ARMOR, September-October 1992 Edition - Fort Benning - U.S. Army

56 Pages·2007·3.3 MB·English

The U.N. Security Council is busy planning to cuts. Those of us who remain in this smaller,
-
use "all necessary means" including military leaner Army must turn our sights toward the fu-
-
force to deliver humanitarian aid to the war- ture. We must begin now to project the needs
ravaged people of Bosnia-Herzegovina. While and capabilities of Armor in the 21st century. But
General Scowcroft has indicated the primary it is not enough only to anticipate requirements
-
U.S. role might come in the form of air power, for hardware, deployment, or ordnance we
the professional Armor soldier cannot help but must anticipate the /8adef~h@re quirements for
watch with apprehension as this situation in Eu- the future with a zeal equal to that of force de-
rope worsens. velopment.
Thirty divisions of Adolf Hitler's army were un- One of the characteristics of American military
ab16 to overcome the resistance of these leadership has always been the value placed on
Eastern European ethnic groups during World each soldier's life. With a shrinking Army and an
War II, and the potential for a bloody, protracted eroding budget, that value increases. In the
struggle concerns every soldier from private to 2000s. we must spend each soldier's life like we
-
general. would our last dollar carefully, reluctantly, and
U.S. Special Forces face the threat of gangs of only if we're convinced we can't get what we
armed bandits, warring clans, and anarchy as want some other way. It's the human dimension
they guard shipments of food to the starving of force structure that will see us through the
people of Somalia. lean years to come and grant us victory on the
But Bosnia-Herzegovina and Somalia are only fields of the 21st century.
two of some two dozen volatile situations that With a view toward defining Armor leadership,
could someday involve Armor soldiers. Our swift, this issue features an excerpt from Lewis
decisive victory in the Gulf War must not lull us Sorley's biography of Creighton Abrams and
into a sense of complacency; each trooper must some thought-provoking comments from the
recommit to maintaining a training edge and Chief of Armor about an unsung Armor leader,
honing his skills to be ready to deploy and fight Major General John S. Wood.
anywhere in the world. Since a leader's eyes and ears are his scouts,
vet, even as we watch these be sure to read about how we
world events unfold, many of train scouts for the force, and
our colleagues will become ci- spend a few moments enter-
vilians, and the chorus of polii- taining the debate on how we
cal leaders will continue to sing get to the fight in the future.
-
out for even deeper defense J. D. Brewer
By Order of the Secretary of the Army: Official:
-4-
GORDON R. SULLIVAN MILTON H. HAMILTON
General, United States Army Administrative Assistant to the
Chief of Staff Secretary of the Army
02470
ARMOR
The Professional Development Bulletin of the Armor Branch PB- 17-92-5
Editor-in-Ch ief
MAJ J.D. BREWER Features
6 On Knowing When to Disobey Orders:
Managing Editor
Creighton Abrams and the Relief of Bastogne
JON T. CLEMENS
(Excerpt from new biography by Lewis Sorley)
10 Growing Scouts
Commandant
by Lieutenant Colonel Michael Matheny
MG PAUL E. FUNK
i 4 New Course at Fort Knox Trains Dismounted Scouts
by Captain Harold L Meyer Jr.
ARMOR (ISSN 0004-2420) is published
and Sergeant First Class Aaron Speakman
bimonthly by the US. Army Armor Center, 4401
Vine Grove Road, Fort Knox. KY 401 21. 16 A Light Tap With a Strong Arm: Doctrine and Employment
of Marine Corps Armor From 1965 to 1975
Disclaimer: The information contained in
ARMOR represents the professional opinions of by Captain Steven L. Parrish, USMC
the authors and does not necessarily reflect the 22 First Into the Breach: Sabre Squadron at the NTC
official Army or TRADOC position, nor does it by Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Mixon Jr.
change or supersede any information presented and Major David E. Robinson
in other official Army publications.
