Armor, September-October 1995 Edition - Fort Benning - U.S. Army

56 Pages·2011·3.14 MB·English

Stand To
In your digitized movement forward toward Force XXI than war (OOTW), and a few of us have even experi-
don’t forget to report your progress. There are many is- enced them, but most heavy guys haven’t: incoming
sues remaining that require thoughtful discussion and fire from any direction; identification problems in dis-
consideration. What still needs to be developed? What cerning friendly force from foe, friendly noncombatants
do we have that doesn’t work as advertised? What from hostile ones; language barriers between military
works better than expected? Where are the holes? forces and civilians, and amongst allied forces; restric-
What is solid? What haven’t we thought of? These are tive rules of engagement; vehicle identification prob-
basic questions, of course, but every armored advocate lems when both ally and potential foe use the same
isn’t currently serving in a position authorizing micro- equipment. Our lighter warfighter brethren have dealt
processor implantation into his body. They are questions with these unconventional situations many times
we must ask and answer. Render spot reports when throughout the last couple of decades and have a ma-
necessary, for the Armor community needs to hear turing body of TTP. One need only think of Somalia
about your discoveries and your questions. Get the de- and Haiti to know that across the entire spectrum of
bate going, for until we have the discussion, we can’t war there is a place for tankers and cavalrymen, so all
effectively move past the words and ideas phase into of us armored warfare planners and executors better
the equipment and implementation phases. Yes, I’m get busy.
calling on you to help us at ARMOR do our part in ush-
Fortunately, learning how to handle these additional
ering in the future.
stresses is part of the curriculum for our heavy forces
As we rush toward the future, however, we can’t ig- at our Combat Training Centers, but we are still as-
nore what we continue to see nightly on our television cending this learning curve. Of course, these opera-
screens or read daily in the morning papers. Let’s face tions are not the armored force’s raison d’être, but the
it, some situations are hard to observe. For instance, requisite skills are ones we must add to our kit bags,
the continued throes of Yugoslavian dissolution are ready to pull out when needed. We’ve all seen the em-
painful to watch. According to the Secretary of Defense, battled peacekeepers looking up to the hills and moun-
it’s possible that “an evacuation of U.N. forces from tains, dodging bullets and shells. They’ve vigilantly
Bosnia may become necessary no matter what we do.” pointed their weapons, but their rules of engagement
That mission would obviously require employment of a largely prevented them from toggling their guns on. A
portion of the armored force once all of the political in- heavy dose of discipline and an equally heavy training
itiatives are complete. Whether we will actually send requirement are necessary before we put ourselves in
tankers, scouts, or cavalrymen to help extract the multi- an area being shelled, and then ask our soldiers not to
national force that is in contact is unknown at this writ- return fire simply because they aren’t the target. Aimed
ing. The possibility is certainly real, though. But, whether fire is too often an oxymoron.
the task is in the Balkans or not isn’t the issue.
No matter how events unfold, we owe it to our sol-
What should most interest us is that, in addition to our diers not to grab hold of tar babies that we can’t shake
digitized movement to the future, and no matter what free. We owe them well-considered tactics, useful tech-
the conflict, we will move armored warriors onto a cur- niques, and rock-solid procedures. We owe them time
rently unfamiliar section of the battlefield. Most everyone to rehearse and time to learn. We owe them our atten-
agrees with that. So now we must think hard about what tions to the immediacy of the close fight while we si-
tasks a heavy unit can perform in a combat zone where multaneously build and discuss the structures which
the conditions fall far short of total commitment against will win our future deep fights.
an opposing tank or mechanized force, a la South West
— TAB
Asia. We can imagine the difficulties in operations other
By Order of the Secretary of the Army: Official:
DENNIS J. REIMER JOEL B. HUDSON
General, United States Army Acting Administrative Assistant to the
Chief of Staff Secretary of the Army
00545
The Professional Development Bulletin of the Armor Branch PB-17-9S-S
Editor-in-Chief
Features
MAJ TERRY A. BLAKELY
6 The Exploitation from the Dieulouard Bridgehead
Managing Editor by Captain Donald E. Vandergriff
JON T. CLEMENS
10 D-Day 50th Anniversary Commemoration
by Lieutenant Colonel John Gillman
Commandant
BG (P) LON E. MAGGART 14 Armored Expeditionary Forces
by Ralph Zumbro
ARMOR (ISSN 0004-2420) is published 17 Cavalry Mortars - A Better Way
bimonthly by the U.S. Army Armor Center, 4401
Vine Grove Road, Fort Knox, KY 40121. 22 The Draper Combat Leadership Award
Disclaimer: The information contained in 22 Kouma Tank Platoon Gunnery Excellence Competition Winners
ARMOR represents the professional opinions of
the authors and does not necessarily reflect the 23 Making the Case for an Airborne Infantry Fighting Vehicle
official Army or TRADOC position, nor does it by Stanley C. Crist
change or supersede any information presented
25 Book Essay - Tank Action: From the Great War to the Gulf
in other official Army publications.
