ARMOR September-October 2001

56 Pages·2010·3.54 MB·English

The Medium Gun System Platoon: A First Look
See Page 7

PB 17-01-5 September-October 2001
Saddle Up... Tonight We Ride
“Though this be madness, yet there is a method in’t.” — Hamlet There is much going in the Army as it advances along
three axes toward transformation. The nuts and bolts of

Well, what do ya’ know, June 14th came and went with- the objective force, interim force, and legacy force
out the volcanic eruptions, tidal waves, or mass mutinies should dominate professional discussions. As we speak,
promised by some over the donning of black berets. What Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCT) boasting the
are the repercussions of last October’s infamous beret Interim Armored Vehicles are standing up. The IBCTs
announcement and this past June’s donning? It takes contain Medium Gun System platoons (see LT Hurley’s
those of us who have never worn the beret a bit more article, p. 7) and a new cavalry organization. The ripples
time to put it on, and certainly there has been pain in- from the IBCT wave are being felt throughout our
volved in watching and correcting the many interesting branch, impacting the mounted force in manning, doc-
ways some of us have worn it, but life has gone on. My trine, etc. The Interim Force also includes planning and
personal fashion experts (read older daughters) have development for an interim cavalry regiment, an organi-
given the beret a thumbs-up over the BDU cap, describ- zation that will serve today’s corps and later shape cav-
ing the beret with their favorite modifier, “cool.” An addi- alry forces in the objective force.
tional fallout from the switch is that soldiers driving POVs
With regard to the objective force, the tip of the trans-
now keep their covers on. Previously many of us whipped
formation spear, dialogue ought to be focused on the
the BDU cap off once inside a POV; now, given the
Future Combat System (FCS), which will serve as
amount of time it takes for new beret wearers to put it on
common platform for all the battlefield functional areas.
correctly, it’s easier to simply leave the beret on.
We know the defining characteristics of this system —
The amount of press, angst, anger, and controversy simply said, it should do everything and not weigh any-
over the decision and execution of beret-donning fasci- thing — and this should make for some interesting dis-
nated me. Granted, there were a few less-than-brilliant cussions.
public affairs decisions that thickened the plot: the an-
Which brings us to the final piece of the triad, the leg-
nouncement that a rites of passage test would be re-
acy force. LTC Dave Pride does an outstanding job in
quired to earn the beret, followed by a quick recantation.
this issue (p. 39) illustrating the relevancy of this force.
And the revelation that China supplied many of the be-
Pride points out that the Abrams tank will continue to
rets, this on the heels of the P-3 downing. (Apparently,
evolve via upgrades, and that tankers will cross LDs on
there are now literally thousands of these berets languish-
this tank until 2031. There is a tremendous amount of
ing in a warehouse somewhere, looking for a home.)
activity with the legacy force, again a lot of grist for the
Swept up in the beret controversy, it seemed to me, many
mill.
of us misread the demonstration as the main effort while
the OPFOR’s main body swept around our flanks. In the So with the beret controversy in our dust, it’s time to
midst of a revolution in the Army, one that impacts dra- glance toward the horizon and sort out the future of
matically on the mounted force, many were more con- mounted warfighting.
cerned about a change in the Army’s headgear.
— D2
By Order of the Secretary of the Army: Official:

ERIC K. SHINSEKI
JOEL B. HUDSON
General, United States Army
Administrative Assistant to the
Chief of Staff
Secretary of the Army
0118602
The Professional Development Bulletin of the Armor Branch PB 17-01-5

Editor-in-Chief
Features
MAJ DAVE DAIGLE
7 Medium Gun System Platoons: A First Look at a New Kind of Unit
by Second Lieutenant Brian P. Hurley
Managing Editor
JON T. CLEMENS 11 Plow Platoon Operations
by Captain Patrick A. Callahan
Commandant
14 Kasserine Pass and the Necessity of Training
MG R. STEVEN WHITCOMB
by Captain James Dunivan
17 Obtaining Maximum Effectiveness from Your Chemical Assets
by Captain Tom Duncan
ARMOR (ISSN 0004-2420) is published bi-
monthly by the U.S. Army Armor Center,
21 The Secret Museum at Kubinka
1109A Sixth Avenue, Fort Knox, KY 40121.
by James M. Warford
Disclaimer: The information contained in AR-
MOR represents the professional opinions of 23 An Easy Way to Cut the Cost of Live-Fire Gunnery Evaluation
the authors and does not necessarily reflect by Dr. Joseph D. Hagman
the official Army or TRADOC position, nor
does it change or supersede any information 25 Busting the Barricades:
presented in other official Army publications. How Armor Was Employed in the Urban Battle of Seoul
by Captain Matthew H. Fath
Official distribution is limited to one copy for
each armored brigade headquarters, armored
30 Modernizing India’s Tank Fleet
cavalry regiment headquarters, armor battalion
headquarters, armored cavalry squadron head- by Lieutenant Colonel Mark A. Olinger
quarters, reconnaissance squadron headquar-
ters, armored cavalry troop, armor company, 36 Tank Myths
and motorized brigade headquarters of the by Charles M. Baily
United States Army. In addition, Army libraries,
Army and DOD schools, HQ DA and MACOM 39 The Abrams Tank, Fulcrum of Army Transformation
staff agencies with responsibility for armored, by Lieutenant Colonel Dave Pride
direct fire, ground combat systems, organiza-
tions, and the training of personnel for such 42 1-12 Cavalry Fields New Abrams M1A2 SEP Tanks
organizations may request two copies by by Specialist Jonathan Del Marcus
sending a request to the editor-in-chief.
