wood
From what we have seen in Iraq, the United States defeated a coun- take us into their battlespace as they describe Task Force 2d Bat-
try the size of California within a matter of weeks. This fact is not im- talion, 69th Armored Regiment’s “60 Hours in the Breach.”
portant — the way in which it was done is important. Captain Jay In keeping with this issue’s lessons-learned focus, Captain Mike
Pellerin explains the overwhelming “shock and awe” that tanks can Sullivan and Master Sergeant Tom Pailliotet provide great insight
have on the enemy. Recent events have proven once again that on how to properly run a logistics package and offer helpful ideas
the U.S. military can achieve rapid dominance by using heavy units. on how to improve unit logistics battles.
Captain Jason Miseli shares his experiences and frustrations with The debate over the Combat Armor Badge and the Expert Armor
just-in-time logistics during Operation Iraqi Freedom. His article, Badge has raged for decades. The issue has been brought forward
“The View From My Windshield: Just-In-Time Logistics Just Isn’t during the tenure of every Army Chief of Staff since World War I.
Working,” explains that when soldiers cannot get more than one or There is however a new twist to the on-going debate — there is no
two bottles of water per day, and must rely on locally purchased need to adopt new badges — we need to simply reinstate the ar-
water and poor-tasting bulk water to meet essential sustenance, mor badges. Captain Shawn Monien takes us through an 85-year
the just-in-time logistics system is not responding, let alone the historical debate that begins with the Combat Tanker’s Badge, that
abject collapse of the class IX repair parts resupply system. He was awarded to the “United States tankmen of 1918 who served in
also provides invaluable tactics, techniques, and procedures to the organized American fighting Tank Corps,” and ends with Opera-
make soldiers aware of their surroundings, which increases their tion Iraqi Freedom where Combat Infantry Badge ceremonies are
chance of surviving during brutal attacks on convoy operations. being held for infantry soldiers who are attached to Armor units
The approach used during OIF, reflects the concept of the bat- while their “brothers in combat arms” watch on.
tlespace replacing the concept of the battlefield. The battlespace We continue to devote military forces and other assets on the
concept produces critical requirements that demand command- ground in Iraq. Perhaps winning the peace in Iraq is more challeng-
ers “know” their battlespace. Digital battle command is the perfect ing than winning the war. No one should have doubts about our
tool to provide commanders with the ability to navigate under lim- maintaining a strong deterrent capability. — DRM
By Order of the Secretary of the Army: Official:
JOEL B. HUDSON
PETER J. SCHOOMAKER
Administrative Assistant to the
General, United States Army
Secretary of the Army
Chief of Staff
0316917
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ARMOR HOTLINE — DSN 464-TANK: The Armor Hotline is a 24- 1st Armor Training Brigade (ATZK-BAZ)
hour service to provide assistance with questions concerning doctrine, COL James K. Greer 8736
training, organizations, and equipment of the armor force. E-mail: [email protected]
2 — September-October 2003
A Designated Combat Armor Badge ize how much more effective they are when MOUT is not a “combined arms team” in the
used in pairs (at a minimum). As armor lead- sense that all members are equal. MOUT is an
Dear ARMOR, ers, you must train infantry leaders at all levels infantry fight with tanks supporting. Infantry
to understand this. leads, tanks overwatch. Tank platoons support
I noticed in the current ARMOR that Gener-
al Franks at TRADOC asked the Chief of Staff ALAN R. HORN infantry companies, with tank sections support-
of the Army to approve Expert and Combat LTC, U.S. Army, Retired ing infantry platoons. The infantry platoons des-
ignate individual squads to accompany (pro-
Ar mor Badges back in 1991. Apparently, the
tect) individual tanks. The idea that tanks lead
Chief of Staff of the Army did not approve. Dear ARMOR,
while watching out against dead-space poten-
You might be interested to know that U.S. ad- I’m writing in response to the article, “Modif y- tial targets is plain flat wrong.