26 Sealift Is to Armor as Airlift Is to Airborne
Official distribution is limited to one copy for by John A. Adams
each armored brigade headquarters, armored
27 It's Time to Consider Glider Delivery of the M1 Abrams
cavalry regiment headquarters, armor battalion
by Major E. C. Parrish Ill
headquarters, armored cavalry squadron head-
quarters, reconnaissance squadron head- 32 Gulf War Showed the Need For More Powerful Optics
quarters, armored cavalry troop, armor company, by Captain Francis E. Wynne
and motorized brigade headquarters of the 39 Discovery Channel Seeks WWll Veterans
United States Army. In addition, Army libraries,
Army and DOD schools, HQ DA and MACOM 40 12th AD'S 'Hellcats" Bounced the Danube
staff agencies with responsibility for armored,
42 Drawing Only One Month in Combat, "Black Cats"
direct fire, ground combat systems,
Got Their Licks In (13th Armored Division History)
organizations, and the training of personnel for
such organizations may request two copies by 44 The 72d lank Battalion in Operation TOUCHDOWN
sending a military letter to the editor-in-chief. by Captain Scott D. Aiken, USMC
Authorized Content: ARMOR will print only 49 Distributed Training For The Armor School:
those materials for which the U.S. Army Armor An Army Test for Training Modernization
Center has proponency. That proponency by Elizabeth A. Meyers
includes: all armored, direct-fire ground combat
systems that do not serve primarily as infantry De partm ent s
carriers; all weapons used exclusively in these
systems or by CMF 19-series enlisted soldiers; 2 Letters
any miscellaneous items of equipment which 2 Contacts
armor and armored cavalry organizations use 4 Commander's Hatch
exclusively; training for all SC 12A, 128. and 5 Armor Trainer Update
12C officers and for all CMF-19-series enlisted 50 Books
soldiers; and information concerning the training,
logistics, history, and leadership of armor and
ATTENTION FREE DISTRIBUTION APO ADDRESSEES: Please send your
armored cavalry units at the brigadekegiment
new address and unit number to ARMOR, ATN: ATSB-AM (Ms. Hager), Ft.
level and below, to indude Threat units at those
Knox, KY 40121-5210. Be sure to include your current mailing label.
levels.
Material may be reprinted, provided credit is
given to ARMOR and to the author, except
where copyright is indicated.
September-October 1992, Vol. CI No. 5
~
"AttRudinal Obstacles" invoked in the training. not doing the train- The Secret of Amy Active and Reserve
And the Reserve Component ing. Conponent Harmony, published by the
*The revision of the leadership develop- Strategic Study Institute, Carlisle Bamcks,
Dear Sir: ment program for the RC NCOs. Pa.)
I am concerned because the tenor of I stand by my belief, as stated m my let-
I read both COL Molinari's letter and MAJ both COL Molinari's response to my letter ters to the editors of both the Army Times
Jones' article (January-Febuary 1992 and MAJ Jones' article smack of what COL (14 October 1991) and ARMOR (January-
issue) on Reserve Component training with Dave Shaver calls %e attitudinal obstades February 1992). where I argued that there
both interest and concern. I did find several which make change painful: (1) Superiority was a need to adopt a long-term plan for
of their initiatives potentially useful in the complex, AC to RC; (2) benign neglect; (3) the development of qualified combined
training of RC units. These include: intolerance; and (4) a general lack of confi- arms leaders in the Reserve Components. I
*The commitment of AC units to the dence in the abilities of reservists, espe- suggested that "such a plan would pick up
training support role to allow RC units to be cially at unit level.' (from C/osing Ranks: today with an emphasis on individual, crew,
- g(&No-yte : Fort Knox Defeose Switch Network (DSN)
DIRECTORY Points of Contact Cornmemid prefu is Area 'Ode 502-
ARMOR Editorial Offices U.S. ARMY ARMOR SCHOOL
Editor-in-Ch ief Commandant (ATZK-CG)
Major J. D. Brewer 2249 MG Paul E. Funk 2121
Managing Editor
Assistant Commandant (ATSB-AC)
Jon T. Clemens 2249 BG Larry R. Jordan 7555
Editorial Assistant
Director of the Armor School ( LTSB -DAS)
Vivian Thompson 2610
COL John B. Sylvester 1050
Production Assistant
Command Sergeant Major
Mary Hager 2610
CSM Richard L. Ross 4952
Contributing Artist
SPC Jody Harmon 2610 Armor School Sergeant Major
SGM Douglas K. Memll 2900
MAILING ADDRESS: ARMOR A'ITN: A'IZK-FTD. Fort Maintenance Department 4TSB-MA)
Knox. KY 40121-5210. COL Gary M. Tobin 8346
Command and Staff Department (ATSB-CS)
ARTICLE SUBMISSIONS: To improve speed and am- COL Pat O'Ned 5855
racy in editing, manuscripts should be originals or clear copies. either Weapons Department (ATSB-WP)
typed or printed out double-spaced in near-letterquality printer mode. COL E. G. Fish I1 1055
We also accept stories on 5-114" floppy disks in MultiMate,
Directorate of Training Developments (ATSB-TD)
Wordstar. Microsoft WORD, WdPerfect, XyWrite. Xerox Writer.