43 How to Build a Successful Scout Platoon
Authorized Content: ARMOR will print only
by Sergeant First Class Shawn E. Wallace
those materials for which the U.S. Army Armor
Center has proponency. That proponency
45 A Search Operation in the Zegra Valley
includes: all armored, direct-fire ground com-
by Trooper M. T. Llewellyn, British Army
bat systems that do not serve primarily as
infantry carriers; all weapons used exclusively
46 The Adventures of a Liaison Officer at the NTC
in these systems or by CMF 19-series enlisted
soldiers; any miscellaneous items of equip- by Captain Clinton D. Alexander
ment which armor and armored cavalry or-
ganizations use exclusively; training for all SC Back Type 98 Chinese Main Battle Tank Poster
12A, 12B, and 12C officers and for all CMF- Cover Threat Branch, Directorate of Force Development
19-series enlisted soldiers; and information
concerning the training, logistics, history, and Departments
leadership of armor and armored cavalry units
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include Threat units at those levels. 3 Letters 50 Reviews
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2 ARMOR — September-October 2001
Russia in Chechnya: A Second Look Staff — wanted no part of such changes. For the Russian Army, (GABTU), stated on sev-
two years, the Russians argued about these eral occasions that this was the primary

Dear Sir: changes in their professional journals and reason for their failures and problems. Tanks
writings. But in December 1994, when Presi- which should have taken six hours to pre-
CPT Geibel’s recent article, “Some Russian dent Yeltsin ordered the crackdown on the pare for combat now took seven to nine
Tankers’ Experiences in the Second Che- Chechens, it was put to the test and found days, and frequently suffered failures of key
chen War” (ARMOR, July-August 2001), seriously wanting. systems shortly afterward (cooling being the
ultimately presents a fuzzy picture of the number one problem with the T-72s and
modern Russian Army, its capabilities, and Part of the problem here was a lack of train- BMPs). Improperly stored batteries — an-
its shortcomings. Since CPT Geibel does not ing at all levels. Troops who were sent to other major weakness of Soviet-era tanks,
speak or read Russian, he is at the mercy of Chechnya had in many cases only just ar- as there were never enough of them around
what English-language materials are avail- rived for their mandatory conscription ser- for proper rotation and stowage — also died
able, and most of those are sorely lacking a vice. As a result, they had only been through quickly, forcing the troops to replace them
good assessment of what has taken place about half of what U.S. soldiers would con- under very trying conditions.
within the Russian Army over the last nine sider basic training. Since Russian planners
years. wanted to conserve their “good stuff” — the The T-80BV tanks used by the “Maykop”
6,000 tanks that they considered to be com- Brigade had no explosive plates in their
To provide a better understanding for the bat worthy against the West — older models reactive armor boxes (actually just a
readers of ARMOR, and so that they can were pulled out of depot storage and issued protective shield over the 4S20 explosive
place the events described by CPT Geibel in to troops. As a result, few tankers were plates), and as a result had no chance
proper perspective, a short background on trained on any of the systems they would against skilled Chechen antitank teams firing
the history of the Russian Army is required, have to fight in, and even trained ones were down on them from buildings. The image of
as well as the framework of how it fits into assigned to the wrong tanks. Trained T-72 a T-80BV, with a few boxes still visible on its
the events which have taken place in drivers wound up in T-80BV tanks, and T-80 glacis, blown completely apart near the train
Chechnya. tankers in T-72As. Crews were thrown to- station in Groznyy sums up the total waste of
In 1992, Russian military writers such as gether and had to train and become familiar the attacks by these forces and units.
Colonel Anatoly Dokuchayev gave an outline with each other during the road march to Whether they were stolen –— or simply not
of how the new Russian Army planned to Groznyy. installed as nobody thought to do that — is
fight in the future. Most forward thinkers saw All of this was compounded by two major anyone’s guess. The vehicles were also
the days of the Soviet “hordes” as over, and errors at the top. First off, all units assigned using “Winter” fuels, with a shot of naphtha
the main problem would then be “Local Wars were kept on peacetime relationships, not added for thinner to ease flow and starting,
and Regional Conflicts.” To engage in these wartime. Under wartime regulations, all which caused the diesel fuels to ignite much
military engagements, the view was to cut troops in a given area belonged to the des- more readily when hit by HEAT projectiles.