visors to the Vietnamese armor force have ing the M1 for Urban Battle,” written by Cap-
Better communications are crucial and dedi-
had a Combat Armor Badge since early 1966. tains Bridges and Evans in the July-August
cated radio and telephone commo between
In those days, Vietnamese armor had no tanks, 2003 issue. In the article’s discussion of sur-
the crew and squads is critical and must be
only M113 armored personnel carriers. The vivability enhancements, the authors promote
practiced. However, a tank crew is already ful-
desk jockeys at the Pentagon apparently thought the use of the 80mm French Galix grenade
ly occupied without strapping on added last-
they were armored infantry, because they launching system, overlooking the 66mm gre-
minute new-fangled systems, especially if those
awarded the Combat Infantry Badge to their nade launchers already mounted on every M1
systems become an excuse for misusing the
armor branch advisors. When I was promoted tank. Presumably, the advantages of the Galix
tanks.
to lieutenant colonel and moved from the 4th would be to fire “stun, smoke, flare, and tear
ARVN Cavalry to the Office of the Chief of Ar- gas [grenades] singly or in volleys.” The 66mm One other point completely missed is that the
mor, he asked what my CIB was. When I told systems already provide those capabilities as M2 Bradley can also support in MOUT. It has
him, he said, “Oh, but where is your Combat a result of significant development by the Ar- better gun elevation, a shorter barrel, and can
Armor Badge?” When I told him we didn’t have my Product Manager Obscuration (PMO). For fire precisely in the counter-sniper scenario
one, he said, “Very bad! I fix!” He cut me a instance, the M6 discharger, already fielded to where collateral damage is to be minimized.
general order, designating the Vietnamese ar- the Stryker, can be retrofitted to the M1 using
Again, MOUT is tough. The doctrine exists
mor branch insignia as a Combat Armor Badge, an already developed kit. The M6 discharger
and must be trained and practiced. Special-
which U.S. Armor advisors have worn proudly provides the advantage of having two loaded
ized modifications should be considered, but
over their right pockets since then and with the salvos, and the ability to fire each tube singly
they must not result in bad tactics and poor
blessing of our own armor branch. or multiple tubes in volleys.
operational planning.
RAYMOND R. BATTREALL In addition to the discharger upgrade, the
CHESTER A. KOJRO
COL, U.S. Army, Retired PMO developed obscurant grenades that can
LTC, U.S. Army, Retired
defeat visual, visual and infrared, and infrared
Editor’s note: For those interested in the con-
and millimeter wave associated RSTA devices;
tinuing armor badge debate, please see “Re-
instating the Combat Tanker Badge,” on page and the PMO has developed a selection of non- Use Caution When Employing Mech
lethal grenades, including tear gas, flash/bang,
45 in this issue. Snipers on the Force XXI Battlefield
and blunt trauma variants.
The authors hit a very important point in the Dear ARMOR,
Feedback on Modifying
inclusion of laser warning systems as a means I commend CPT Morrow for raising the issue
the M1 for Urban Battle to increase situational awareness and respond on snipers in his article, “Mechanized Snipers
Dear ARMOR, to increasingly sophisticated threats such as on the Force XXI Battlefield,” in the July-Au-
beam-riding antitank guided missiles (ATGMs). gust 2003 issue. His unit’s efforts are notewor-
I wish to congratulate Captains Evans and However, the sensors need to be coupled with thy. Still, I wish to caution him that some of the
Bridges for their fine, thought-provoking article an upgraded smoke grenade fire control sys- proposed tasks contradict proper sniper em-
on fighting tanks in urban environments. They tem. A launched obscurant cloud will actually ployment and should be executed by other
make some very telling arguments, especially defeat incoming ATGMs of all kinds. With a re- soldiers.
