Armor, May-June 1999 Edition - Fort Benning - U.S. Army

56 Pages·2011·4.58 MB·English

Saddle Up... Tonight We Ride
I confess, I’m old enough to have TC’ed an M60A1 dinosaur execute when called upon. A recent report by the Massa-
complete with searchlight and exterior telephone. My mud- chusetts Institute of Technology confirms the same — the
caked telephone was inoperative, like most, but it was also a U.S. will continue to deploy forces to urban locations. True it’s
constant source of amusement. The first time an infantry easy enough to find those who will chant the old mantra
soldier approached the tank and tried yelling over the engine “Tanks don’t go into cities.” One must only look as far as the
to tell us something, my loader said, “Watch this sir,” and 22 March issue of Army Times where the president of a
pointed the infantryman toward the telephone. Diligently the consulting firm (do you ever wonder where reporters find
infantryman worked his way through the mud on the outside these guys?), condemns the use of armor in urban terrain
of the long-ago broken phone to find yet more mud on the with these tired, short-sighted lines: “Tanks are cumbersome
inside, eventually the determined grunt would find the phone and make easy targets in cities,” and “Everyone these days
and attempt to talk to us. We would laugh and occasionally has an antitank weapon.” The consultant may be correct with
my loader would nod his head as if he actually heard what the his blinding flashes of the obvious, but is anyone advocating
grunt had to say. It was great fun. armor operate solo in urban terrain? Rather we strive for a
combined arms team that trains and prepares for MOUT on
I’m willing to bet the articles we receive for publication are a
the same type of facility this consultant derides. Agreed few
good barometer for what’s on the mind of the armored force.
tankers or cavalrymen relish the prospect of taking tanks into
One trend that we here at ARMOR have observed is an
an urban environment, but once again the refrain of Panama,
increase in pieces that discuss working with light infantry (see
Haiti, and Bosnia with the addition of Mogadishu (not to
March-April 1999 ARMOR, “Life After Operational Maneu-
mention Chechnya, Lebanon, and Northern Ireland) point to
ver”). Gone are the days when we merely gave lip service to
the necessity of training and preparing for MOUT. Should
the task. From Panama to Haiti to Bosnia and the prospect of
tanks do cities? Read Mark Bowden’s Black Hawk Down.
Kosovo looming, armored and cavalry units are working more
and more with infantry and will no doubt continue to do so. Since I seem to be in the habit of dropping the names of
The increased emphasis on working heavy/light goes hand other publications, let me recommend Lester W. Grau’s “The
in hand with another trend observed — more pieces on RPG-7 on the Battlefields of Today and Tomorrow” in
MOUT. This issue’s “Commander’s Hatch” describes the Infantry’s May-August 1998 issue. Grau provides a chilling
Armor Center’s approach to operations in urban terrain, and account of the use of RPGs in Grozny and points out:
LTC Lamont, USMC, details the role of armor on two urban “Whenever U.S. soldiers are deployed to a trouble spot in the
battlefields — Hue and Khorramshahr. Imagine, MOUT being future, the RPG-7 is likely to be a part of the local land-
more than finding and fixing the local bäckeri. scape...” Also see this issue’s article on the Grozny disaster.
I doubt many tankers will ever be comfortable or confident Not a positive note to close on, but as I bang away on the
inside an urban canyon wondering where an RPG-equipped column, Kosovo unfolds and the debate over inviting ground
hunter-killer team might be setting up an ambush. But the forces to the fray rages. Where are we going? By the time
reality is that tankers and cavalrymen must be prepared to you read this, we may be there. — D2
By Order of the Secretary of the Army: Official:

DENNIS J. REIMER
JOEL B. HUDSON
General, United States Army
Administrative Assistant to the
Chief of Staff
Secretary of the Army
05779
The Professional Development Bulletin of the Armor Branch PB-17-99-3
Editor-in-Chief
Features
MAJ DAVE DAIGLE
6 Patton Museum 50th Anniversary
Managing Editor 8 Reaching Our Army's Full Combat Potential in the 21st Century
JON T. CLEMENS by Colonel John D. Rosenberger
15 Breaching Fortified Positions and Obstacles
Commandant by Major Roger Morin and Ty Cobb
MG GEORGEH. HARMEYER 18 Yugoslavian Armor Fleet Is a Mix of New and (Some Very) Old
by David M. Phipps, Threat Branch, DFD, Fort Knox
ARMOR (ISSN 0004-2420) is published bi 20 The Battle of Grozny
monthly by the U.S. Army Armor Center, 4401 Captain Chad A. Rupe
Vine Grove Road, Fort Knox, KY 40121.
24 A Tale of Two Cities - Hue and Khorramshahr
Disclaimer: The information contained in AR by Lieutenant Colonel R.W. Lamont, USMC
MOR represents the professional opinions of the 27 An Independent Tank Battalion in World War II:
authors and does not necessarily reflect the offi How It Was Used. ..... And Sometimes Misused
cial Army or TRADOC position, nor does it by Marvin G. Jensen
change or supersede any information presented
29 Task Force Battle Drills
in other official Army publications.
by Lieutenant Colonel Tim Reese, Major Matt Waring, and Major Curt Lapham
Official distribution is limited to one copy for
33 Soviet and German Advisors Put Doctrine to the Test:
each armored brigade headquarters, armored
Tanks in the Siege of Madrid
cavalry regiment headquarters, armor battalion by Dr. John Daley
headquarters, armored cavalry squadron be.ad.:
38 U.S. Cavalry Memorial Research Library Opens at Fort Riley
quarters, reconnaissance squadron headquar
by Brigadier General Philip L. Bolte, USA, Ret.
ters, armored cavalry troop, armor company,
and motorized brigade headquarters of the 40 Three-or Four-Company Battalions?
United States Army. In addition, Army libraries, by Lieutenant Colonel Michael K. Robel
Army and DOD schools, HQ DA and MAC OM 43 Turning Civilians into Tankers, 19K One Station Unit Training at Fort Knox
staff agencies with responsibility for armored, di by Captain Lance Roper
rect fire, ground combat systems, organizations,
44 Abrams TSM: Halon Extinguishers Are Not a Health Hazard
and the training of personnel for such organiza
tions may request two copies by sending a re 45 Training in a Multi-Intensity Environment
quest to the editor-in-chief. by Captain Charles T. Lombardo and First Lieutenant Max Clegg
Authorized Content: ARMOR will print only 47 The Final Score: Russian Armor Losses in Chechnya
those materials for which the U.S. Army Armor Reflect Lethality of an Urban Fight
Center has proponency. That proponency in by First Lieutenant Adam Geibel
cludes: all armored, direct-fire ground combat 49 Tactical Vignette 99-3: "Screen in a Snowstorm"
systems that do not serve primarily as infantry
50 Solution to Tactical Vignette 99-1, "FORGING STEEL"
carriers; all weapons used exclusively in these
systems or by CMF 19-series enlisted soldiers; 51 Some Lessons Learned to Avoid Fatal Accidents
any miscellaneous items of equipment which ar From Major Monroe Harden, U.S. Army Safety Center
mor and armored cavalry organizations use ex Back The HMMWV Storage Rack
clusively; training for all SC 12A, 12B, and 12C Cover by Captain T.J. Johnson
officers and for all CMF-19-series enlisted sol
diers; and information concerning the training, Departments
logistics, history, and leadership of armor and ar
2 Contacts 7 Driver's Seat
mored cavalry units at the brigade/regiment level
3 Letters 52 Reviews
and below, to include Threat units at those lev
5 Commander's Hatch
els.
Material may be reprinted, provided credit is
given to ARMOR and to the author, except Periodicals Postage paid at Fort Knox. KY. and additional mailing offices. Postmaster: Send address changes to
where copyright is indicated. Editor. ARMOR. AnN: ATZK·TDM. Fort Knox. KY 40121-5210.
Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
May-June 1999, Vol. CVIll No.3 USPS 467-970
..
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16th Cavalry Regiment (ATSB-SBZ) COL Patrick F. Webb
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1st Armor Training Brigade (ATSB-BAZ) Special Assistant to the CG (ARNG)
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COL Scott R. Feil 6843 TBA
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2 ARMOR - May-June 1999
LETTERS
Bradley Weaknesses Rooted tained within: “...We also knew from the be- for all of the above roles. The U.S. Army in
In Cold War Compromises ginning that, if the vehicle was hit by large Europe needed a vehicle that could offset the
mines, large antitank missiles, or tank rounds Soviet superiority in numbers of tanks and
of any size, there would be major penetrations their own infantry fighting vehicle, the BMP.