and ASCII (please include a double-spaced printout). Please tape cap- COL Joseph D. Molinari 7250
tions to any illustrations submitted. Directorate of Combat Developments (ATZK-CD)
COL Edward A. Bryla 5050
PAID SUBSCRIPITONS/ST. GEORGEST. JOAN
NCO Academy/Drill Sergeant School (ATZK-NC)
AWARDS: Report delivery problems or changes of address to CSM Taft D. Webster Sr. 5150
Ms. Connie Bright. Sezretary-Treasurer. P.O. Box 607. Ft. Knox.
Reserve Component Spt Div (ATZK-PTE)
Ky. 40121 call [phone], FAX [phone].
LTC Billy W. Thomas 5953
UNIT DISTRIBUTION Report delivery problems or Directorate of Total Armor Force (A'IZ-K -TF)
changes of address to Ms. Mary Hager. DSN 464-2610; annmercial: Readiness FAX 7585
[phone]. Requests to be added to the f m distribution list COL Don Elder 7809
should be in the form of a letter to the Editor-in-Chief. TRADOC System Manager
ARMOR HOTLINE - DSN 464-TANK for Armored Gun System (A7ZK-T!3)
COL Charles F. Moler 7955
m eA rmor Hocline is a 24-hour service to provide assistance with
questions concerning doctrine, training, organizations. and equipnent Mounted Warfighting Battlespace Lab (ATZK-MW)
of the Armor Force.) COL David L. Porter 2139
-
2 ARMOR Sepfember-October 1992
and platoon proficiency and would culmi- Armor community, have new maximized lronlng Out RC Problems
nate five years from now with each maneu- our use of the training time during a gun-
ver team starting a repetitive process that nery density. We focus on the process of
would see them undergoing a two-week, putting rounds down range and the AAR, Dear Sir:
NTC-type experience at the company team and not the remedial and additional training
level. Thereafter, every three to five years, that could be conducted. I have seen units This letter is in response to S O
that company would repeat the process of where the COFTs were employed 24 hours Schneider's letter in the May-June 1992
train-up, followed by an intensive training a day. During gunnery densities, crews issue. While I agree with some of the
evaluation at a company-level Reserve were sent to the COFT to work out specific points expressed, I disagree as follows:
Component Training Center. In this man- problems that were discerned during the The breakdown of equipment is some-
ner, we would be requiring the company AAR process (remedial training). Addition- thing that can be resolved by proper PMCS
team commander, through simulations, self ally, non-firing time was used by platoon before, during, and after use. By forwarding
and schoolhouse study, and hands-on ex- leaders for rehearsals of Platoon Kills Bat- properly completed 2404s for faults through
perience to learn to manage and lead the talion (PKB) - a 1/60-scale range, and the proper channels, items can be repaired
various combined arms elements of the Brewster devices were also used to re- or replaced. If it is beyond troop or squad-
combined arms team." hearse PKB. There are a lot of innovative ron level, it can be referred to direct sup-
What I was suggesting is in total agree- things that can be done, and, frankly. the port units.
ment with the Chief of Staff of the Army's cookbook nature of MAJ Jones' article Even though the M60A3 is not the most
views, as stated in his November 1991 Mi/& seems to eliminate them. modem equipment, it is still an effective
tary Review article. The smaller. more stable (Active and Re- piece of equipment and can put steel on
MAJ Jones' article talks about many, serve) Army should see a reduction in crew target. The Marine Corps does not have
probably useful, manuals that are to be de- turbulence, thus reducing the need for re- the A3 version and is presently upgrading
veloped and programs that are to be me- training. The thrust of both the letter and from M6Os to Mls.