26 The Battle of the Bridges: Kuwait's 35th Brigade on the 2d of August 1990
Official distribution is limited to one copy for
by Major Robert A. Nelson
each armored brigade headquarters, armored
cavalry regiment headquarters, armor battalion 33 Mission: Combat Reconnaissance Patrol
headquarters, armored cavalry squadron head by Captain Daniel B. Miller
quarters, reconnaissance squadron head
quarters, armored cavalry troop, armor company, 35 The Work Order Logistics File (WOLF)
and motorized brigade headquarters of the by Tom Ress
United States Army. In addition, Army libraries,
37 Engagement Area Development
Army and DOD schools, HQ DA and MACOM
First Lieutenant Brian L. Steed.
staff agencies with responsibility for armored,
direct fire, ground combat systems. 41 The Lessons of Operation Desert Hammer VI: Training
organizations, and the training of personnel for Digltizatlon Will Impact Many Areas of Training
such organizations may request two copies by by Captain Ronald K. Kollhoff
sending a military letter to the editor-in-chief.
44 The Combat Trains Desert Laager
Authorized Content: ARMOR will print only by Captain Gregory A. Daddis
those materials for which the U.S. Army Armor
Center has proponency. That proponency 46 CSS For the Scout Platoon: Another Solution
by First Lieutenant John S. Wilson
includes: all anrnored, direct-fire ground combat
systems that do not serve primarily as infantry 48 Franks Award Winner Worked on Desert Mobility for Special Forces Units
carriers; all weapons used exclusively in these
systems or by CMF 19-series enlisted soldiers; Back All Active Cavalry Unit Locations
any miscellaneous items of equipment which Cover
armor and armored cavalry organizations use
exclusively; training for all SC 12A, 12B, and Departments
12C officers and for all CMF-19-series enlisted
soldiers; and information concerning the training. 2 Contacts
logistics, history. and leadership of armor and 3 Letters
armored cavalry units at the brigade/regiment 4 Commander's Hatch
level and below, to include Threat units at those 5 Driver's Seat
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September-October 1995, Vol. CIV No.5 USPS 467·970
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2 ARMOR - September-October 1995
Dismounted Scouts in continuous dynamic training of the dis- also reports that several air defense batter-
mounted platoon within the squadron and ies of S60 radar-directed guns, ZSU-23
Mechanized Cavalry Operations
allows cross-training with ground and air cannons, and ZPU multi-barreled machine
elements of the squadron to enhance mis- guns have been positioned in the valley
Dear Sir: sion success. around the town.
The assets needed to allow the platoon At this point, tactical planning by the coa-
to accomplish its mission are currently or- lition forces begins. This is also the time for
Divisional cavalry organizations are “com-
ganic to the squadron or easily attached dismounted scouts to become active, mov-
bined arms” units with the capability and
from the aviation brigade. The modes of ing to positions overlooking the enemy’s lo-
flexibility to operate within a variety of op-
transportation for insertion and extraction cation to provide hard intelligence for the
erational concepts, today and in the future.
would vary. Aerial support can be accom- S2 and reports of enemy main logistical
The versatility of divisional cavalry makes plished by the UH1 that is within the routes resupplying their forward units. This
it the unit of tomorrow’s Army, capable of squadron, or by an attached UH60 pro- intelligence will greatly benefit the com-
sustaining operations as far as 100 kilome- vided by the brigade. Ground transportation mander in his tactical planning.