Dear Sir: and serious damage. These risks, as a trade- Unfortunately, it has been decided that the
Since I have been in or associated with off between mobility, protection, and weight, Bradley will be improved and upgraded at the
Bradley-equipped mechanized infantry units were accepted by the Army from program expense of a newer, more capable vehicle.
11 of my 12 years in the Army, I read with inception...” The most unfortunate result of this compro-
great interest the article, “Chariots of Fire: 2. “The addition of a two TOW antitank mis- mise will be the continuation of the doctrinal
Building the Bradley Fighting Vehicle” by MG sile launcher gave the mechanized infantry disconnects we now see at the NTC. Whereas
Stan R. Sheridan (Ret.). I am disappointed, battalion a long-range, front-line, tank-killing the Bradley has potential as a lightweight
however, that some beliefs about the Brad- capability without increasing the Army’s force complement to the M1 heavy tank in its an-
ley’s abilities and doctrinal roles are still mis- structure.” This desirable capability of provid- tiarmor role (both 25mm and TOW), it does
understood by even the very senior officers ing the infantryman a means to both offen- not meet the requirements of a vehicle whose
that helped bring about its creation. While I do sively (long-range antiarmor ambush) and primary mission is to get sufficient infantry
agree that the M2A2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle defensively (battle position) engage and de- (tole tshse t hcaritnic aa lf upllla 9c-em oann trhifele bsaqtutlaedfi epledr. vehicle)
is superior to its contemporaries (the British stroy enemy tanks has more than anything
Warrior, German Marder, and Russian BMP else made the Bradley a “high-payoff target” As for swimming, the U.S. Army placed a
2/3), I do not believe that its basic design and for opposing tankers. One of the first lessons moratorium on swimming the Bradley in 1994.
doctrinal employment will prove able to with- an infantryman or tanker learns is of the im- The original requirement stemmed from the
stand the rigors of 21st century high-intensity portance of combined arms. It is a widely held fact that Western Europe has significant water
armored combat. belief that the majority of attacks or defenses obstacles in the form of rivers and canals
Several points MG Sheridan made in his ar- will fail if all pieces of the combined arms team approximately every 10 to 25 kilometers and
ticle I believe are well worth discussing and do not work together effectively. Separate the the ability to rapidly shift forces in any direc-
will support my beliefs. In the order they were infantry from the armor, or vice versa, and the tion was considered critical to reacting to a
written they are: attack or defense will fail; and since we have Soviet thrust into West Germany. Simple
equipped our primary infantry carrying vehicle calculations will show that having a Bradley
1. “Was the replacement to be another APC with a heavy antiarmor weapon, its use in this with its swim capability would in theory signifi-
that brought fighting men to the battle in a role makes it such a threat to the enemy that it cantly decrease the amount of time an
protected ‘battlefield taxi’ and then placed is often more profitable to destroy the Brad- M1/M2-equipped heavy force would take to
them in harm’s way to fight on foot; or was it leys, because they are vulnerable to tank cross a major water obstacle. The time spent,
to be a true fighting vehicle, giving the soldier main guns and heavy AT missiles, than it is to however, in vehicle and swim site preparation
a protected place from which to assault, fight, engage the harder-to-destroy M1s. During reduced the time savings to the point of nega-
and kill the enemy?” While it has long been a World War II, the greatest crisis the Allies tive returns.
goal of designers to decrease the risk a sol- faced on the Western Front was not a short-
dier faces in combat, it has been proven by age of Sherman tanks but the shortage of 4. “...in view of the recent HBO movie about
actual combat and during training simulations trained, quality dismounted infantry that could the Bradley, which said just the opposite,
that attempting to fight through an objective operate as part of that combined arms team. described the vehicle and the program as a
while keeping your dismounted infantry flaming disaster...” The HBO comic satire,
mounted is pure folly. The end result of this is 3. “It is not an APC nor a battlefield taxi, but “The Pentagon Wars,” was just that....a comic
usually a substantially higher number of it does take soldiers to the battle and lets satire. Hollywood has a proven reputation of
friendly casualties without any increase of them fight while mounted and protected. It is being able to turn anything into a complete
effectiveness. Desert Storm is the worst ex- not a boat, but it does have a swimming ca- farce and, for that reason, their creations