ated. But it doesn't lay out a challenging the article seem to suggest a 100-percent M60A3 master gunner courses are am&
long-term program that will excite the RC "forget curve" and a very gradual learning able for National Guard and Reserve units
tankers to excel. It tells them that there are curve, coupled with little being learned dur- through Camp Shelby, Miss. It is the duty
going to do Tank Tables VII, XII, and pla- ing AIT, the Basic Course, etc. The solution and responsibility of units to send people to
toon STXs almost for the rest of their lives. lies in a mix of battle drill emphasis, time the course. Upon completion. these new
As such, it does not lay out a long-term management, the use of simulation de- master gunners can help to train and im-
training goal. It also does not seem to ap- vices, the setting of long-term goals, and prove the unit's effectiveness with their
preciate the utility of simultaneous-multi- turbulence reduction. One might ask how M60A3 equipment.
echeloned training, and it only pays lip ser- the Israeli Reserve forces have maintained As to soldiers attending schools, with the
vice to the concept of the Mission Essential their combat edge and see if we can emu-
current requirements for promotion and ad-
Task List (METL). late it. vancement. it is imperative that individuals
True. in a contingency environment, it is Finally, I am concerned that neither COL attend the MOS and educational schools.
difficult to develop METL. However, at the Molinari nor MAJ Jones grasped the im- By attending these schools, the soldiers
platoon and company level, there are two portance of hands-on leadership experi- learn the skills necessary to train and moti-
basic tasks at which a unit must be profi- ence at the company command level. If
vate their fellow soldiers. Additionally. with
cient - attacking and defending. In other captains are not given the opportunity to the downsizing of National Guard and Re-
words, maybe there is a need to pare "fighr their companies, they will never be serve units, it is of the upmost importance
down the nine platoon missions and 59 able to fight battalions if called upon to do that the soldier attend and graduate from
combat critical tasks. Additionally, nowhere so. I would suggest that the Armor School MOS and educational schools.
do they highlight the criticality of battle retook its concepts in light of the above and
Weekend drills cannot, and should not,
drills! In my opinion, battle drills are key to the CSAs Military Review article.
be cut down to one day. Weekend drills
overcoming mew turbulence. At the platoon
provide the units the time to accomplish
level, 98 percent of what a platoon does Obviously, both the letter and artide hit
other tasks mandated in smalls arms quali-
should be a prerehearsed drill. About 75 nerves, and I hope that their authors won't
fication, civil disturbance, and NBC training.
percent of a company team's missions are take the above critique personally. What
a series of changing battle drills that are we have begun is the needed dialogue on It would be great if an of a unit's equip-
orchestrated by the team commander. how to improve the training readiness of ment could be located at its armory, but
unless your unit is located on a military
Once this is recognized and stressed in the Reserve Component mobile warriors.
training, we will handle many of our training This is an extremely important issue to base or a state military resewation, there is
problems. These two missions were dearly which no one has the total answer. Hope- not enough space or facilities for the proper
highlighted in my proposed training plan fully, many of your other readers will pick storage of the equipment.
that culminated in a visit to the RCTC. up the gauntlet that has been thrown down, I agree that gunnery should be fired dur-
The concepts suggested also do not ex- and through the resulting dialogue, we will ing annual training. I feel that an additional
ploit technology. They seem to rely on out- all learn and readiness will be enhanced. MUTA 6 should be scheduled each year to
dated IDT training concepts. If weeldy drills fire Tank TablePVlI and VIII. As it pres-
were scheduled on a 24-hour clock, a crew ARMOR is to be commended for begin- ently stands, gunnery is fired every other
could accomplish a lot in a COFT. In a ning this useful discussion. year after a maneuver training period.