ters forward of a division in a massive can be accomplished by using ground force
The dismounted scouts will also pinpoint
strike concept, such as DESERT STORM, M3 Bradleys or HMMWVs. Another option enemy built-up areas and preplot them for
or providing mechanized and air support of is to simply move dismounted into the area
indirect fire. Resupply of cache sites by
security operations in a lower intensity, of operation. Resupply is handled similarly, OH58 scout helicopters and other outgoing
small force concept which faces the Army or by other creative options such as pon-
teams allows continuous operations by the
and U.N. forces today. Another theater of cho parachute drops from OH58s. dismounted teams.
operation for today’s cavalry is its involve-
ment in the support of counternarcotics op- The issue of sustaining communications At H-3 of mission execution, an MLRS
with dismounted teams can also be han-
erations. The divisional cavalry serves as battery fires on known locations of enemy
the eyes, ears, and support element for dled internally. One option is to establish a ADA Batteries. Dismounted teams are used
series of observation posts with additional
joint task force operations on our nation’s to assess battle damage and ensure there
borders. teams from within the platoon, each of is no longer a threat from these units prior
these observation posts having an addi-
to committing aerial assets to the area. In
A divisional cavalry squadron’s TO&E is tional mission of acting as relay stations. addition, an Apache company is placed in
ideally suited for these various missions, Another option is to use helicopters or for-
reserve to help locate and destroy a miss-
consisting of 28 M3 Bradleys, 18 M1 ward-deployed ground scouts to act as re- ing ADA battery. With dismounted teams in
Abrams, and four mortars for ground op- lay stations. Using these methods of com-
the area days prior to mission execution,
erations, and eight AH1 Cobras, 12 OH58C munication must be rehearsed and per- the missing enemy battery may previously
Kiowa, and a UH1 Iroquois for aerial recon- fected, which further justifies the need of
have been located and marked for indirect
naissance and group support. this platoon to be an organic, not attached, fire, alleviating the need to tie up assets
The concept of security in speed (offen- element of the squadron. such as the Apache company. In the event
sive) and security in depth (defensive) justi- The absolute need for the dismounted the missing battery is discovered after the
fies the need for an additional element in platoon’s soldiers to understand cavalry op- operation begins, a dismounted team can
the cavalry squadron, a dismounted scout erations, coordinate direct and indirect direct indirect fire and conduct battle dam-
platoon. fires, conduct reconnaissance to support age assessment to eliminate the possible
The dismounted team concept is not new the squadron’s operations and execute loss of friendly aircraft by direct fire. Later
to the cavalry. The “Blues Platoon” of the small team dismounted operations indi- in the mission, the dismounts’ battle dam-
Vietnam era was very successful, and to- cates the need for the team’s members to age assessment becomes vital because
day’s OPFOR ground scouts at the Na- be 19D scouts. two friendly helicopters are lost to enemy
tional Training Center (NTC) are highly suc- The need for such an element would best air defense artillery fire. Lack of proper bat-
cessful in utilizing small dismounted “dirt be demonstrated by employing them on a tle damage assessment of the MLRS fire
teams” to gain intelligence and call indirect theoretical mission. I refer to LTC Douglas on the enemy ADA positions can be directly
fires on unsuspecting rotational forces. A. Macgregor’s example in “Cavalry Opera- attributed to these losses.
The mission of the dismounted scout pla- tions in Limited Warfare” (printed in Army Upon committing of the ground forces (H-
toon must be tailored to the conduct of op- Trainer, Spring 93 issue) to display the Hour), small dismounted teams located
erations forward of the cavalry squadron. possible use of the dismounted platoon. along the friendly main axis of attack would
This platoon would provide intelligence and better be able to direct indirect fires, in
security prior to the commitment of ground In this scenario, an Army aviation brigade turn, providing an increased level of secu-
and air forces and would conduct battle (-) has been deployed as the vanguard of rity along the axis. The ground and air ele-
damage assessment for aerial and indirect the U.S. contingent. Sent as part of the ments conducting the attack (using security
fires. It would also provide security, allow- U.N. forces, the brigade is to quell ethnic in speed) have a greater level of success,
ing ground and air elements freedom and fighting between rival factions and push the while minimizing losses.