ample to use if one wants to validate the fight- pability. It is not a tank, nor is it heavily ar- should not be taken seriously by professionals
ing vehicle concept. Our Iraqi opponents had mored, but it does have a long-range tank who make hard decisions. Although the Brad-
so little will to fight that I’d dare say we actu- killing capability...” [This is] a pretty fair de- ley Fighting Vehicle program was, and is, the
ally did not fully exercise our doctrine or the scription of what the Bradley is and was de- result of several compromises, it is still a ca-
capabilities and vulnerabilities of our equip- signed to do during the peaceful confrontation pable vehicle that partially meets a need. I
ment. A better example would be to look at of the Cold War conventional arms race be- believe that the Army’s decision to continue
the lack of success the Syrian army experi- tween the former Soviet Union and the United development of the BFV in order to fulfill the
enced during the 1973 Yom Kippur War with States. The Bradley’s limitations stand out; it needs of the 21st century mounted/dis-
its BMP-equipped mechanized infantry ac- was a compromise of several different factions mounted combined arms team are incorrect.
companying T54/55 and T62 tanks in Soviet within the infantry and armor communities. What the future combined arms team needs is
style mass formation “cavalry charges” The infantry community wanted a vehicle that a vehicle capable of carrying a full-sized infan-
against Israeli prepared and hasty defenses was more capable than the M113-series ar- try squad (9-11 soldiers plus vehicle crew), a
protected by simple and complex obstacles. mored personnel carrier in terms of mobility, weapon system optimized for support of dis-
firepower, and protection. The armor commu- mounted infantry, and sufficient armor protec-
While most would say the reason for the lack nity wanted a vehicle with both a light and tion (as much as the current M1) that will allow
of Syrian success was their faulty Soviet-style heavy antiarmor capability that could replace it to operate in close proximity to the main
tactics, coupled with the fact that we in the the ill-fated M551-series light tank in its divi- battle tank it will accompany. Mr. Simon Tan
West may consider them a third-rate military, I sional and regimental armored reconnais- (ARMOR, January-February 1999, “Is the
disagree. Nearly the same tactical style can sance units. The result was the current Brad- Bradley Heavy Enough to Replace the M113
be seen monthly being practiced by U.S. ley, too light to stand toe-to-toe in the direct in Combat Engineer Units?”) proposed a simi-
Army units at the National Training Center fire fight, too large to provide a stealthy recon lar M1-based vehicle in his article about a
(NTC) with most often the same results. Thin- platform, too small to carry sufficient dis- possible replacement for combat engineer
skinned BFVs accompanying M1A1/2 tanks mounted infantry to the fight, and too much of M113s. The inclusion of a heavy antiarmor
into head-on direct fire fights with an OPFOR a threat to the enemy with its TOW missile to missile system should be considered as long
equipped with large caliber tank main guns be considered a low payoff target. Although as it does not reduce the carrying capacity for
and heavy antitank missiles. These are the this sounds overly critical of the BFV, it’s not dismounted infantry and the warfighters un-
weapon systems that MG Sheridan specifi- meant to be. The United States during the derstand the vehicle’s doctrinal role. A current
cally points out as the highest threat to the Cold War could not afford to build and pur- example of this is the Israeli Achzarit heavy
Bradley and the dismounted infantry con- chase several different specialized vehicles infantry carrier. The greatest lesson learned, I
ARMOR — May-June 1999 3
believe, from the Bradley IFV/CFV program talion headquarters with you? I’d probably say the Project. Cased Telescoped Ammunition
was that combining a reconnaissance vehicle yes. You don’t have to read the whole thing, and Gun Technology (CTAGT, aka: CTA) is
and infantry vehicle does not give you a sys- but you can get a sense of the enormity of the clearly the Project’s favorite, made clear at the
tem that truly meets the needs of either re- undertaking from just parts of it. Oh, and if you May 1998 Armor Conference. The FSCS
quirement. are looking for info on the kinds of challenges presentation, under Relevant Technologies -
that popped up in executing the USAREUR 2, Lethality, mentioned only CTA, no other
MARK D WINSTEAD
and Corps plans, skim Chapter 5 on “Deploy- weapon approach. You may be certain that
MAJ, IN
ing VII Corps.” Glitches encountered by family the bidders will understand so unsubtle a
via e-mail support groups? Look at pages 204-211. (The ‘hint.’