in their examples from combat in Chechnya, to quirement from the Armor School, we could
drive home the importance of being properly develop and field a sensor equipped fire con- CPT Morrow is correct that doctrine, U.S. Ar-
equipped and trained for urban combat. How- trol that will truly increase survivability. my Field Manual (FM) 23-10, says little about
ever, they make the statement, “individual tanks, employment by mechanized battalions. His bul-
working with a squad.” I realize I am retired and Finally, I was dismayed to find that every pho- let list of effective techniques that his unit em-
not fully cognizant of modern doctrine, but no to, figure, or sketch of an armored vehicle in ployed is sound. However, placing all snipers
tank should be without his wingman in com- the magazine showed the 66mm tubes empty under the scout platoon and assigning still
bat. That is the tank’s best protection — anoth- and/or hidden behind the canvas covers. Vid- heavier weapons like .50-cal rifles is counter-
er tank. True, armored cavalry units sometimes eo during the march through Iraq clearly showed productive. While a sniper can do so, you do
substitute M3s for a wingman in hunter-killer the launchers loaded there, but for some un- not need one to call in indirect fires. That is a
teams, but these are habitual relationships with known reason they’re always empty during common skill.
train ing, demos, and photo-ops here. I would
everyone fully understanding each other’s ca-
love to see some photos with the grenades in If heavy antitank rifles are needed for engag-
pabilities and limitations, and are bonded over
use, and get some feedback from their use in ing light vehicles, then train the dismounted
years (at least months) of training. At some
theatre. scouts to employ them as an alternate to AT-4
point, possibly when we transform to the Ob-
or Javelin.
jec tive Force design with units of action, we DAVID BROWN, P.E.
might establish habitual relationships between Product Manager Obscuration Expecting a sniper to dismount and spray a
squads of infantry and a single tank, but I doubt high volume of fire against rapidly moving en-
we will ever reach that level of training. When emy vehicles as a form of hasty ambush is a
Dear ARMOR,
tanks were employed singly at the Joint Read- complete misunderstanding of sniper tech-
iness Training Center, they were highly ineffec- I must strongly disagree with the authors of niques concerning stalking, stealth, and sur-
tive against the skilled Opposing Force. While “Modifying the M1 for Urban Battle.” While they vival. Instead, train the other scouts and infan-
an infantry or Marine ground commander might recommend intriguing modifications to the M1 try to be better marksmen.
think a single tank working in conjunction with tank, they have lost sight of the doctrinal fun-
infantry is effective, he is probably just so hap- damental role of tanks in military operations in
py to have a tank with him that he fails to real- urban terrain (MOUT). Continued on Page 44
September-October 2003 — 3
Major General Terry L. Tucker
Commanding General
U.S. Army Armor Center
What We Are Not Doing
to Uphold Training Standards
I would like to use this column as a fo- publications. This process has been un- the force, and our professional and moral
rum to inform you of what we are not do- der the microscope to ensure efficient and standards.
ing at the Armor Center to uphold train- effective use of every resource as part of The news is not all bad — in fact, it has
ing standards. We are not doing more each decision. gotten much better. These actions have
with less, which in the training base nor- To state the obvious, the primary reason extremely positive results. First, we are
mally means not meeting the standards for not training to standard is lack of re- beginning to meet our mission to provide
for training soldiers or building leaders. sources — primarily people. Many are trained and ready soldiers and leaders to
Training to standard is not an option — simply not assigned here, they are filling the field. Second, we are giving our great
it is a requirement. The fact is we were not critical requirements in the field, and some officers, noncommissioned officers, civil-
meeting the standard in all cases. It was are tasked from Fort Knox to support oth- ians, and contractors the best chance of
not because of careless or negligent lead- er Army missions in combat zones. accomplishing their missions to standard.