week's time, an entire company could con- When not firing, units should make use of
duct eight hours of training in a single BRUCE B.G. CLARKE the MCOFT or UCOFT. These COFTs help
COFT. Additionally, excess time is devoted COL. Armor
to tank gunnery. We. the members of the Carlisle, Pa. Continued on Paae 39
I
-
ARMOR September-October 1992 3
MG Paul E. Funk
Commanding General
U.S.A rmy Armor Center
A Model for Leadership Traits,
LTG John J. Yeosock Reflected
MG John Wood’s Style in WWll
Although I still have many on active combat role of m o r during its in- discipline in the Mojave Desert. The
duty, one of my heroes retired the fnncy allowcd his division, the 4th k- stones of John S. Wood standing up
other day - LTG John J. Yeosock morcd, to reach unparalleled heights to superiors who generated stupid
embodied many of the characteristics of military accomplishmcnt during ideas, or needlessly risked soldiers’
which we in our Army have stood for World War 11; and his near-prophetic lives, are now legend. For Wood, also
but which, often, we don’t attain. I vision of what future combat would known and feared by the Germans as
believe that a leader from our past rcquire bccame fundamental to shap- “Tiger Jack,” the fundamental quality
who was much like Yeosock was MG ing our modern armor force. But it required to be an effective armor
John Wood, and we have written was his dynamic, inspirational Icadcr- leadcr was hitman understanding.
about him here, today. For those of ship that had made General Wood Rather than maintaining the cold,
you who know Yeosock, pull out (nicknamed “ P Wood for his tutor- aloof facade present in so many of his
those traits which match Wood’s. ship of fellow cadets at USMA) a colleagues, he believed that a com-
You’ll find a close match. template of competent combat com- mander could and should communi-
Throughout the history of armor, mand that modern officers and NCOs cate to his subordinates “...warmth,
some of our best combat leaders have would profit from overlaying on their understamding, sympathy, compassion
...
gotten the least notic% in the press. carecrs. the intangible essence of human
Perhaps this is because they spent the A selflcss leadcr, “P Wood never comprehcnsion that emanated from
majority of their time leading and car- demandcd of his soldiers that which Lee and from Washington.”
ing for soldiers, leaving little opportu- he was unwilling to do himself, be it Because he believed in soldiers, and
nity for media grandstanding. Major moving to the front to engage the his soldiers bclieved in him, team-
General John Shirley Wood was one Nazis, or keeping top buttons fastened work became the mainstay of the
such leader. His understanding of the and sleeves rolled down for training Fighting Fourth. Instead of encourag-
-
4 ARMOR September-October 1992
While Wood expected his troops
to train with perfection as their
goal, he still allowed his subordi-
nate leaders to make mistakes
-
and learn from them but never
the same mistake.
ing competition between elements of he also kept one eye
his command, Major General Wood scanning the require-
operated under the motto, “All for one ments of the future,
and one for all.” believing that when a
Wood said, ‘The only goal must be leader fails to look
...
perfection in attaining the standards ahead, he is, in fact,
set by the commander, perfection in falling behind. Accu-
team play, perfection in concerted and rately anticipating the
combined action - and every man challenges and mission
must be convinced that he is person- for the armor force of
ally responsible for it.” the 90’s. he still believed that the in- I’ve also just finished reading Bob
-
dividual soldier was “the ultimate Sorley’s book on General Abrams
-
This was a leader constantly gather- weapon.” (superb effort) and that reminded
ing his soldiers around him in groups Wood wrote, “Un] future wm[sl me that LTG John J. Yeosock is cer-
and telling them how proud he was of there will not be time for the mobili- tainly one of those who always
them and how he trusted their judge- zation and training of large forces wanted to just do a good job “without
ment and initiative. By extending his such as was possible in former wars. worrying about who got the credit.”
-
intense personal pride to every unit Sufficient force must be available Selflessness and superb intellect
and every soldier in his command, he from the start to prevent disaster, and two great leaders, Wood and Yeos-
guaranteed their concerted effort. The they must be kept in a state of combat ock. We couldn’t go wrong in vener-
result was a unit that did not want to readiness. This requires constant lead- ating and following the lead of these
let the “Old Man” down - an outfit ership of the highest quality.” two great soldiers.
that believed it could accomplish any-
thing. The bold, decisive thrust of the
4th Armored Division through France
and Germany in 1944 and 1945 sup-
FY 93 Armor Trainer Update Slated
ports that belief.