discussion of “burn-out” among officers’ and
A rmy History of VII Corps NCOs’ wives is enlightening.) So, after 45 years of failure (and approxi-
mately $213 million spent in then-year dol-
Was Not Intended As Combat Account
In his review, CPT Sobchak states correctly lars), the arsenals’ ‘pet rock’ gets another
that the book touches only briefly on the lease on life. Within the DOD, political consid-
Dear Sir: ground war. Anyone looking for accounts of erations usually override the laws of physics,
combat in the Gulf can find a number of book- with disasters for readiness, the users, and
The January-February issue of ARMOR in- length sources. There are hundreds of arti- the taxpayers, who are all of us.”
cluded a review of From the Fulda Gap to cles. In fact, if you are going on staff duty
Kuwait, U.S. Army, Europe and the Gulf War. soon, save the Jan-Feb ’99 issue of ARMOR DON LOUGHLIN
The reviewer acknowledged that this report, so you can take it on duty with you to read via e-mail

written by USAREUR command historian Steve Borque’s fascinating piece entitled
Steve Gehring, contained a great deal of in- “Incident at Safwan.” Former Armor officer Editor’s Note: The letter writer, a former Ma-
formation based on extensive research. But Borque is in the final stages of a superb his- rine tanker (1953 Armor School graduate) with
he found it to be uncritical, even biased, and tory of the VII Corps in combat that will be a long second career in ordnance develop-
of little use to anyone not serving on a corps published by the Center of Military History. ment, complained to Congress about the
or division staff. He concludes that the book Hopefully, there will be more work done soon Cased Telescoped Ammunition and Gun
glosses or ignores mistakes made during the to flesh out the history of this critical period in Technology program, calling it a waste of
deployment of USAREUR units to the Gulf the history of our Army. Hey, XVIII Airborne money on a system that has never proved
and does not recommend it. Corps; are you listening? itself despite years of research. Unsuccessful
I’d like to comment on this assessment. As In closing, let me point out that while auto- in getting action from Congress, he took the
the Army’s former Chief of Military History, I mation has assisted us in countless ways, it is case to the Department of Defense Inspector
was determined to get this study by a not without its pitfalls. When we were given General. That staff studied the complaint for
MACOM published. We found the funds nec- the mission of collecting, reviewing, and cata- six months and, in June 1996, issued a report
essary to do so. In publishing what had initially loging the Army’s operational records from the confirming Loughlin’s claims that there were
been a classified After Action Report, we Persian Gulf War, those of us at the Center of serious problems with the technology, al-
committed to providing the Army and the his- Military History responsible for this massive though the IG’s staff did not conclude that the
tory community in general with a base docu- undertaking were dismayed to find out just money was wasted. The IG report said,
ment dealing with a massive undertaking by a how few of the original (paper) operational “...The DoD expenditure of $213 million over
field army. It seemed to me that we badly records of Gulf War units had been saved. 41 years has not resulted in a viable weapon
needed to chronicle the efforts of all those Commanders were, in nearly all cases, igno- system because several major problems have
participants in Operations Desert Shield, De- rant of their requirement to save their TOC not been resolved.” These problems included
sert Storm, and Provide Comfort who had logs, orders, and SITREPs. They lost, mis- higher life-cycle costs, “ballistically inefficient”
been launched into CENTCOM’s AO from a filed, or disposed of them. We are left today ammunition, significantly reduced barrel life
forward-deployed location in Europe. with great holes in our history. The publication (200 rounds vs. 10,000-15,000 rounds), and
greater recoil forces requiring heavier mounts.
of studies like this one will help us retain the
Those people who served in USAREUR in According to Jane’s Armor and Artillery Up-
history of this great undertaking and provide a
the late 1980s are aware of how well our sol- grades, the current proponent for this gun
real service to historians and commanders for
diers met the Army’s goal of being “Trained system is a British-French joint venture.
years to come. As the great author and histo-
and Ready.” We were just that. Not perfect,
rian Steve Ambrose told me a few years ago,
but very, very good. With over 200,000 per-
if the Army doesn’t continue to tell its own
sonnel serving in Europe, the United States Expanding the Discussion
story, to publish histories, and to investigate
Army was able to deploy a fully capable corps, what happened and why, future generations Of Light Cavalry Issues
numerous support and special operations
of writers like him will find it nearly impossible
units, and still maintain stability in the Central
to write a book like Citizen Soldiers. I am in- Dear Sir:
Region. It seems to me that we need to make
clined to think he’s right.
readers aware of the power, the flexibility, and I very much enjoyed reading CPT Stephens’
the talent that existed ten years ago. By com- JOHN W. MOUNTCASTLE article (“Airborne Ground Cavalry”) in the Nov-
parison, while still composed of superb sol- BG, USA (Retired) Dec ’98 issue of ARMOR. Because it’s such
diers and talented leaders engaged in a host via e-mail a strange beast in comparison to armor/mech
of different operations, today’s USAREUR is and there are so few light cav units, few things
only a shadow of the mighty force that is the tend to be said about light cavalry in general,
subject of this book. That is something that FSCS Program Will Resurrect and light division cavalry in particular. I would
seems to have escaped the attention of far too Problem-Prone Gun Technology like to expand upon a few points CPT
many people in the United States. In showing Stephens made in his article, specifically relat-
what it took to deploy a sizable force to a ing to light div cav ground troop TO&E. Briefly,
combat zone, this volume will raise questions Dear Sir: my points are as follows:
(in fact, has already done so) about our ca-
pacity to support our current National Military “Casual readers of ARMOR may get the im- 1. Unit distribution: in addition to the four
Strategy. pression from Sharoni and Bacon’s article that Regular Army light div cav squadrons (for the
the 35mm Bushmaster III is the chosen 82nd, 10th, 25th, and 101st Divs respectively)
So, if you want to read something while pull- weapon for the Future Scout and Cavalry
ing staff duty, should you take your unit’s copy System (FSCS). It is not. The Bushmaster III
Continued on Page 48
of From the Fulda Gap to Kuwait over to bat- is the choice of the article’s authors, not that of
4 ARMOR — May-June 1999
C OMMANDER'S HATCH