Third, this is a forcing function that is
ers, it was because training was not our You deserve to know the details. From working to bring resources to the train-
first priority, and we were living outside May through September, we cancelled or ing base.
our means. We did more with less, and reduced the load for the Senior Officer
did our best to meet standards. Logistics Management Course (56 officers With General Byrnes’ active involve-
not trained); the Cavalry Leader Course ment and support, we are finding solu-
With our Army at war, it is more impor- (46 students not trained); the Scout Lead- tions to some of these issues. Examples
tant than ever for soldiers to leave the er Course (22 students not trained and include hiring contract support for mis-
training base prepared to join their first unit potentially 29 more not trained); the Ar- sions such as teaching basic common skills
of assignment in a combat zone. While mor Captains Career Course (delayed tasks, training development, writing field
supporting the war effort, training to stan- for at least 73 captains); M1A2 addition- manuals and training and evaluation pro-
dard is now clearly job one in the U.S. al skill identifier—9K10 K4 (189 stu- grams, as well as working on Stryker and
Army Training and Doctrine Command dents not trained); M3A3 Cavalry Fight- Objective Force requirements. The Ar-
(TRADOC), and at the U.S. Army Armor ing Vehicle Operator’s Course (108 stu- mor branch has first-rate officers and non-
Center. With the guidance and support dents not trained); and the Tank Com- commissioned officers assigned to the Ar-
of the TRADOC Commanding General, mander’s Certification Course (117 stu- mor Center as small group instructors and
General Byrnes, we are not conducting dents not trained). We have delayed de- trainers.
training that we cannot conduct to stan-
veloping courses for reconnaissance ve- This is a pretty fundamental change,
dard. This is not a luxury — this is about
hicle crewmen, mobile gun system crew- which started with TRADOC establish-
standards and not sending unprepared sol-
men, leaders, and master gunners, as well ing and supporting training as its first pri-
diers and leaders to units.
as M3A3 scout certification until May ority in supporting the war. The situation
2004. We also delayed development of improves every day and there is light at
Simply put, we are aligning priorities and
several training and evaluation program the end of the tunnel. I pledge to conduct
resources, and making conscious, well-in-
manuals. training to standard at Fort Knox and
formed decisions to cancel or delay train-
provide the best soldiers and leaders to
ing that does not meet standards. Addi- These actions obviously impact the force.
the world’s finest Mounted Force.
tionally, we have delayed updates and However, assigning unprepared and un-
developing certain training and doctrine trained soldiers to a unit fails the soldier, FORGE THE THUNDERBOLT!
4 — September-October 2003
CSM George DeSario Jr.
Command Sergeant Major
U.S. Army Armor Center
Safety First
Our Army is better now than it has been Track vehicle accidents continue to be a
in my 26 years of service. Today, we have concern throughout the armor force. Sol-
the best equipment, the best training, and diers are driving into other vehicles, road-
the finest soldiers, civilians, and families side objects, such as trees and power
areas, or wash racks, ground guides must
in its history. We can deploy in a mo- poles, or into obstacles, such as ditches
be used.
ment’s notice to wherever we are needed and rocks, while maneuvering cross-coun-
and successfully meet mission require- try. There are several reasons for acci- In most military vehicle accidents, the
ments. dents related to driving tracked vehicles. operator was not trained, tested, selected,
The most common include driving too or licensed properly. Sometimes the fail-
Safety and mission accomplishment are
fast for road conditions, improper use of ure is only in one of these areas; others
two important parts of every soldier’s life.
night vision (or failure to use night vision times it is a combination of the four. We
If we are serious about our Army’s readi-
devices all together), and failure to iden- must identify high-risk individuals.
ness, leaders must be serious about safe-
tify other vehicles or personnel in the area
ty. It our responsibility to ensure soldiers The leading cause of accidental death is
prior to moving. Track and heavy wheeled
stay alive and uninjured while preparing attributed to POVs. Most POV accidents
vehicles can be hard to control on slip-
for combat. occur relatively close to the soldier’s duty
pery road surfaces. Drivers and vehicle
station, although long-distance driving
Day in and day out, soldiers perform the commanders need to be familiar with slip-
does account for a small number of the
Army’s mission; however, we cannot al- pery roads and must adjust their speeds
accidents. Off-duty POV accidents remain
low our mission to become routine. When to prevent accidents. Roads can become
the number one killer of soldiers.