Krasnovian forces back over the approved
speed of movement, security of downed Dismounted teams are also used as
demarcation line in the region of Lydia, a
aircraft sites, and extraction of downed air- search and rescue teams in the event of
province of Samaria. Upon deployment,
craft crewmembers. The addition of these downed, friendly aircraft. Teams already lo-
U.S.-U.N. coalition forces establish an air-
missions greatly enhances the squadron’s cated in the area of operations speed to
ground screen without interference from
survivability on the battlefield, buys more the scene and provide security at the crash
the hostile Krasnovian forces.
realtime, hard intelligence, and provides site. This will also help reduce the risk of
added security and support for ground and Intelligence then reports that the Kras- capture, and allow quick evaluation of
air forces moving into an area of operation. novian forces refuse to evacuate the area wounded air crews.
Including this dismounted platoon as an around the town of Krasnoye-selo due to Upon completion of the operation, the
element of the squadron alleviates the co- its tactical and logistical importance. The squadron begins security and surveillance
ordination needed with other ground forces townspeople, being primarily of Samarian operations in which the dismounted teams,
not organic to the squadron, and allows the descent, have voted themselves free of
division to use those assets that would oth- Krasnovian rule. The town lies within the
erwise be attached to the squadron. Mak- Samarian boundaries, as set forth by the
Continued on Page 49
ing the dismount scouts organic also allows agreed upon demarcation line. Intelligence
ARMOR — September-October 1995 3
COMMANDER’S HATCH
BG (P) Lon E. Maggart
Commanding General
U.S. Army Armor Center
Digital Warrior
Force XXI digital systems are rede- will have less time in tactical units to and spend our precious time working
fining the way we will fight on the bat- develop the skills necessary to become only on the important tasks. What we
tlefields of the future. Mounted war- quality battalion and brigade com- cannot change is the standard of per-
fighters must familiarize themselves manders. formance in leading, training, main-
with the new technological advances taining, and caring for our soldiers and
For the foreseeable future, company
that are driving our Army into the 21st their families that we achieved during
command, S3, and battalion executive
Century. This requirement is compli- DESERT STORM.
officer tours will be approximately
cated by the necessity to conduct the
twelve months in duration. There are
day-to-day business of running pla- All of us will have to work hard to
many, competing demands on leaders
toons, companies, battalions, and bri- maintain currency on the emerging
in the Army of today, including an ever
gades with non-digital systems. Force XXI developments while doing
increasing requirement for joint and
other important jobs. But the mounted
We have come a long way in under- AC/RC duty assignments. If we are to
force has faced periods of change like
standing the implications of digital op- continue building competent war-
this before and has not only endured,
erations and it is clear now that infor- fighters for the future, all of us must
but flourished. Innovation and team-
mation age technology will profoundly find ways to teach our young officers
work remain core characteristics of the
change the way we fight in the next critical warfighting and leadership
mounted force.
century. The challenge is to deal with skills quicker and more efficiently.
the technological advances while ad-
This will be a complex undertaking Dealing with the Army of today is not
dressing the daily problems of training,
with no precedent to follow. However, unlike preparing for a rotation at one of
maintaining, and sustaining our tactical
there are some general guidelines our combat training centers. We must
units.
which may provide insight into this di- focus on the important tasks, move
lemma. We can empower subordinates authority to get things done down to
The need to keep our units prepared
with relevant information, focus on the lowest level, and integrate our ef-
and ready during this process is evi-
teaching and mentoring, and redefine forts if we are to be successful. We
dent. I know this will be difficult over
roles and relationships. We can take ad- must do all of this without grinding our
the next few years as we search for
vantage of the information available on leaders and soldiers into the ground.
ways to reduce personnel turbulence.
the Internet. Unit leaders can call the There must be time for reflection,
In fact, the number of armor and cav-
doctrine writers and the training and thinking, planning, and coordination if
alry soldiers will be reduced by about
concept developers at the Armor we are to operate at peak efficiency.
one-third from that available in Opera-
School to find ways to assist subordi- We must make time for our families
tion DESERT STORM by the time we
nates in learning about new ideas and and for professional growth. There also
complete downsizing. The number of
procedures. has to be a place for fun. And lastly, we
available company level commands
must accomplish the mission. All of
will be reduced as will opportunities to Also, we cannot underestimate the
this is possible, but not without effort.
serve as a battalion S3 and XO. How- power of talking to one another profes-
We can and must accommodate change
ever, the demand for branch qualified sionally and in frank, plain language.
in this period of turmoil and turbu-
officers, particularly captains and ma- The ability to move information around
lence, and now is the time to start.
jors, will remain about the same. in our organizations remains the single
Therefore, unless we carefully manage best way to ensure high performance.
our human resources, young officers Clearly, we must establish priorities ON THE WAY!