Armor and MOUT

by MG George H. Harmeyer, Commanding General, U.S. Army Armor Center

When one imagines armored operations ity operations like Task Force Eagle ex- armored platform provides distant protec-
in urban terrain, one may envision World pected to be the norm, I want to review tion.
War II Metz, the Cold War Berlin Bri- how armored forces will participate in
There have been few places in our
gade or, in a more recent time, Moga- them and the added benefit their presence
Army where leaders could train in urban
dishu. Should the modern mounted war- brings. I also want to address how the
terrain conditions. We are changing that
rior be concerned with fighting in an ur- Armor Center envisions training for such
at Fort Knox. The Mounted Urban Com-
ban environment? All evidence suggests missions.
bat Training Site (MUCTS), near com-
a resounding yes!
The presence of tanks and IFVs is a pletion on the north side of post, will
For years, the generally held attitude has physical and psychological deterrent to provide the Total Army armored force
been to avoid urban areas. The Armor anyone. Our Army has proved the value the means to practice techniques and pro-
Force that grew up in the Cold War with of the Abrams and Bradley in high inten- cedures between heavy and light forces in
a focus on the European theater disdained sity operations; thanks to a pervasive and a built-up area. It is built specifically to
the very notion of urban combat. That real-time media presence, the rest of the withstand the pounding, maneuvering,
may well have been the correct attitude world knows it as well. Our presence in a and weight of armored vehicles.
for that era and that place. Now, as the troubled area instantly overmatches any
The MUCTS will have 21 buildings and
world and threats change, built-up areas threatening force. The psychological im-
enough road network to support a ma-
are something we can no longer avoid or pact of our armored vehicles is a signifi-
neuver force. The site will have the nec-
outright ignore. Operations in Panama, cant deterrent to any threat, no matter
essary fiber-optic and other digital links
Somalia, and the Balkans show us that, what capabilities it may have. The acqui-
to allow for world-class after-action re-
rather than being a liability, armor pro- sition and detection capabilities associ-
views and ties to the virtual and construc-
vides an overwhelming capability to any ated with armored platforms are unique.
tive world. It is built with some of the
force. The presence of Abrams tanks and The distances and clarity are incompara-
best special effects available to the Army
Bradleys has made potential enemies bly greater than other ground-based, pro-
today. Effects include burning buildings,
think twice about their actions. When tected systems. Firepower, and the ability
destroyed bridges, and enough pyrotech-
called for, armored forces were able to to put a round on a pinpoint from a great
nics to make you feel the pressure of ur-
provide the necessary firepower and distance, is an armored hallmark. All of
ban combat. There is sufficient height to
shock effect to defeat whatever force they these things in combination provide any
the buildings and underground construc-
were up against. All indications are that force with tremendous capabilities.
tion to make any force concerned about
we will continue to operate in urban envi-
the enemy from all directions.
ronments well into the future. There are drawbacks. Weight, blind
spots, and overall size naturally require Training will feature a dedicated
With one eye to our own heritage and
an armored commander to think through OPFOR and observer-controller package
history, the Armor Center is examining
an operation very carefully. He must designed to give a visiting unit a true
anew the role of armor in operations in
gauge where and how he will traverse the workout. Prior to the unit’s arrival, exten-
urban terrain. We need to apply the bene-
built-up area. He must consider ambush sive coordination will take place to en-
fits of Force XXI technologies to a study
and the ability to react. He must consider sure that the unit arrives ready to train.
of this history and, in coordination with
maneuverability in confined areas and the Training Support Packages are being
the Infantry School, refresh the Armor
radius of a turning turret. These consid- developed for the typical missions a unit
Force on operations in urban terrain.
erations are very similar to those for a will perform. For the near term, units
I consider this a critical effort on every- defile drill that many of us have practiced training on the MUCTS will go through a
one’s part. Within our branch, many have in Korea and Europe. Lastly, employ- reception and onward movement phase
been to the places named above. Dealing ment is never an isolated action. It takes and then break into crew and squad train-
with confined areas, rules of engagement, place in combination with dismounted ing and leader and staff training. Leaders
and the physical movement of our units soldiers to cover the blind spots and to and staffs will develop courses of action
caused us to pause and think. With stabil- provide close-in protection, just as the using the MUCTS mock-up while squads
ARMOR — May-June 1999 5
and crews draw equipment and train their Small Arms Qualification Training tactics and procedures for negotiating
respective missions in urban terrain. Once Ranges are renovated, units can live fire urban terrain. Also expect to see a greater
the courses of action have been deter- before they deploy and train at the emphasis on the combined arms nature of
mined and the leader and staff training MUCTS. Our goal is to prepare, train and future deployments; every branch has a
completed, the unit will come together execute mounted missions in the urban piece of Urban Operations.
and exercise at the platoon level, fol- environment. In order to battle-focus the
lowed by CO/TM exercises. In the far units, we will provide the terrain a unit There is no doubt that armor and
term, when upgrades to the CCTT data- may be required to fight on in the con- mechanized units today face challenges
base are complete, we will give units the structive and virtual environments and, in conducting operations in built-up ar-
opportunity to work through courses of with the capability of the MUCTS, we eas. We are working very closely with
action in a virtual model of the MUCTS. will tailor the scenarios the units must the Infantry Center and the rest of the
Additionally, the goal is for the unit to master to be successful and win. Army to revitalize the institutional look at
conduct BN/TF operations in a virtual, MOUT. We must prepare soldiers to
constructive and live environment simul- In the future, as the Fort Benning operate in this environment. As a force,
taneously. With the planned improve- MOUT study is completed, we will re- we must orient our thinking to include
ments, units can practice several different vamp some of our doctrine to include the urban terrain as an operational area. As a
types of operations and execute specified technological benefits projected in the branch, we must lose the mindset that
missions in the live environment at the next few years. Expect to see Combined “Tankers don’t do MOUT.”
MUCTS. Further, as the Wilcox Multi- Arms and Cavalry manuals include sec-
Purpose Digital Range Complex and tions on traversing built-up areas and Forge the Thunderbolt!