the mission becomes so familiar that we slick after a rainfall and when covered by
begin to ignore safety procedures, disas- snow, sand, or mud. A driver moving too We must take every precaution while op-
ter will strike. It is called complacency. quickly can lose control of the vehicle, erating a vehicle. Buckle up! Seatbelts do
Complacency is that feeling of security, striking whatever is in its path. Track ve- save lives. While POV accidents account
while unaware of potential danger. It can hicles are often much larger than other for the majority of our losses, they are not
happen to any one of us. Therefore, sol- vehicles, and cause greater accidents re- the only killers, use the common-sense
diers must make a conscious effort to per- sulting in serious injury or death. approach and beware of dangerous situa-
tions and areas. Every summer, we lose
form every task with attention to detail, As part of their risk-management pro- soldiers to all types of hazards.
which means remaining aware of their cess, leaders need to consider these haz-
surroundings and taking necessary pre- ards when defining movement speeds. In today’s complex world, safety is be-
cautions to reduce risks. This isn’t just a Drivers and vehicle commanders often coming a significant challenge. Our mis-
good idea — this is our job as leaders. have limited visibility. During night oper- sion plates are full and we have fewer
and fewer soldiers available to accom-
We cannot lose sight of one very impor- ations, some crews will fail to use night
plish countless missions. Soldiers must
tant thing — accidental death is unac- vision devices, or during “dust out” con-
be trained to follow correct procedures
ceptable. We must not let down our guard ditions fail to reduce vehicle speed and,
in every task. The present operational
when it comes to risk management. We as a result, they run into other vehicles or
tempo and increased hazards mandate
cannot continue doing things that are in- even dismounted soldiers. Leaders must
no shortcuts. Leaders at all levels must
juring and killing our soldiers, such as en force the proper procedures regarding
manage risk properly and maintain a vig-
trucks rolling over because drivers are not vehicle speed reduction and use of night
il against complacency, shortcuts, and
properly trained or soldiers being crushed vision devices during night operations.
improper procedures. We cannot afford
by turrets because they fail to pay atten-
Safety is both a reality and a state of to continue to make the same mistakes.
tion.
mind. Leaders must demonstrate safety
Remember, we are a standards-based or-
Each soldier is an important member of in garrison as well as in the field environ-
ganization, and when we violate a pub-
the team and teammates do not let down ment. Prior to moving vehicles, leaders
lished standard, accidents happen. NCOs
their comrades. When leaders and soldiers must train soldiers to ensure that the in-
must always enforce our standards to safe-
exercise smart risk-management and make tended path is clear of other vehicles and
guard our soldiers and equipment.
sound decisions, unit readiness increases personnel. During movement in congest-
and soldiers are not injured or killed. ed areas, such as motor pools, assembly Iron Discipline!
September-October 2003 — 5
“Checkmate on the Northern Front”
The Deployment of Task Force 1-63 Armor
In Support of Operation Iraqi Freedom
by Major Brian Maddox
Strategic Chess Match stated objectives. This strategy involved article out lines TF 1-63 Armor’s unique
a di verse group of forces and organiza- organization, briefly describes the unit’s
Chess is a game of strategy where an in-
tions that included national intelligence actions in Northern Iraq, and provides
direct approach is often more valuable
agencies, con ventional U.S. Army and Air lessons learned from this historic de-
than overt strength. A skilled player de-
Force units, Special Operations Forces, ployment.
liberately maneuvers to eliminate his op-
and Kurd ish Pesh Merga fighters. One of
ponent’s options and then, at the right Background and Organization
the conventional units involved in this
time, boldly moves toward the objective of the Immediate Ready Task Force
campaign in Northern Iraq was the 1st
— checkmate. During March and April
Battalion, 63d (1-63) Armor, 3d Brigade, TF 1-63 Armor deployed to Northern
2003, coalition and U.S. military plan-
1st Infantry Division, Vilseck, Germany. Iraq as the U.S. Army Europe (USAR-
ners crafted a strategy for Northern Iraq
EUR) Immediate Ready Task Force
worthy of a gifted chess master. At stake
The air deployment of Task Force (TF) (IRTF). The IRTF is a unique organiza-
in this “game” was the defeat of Iraqi
1-63 Armor to Iraq in April 2003 played an tion with an unusual organizational struc-
forces north of Kirkuk and coalition con-
essential role in the success of the North- ture. Born in the wake of Task Force
trol of the critically important Kirk uk oil
ern Front. TF 1-63 Armor’s deployment Hawk, the USAREUR IRTF was designed
fields.