the Army drastically from its Soviet days of ignated commander. Under peacetime, they To comment on CPT Geibel’s quote that
over 200 divisions down to only around 50 or still were responsible to their own chains of prior to Chechnya-2, ERA plates were re-
so. Most of the divisions were to be reorgan- command. This was true with the VDV units moved from T-72BM or T-90S tanks and
ized into brigades, with more artillery and sent into the country, as well as the MVD sold on the “Black Market,” he does not ap-
support assets, and would fight under the Internal Troops units, which comprised some pear to understand how the ERA they use
direction of a corps or army headquarters 40 percent of the original troops deploying differs from the circa 1983 ERA version used
(which had the command and control assets (15,000 out of 38,000). in Chechnya-1. The T-72BM, T-80U, and T-
to run major operations). They were also to
include, if necessary, forces from other Secondly, the North Caucasus Military Dis- 90S tanks use what the Russians call “Built-
branches of the armed forces (e.g., VDV, trict commander organized the operation as In Reactive Dynamic Protection.” This is a
Naval Infantry, Frontal Aviation, etc.) and a classic Soviet front, with too many levels of newer design of reactive armor, fully inte-
troops from the other 12 ministries that had command for the forces deployed. The result grated into the design of the tank, which can
military or paramilitary formations (MVD was an unmitigated disaster, highlighted by defeat both HEAT and sabot projectiles. The
Internal Troops, Border Guards, Railway the nearly complete destruction of the 131st T-72AV, T-72BV, T-64BV, and T-80BV all
Troops, Ministry of Emergency Situations, Independent “Maykop” Motorized Rifle Bri- use “Attached Reactive Dynamic Protection,”
etc.) gade and the 81st Guards Motorized Rifle which is attached to studs welded to the
Regiment on New Year’s Eve 1994-95. outer surface of the tank. In most cases,
These formations were to fight as “Gruppi- commanders had the studs and boxes
rovka” – a Russian word which means Most of CPT Geibel’s anecdotes on failings mounted on the tanks, but the 4S20 plates
“Force Grouping,” but in the U.S. sense ap- apply to this war, not the current one. The were stored separately, not to be issued and
proximates a task force. Each gruppirovka Soviets had a very good system of long-term mounted except in case of war. It is very
would form “Gruppa” or battle groups that conservation and storage, but it relied on difficult, if not impossible, for troops to re-
were tailored for specific missions, and skilled depot-level preparation and storage of move the ERA plates from either a T-72BM
would prosecute them as required. The equipment to work properly. This is why in or T-90S to sell those items.
1991 Lieutenant General Dmitry Volkogonov
gruppirovki would be commanded under an
noted that the Soviet Union, at the moment Over the course of the war, the Russians
“Ob’yedinyonnaya Gruppirovka” headquar-
of its breakup, had 77,000 tanks on its solved most of their command and control
ters, or what U.S. planners would call a joint
books, albeit in various states of operational problems and tried to provide additional
task force. On paper, this seemed to be a
service or repair. In the breakup, most of the training for the soldiers who would fight in
modern and functional method of conducting
restoration factories — charged with the Chechnya. The only solution they found for
combat, better suited for operations like
depot-level rebuilding and some of the stor- using tanks was to avoid using them in city
Desert Storm than the ponderous WWII
age work — were lost to Belarus and conditions unless they had sufficient infantry
fronts which the Soviets planned to use.
Ukraine. As skilled personnel left in the to provide protection. One tactic they did use
Unfortunately, all this requires training — drawdown, many vehicles had to be stored with success was the “Fire Carousel.” The T-
from the soldier skills at the bottom to the by use of troop labor. These personnel were 72, and the T-80 as well, are very good
command employment at the top. This was untrained in proper preparation of vehicles, when their autoloader is working, but very
not done, partially because the Russian and as a result, when the tanks were drawn tedious and awkward to use without it or
Army suddenly found itself without a budget, out of storage, many of them failed nearly at when the ammunition carousel goes empty.
and partially because the bureaucrats from once. Colonel General Sergey Mayev, head It can take up to 45 minutes to reload a T-
the “Arbat Military District” — the General of the Tank and Automotive Directorate of 72’s 22-round carousel, and until that point in
ARMOR — September-October 2001 3
time, the tank is relatively helpless. This backblast which crushes nearly everything in isolate enemy forces and then destroy them.
tactic saw them bring up one tank at a time the area. They have also been called “Vac- Tanks were used in this manner to assist in
— keeping it head-on to the Chechens to uum Bombs” by the Chechens, who fear the cordoning operations, but did not partici-
prevent shooting down on the tank — and them for the damage they can cause. They pate in the destruction by fire of the enemy.
firing up all of the 22 rounds in the auto- are quite dangerous to armored vehicles, as The new rule of thumb for Russian com-
loader. When the tank went “dry,” it would they can penetrate the engine bays or via manders is that if you find yourself in small
reverse out of position and a new tank with a NBC filtration systems and cause havoc arms range, then you have failed to carry out
full load would move up to take its place. inside the fighting compartment. the tactics correctly.
Using this tactic, the Russians were able to
The Second Chechen War (“Chechnya-2” While losses among the Army units have
clean out nests of Chechens with success,
in some areas) saw a great deal of changes been far fewer, casualties overall have been
but were still limited by the 45 minutes each
in Russian planning, thinking, and training. about the same. Chechnya-1 saw the Rus-
tank would be out of action when empty.