Patton Museum Turns Fifty

As World War II ended, the United States Army began the occupa-
tion of Germany. The surrender of the German armies had left war
equipment all across Germany, and in the U.S. sector, roughly Bava-
ria, the Army began to collect weapons and armed vehicles to feed
American steel mills after the war. But looking over the last battlefield,
General George S. Patton, Jr. saw not just enemy equipment, but an
opportunity to study the German equipment and learn from it. At his
inspiration, selected equipment was reserved for shipment to Fort
Knox. One of Patton’s last diary entries recorded a visit to the Skoda
factory, a major arms producer in Czechoslovakia, where Patton
noted that U.S. designers needed to look at a suspension system
developed there. •
It would establish and operate a research library containing papers,
General Patton died before the equipment could be shipped to Fort articles, photographs and other material related to Cavalry and Ar-
Knox, but in 1946 and in the years that followed, Fort Knox became a mor.
collection point for many of these samples of German engineering.
To this day, these three goals form the core mission of the Patton
The equipment was stored in a large frame building that had once
Museum. The study also recommended the construction of a new
been used as a sub-caliber range, where soldiers fired .22-caliber
facility and the creation of a private organization to raise funds for the
rounds through 37mm tank guns at tin tank targets mounted on mov-
new facility. In 1965, the Cavalry Armor Foundation was formed to
ing tracks.
build a new museum building. Funds were collected from the Armor
While the Armor Center and School tried to figure how to exploit this community and initially rose to a sizable sum, yet it was far short of
material, veterans began to ask to see the equipment of their war. In the funds necessary to build the Museum.
1947, the “Patton Collection” was opened to the public. Veterans
Officers returned from Vietnam and asked, “What happened to the
would bring their families to see the captured equipment and the walls
money?” when MG William R. Desobry assumed command of the
resounded with tales, both humorous and frightening, of the exploits
Armor Center and School. General Desobry challenged the Founda-
of American units in World War II.
tion to build what they could afford and renew their credibility with the
By 1949, the annual attendance had grown to 82,000. The Armor Armor community. In 1972, General Desobry presided over the open-
Center decided to form a museum around the collection. Monument ing of the Patton Museum in a new building, the first phase of the
tanks from the First World War were recovered from around post and current structure off U.S. 31W near the Chaffee Avenue main gate.
added to the collection. On May 30, 1949, the museum was dedi-
General Desobry’s concept of building in phases became the pat-
cated to General Patton.
tern for the future. In 1975, just three years after the opening of the
As American armor was added to the collection, the focus of exhibits small building, the Foundation doubled the space, which now equaled
shifted toward the story of U.S. armor, with less emphasis on German the space available at the old sub-caliber range that had been the
armor. In 1963, an Armor School staff study attempted to define just museum’s previous home. Additional construction in 1982 and 1984
what the Museum should be, and recommended the following major completed the original Foundation plan.
changes:
• While the Foundation worked on a new museum building, the collec-
The Museum would become the “official museum of Cavalry and tion doubled and doubled again. Attendance increased, and visitors
Armor.” demanded more services. In 1983, as the Foundation closed in on its
•
The Museum and its collection would be incorporated into pro- final goal to complete the building, the Armor Center asked the Foun-
grams of instruction for officer and enlisted students of the U.S. dation to add an auditorium. This was completed and dedicated to
Army Armor School. General Creighton W. Abrams in 1992.
6 ARMOR — May-June 1999
D RIVER'S SEAT

Excellence in Armor:
First Sergeant’s Program to
Train and Retain Future Leaders

by CSM David L. Lady, Command Sergeant Major, U.S. Army Armor Center

In 1984, CSM John Stephens, former The soldier’s first opportunity for selec- not put them immediately into gunner
USAARMC CSM, developed and pro- tion to EIA is in 19D and 19K OSUT. In seats but saw to it that they were utilized
posed the Excellence in Armor Program the tenth week of training, up to 20 per- sensibly and given more training in gun-
(EIA), which identifies outstanding sol- cent of each class may be selected to nery tasks (one newly assigned EIA sol-
diers in CMF 19 OSUT, armor/cavalry compete to enter the program. These sol- dier walked into my office and demanded
units, and infantry scout platoons. For 12 diers are recommended by their drill ser- to be made a gunner. He had a short,
years, our leaders have used the program geants, based on performance, motiva- blunt, one-sided interview with me and
to develop the NCO corps of the future. tion, and leadership potential. A battal- returned to his loader’s station). In my
We are now seeing the final products of ion-level board, chaired by the battal- battalion, such great Silver Lion first ser-
this program: the FY98 Centralized Pro- ion/squadron CSM, confirms this rec- geants as CSM David Hartzell and SGM
motion Boards selected a large percent- ommendation and admits the soldier into James Sands ran excellent programs
age of EIAs for additional responsibility the additional training program. The 19D which trained their Excellence in Armor
(FY98 SGM, 10 EIA selectees (24.3%); EIA soldiers receive 60 additional hours soldiers to be ready when gunner posi-
MSG, 28 EIA selectees (30.4%); SFC, training in communications, land naviga- tions opened up.
296 selectees (60.9%!). tion, vehicles, tactics and leadership, and
I ask that unit leaders identify newly as-
scout skills. All 19K EIA soldiers receive
Currently, 19 percent of the armor force signed EIA soldiers. Track them and
52 additional hours training in the same
is enrolled in the EIA program. The ex- keep them on tanks or scout vehicles.
basic areas. They must pass the APFT
tremely high promotion rates for EIA Yes, they’re good, but the Armor Center
with 230 or more points; qualify Sharp-
soldiers clearly show that the program is did not make the extra investment to cre-
shooter or Expert with the 9mm pistol or
identifying the best and brightest armor ate computer operators or drivers. Disen-
the M16 rifle; receive all GOs on the
and cavalry soldiers whose level of per- roll them if they fail to meet the higher
Armor Crewman Test (ACT) or the
formance is consistently outstanding. Can unit enrollment standards within a year of
Scout Skills Test (SST), all GOs on the
it do even better? Can it be a program to assignment: APFT 260; CTT Pass;
Scout Gunnery Skills Test, and all GOs
address the significant attrition of our Sharpshooter or higher with individual
in the Armor or Cavalry Skills Test. They
first-term soldiers? Of course it can, but weapon; Pass the Tank Commander or
must have a high school diploma or
only if first sergeants and master gunners Scout Commander Competency Test
equivalent and NO UCMJ actions.
implement the program in our companies (TCCT/SCCT Level I); Pass the com-
and troops. Too many armor leaders do At nomination (10th week), the soldier mander’s subjective evaluation of their
not understand the program, do not know is promoted to PV2. At graduation, the proficiency, leadership, potential, and
that it exists, and resent the program as an soldier who has passed all tests to stan- motivation.
“OSUT Program” with little use to the dard is formally enrolled in EIA. The unit
The second opportunity for enrollment
field. should expect an OSUT EIA to have
in EIA is in the unit. As Armor leaders,
more leadership potential, to be moti-
We will retain the best of our soldiers we are responsible for identifying and
vated and disciplined, to be better trained
only if we can excite them about the role enrolling soldiers whose performance
in critical skills, and to be more mature,
and skills of the Armor/Cavalry leader. meets the criteria for EIA membership.
self confident, and responsible — and the
Tough/realistic training and the promise OSUT enrollees showed that they could
unit should support him by providing him
of increased responsibility, combined peak for a short period under strict super-
the opportunity to display these qualities.
with accelerated promotions, will help to
keep our best young soldiers in com- As a first sergeant, I identified and
mander’s hatches and stations. tracked my newly assigned EIAs. I did Continued on Page 37
ARMOR — May-June 1999 7
Reaching Our Army’s
Full Combat Potential
In the 21st Century
Insights from the National Training Center’s Opposing Force