While Wood expected his troops to
hain with perfection as their goal, he FY 93 Armor Trainer Update (ATU) is scheduled for 18-21 November
still allowed his subordinate leaders to 1992 at the US. Army Armor Center and Fort Knox, Fort Knox, Ky.
make mistakes and learn from them Registration will be held in Gaffey Hall on 18 November 1992, followed
- but never the same mistake; and by 21h days of conference and open forum. This conference will provide
his advice on the precious trust they information to RC Armor officers and NCOs on safety, leader develop-
held is worthy of the modem armor ment, training, doctrine, organization, materiel, and mission support.
Armor and cavalry officers and NCOs who are in National Guard units
leader’s consideration.
and U.S. Army Reserve forces, and personnel who work in related
According to Wood, “You may have
areas, should attend this update.
only eight, or even thousands of men
All personnel who plan to attend FY 93 ATU should preregister by
-
in your unit, but always remember
contacting Ms. Cheryl Hawkins or Mr. Troy Schaffner at DSN 464-
each one has a mother, father, perhaps
711 415 43 or commercial (502) 624-711 41; 543. Questions may be left
a wife and children. They want that on a 24-hour answering machine at DSN 464-TANK. Additionally, ques-
soldier home, after this war ends! So, tions may be called in to the Armor Hotline through the use of our toll
you invest them carefully - lead free number (1-800-525-6848). Written requests for FY 93 ATU informa-
them, don’t just order them!” tion may be obtained from the Fort Knox points of contact at the follow-
Just as ‘Tiger Jack” always looked ing address: Commander, US. Army Armor Center, ATTN: ATZK-TFR,
ahead to the next objective while Fort Knox, Ky. 401 21 -5000.
pounding the Germans in Normandy,
-
ARMOR September-Ocfober 7992 5
On Knowing When to Disobey Orders:
Creighton Abrams and the Relief of Bastogne
by Lewis Sorley
(Adapted from the forthcoming
Thunderbolt: General Creighton
Abrams and the Army of His Times, to
be published in September by Simon
& Schuster. An audio version will be
brought out simultaneously by “Books
on Tape.”)
As Lieutenant Colonel Creighton W.
Abrams, commanding the 37th Tank
Battalion of the 4th Armored Divi-
sion, had demonstrated in the summer
and autumn campaigns of 1944, his
exceptional tactical acumen was cou-
pled with an unparalleled sense of
pace, timing, and the use of terrain.
He also had a sense of urgency, of the
need to press on past the point of ex-
haustion in order to fully exploit suc-
The Belgian village of Bastogne, after the struggle.
cesses against the enemy. He told his
troops over and over again that the
shortest road home was east. ing the columns being readied to slam ported moving on the exposed right
The battalion was thus headed east, into the southern flank of the Geman flank of CCA. Major General Hugh
as usual, in early December. Then, advance, into the belly of the Bulge. Gaffey, now commanding 4th Ar-
without warning, the Germans mored Division, ordered Colonel
launched one last great attack in the After a long road march north, mov- Wendell Blanchard to deploy Reserve
Ardennes, scene of so much bloody ing into the attack, the first objective Command as a balanced task force
.fighting over the course of history. was a town called Flatzbourhof. At (based on Abrams’ 37th Tank and the
What came to be popularly known as this point, the 37th Tank, along with 53rd Armored Infantry under Lieuten-
the “Battle of the Bulge” was under- the 53rd Armored Infantry, formed ant Colonel “Jigger“ Jaques, sup
way. the maneuver elements of the 4th Ar- ported by Lieutenant Colonel Robert
Much of the h m a of the ensuing mored Division’s Reserve Command Parker’s 94th Armored Field Artil-
days focused on Bastogne, where the (CCR). Combat Command A and lery). He pointed them toward the
lOlst Airborne Division and elements Combat Command B, the lead fight- town of Bigonville. But fmt there was
of other U.S. units were cut off and ing elements of the division in the Flatzbourhof.