First off, the decision was made that no unit sians take 57,000 casualties — 5,500 KIA or
T-62s began to be issued to troop units at would deploy to Chechnya until it had com- died of wounds, 16,000 WIA, and 35,000
the end of Chechnya-1. The reason for this pleted six months’ training (one training cy- sick or injured. LTC (Ret.) Les Grau of the
was simple. These tanks had proven them- cle). What many people forget is that on the Foreign Military Studies Office at Fort
selves in Afghanistan and were far better for still-in-force Soviet two-year conscription cy- Leavenworth has a 900-page study on the
the types of conditions found in Chechnya. cle, only 50 percent of a unit is truly trained history of the 40th Army in Afghanistan
They had been the last tanks to undergo a and deployable at any one time. Twenty-five which he is painstakingly translating into
full depot rebuilding. (This is due to the fact percent are in each cycle; the 1st cycle is too English; the main problem the Soviets suf-
that they were around 20 years old. A Soviet new and the troops in the 4th cycle (e.g., the fered from in Afghanistan was, as in Chech-
regulation called for this with all serviceable one prior to release) are usually either too nya-1 and -2, sickness and ill health caused
tanks to extend their life as reserve tanks for close to release to be effective or, in the by poor field sanitation and support. Casual-
another 20 years. Each tank received a case of Chechnya, already gone. (To ensure ties in Chechnya-2 are less reliable at the
completely new engine, suspension compo- a desire to serve, troops in Chechnya re- moment, but from all published reports, they
nents, tracks, electronics, and upgrade items ceive two days’ service credit for each day in appear to have taken in excess of 4,300 KIA,
such as laser rangefinders, BDD armor ap- Chechnya; ergo, some troops can complete 13,000 WIA, and an average of 40 personnel
plique packages, and in a very few cases, their two-year stint in 15 months.) a day diagnosed with various illnesses or
the 1K13 sight and 9M117 “Sheksna” missile Few of the units cited by CPT Geibel de- injuries.
system.) ployed in full measure to Dagestan or CPT Geibel has glossed over the main
The T-62, with its five-speed manual trans- Chechnya-2. Due to their lessons learned problem suffered by Russian tankers in
mission and lower stressed engine, was from Chechnya-1, only part of a unit’s tanks Chechnya-2, namely remote-controlled mines.
found to be superior in the mountains over was actually taken into the republic in com- Few pitched battles with armor have taken
the T-72 with its seven-speed and turbo- parison with unit TO&E strengths. The main place in this war. As a result, the Chechens
charged diesel. However, these tanks did difference in Chechnya-2 was the fact that have discovered the only way to defeat them
have their limits and were not a total pana- tank crews had trained together, and were is with remote-controlled explosive devices,
cea. They did have the advantage of a fourth using the tank they trained on. This provided such as a 152mm projectile buried in a road,
crewmember, making self-repairs easier and a much better chance for survival as well as as they have rarely been able to close to
also providing another set of eyes to keep better combat performance. RPG range. They have also discovered that
watch on the Chechens. The BDD armor, Still, the main problems with Russian train- if you shoot a Ground Forces or VDV soldier,
consisting of varying types of plates encased ing — another Soviet-era holdover — re- artillery and aircraft will visit the nearest vil-
in a resin matrix and a ceramic filler inside mained. Troop training, even for Chechnya, lage and flatten it. If you shoot an MVD sol-
the turret “eyebrows,” was capable of dealing was done in a pro forma style which did not dier, he just dies. More casualties are now
with all of the HEAT weapons used by the train crews to function in new situations or being taken by the MVD Internal Troops and
Chechens except captured RPO “flame- when left to their own devices. Maintenance Militia (police) than by the Army.
throwers.” skills were still poor, and readiness rates The Russian Army is also unlikely to see
were not as high as they should have been. some of its wishes fulfilled in the near future
A word on the RPO, which has come to the
Also, sergeants were identified based on (through 2005-2010). CPT Geibel’s state-
fore in Chechnya as a particularly nasty and
either schooling or estimated levels of ability, ments on missile developments are essen-
brutally effective weapon. The Russians call
and were not fully trained NCOs in the tially true, but in the context of their priorities
it a “flamethrower” but it is more accurately
American mold. Whereas a U.S. soldier may for the Armed Forces, unlikely to be seen by
described as a “volumetric” weapon, a class
take four years to make sergeant E-5, the Russian soldiers. Few of the tanks being
of weapons which use expanding gases or
Russians were appointing them after only a used in Chechnya have through-the-tube
aerosols to cause their effects. The RPO is a
period of time as little as 12 weeks. Also, missile capability due to a number of factors.
