ARMOR, July-August 2000 Edition

64 Pages·2011·4.89 MB·English

Urban Fighting in Lebanon
See Page 8

PB 17-00-4 July-August 2000
Saddle Up... Tonight We Ride
It’s 0600 hours, dark, early, and the commander is tired The wives of mounted soldiers have a history as long
and groggy — Stand To. A crying child approaches, fe- and storied as their husbands. Over a hundred years
ver raging. The commander, the spouse of a deployed ago, wives waved goodbye to cavalrymen on western
tanker or cavalryman, initiates an all-too-familiar battle frontiers, and today they do the same, bidding farewell to
drill — the emergency room. Moving quickly she wakes, tankers and cavalrymen off to Kosovo, Bosnia, SW Asia,
dresses herself and four children, preps a snow and ice- and Korea. We slink out the door for TDYs and deploy-
laden vehicle, and crosses the LD. As she nears the ments confident that our spouses will keep the home
objective, one child sprays windshield de-icier into the fires burning, visiting emergency rooms, battling TRI-
eyes of his brother. Calmly she instructs the spraying CARE, fixing the car, taking care of the lawn while rais-
victim to, “Hang tight, we are almost at the hospital.” ing our children.
While comforting the child with the fever, driving the car,
We ask a great deal of our wives; we ask them to leave
and applying her makeup, she settles another border
family and friends to follow us; we ask them to relocate
dispute between siblings before sliding into the hospital’s
every two or three years, and endure the destruction of
icy parking lot. Her actions at the objective are a marvel
their treasured belongings by movers contracted at the
of efficiency: she conducts an informal triage with the
lowest bid; and we require them to run our home during
emergency room staff, settles kids into activities, and
long work hours and frequent separations. These are
begins planning for Class I. And you thought qualifying a
special women indeed, so ARMOR will take a moment to
tank or conducting a zone recon was tough.
both salute and thank the wives of the men of the
Not long ago I glanced down at my calendar to discover mounted force — thanks very much, ladies. I for one will
that May 12 was not only a Friday but also Military do better next year.
Spouse’s Day. Not sure where I got the information or
We think you’ll find an eclectic collection of articles in
what inspired me to annotate it, I announced the day’s
this issue of ARMOR. In an interesting bit of timing that
significance to the magazine’s staff and drew little re-
coincides with recent events in the Middle East, we
sponse. What actions are required on Military Spouse’s
chose CPT James Leaf’s article on the Israel approach
Day — a gift, flowers, or is there some sort of ritual or
to MOUT in the 1982 Lebanon campaign for our cover.
festival involved? Ignorance is not always bliss.
This is the season for Annual Training and we feature
It’s getting difficult to track the plethora of recognition two pieces on the National Guard and Reserve which
days and months. Honestly, how many of you knew 12 attempt to answer the questions: “What to Make of Na-
May was Military Spouse’s Day, and for those of you tional Guard Tankers?” and “Can the One Team Con-
who did (both of you), what did you do to honor your cept Mean One Equal Team?”. Also, a defining moment
spouse? My course of action was simple: do nothing and approaches for the Interim Brigade, as the Platform Se-
hope (normally not a method). Declaring a day “Military lection Process will soon designate a vehicle for the mo-
Spouse’s Day” as a means to check the block and rec- bile gun system, and CPT Francis Park makes a case for
ognize this outstanding group is a gross injustice — they a second look at the Armored Gun System.
have earned and deserve much more. — D2
By Order of the Secretary of the Army: Official:

ERIC K. SHINSEKI
JOEL B. HUDSON
General, United States Army
Administrative Assistant to the
Chief of Staff
Secretary of the Army
0013305
The Professional Development Bulletin of the Armor Branch PB 17-00-4

Editor-in-Chief Features
MAJ DAVE DAIGLE
8 MOUT and the 1982 Lebanon Campaign: The Israeli Approach

by Captain James D. Leaf
Managing Editor
12 A Second Look at the Armored Gun System
JON T. CLEMENS
by Captain Francis J. H. Park

16 Fort Knox Opens Urban Training Site
Commandant
MG B. B. BELL 19 1975-2000: 25 Years of Master Gunner Training
by Sergeant First Class Ira L. Partridge

22 The Hidden Risks of High-Intensity, Multiechelon
ARMOR (ISSN 0004-2420) is published bi- Battle-Focused Lane Training
monthly by the U.S. Army Armor Center, 4401 by James M. Coffman
Vine Grove Road, Fort Knox, KY 40121.
25 Change of Command Inventory 101
Disclaimer: The information contained in AR- by Major Pat Flanders
MOR represents the professional opinions of
30 A Rite of Passage
the authors and does not necessarily reflect
the official Army or TRADOC position, nor 32 Depleted Uranium — the truth and nothing but the truth
does it change or supersede any information
by Mike Sheheane
presented in other official Army publications.
34 Tips on Mentoring a CTLT Cadet
Official distribution is limited to one copy for
by Captain Keith A. McKinley
each armored brigade headquarters, armored
cavalry regiment headquarters, armor battalion 35 Contingency Contracting — A Commander’s Logistics Force Multiplier
headquarters, armored cavalry squadron head- Major John Shannon Womack
quarters, reconnaissance squadron headquar-
ters, armored cavalry troop, armor company, 38 The United States Army, National Guard, and Reserves:
and motorized brigade headquarters of the Can the One-Team Concept Mean One “Equal” Team?
United States Army. In addition, Army libraries, by Captain Michael L. Scholes, Sr.
Army and DOD schools, HQ DA and MACOM
staff agencies with responsibility for armored, 41 The 49th AD Ships Out
direct fire, ground combat systems, organiza-
42 What to Make of National Guard Tankers?
tions, and the training of personnel for such
by First Lieutenant Jim Sosnicky
organizations may request two copies by
sending a request to the editor-in-chief. 45 Riding To the Sound of the Guns:
Authorized Content: ARMOR will print only Leadership in the XXI Century — Digital Age
those materials for which the U.S. Army Armor by Major Scott L. Efflandt
Center has proponency. That proponency
49 Wounded Knee — What Really Happened
includes: all armored, direct-fire ground com-
by Major Mark A. Farrar
bat systems that do not serve primarily as
infantry carriers; all weapons used exclusively 57 Uniform Discipline: A Good Indicator of a Unit’s Deeper Problems?
in these systems or by CMF 19-series enlisted
by Command Sergeant Major Kenneth O. Preston
soldiers; any miscellaneous items of equip-
ment which armor and armored cavalry or- Back New M1A2 SEP Tanks Are Fielded
ganizations use exclusively; training for all SC Cover At 3-67 Armor, Fort Hood
12A, 12B, and 12C officers and for all CMF-
19-series enlisted soldiers; and information
Departments
concerning the training, logistics, history, and