surrounded by superior Gexman configuration of the moment, were at-
* * *
forces. They held on gallantly while tacking on parallel tracks, CCA on the
desperate efforts were made by the right working along the main Arlon-
4th Armored to punch through to Bastogne road and CCB on the left There was hard fighting at these two
them. The 37th Tank Battalion was using secondary roads to keep abreast. towns, and it soon became apparent
then fighting in the Sax, some 125 When these two columns got bogged that getting to Bastogne was going to
miles from Bastogne, with its-compa- down, Reserve Command, customar- be quite a challenge. Along the way
nies attached to infantry regiments of ily used only for resting up various el- Task Force Abrams received a num-
an adjoining division. On 19 Decem- ements, was committed to help out the ber of replacements, and these men
ber came orders to report to their par- stalled units. An immediate concern were immediately integrated into the
ent outfit, and so off they went, join- was a large body of German mor re- tank crews. The extra help was ex-
-
6 ARMOR September-October 1992
~~ ~
tremely welcome because, even
though the battalion was down to only
twenty-one operational tanks at this
point, it was still so short of crewmen
that some of the tanks were without
bow gunners. Meanwhile the division
received a message from the besieged
lOlst Airborne in Bastogne: “There is
only one more shopping day before
Christmas!
”
It was nearly dark by the time tanks
and infantry moved through to secure
the high ground beyond Bigonville.
By then it was Christmas Eve, but
there was to be no rest. Shortly before
midnight, Abrams gave orders to get
ready to move again. Reserve Com-
mand was to march around to the
division’s left flank for an attack on
Bastogne from a different direction.
That night, Patton wrote in his diary:
‘This has been a very bad Christmas
Eve. All along our line we have re-
ceived violent counterattacks, one of
which for ced... the 4th Armored back
some miles with the loss of ten
tanks.”’
On the far side of Bigonville, CCR
had been counting prisoners and (even
though it was midnight) making plans
for Christmas dinner when the orders
came: move to Neufchateau (south- .
west of Bastogne, and some 60 miles
down and around the rest of the divi- And the Drive Toward Bastogne\ ARLoNO \
sion and on the opposite flank) at
once. CCR was underway an hour
later. As it approached Neufchateau, the Germans. It was also Christmas rush as a tank company and an infan-
further orders came: continue the at- Day. try company mared in with all guns
tack around the left flank of the divi- The attack was planned along an firing, taking more than three hundred
sion to relieve Bastogne. axis defined by successive towns to prisoners in the process. Outposting
Thus, in a matter of perhaps 72 be assaulted en mute to Bastogne, be- the town, the task force spent Christ-
hours, the elements of Reserve Com- ginning with Vaux-les-Rosieres, Petite mas night in these positions?
mand had trailed along in reserve, at- Rosieres, Nives, and Cobreville. The By day’s end, CCR was only six
tacked on the axis of one of the lead- force worked its way through this fmt miles from Bastogne. That night
ing combat commands, moved to the set of objectives in only two hours. Abrams planned the next day’s attack.
extreme right flank of the division to On the far side of Cobreville, the col- First was to be an advance on
wad off a heavy enemy armor forma- umn was held up by a blown bridge Remichampagne. Clochimont would
tion, withdrawn from that position to and a large crater. A bulldozer tank be next, then Sibret, which was
the division rear, and swung all the was ordered forward and quickly re- thought to be full of Germans and the
way around to the left flank to attack duced the obstacle by pushing a likely site of the main battle.
again toward Bastogne. It was cold, it nearby stone wall into the crater. In As it turned out, Remichampagne
was wet, it was slippery, and (proba- three-quarters of an hour, the advance was my. A large number of P47s
bly) by this time, they were damned continued to the next objective, unexpectedly turned up and bombed
mad as well. So much the worse for Remoiville, which was cleared in a hell out of it only a few hundred yards
-
ARMOR September-October 7992 7
Abrams and Jacqes stood by the side of the
in front of the advancing tanks. road. From there they could see hundreds of recon work done on the road,
Captain William Dwight, the cargo planes parachuting supplies into Bastogne. but it was known that all this
37th Tank’s liaison officer, Finally Abrams turned to Jacqes: “Let’s try a area was held by the enemy. If
thought “the coordination of dash through Assenois straight into Bastogne.” we could get through on this
tanks, infantry, artillery, and air road, it might work for a sur-
was to perfection.” On to prise attack.” Then “he gave
Clochimont. eral Hal Pattison, former Army Chief me his familiar short and explicit
By noon, Abrams was on a ridge of Military History, and if Abrams order, which [in this case] was sim-
south of that town, a small Belgian had called and asked for the change in ply, ‘Get to those men in Bastogne’.”
hamlet three miles from Bastogne. mission, he would probably have been Boggess quickly briefed his tank com-
...