“thermobaric” weapon; thermobarics are
junior officers were in critically short supply; First is the cost; only about 1 in 3 Soviet-era
essentially slow-burning explosive slurries
no one wanted to serve in Chechnya, and tanks were ever assessed to have it (there
that compound the damage they cause in
those who went in many cases were con- were more B1 versions of the T-64, T-72,
three ways. First, they burn very slowly for
scripted out of college for a two-year active and T-80 than B versions; the Bs have the
an explosive, causing much greater dwell
duty stint. Their experience and knowledge missile capability, the B1s do not). Secondly
times of their explosive impulses on a target.
were no higher than their troops, which given is the training problem, and few gunners are
(To give a comparison from nuclear training,
the lack of a true NCO corps, placed all of proficient on their weapons now without
the human body can take an instantaneous
them at risk. adding the additional load of missile flight
overpressure of about 200 psi and survive;
control. Lastly, they do not have the person-
but as little as 15 psi over a longer time Innovations were tried to minimize losses.
nel to fix and maintain these systems, and
crushes the vital organs and kills the victim. One of these was the concept of “Recon-
thus cannot handle the extra materiel prob-
This longer “dwell” is the first killer factor in naissance Fire Operations,” an outgrowth of
lems caused by new equipment.
thermobarics.) Second, the burning plasma the Cold War-era “Reconnaissance Fire
cloud can penetrate even the smallest Complex” and the “Reconnaissance Strike As they see local wars and regional con-
cracks and enter inside a vehicle or other Complex.” In this tactic, all of the fire support flicts being their main problem, the new
stationary object, such as a house or pillbox. assets — missiles, rockets, artillery, helicop- tanks forecasted are also unlikely to come
Finally, when the slurry is totally consumed, ters, and fixed wing aircraft — are coordi-
the resulting vacuum causes a massive nated by a single authority and used to first Continued on Page 48
4 ARMOR — September-October 2001
Changing While Remaining the Same

by Major General R. Steven Whitcomb, Commanding General, U.S. Army Armor Center

Returning to Fort Knox as the Com- instilling basic soldier skills has led System or the Interim Cavalry Regi-
mander and 39th Chief of Armor is a them to develop an outstanding basic ment while never forgetting the pur-
true honor and privilege for me. I am marksmanship and physical training pose for their existence. LTG Bell has
very excited at rejoining a team of program for our Army. The NCO left your Branch home postured to lead
dedicated professionals that serve the Academy was recently accredited by the Army into transformation and the
most lethal and decisive force in the the Sergeants Major Academy. Our Fu- challenges of the future. This unit has
world. One of the things that I have tures staff continues to provide solid, gotten better!
observed during my career is that units cutting-edge doctrine; the best equip-
I look forward to running with the ba-
never stay the same, they either get ment and platforms ; and superior train-
ton that he has passed. We remain fo-
better or they get worse. In an effort to ing systems.
cused on supporting our field com-
make things better, some people be-
manders with the best trained soldiers
lieve that you have to change them. I As I assume the responsibilities of
and leaders, the best training facilities,
disagree. Sometimes the hardest thing Chief of Armor, I want to thank LTG
the best doctrine, the best training sys-
to do is to figure out what needs fixing Bell for the improvements that he has
tems, and our finest intellectual effort
and what needs to be left alone. While I made and for the things that he has
for the challenges of tomorrow.
have only been away from the “Home preserved. He leaves behind a team that
of Cavalry and Armor” for two years, I can address issues as complex as the FORGE THE THUNDERBOLT AND
am amazed at what has been changed Unit of Action for the Future Combat STRIKE FIRST!
and at what has been left the same.
What has changed, or evolved, is the
way training is done here and the
Major General R. Steven Whitcomb assumed his present duties as Commanding
training infrastructure. The creation of
General of Fort Knox, Ky., on 3 August 2001. His last assignment was as the Assis-
multi-echelon, multi-grade training by
tant Chief of Staff, C3 (Operations), Republic of Korea/United States (ROK/US)
the 16th Cavalry Regiment is ahead of Combined Forces Command, Assistant Chief of Staff, J3 (Operations), U. S. Forces
its time. This training, which links cap- Korea and Deputy Commanding General (Operations), Eighth U.S. Army.
tains, lieutenants, and noncommis-
General Whitcomb was commissioned a lieutenant of Infantry upon graduation
sioned officers in demanding training
from the University of Virginia in 1970. Following graduation from the Infantry Officer
events called Gauntlets, will revolu- Basic Course, he served as a rifle platoon leader, weapons platoon leader, and ex-
tionize training at the institutional level. ecutive officer in Company C, 2d Battalion, 508th Infantry (Airborne), 82d Airborne
Fort Knox has invested heavily and is Division. Branch transferring to Armor, he next served in the Federal Republic of
an Army leader in all three training Germany as a Tank Company Commander, Company B, 3d Battalion, 64th Armor
domains (live, virtual, and construc- and Company Commander and Battalion S1, 2d Battalion, 64th Armor, 3d ID.
tive). Not surprisingly, the training in- Following completion of the Armor Officer Advanced Course, he served as Assis-
tensity for everyone who trains at Fort tant Professor of Military Science at California State College, where he obtained a
Knox has increased. Our MOUT Zuss- Masters of Education degree in Counseling. After attending the Counter Intelligence
man Range Complex site is state of the Officers Course at Fort Huachuca, Ariz., he was the Battalion S3, 524th Military Intel-
art and, when finished, the entire Wil- ligence Battalion, Republic of Korea. Upon completion of Command and General
Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., he served as the 2d AD Deputy G2 and as
cox training area will be the best light-
Battalion S3 and XO, 3d Battalion, 67th Armor, 2d AD.
to-medium training area in the Army.