4 ARMOR — September-October 1995
CSM Ronnie W. Davis
Command Sergeant Major
U.S. Army Armor Center
The Cavalry Scout
Those whose job it is to pull triggers reconnaissance, security, and other laying the Confederate advance until
in war will tell you theirs is a danger- combat operations.” the Union infantry arrived. Through the
ous business. Believe it! Those whose Indian Wars, World Wars I and II, and
Throughout history, scouts have been
job it is to collect intelligence about the Vietnam, to their most recent role in
performing this unique mission. Ac-
enemy without being detected, will tell DESERT STORM, scouts have contin-
cording to Lynn Montross’s War
you theirs is more dangerous. Then, ued to own the night and gather intelli-
Through the Ages, most armies have
there is the essence of danger...the gence.
used scouts in one form or another.
scout.
One of the earliest recorded accounts is As intelligence gatherers today, the
Scouts are commonly referred to as in the year 331 B.C. in ancient Greece, scout’s unique mission is simple —
the eyes and ears of the battlefield during the time period Alexander the find the enemy! This is considered the
commander. As the commander’s eyes Great conquered Persia. heart of his mission — providing the
and ears, scouts are considered the maneuver commander with his most
Cavalry scouts were used in the
most highly trained soldiers on the bat- critical information, combat intelli-
Americas as early as the 1750s, when
tlefield. They are required to know gence, enabling him to achieve free-
the British were fighting the French. A
more common and specialized skills dom of action, focus combat power,
colonial American, Robert Rogers,
than any other soldier to accomplish and overwhelm and decisively defeat
raised a company of rangers and used
their mission and survive. the enemy. To do that, scouts perform
scouts to gather information in order to
two primary missions — reconnais-
Survivability demands that scouts carry out his raids against the French.
sance and security.
possess courage, strength, endurance, In that day and age, it wasn’t called
resourcefulness, and agility. These at- “going on a recon;” it was called, “go- During reconnaissance missions,
tributes are necessary for conducting ing on a scout.” It is important to note scouts conduct route, area, and zone re-
their unique mission, operating close to that Rogers learned most of his scout- connaissance to obtain information
and within enemy lines. ing skills from Native Americans, about enemy forces and the terrain
many of whom served with him. It is within the area of operations. When
The manual, Tactics and Techniques
believed those skills created the foun- performing a security mission, scouts
of Cavalry, dated August 1940, pro-
dation for the scout’s mission through- provide the maneuver commander
vides a clear definition of the scout. “A
out U.S. Army history. early warning, enabling him to concen-
scout is a trooper trained in the use of
trate his combat power at the decisive
ground and cover; in mounted and dis- Cavalry scouts continued their useful-
place and time.
mounted movement from cover to ness from the Revolutionary War
cover; in marksmanship; in observa- through the Civil War. Those familiar To ensure this reconnaissance and se-
tion, and accurately reporting the re- with American history can recall the curity mission, today’s scouts use
sults of his observation.” A more cur- exploits of Jeb Stuart’s and John mounted and dismounted techniques
rent definition from Army Regulation Buford’s cavalry; most importantly and stealth to ensure their survivability.
611-201 states that a cavalry scout, Robert E. Lee’s “blindness” on the bat-
“leads, serves, or assists as a member tlefield at Gettysburg without Stuart’s
of a scout crew, section, or platoon in cavalry, and Buford’s initial stand de- Continued on Page 43
ARMOR — September-October 1995 5
The Exploitation
from the Dieulouard Bridgehead:
An Example of Maneuver Warfare that Applies Today
by Captain Donald E. Vandergriff
The exploitation from the Dieulouard The exploitation from
bridgehead by Combat Command A the Dieulouard bridge-
(CCA) 4th Armored Division, 12-14 head demonstrated
September 1944, offers valuable les- speed, “not just speed
sons if we are to adapt maneuver war- in movement, which
fare as our Army’s future doctrine. Em- is important, but speed
ploying the fundamentals of maneuver in everything, called
warfare, CCA achieved a difficult mis- tempo.”2 Throughout
sion — exploitation to operational depth the period, CCA, un-
against a determined, well trained, der Colonel Bruce C.