by Colonel John D. Rosenberger

Reprinted with permission of the Association of the U.S. Army (AUSA). derstanding this premise, and the disparity, must begin with a
Colonel Rosenberger’s paper was originally published by AUSA’s Insti- discussion of how the OPFOR is organized.
tute of Land Warfare (ILW) as Landpower Essay No. 99-2, February
1999. Information about AUSA, the professional education program and It Is How the OPFOR Is Organized?
other ILW publications is available on the AUSA Webpage,
Fundamentally, the warfighting ability of the OPFOR stems
www.ausa.org.
from how it is organized. It is organized as a combined-arms

team. It lives together as a combined-arms team, it trains as a
combined-arms team, and it fights as a combined-arms team —
Introduction
all the time. It is not a collection of units, thrown together on an
Few in our Army would dispute the assertion that the 11th ad hoc basis from various divisions and installations, who have
Armored Cavalry Regiment, the Opposing Force (OPFOR) at never trained together, or a collection of units within a division
the National Training Center (NTC) is very good at what they which task organize and train infrequently as a brigade combat
do. The commanders and soldiers in the OPFOR are seldom team.
defeated in battle. For years, this unit has been the anvil upon
On the battlefield, habitual fighting, training and support rela-
which we have hammered and forged the combat power of our
tionships matter. They matter a lot in combat, and historically,
Army. Have you ever wondered how they do it?
the most combat effective organizations our Army has ever put
How does OPFOR develop and sustain its ability to fight and on a battlefield share this organizational characteristic. Our mili-
defeat its opponents in almost every battle at the National Train- tary history is replete with examples. This comes as no surprise
ing Center? How does the regiment, fighting with 1960s-1970s to those who know and understand what it takes to win in com-
technology, routinely defeat brigade task forces equipped with bat — teamwork, mutual trust and absolute confidence in every
the most modern weapon systems and technology our Army can member of the team. To achieve these essential feelings, com-
provide? How can the regiment do it given the same soldiers, bat, combat support and combat service support units have to
the same personnel turbulence (about 40 percent turnover each train and fight together as one team for long periods of time.
year), the same leader development challenges, and the oldest Habitual team relationships foster incomparable teamwork, a
fighting equipment in the active Army? prerequisite to success on any modern battlefield, where multi-
ple units, with multiple capabilities, must be artfully integrated
It’s my premise in this essay that these are not trivial questions,
and employed simultaneously. A football analogy works well to
simply answered by the fact that the regiment has the opportu-
describe this critical dynamic.
nity to train and fight more frequently, or that the OPFOR
knows the terrain. Just the opposite: I believe the answers to In the great professional football teams, because they live to-
these questions are critically important to a force-projection gether, train together and play together, every member of the
Army that is growing ever smaller, and they are absolutely key team understands every other role and responsibility and every
to achieving the full combat potential of Force XXI and the member knows the others’ capabilities and limitations. In every
Army After Next. play (battle), every player has a specific task and purpose to
achieve; he knows when and where his task must be achieved in
order to set conditions for success. Equally important, he also
Realization of Combat Potential
understands what every other member of the team will do, when
Bottom line up front: It’s my conclusion, after fighting against he will do it, and where he will do it. This common understand-
it, observing it for 12 years and now commanding the OPFOR, ing develops an incredible sense of unity and purpose, and the
that the fundamental reason this remarkable military organiza- most powerful effect of all, a common visualization of the play
tion is able to dominate its opponents is because the OPFOR (battle) and how it will unfold. Each player sees how he fits in
has achieved the full combat potential residing in its doctrine, the big picture, thereby giving him a sense of purpose. Having a
organization, training methods, leaders, soldiers and the capa- sense of purpose, and knowing your team is counting on you to
bilities of its equipment. The brigade task forces they oppose do your job, produces a powerful motivation to succeed. More-
have not. Moreover, they cannot achieve their full combat po- over, the plays executed by a professional team are a display of
tential, given existing conditions within our Army today. Un- artful synchronization, achieved through constant, repetitive
8 ARMOR — May-June 1999