Further, technology has been incorpo- Following assignment as Aide-de-Camp to the Commanding General, III Corps and
rated into our classrooms in exciting Fort Hood, he returned to Fort Leavenworth as a Staff Leader at the Combined Arms
and Services Staff School (CAS3). He was posted to Germany where he com-
and innovative ways. For any one who
manded the 2d Battalion, 70th Armor, 1st AD, deploying the battalion to Operation
hasn’t walked through Skidgel Hall
Desert Shield and Desert Storm. He attended the Army War College and was then
lately, I will tell you that the classroom
assigned to the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans as the
facilities are far ahead of any university Chief, Western Hemisphere Division, Current Operations.
in America.
Major General Whitcomb commanded the 2d Brigade, 24th Infantry Division at Fort
What has not changed at Fort Knox is Stewart, Georgia. He was again assigned to ODCSOPS as the Chief of the Combat
the focus on producing competent, con- Maneuver Division, Force Development. Major General Whitcomb then served as
fident, and adaptable Armor leaders. the Executive Officer of the Vice Chief of Staff, Army. He was previously assigned as
the Assistant Division Commander, Maneuver for the 1st Cavalry Division, serving
From initial entry soldier (IET) training
with the division in Bosnia. He was then assigned as the Deputy Commanding Gen-
to the pre-command courses, the qual-
eral, United States Army Armor Center, Fort Knox, Kentucky.
ity of instruction remains the key. The
1st Armor Training Brigade’s focus on
ARMOR — September-October 2001 5
Transforming the Force:
How Will It Impact Me?

CSM Carl E. Christian, Command Sergeant Major, U.S. Army Armor Center

The Army recently designated the Infantry Brigade (Separate) in Alaska,
next four Interim Brigade Combat which will transform no later than FY
Teams (IBCT) as part of its continuing 2003. The creation of the Reconnais-
transformation. Three of them will be sance, Surveillance, and Target Acqui-
part of the Regular Army and one will sition (RSTA) squadron and the inser-
gression, armor soldiers will migrate
be in the Army National Guard. As tion of the Mobile Gun System (MGS)
back to legacy force units and other
each IBCT stands up, the changes will platoons into the brigade translates to
assignments.
have a major impact on the armor force 143 19Ds, 91 19Ks, and 5 19Zs. The
personnel structure, so I want to share nucleus of this force will come from E Not only must we increase the number
with you how this announcement is Troop/1st Cavalry. of Skill Level One soldiers in the force,
likely to affect you, your career oppor- but also the numbers in all skill levels.
The additional MOS allocations are
tunities, and the armor force in general. It will be incumbent on the units to
good news for the armor force. The 2d
coach, teach, and mentor their quality
Two years ago, to meet the changing Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR), at soldiers to develop the noncommis-
MTOE requirements of the Force XXI Fort Polk, Louisiana, will transform no sioned officers needed for the force.
structure and the creation of the first later than FY 2004, and the 2d Brigade, Additionally, the crew configurations
two IBCTs at Fort Lewis, Washington, 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii will of the LAV3 and MGS mean a higher
the armor force was forced to reduce transform no later than FY 2005. This NCO-to-soldier ratio in these new
the number of 19K armor crewmen and brigade will see the same MOS alloca- units. The increase in noncommis-
increase the number of 19D cavalry tions as the 172d Brigade; however, sioned officers will translate into a need
scouts. We choose to meet this re- they will have no cavalry troop to grow for more to attend NCOES schools.
quirement by retraining 19K soldiers to from, so some personnel may come The NCO academy at Fort Knox will
19D scouts to better balance the force, from other 25th Infantry Division units. ensure that every NCO has the oppor-
retain quality armor soldiers in the Ca- The 2d ACR’s transformation will be tunity to attend the appropriate school
reer Management Field (CMF), and re- a little more complex. The 2d ACR will in a timely manner for soldiers to meet
duce accession requirements. Although gain 201 19K positions and one 19Z their promotion requirements. We will
we needed 258 19K Skill Level 10 sol- position, while losing 112 19D posi- stabilize the soldiers in these IBCTs
diers to volunteer to make the conver- tions as they transition from HMMWVs during the transition phase to meet the
sion, ultimately over 250 19K10 sol- to LAV3s and MGSs. needs of the unit and to ensure that the
diers had to be involuntarily selected to NCOs are able to meet the branch
convert to 19D. The program was not It is obvious the armor force will have qualification standards necessary for
the success we had hoped for, nor did to grow in personnel to meet these re- promotion.
the soldiers and their leaders receive quirements. Recruiting Command will
the program well. The basic problem access more CMF 19 soldiers and the Alaska and Hawaii are two locations
was that soldiers and their leaders did training base at Fort Knox will flex to that have, in the past, offered few posi-
not fully understand the necessity for handle the additional soldiers. The ad- tions for 19Ds and 19Ks. Many armor
the program and its future ramifications ditional 19D and 19K requirements will soldiers will soon have their first op-
on their development and the armor equate to about one additional fill per portunity to be assigned there. There
force. year for each of the One Station Unit will be many new challenges as the
Training (OSUT) battalions. The Skill IBCTs and the 2nd ACR transform, so
As we move forward with transforma- Level One soldiers for the new IBCT soldiers and leaders need to take a close
tion, we do not foresee doing another will not come just from the 1st Training look at volunteering for assignments to
involuntary reclassification program. Brigade. Many will come from existing an IBCT or 2nd ACR. Never has the
We have been working this now far units in order to get a good cross-level opportunity for professional develop-
enough in advance, in approximate of experience in the organizations. The ment of our soldiers been so great.