equipped, and led enemy in rolling for- Clarke, forced the
ested terrain inhabited by an unfriendly Germans to react to
population. the Americans’ faster U.S. infantrymen haul an assault boat to the banks of the Moselle
tempo. Examples of River. This unit was crossing near Metz, north of the Dieulouard
CCA continually overcame complex
rapid decision-mak- bridgehead at about the same time the 80th Infantry Division
problems because it possessed cohe-
ing, enabling units to seized the crossing exploited by CCA, 4th Armored Division.
sion, solidified through two years of
act quickly, occurred
hard training, and a command climate
throughout the exploitation. They in- Mousson. When the division was re-
that promoted mission tactics. Today’s
cluded the flexibility of CCA as it pulsed there, it changed its focus of ef-
Army must take a hard look at aligning
changed its route from crossing the fort further south, and with the assis-
new doctrine (both operations and lead-
Moselle at Pont-a-Mousson to the tance of careful deception and prepara-
ership) with the benefits produced by
bridgehead at Dieulouard, the actions tion, seized a bridgehead at Dieulouard.
the new Intervehicular Information
of CPT Charles Trover and LTC
System (IVIS) in order to become as Through 80th Division’s rapid seizure
Creighton Abrams along the route of
proficient as CCA 4th Armored Divi- of a crossing site at Dieulouard, CCA
march, their avoidance of strength at
sion.1 The Army must encourage com- was able to demonstrate its ability to
Chateau Salins, and COL Clarke’s use
manders to create a command climate adapt to a rapidly changing situation.5
of mission orders. This flexibility only
that promotes mission tactics. The COL Clarke, upon hearing of the infan-
came about because the unit and its
growing complexity, speed, and accu- try crossing at a different crossing site
leaders worked, trained, and knew one
racy of weapons on today’s battlefield, than planned, quickly dispatched his
another for a long period of time.
compounded by shrinking budgets that reconnaissance troop, under CPT Tro-
limit actual maneuver time, highlight The 3d Army plan called for an of- ver, with the appropriate liaison offi-
the need to pursue better cohesion in fensive across the width of the sector.3 cers, toward the bridgehead. As the
tactical units. General George S. Patton speculated troop approached the Moselle, it
that the Germans were still reeling marked the route, thus facilitating the
With a vast array of potential and de- from their defeats in Normandy. He or- rapid movement of the brigade through
termined enemies to be fought on their dered both the XX and XII Corps to the first of many difficult and complex
home territory, the Army cannot afford seize Metz and Nancy, respectively, missions of the exploitation.
to keep practicing the “break-the-glass- and prepare to continue the advance to
in-case-of-war” philosophy toward lead- the Rhine. Specifically, the XII Corps COL Clarke and his subordinate com-
ership that practices maneuver warfare. planned a double envelopment. The manders were able to make rapid deci-
two prongs of the corps, led by CCA sions. As he foresaw and wargamed the
The encirclement of Nancy, specifi- and CCB, 4th Armored Division, were upcoming mission, his staff quickly
cally the actions of CCA on 11-14 Sep- to seize the high ground around Arra- and efficiently dealt with current prob-
tember 1944, provide many examples court, and isolate the Germans defend- lems.6 The experience and teamwork
of rapid and decisive decision-making, ing Nancy.4 CCA was to conduct one within the CCA staff overcame the dif-
from the individual to the combat com- of the war’s first forward passages of ficulty of the first part of the mission,
mand (brigade) level, that only an ex- lines, through 80th Infantry Division as getting hundreds of vehicles and per-
perienced, well trained, and maneuver it seized a planned crossing site of the sonnel to the Dieulouard crossing point
warfare-oriented unit could accomplish. Moselle River in the vicinity of Pont a and conducting a forward passage of
6 ARMOR — September-October 1995
CPT Trover’s de- intelligence about the enemy. The fol-
feat of the Ger- low-on units — the 53d Armored In-
man counterat- fantry task force and an engineer col-
tack. They made umn — provided their own security.
a rapid decision COL Clarke and the leaders of CCA
that took advan- worried more about what they were go-
tage of “thriving ing to do to the Germans than what the
on chaos.”10 As Germans could do to them.12
confusing as the
With speed and focus, CCA overcame
situation seemed
any German unit it encountered as it
to the Americans,
moved to seize the high ground around
the unexpected
Arracourt. Once the leaders made the
arrival of Ameri-
decision to move faster than the Ger-
can armor threw
mans, subordinate units, time and time
General Patton, the Third Army commander, ordered his two corps to the Germans into
attack Metz and Nancy preparatory to a Rhine crossing. The crossing a temporary again, executed drills that destroyed the
at Dieulouard and the sprint eastward toward Arracourt isolated the trauma, offer- enemy and prevented the Germans
Germans in Nancy and led to control of the high ground farther east. ing an imme- from establishing a coherent defense.