demonstrated that the United States could and equipped to accomplish a wide range
Diplomatic differences with a new ly project a viable heavy armor force any- off short-notice missions. In 1998, USAR-
elected Tur kish govern ment prevented the where in the world. The mere presence EUR identified the requirement for an
planned de ploy ment of a large coalition of U.S. armor in Northern Iraq weakened armor force capable of deploying rapid-
force to open a second “Northern the resolve of defending Iraqi ly anywhere in the European Command
Front” in Iraq. Military plan- forces in the region and con- (EU COM) area of operations (AOR). Ori-
ners turned to a different tributed to their rapid ginally designed around a mechanized in-
option that relied more collapse north fantry or armor company team, the IRTF
on finesse and of Kirk uk. has since expanded to a battalion task
flexibility to This force consisting of a medium ready com-
accomplish pany (MRC), a heavy ready company
(HRC), and five force enhancement
mod ules (FEM). The MRC con-
sists of a comp any headquar-
ters element and two
mech anized infan-
try platoons
6 — September-October 2003
MRC HRC FEM
equipped with M113A3s and rapidly. Kurdish Pesh Merga
four dismounted infantry squads. fighters continued to press their
The HRC consists of one M1A1 (-) (-) IRTF attacks against Iraqi forces de-
Abrams platoon and one M2 fending north of the city.
Bradley pla toon with two dis- TOC
The 173d Brigade commander
mounted infantry squads. An ad-
believed the time was ripe for a
ditional M1A1 or M2 serves as
concerted move on Irbil. The
the HRC commander’s vehicle.1
task force commander arrived at
In addition to the HRC and the Bashur at approximately 0300
MP
MRC, five supporting FEMs pro- hours on the morning of 10 April
vide the IRTF commander with and immediately received a ver-
the force multipliers need ed to bal warning order to be ready
E
accomplish various missions. For to move south in three hours.
example, the comm and and con- At that time, TF 1-63 Armor had
trol FEM consists of two modi- five M1A1 tanks and two M2
CSS
fied M997 am bu lances equipped Bradleys on the ground at Ba-
with an array of communications shur. No recovery or mainte-
and computer equipment. These Figure 1. IRTF Organization nance assets had yet arrived. TF
vehicles provide the IRTF com- 1-63 Armor soldiers hurriedly
mander a highl y mobile tactical finished off-loading the last of
operations center (TOC) capable of plan- Bashur Landing and the vehicles to arrive and began to pre-
ning and tracking armor operations. The Operations in Northern Iraq pare for offensive operations.
four remain ing FEMs consisting of com-
Early morning 8 April 2003, the first The task force commander decided to
bat ser v ice support assets, engineers, mil-
M1A1 Abrams tank drove off the back assume risk and prepare to move what
itary police, and scouts complete the IRTF’s
ramp of an Air Force C-17 at Bashur Air force he had toward Irbil. The command-
organization. Each FEM is air de ploy-
Field in Northern Iraq. This was the first er believed that the mere movement of
able and capable of supporting task force-
time an M1A1 had air landed in support an armored force south toward Irbil and
level operations or, with proper support,
of a combat operation. The task force op- Kirkuk would provide coalition forces an
lim ited independent operations.