numbers, to create a better understand- 19Ks in the IBCTs will gain the Addi- With transformation comes that oppor-
ing of the needs of the force. Soldiers tional Skill Identifier (ASI) of R4. The tunity. Transformation will allow our
and leaders, however, will be affected, Master Gunners will get an R8 ASI. best soldiers to emerge to become the
but they should leverage the opportuni- We will use these to track our trained leaders of a better armor force. That is
ties presented and not be wary of them. base. We will not “lock” 19D or 19K why “TODAY IS THE BEST DAY TO
The first of the new IBCTs is the 172d soldiers into the IBCTs. For career pro- BE A SOLDIER.”
6 ARMOR — September-October 2001
Medium Gun System Platoons:
A First Look at a New Kind of Unit

by Second Lieutenant Brian P. Hurley

The Medium Gun System (MGS) pla- dismounted infantry squad (The other close infantry support fire teams were
toon is a new unit dedicated to accom- MGS vehicle was attached to the Main able to identify the dismounted AT
plishing the same mission as tanks were Effort Platoon.); and a third with one threat and destroy them before they
first called upon to carry out — sup- MGS vehicle per rifle platoon, under could initiate firing. Conversely, when
porting the infantry. In this case, the in- the rifle platoon leader’s control. The a company chose to leave the MGS
fantry units are part of the new Interim first configuration, pure plus, is usually without infantry security, they were
Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs) now best for non-restrictive terrain, and in completely destroyed. After the mis-
training at Fort Lewis, Washington. support/attack-by-fire positions. The dis- sion, the only units with surviving
mounted infantry squad from the ac- MGS vehicles were the units that util-
Consider this article a progress report
companying IAV conducts an occupa- ized the deliberate occupation method
on the training, problems, and achieve-
tion by force of the SBF/ABF position. with infantry.
ments of C Co, 1-23 IN’s Medium Gun
System platoon, which supports the The second task organization
Third Brigade Combat Team (BCT). is usually the normal task or-
ganization for the company.
The company has conducted several
Fort Lewis’ restrictive terrain is
raids, traffic checkpoints, presence pa-
not conducive to a pure MGS
trols, and perimeter defenses since June
organization and the missions
2000 and has taken initial strides to-
executed by IBCT infantry com-
ward maintaining 19K proficiency
panies usually require MGS
through the first Interim Brigade Com-
intervention in the close fight.
bat Team (IBCT) Tank Crew Profi-
MGS vehicles operate on the
ciency Course (TCPC). Company com-
section/wingman concept, util-
manders have had the opportunity to
izing the infantry as local secu-
execute numerous missions utilizing
rity, but this is not limited to
varied employment methods and task
static local security. Often, the
organizations for the MGS. This article
MGS platoon leader will use
will cover the training conducted, the
active dismounted patrolling
various ways the MGS has been em-
with one MGS overwatching the
ployed, the close infantry fight, MGS
dismounted maneuver element.
training, and some 19K-specific issues
The remaining MGS and IAV
that have arisen in the MGS/IBCT con-
operate on the wingman/section
cept.
concept. One full rifle squad
Because the final version of the Me- with one MGS in overwatch
dium Gun System is not yet available provides the lethality needed to
for training, we use eight-wheeled Ital- deal with almost any contin-
ian Centauro armored cars, equipped The IAV squad dismounts, clears the gency. If the threat is too great for the
with 105mm tank guns similar to those position, and secures the flanks and squad and MGS, the other MGS and
on the M60 and early M1-series tanks. rear of the position. The MGS platoon IAV provide a quick reaction force to
These vehicles are on loan to the U.S. then conducts deliberate occupation of defeat the enemy. The third MGS vehi-
Army. The Infantry Assault Vehicles the SBF/ABF. Dismounted infantry are cle is utilized by the main effort as the
(IAVs) that our unit uses are also aware of the “danger cone” of 105mm weapon system to sway the battle and
“loaners,” from the Canadian Army, rounds and are well clear of the rear of enter the close infantry fight.
similar to Marine Corps Light Armored the vehicle. The remaining IAV sup-
Vehicles (LAVs). ports the dismounted infantry in secu- This task organization is also ex-
rity operations and can mount up and tremely effective. Organizing the com-
Task Organization
conduct quick reaction force (QRF) pany in this manner provides the com-
To date, MGS platoons have focused operations. mander one or two more maneuver ele-
on three configurations: pure plus ments (to make five) instead of three
(three MGS vehicles plus one Infantry This task organization proved ex- (just the rifle platoons). The armor pla-
Assault Vehicle (IAV) and one dis- tremely effective. When the enemy toon leader has his E-6 wingman and
mounted infantry squad); another with tried to destroy the MGS SBF by flank- another infantry E-6 squad leader,
two MGS vehicles, one IAV, and one ing with dismounted AT weaponry, while the MGS PSG is attached to the
ARMOR — September-October 2001 7
While the U.S. version of the Medium
Gun System is being re-engineered to
reduce its height for C-130 deployment,
troops of the Interim Brigade Combat
Teams are training on Centauro armored
cars borrowed from the Italian Army.