From Benicourt to Fresnes, Task Force
diate oppor-
Abrams expertly handled the advance
lines against an expectant enemy. Each tunityo nlye xperienceda ndh ighly
guard mission for CCA. LTC Abrams,
staff officer understood his mission trainleeda derresc ognize.
taking advantage of a surprised enemy,
and, more importantly, received the
LTC Abrams’ task force rapidly pene- did not slow his unit to deploy as they
latitude to make decisions in support of
trated the ring of German units sur- ran into and around German units. Em-
the commander’s intent. CCA’s focus
rounding the bridgehead using effective phasizing shock, the task force mini-
of effort received total support and co-
combined arms teamwork, then ex- mized casualties through its ability to
ordination through an experienced and
ploited into the German rear using a conduct its action drills, enhanced by
confident cross-talking staff.
paved highway. As Task Force Abrams indirect fire support, before a German
When CPT Trover and his troop ar- pressed the confused Germans, light unit could deploy. To execute such
rived at the Dieulouard bridgehead, tanks from CPT Trover’s troop and D rapid drills with no fratricide, the unit
they found it under a German counter- Company of 37th Armor quickly estab- practiced established SOPs repeti-
attack that threatened the very bridges lished flank screens north and south of tively.13
CCA planned to use. After reporting
the situation to CCA, and being de-
layed by a crossing control officer,
CPT Trover led his troop across the
river and immediately eliminated the
threat to the bridges by destroying the
attackers. As the troop moved away
from the bridgehead, CPT Trover iden-
tified assault gun units too strong for
his reconnaissance troop to handle. He
halted, assumed a hasty defense, and
reported his situation to CCA head-
quarters.7 During this first phase of the
crossing, CPT Trover conducted an ef-
fective advance guard mission for CCA
and enhanced its movement to,
through, and out of the bridgehead.8
The actions of CPT Trover led to a
decision-making conference attended the rapidly moving column.11 This As mentioned earlier, CPT Trover’s
by representatives of XII Corps, 80th phase of the operation, the exploitation, troop and D Company provided the
Division, CCA, and the TF 37th Armor demonstrated the effective use of des- flank screen as CCA advanced deep
commander, LTC Creighton Abrams. ignating the main effort. COL Clarke into the German rear. Given their mis-
Asked his opinion on a course of ac- chose his best subordinate to lead the sion orders, these units confused the
tion, LTC Abrams pointed toward Ger- attack through the German rear and Germans because they provided the
many and said, “That is the shortest supported him with everything else CCA commander with “multiple
way home.”9 within CCA (a sharp contrast to what thrusts.” These “multiple thrusts” gen-
was occurring at the operational level). erated more enemy confusion and
Immediately, COL Clarke backed his
LTC Abrams took decisive action, and served to disguise LTC Abrams’ task
subordinate by ordering him to proceed
COL Clarke ruthlessly focused combat force as the main effort. As long as the
with the next mission, conducting a
power at any enemy weakness that two units supported the main effort to-
forward passage of lines and penetrat-
CCA encountered. COL Clarke made ward Arracourt, the company com-
ing the enemy defenses.
this decision based on his experience manders made whatever decisions were
Both COL Clarke and LTC Abrams and strong character. He took risk in necessary to accomplish their missions
understood the situation created by focusing on a single route, despite little and thus support COL Clarke’s intent.14
ARMOR — September-October 1995 7
The next rapidly changing situation
was reported by LTC Abrams’ task
force and observed by COL Clarke,
who flew over the battlefield in his
small airplane. As the CCA neared
Chateau-Salins, increased artillery fire
from the town fueled COL Clarke’s
suspicion that a larger German unit oc-
cupied the town. CCA did not want to
fight Germans defending a built-up
area. So, as September 13th drew to a
close, CCA — following one of its ac-
customed drills at the close of a march
— moved into a coil formation that
provided a 360-degree defense. As
units arrived in the laager, they imme-
diately assumed an assigned place
within the perimeter under the watchful
eye of the CCA executive officer. Fol-
low-on units of the CCA, under the
charge of CCA staff, assumed the same
formation. The field trains beat off
German patrols with internal resources
without weakening the main effort.