erations officer arrived on the ground with important psychological advantage. In-
The IRTF was not originally designed the first M1A1 and began to coordinate telligence reports indicated that Iraqi forc-
to deploy or operate independently. The the arrival of the rest of the task force. es, dug in north of Kirkuk, did not ex pect
IRTF was created to provide a light infan- The task force commander’s plan was to encounter American armor moving
try organization with a viable arm or capa- to first deploy the HRC’s tank platoon, an from the north. Even a small armored
bility. In the EUCOM AOR, units serv- M88 recovery vehicle, and small com- force moving from Bashur might con-
ing as the IRTF often trained with the mand and control elements to quickly get vince the Iraqis to abandon their defens-
173d Airborne Brigade based in Vicen- an organized force on the ground capa- es. Likewise, Kurdish Pesh Merga fight-
za, Italy. This brigade provides a lethal, ble of conducting and sustaining combat ers, energized by the presence of armored
high ly mo bile infantry force, but lacks a operations. By 10 April, the situation in vehicles, could press home their attacks
heavy armor punch. The IRTF is designed the vicinity of Kirkuk began to change against Iraqi positions.
to provide that armor punch. A series of
suc cessful training exercises cond ucted at
the Combat Maneuver Traini ng Center,
Hohenfels, Germany, and training deploy-
ments to Hungary and Po land in which
various IRTF units trained with the 173d
Brigade, cemented a successful working
relationship in a training environment. In
Northern Iraq, TF 1-63 Armor and the
173d Brigade validated this relationship
during combat ope rations.
“Early morning 8 April 2003, the
first M1A1 Abrams tank drove off
the back ramp of an Air Force C-
17 at Bashur Air Field in Northern
Iraq. This was the first time an
M1A1 had air landed in support
of a combat operation. The task
force operations officer arrived
on the ground with the first M1A1
and began to coordinate the ar-
rival of the rest of the task force.”
September-October 2003 — 7
“The task force commander de-
cided to assume risk and pre-
pare to move what force he had
toward Irbil. The commander
believed that the mere move-
ment of an armored force south
toward Irbil and Kirkuk would
provide coalition forces an im-
portant psychological advan-
tage. Intelligence reports indi-
cated that Iraqi forces, dug in
north of Kirkuk, did not exp ect
to encounter American armor
moving from the north.”
For over a decade, Kurdish fighters strug- suitable for armored vehicle traffic, and fantry occupying a small stone castle on
gled against Saddam Hussein’s regime it allowed coalition forces to use the Irbil the east side of the river heavily defend-
with antiquated small arms and home- airfield to stage future operations to the ed Altun Kupri. Intelligence reports indi-
made artillery and explosives. The Kurds south. cated that these troops would strongly
fought valiantly, but they lacked the heavy resist any effort to dislodge them.
The disadvantage of the Irbil route was
weapons to defeat Iraqi forces dug in and
supported by artillery. For days, Kurds that it led right into the teeth of the Iraqi The liaison officer and the task force
wondered when the tanks would arrive.2 defenses north of Kirkuk. Forces moving operations officer also conducted recon-
south along this route must travel through naissance on an eastern indirect approach
Prior to the arrival of the main body of a wide valley with steep rolling hills. The route south toward Kirkuk. This route
TF 1-63 Armor at Bashur, the task force imposing Kani Domlan Ridgeline domi- winds southeast of Bashur through small
operations officer and the liaison officer nates the southern edge of this valley. villages and numerous narrow mountain
conducted leader’s reconnaissance of two Iraqi infantry and artillery positioned on switchbacks to the town of Taqtaq locat-
possible routes to Irbil and Kirkuk. The this key terrain continued to hold this ed on the Little Zab River. The advan-
liaison officer traveled the direct route ground despite weeks of heavy bombing tage of this route was that it avoided the
down Highway 3 to a point just North of by coalition aircraft and attacks by Pesh strength of the Iraqi positions along the
Irbil. Any forces traveling this route could Merga fighters and U.S. Special Opera- Kani Domlan Ridge.
secure the Irbil airfield and if necessary tions Forces. Forces moving along this
skirt the western edge of Irbil and con- route would also have to cross the Little Approximately 10 kilometers north of
tinue south on Highway 2 toward Kirkuk. Zab River at the town of Altun Kupri. Kirkuk, there is a gap in the ridgeline
This route had two advantages: it was Local Pesh Merga reported that Iraqi in- where a small tributary of the Little Zab
8 — September-October 2003