main effort. The PL and PSG must be The third task organization is used During the screening operation, the
proficient at all infantry tasks for this when each rifle platoon is expected to MGS platoon was ordered to stop a
organization to work. Using this orga- fight in limited terrain under heavy specific vehicle to search and detain
nization, the company commander can enemy opposition. Each rifle platoon suspects. Maintaining covered and con-
parcel out his elements to cover more leader employs his MGS according to cealed positions, the MGS utilized its
area without sacrificing firepower. his own judgment. Usually, the MGS optics to track and identify vehicles.
Also, he is able to spread senior leader- role is limited to a support by fire role Upon identification, the MGS radioed
ship over a larger area, which translates or is used to help establish the machine to the dismounted element while the
to greater command and control. 11B gun teams. Effects are limited in this MGS maneuvered to block the road.
platoon sergeants and new platoon method since the terrain and enemy The suspect vehicle was trapped on the
leaders benefit from the attached 19K threat can drastically affect MGS com- road between one MGS and one IAV.
E-7 who aids in the troop leading pro- bat power. This task organization is the Dismounted infantry conducted a
cedures and from integrating armor into least effective of the three. It is best search of vehicle and personnel, de-
the close infantry fight. suited to perimeter defenses, presence tained suspects and radioed for EPW
patrols, or assembly area operations; pick up. The second MGS vehicle pro-
The MGS platoon can now operate the scenarios depend on the threat tem- vided overwatch and eyes on the road
traffic control points, conduct screen plate. MGS vehicles can be split to network.
line operations, be prepared for reserve/ provide evenly distributed firepower to
Organizing the MGS platoon in this
quick reaction force (QRF) missions, each section of the perimeter defense.
manner did not reduce the combat
conduct active reconnaissance and Obviously, this type of organization
power of the platoons conducting the
presence patrol operations, and secure a does not lend itself to massing fires.
presence patrols and it enabled the MGS
section of a mobile defense in depth.
During a presence patrol, each platoon to maximize its optics and maneuver-
The other MGS vehicle in the main
can cover a specific area and use the ability advantages over the enemy.
effort can be used in a SBF/ABF, or
MGS as an intimidating force as well
switch to precision coax and provide Screen operations/hunter-killer teams
as a QRF if the platoon is overwhelmed.
close machine gun support. Another were employed during the perimeter
Utilizing this task organization for raids
option for the lone MGS is to operate defense using the same organization.
or deliberate attacks limits the com-
as the breach element when the main The platoon had two MGS vehicles
mander to three maneuver units, instead
effort is attempting to gain a foothold plus one IAV and squad. The other
of a potential five, and limits the fire-
in an urban environment. After exten- MGS was attached to a full rifle pla-
power of mass and maneuverability
sive rehearsals, the grappling hook toon charged with active security pa-
benefits that the MGS offers. Also, two
method was used to clear concertina trolling. The rifle platoon leader organ-
key leaders (the PL and PSG) are sim-
wire in an urban raid. ized a hunter-killer team with two
ply reduced to tank commanders. This
IAVs, two squads, and one MGS. IAVs
proposed organization has as many
The dismounted infantry set the patrolled for the enemy, and once the
limitations as the platoon file does in
conditions for the MGS to maneuver, enemy was found, would dismount and
dismounted operations.
under smoke, to execute the breach. further evaluate/develop the situation.
Setting the conditions translates to MGS would then be deployed into the
Battlefield Examples of Task
neutralizing the immediate AT threat fight once the hunter team set the con-
Organizations
while continuously applying suppres- ditions for MGS intervention.
sive fire and smoke on the enemy. The Task Organization 2: While con-
The MGS platoon conducted station-
MGS vehicle exposure time was lim- ducting area presence operations, in-
ary screen line operations with an on-
ited to about 15 seconds and, in that surgent forces were entering and leav-
order mission to reinforce the perime-
time, the vehicle was concealed under a ing the occupied areas. Company com-
ter. The dismount squad was the QRF
wall of smoke. After the breach, the manders needed to maintain surveil-
for the perimeter defense and also the
infantry penetrated the enemy perime- lance and provide a quick reaction
designated EPW team and vehicle
ter and seized the foothold. Upon occu- force should the presence patrols meet
search team.
pation of a second building, the MGS resistance. The task organization for
vehicle maneuvered, under cover of this mission utilized two MGS vehi- The hunter-killer team executed flaw-
suppressive fire and building obscura- cles, one IAV, and one dismounted lessly. The MGS truly swayed the fight
tion, to enter the close infantry fight. infantry squad. They were to conduct with precision coax and APERS
The MGS began to turn the tide of the screen line operations and, on order, rounds. However, this tactic relies
battle and allow the infantry freedom of provide a QRF to the nearby village to heavily upon the infantry’s adjustment
maneuver. reinforce. for the MGS danger cone, which is an
8 ARMOR — September-October 2001