A 37th Tank Battalion crew gets a few moments rest near Chateau Salins on September 26,
CCA maintained tempo even as ma-
1944. This town had been bypassed in the drive toward Arracourt.
neuver slowed in hours of limited visi-
bility. To maintain relentless pressure
tacked German units, and did not go corps commander, General Eddy,
on the Germans, three battalions of
outside the artillery’s range.16 needed to eliminate bypassed Germans
CCA artillery fired onto every sus-
and tidy up his flanks, so he stopped
pected enemy attack position or assem- To top off the training and the effec-
the forward movement of the armored
bly area.15 tive leadership that made the exploita-
division.19 Thus the Germans regained
tion by CCA seem easy, it was the 4th
As the CCA trains closed up to and the initiative and did not give up until
Armored Division commander, MG
resupplied the main body on 14 Sep- November. The fault cannot rest with
Wood, who created CCA’s climate of
tember, increased artillery fire from General Eddy, for General Patton or-
success. During all phases of the CCA
Chateau-Salins confirmed a decision by dered attacks across the entire front of
advance, General Wood’s command
4th AD commander, General John “P” the 3d Army, and stretched its limited
style of trust promoted rapid decisions,
Wood, to bypass the town. Task Force resources so no success could be ex-
enabling the commanders at combat
Abrams left the main road, taking an ploited. Patton’s 3d Army strategy re-
command and task force level to de-
indirect route through heavy forests to flected General Eishenhower’s broad
cide a course of action “up front,”
reach the CCA objective of Arracourt. front policy — a policy that accepted
without awaiting permission. General
The stress and strain of the previous no risk and took away scarce resources
Wood pressed his corps commander,
two days continued to prevail over to feed the British army’s lackluster ad-
General Manton S. Eddy, to employ
German units as Task Force Abrams vance into Belgium and Holland.20
the entire division in the exploitation.
overran more units, to include the
Failing this, he pushed both commands Several valuable lessons from this
headquarters of the 15th Panzer Grena-
toward reuniting the division’s combat dramatic operation still apply. The ad-
dier Division. Even blown bridges did
power at Arracourt. During the opera- vent of digital technology intensifies
not slow the tempo of the advance, as
tion, General Wood pushed reinforce- the need to practice maneuver warfare.
reconnaissance assets of the CCA sim-
ments to further CCA’s exploitation, Future conflict pits our smaller but
ply found alternate crossing points. All
and did not interfere with the decisions more expensive forces against numeri-
these events occurred under the obser-
made “on the ground” by subordinate cally larger but slower-reacting adver-
vation of COL Clarke without units
commanders.17 saries. We will likely be operating over
having to ask his permission or halt to
vast distances. Maneuver-oriented op-
await decisions from “higher.” The commanders of both the division
erations, such as the exploitation from
and combat command did not rest on
On 14 September, CCA seized its ob- the Dieulouard bridgehead, must be-
the laurels won with the encirclement
jective in and around the high ground come commonplace in order to limit
of Nancy. They immediately looked
at Arracourt. It did not settle down to politically unacceptable casualties and
beyond Arracourt, proposed the seizure
await German efforts to regain the in- end conflicts quickly. Units that find
of Saarbrucken, and continued to focus
itiative. Units from the different task themselves fighting widely dispersed,
on how to defeat and destroy the en-
forces fanned out from Arracourt to to avoid strikes by enemy nuclear and
emy.18 This was exactly what the Ger-
continue harassing and paralyzing the chemical weapons, must be able to
mans feared. No reserves were present
German command, and affected a link- come together as D Troop, D/37 Ar-
to shore up their tattered front.
up with CCB, moving up from the mor, CCA, and CCB massed around
south. These roaming units always Unfortunately, the designated focus of Arracourt. They must be prepared to
made certain that CCA’s artillery could effort stopped with 4th Armored Divi- destroy high value enemy targets pin-
effectively support them as they at- sion and the tactical level of war. The pointed by our vast intelligence-gather-
8 ARMOR — September-October 1995