Here he deployed his tanks with care, denied. “Not too many commanders manders, then “Colonel Abrams gave
protecting the flanks and sending out over the course of histor y...,” said Pat- us the familiar hand signal, and we
one company to locate any enemy that tison, “have had the courage to make started to roll toward Bastogne.”
might be in the vicinity of Sibret or the right decision in the face of the Boggess, in the fmt tank, was think-
Assenois. As the lead company de- wrong orders.” Pattison thought there ing about all the Germans in Clochim-
ployed overlooking the town, Abrams wasn’t any question but that, tacti- ont and in Assenois, both abutting the
joined them on the position, and the cally, Abrams did the right thing, also road into Bastogne. Beyond Assenois,
infantry closed in behind. German sol- demonstrating in the course of it the the road ran up a ridge and through
diers in slit trenches not 50 yards to moral courage that SO strongly marked some heavy woods, and there were
their front were plugging away at the him. Besides, “the combat commander plenty of Germans in there, too. The
tanks with Panzerfausts. Eventually, hadn’t been anywhere near the action road might be mined, and the bridge
Abrams’ force captured them all. all day long, and he [Abrams] was in at Assenois might .be blown, and the
By then it was midafternoon, well a far better position to assess what Germans might have antitank guns ze-
after three o’clock. The orders were to should and shouldn’t be done. ...”3 roed in on the road. And Boggess had
continue the attack to seize Sibret. But Apparently, Abrams did the right only nine tanks in his whole company,
that town was going to be well de- thing logistically as well. As one of plus the one more commanded by
fended. The 37th had been seriously his company commanders later ob- Captain Dwight. But then the charge
understrength in tanks when the battle served, “When we went into began, and Boggess didn’t have time
began and was now down to only 20 Bastogne, thank God for his computa- to think about these things any more.
Shermans left in the whole battalion, tion of the mileage and planning ... or He took them in fast, throttles open
scarcely more than a company would we would have never made it. We and all guns firing, trying to bust
normally have. In fact, CCB of the were just about out of ammunition through before the enemy had time to
10th Armored Division had about and no time to resupply. And we had react.
twice as many medium tanks inside to take advantage of the success that Artillery fm from 13 batteries
Bastogne as Abrams had trying to we had there.” crashed down on Assenois. The tanks
break through to them. His accompa- Once the decision had been made, and half-tncks followed SO ClOSely in
nying armored infantry battalion was Abrams cranked up Captain Dwight. its wake that scarcely a shot was fired
short more than two hundred men. It Get the tanks and infantry moving, he at them as they roared through the
was going to be getting dark soon; the instructed, and contact the artillery. town. The four lead tanks made it
shortest day of the year had only just Dwight was given command of the through safely. But a half-hack right
gone by, and sunset would occur at two companies that were going to behind them took a direct hit from its
about 4:30 p.m., with dusk ending less lead the way - one tank and one ar- own artillery support, and farther
than 40 minutes later. mored infantry. Heavy artillery con- back, a half-track was pinned by a
Abrams and Jacqes stood by the side centrations were laid on Assenois. falling telephone pole. The remainder
of the road. From there they could see ‘This is it!” Abrams told Dwight, and of the column was forced to a halt on
hundreds of cargo planes parachuting at 4:lO p.m. the column moved out, the mw-road. Abrams and his crew
supplies into Bastogne. . Finally tanks in the lead! Before they jumped leapt from their tank and wrestled the
Abrams turned to Jacqes: “Let’s try a off, Ahms had talked with Boggess. telephone pole aside, freeing the
dash through Assenois straight into “I mounted his tank that afternoon trapped half-track, as accompanying
Bastogne.” and we studied a well-worn battle infantry exchanged fire with German
Abrams and Jaques didn’t check map,” Boggess recalled. Abrams snipers. Back in his hnk, Abms
with anyone about this switch in pointed out to him the secondary road waved the column forward once more.
plans. The CCR commander was lading to Bastogne through Assenois, In the smoke and dust that now cov-
weak, later observed Brigadier Gen- and explained that there had been no ered the town, it was nearly dark, and
~ _____ ~ - ~~
a ARMOR September-October 1992