leadership of armor and armored cavalry units
2 Contacts
at the brigade/regiment level and below, to
include Threat units at those levels. 3 Letters
6 Commander’s Hatch
Material may be reprinted, provided credit is 58 Book and Software Reviews
given to ARMOR and to the author, except
where copyright is indicated.
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Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
July-August 2000, Vol. CIX, No. 4 USPS 467-970
Directory — Points of Contact

DSN prefix – 464-
Commercial prefix– (502) 624-
ARMOR Editorial Offices U.S. Army Armor Center
Editor-in-Chief Commanding General (ATZK-CG)
MAJ Dave Daigle 2249 MG B. B. Bell 2121
E-Mail: [email protected] E-Mail: [email protected]
Managing Editor Deputy Commanding General (ATZK-DCG)
Jon T. Clemens 2249 BG James J. Grazioplene 7555
E-Mail: [email protected] E-Mail: [email protected]
Editor Chief of Staff (ATZK-CS)
Vivian Oertle 2610 COL George Edwards 1101
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Production Assistant Command Sergeant Major (ATZK-CSM)
Mary Hager 2610 CSM Carl E. Christian 4952
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E-Mail: [email protected] E-Mail: [email protected]
Directorate of Training and Doctrine Development (ATZK-TD)
COL Matthew L. Smith 8247
U.S. Army Armor School E-Mail: [email protected]
TRADOC System Manager for Force XXI (ATZK-XXI)
Director, Armor School (ATSB-DAS) COL Brett H. Weaver 4009
COL Robert T. Gahagan 1050 E-Mail: [email protected]
E-Mail: [email protected]
TRADOC System Manager for Abrams (ATZK-TS)
Armor School Sergeant Major (ATSB-CSM) COL James H. Nunn 7955
CSM Terry McWilliams 7091 E-Mail: [email protected]
E-Mail:
Mounted Maneuver Battlespace Battle Lab (ATZK-MW)
NCO Academy (ATSB-NC) COL Richard T. Savage 7809
CSM Kevin P. Garvey 5150 E-Mail: [email protected]
E-Mail: [email protected]
Office, Chief of Armor (ATZK-AR)
16th Cavalry Regiment (ATSB-SBZ) Aubrey Henley 1272
COL John Antal 7848 E-Mail: [email protected]
E-Mail: [email protected] FAX 7585
1st Armor Training Brigade (ATSB-BAZ) Special Assistant to the CG (ARNG) (ATZK-SA)
COL William J. Blankmeyer 6843 COL D. Allen Youngman 1315
E-Mail: [email protected] E-Mail: [email protected]

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2 ARMOR — July-August 2000
The May-June 2000 issue marked a new tactics instead of logistics, and shame on us. Close Look Shows
milestone for ARMOR with the first electronic But before we face the grieving parents, I’d Merkava’s Pluses and Minuses
submission of the magazine to our contract hope that we could at least articulate a com-
printer. Of course, as some of you may have pelling reason to justify the expenditure.
noticed, it was not a totally smooth transition. Somehow, the urgency of “doing it on my Dear Sir:
Because of a font compatibility issue be- watch” falls rather short. “What’s the best tank in the world?” My
tween our equipment and the printer’s, we CHESTER A. KOJRO Yankee impulses prompt me to vote unhesi-
had a problem with some of our quotation LTC, AR, USAR (Ret.) tatingly for the M1A2 Systems Enhanced
marks and long dashes. We apologize for Package, the most advanced main battle
any inconvenience to our authors and read- tank of the U.S. fleet. I am not at all surprised
ers. – Ed.
Main Battle Tank Rankings: at the level of response, however, to the
More Perspective Was Needed relative rankings of tanks compared in the
IB CT “Armored Car” Acquisition July-August 1999 issue of ARMOR. Beauty
contests like this always seem to rankle
Squanders Millions in Research Money Dear Sir: someone. If you do not believe me take a
look at the discussion, also in this forum,
Although being pleased to read and very
Dear Sir: over what are the best all-time tanker movies
agreeable with Herr Klenke’s letter (Jan-Feb
or the fuss created when VH-1 selected the
As I read the “Commander’s Hatch” of the 2000 issue) concerning the “ranking” of the
top 100 rock and roll songs of all time.
March-April 2000 issue, I am disturbed by world’s MBTs, I would comment on three
the “…Chief of Staff of the Army’s decision to specific aspects: the ranking concept itself, a I am particularly not surprised at the wave
field an initial Brigade Combat Team at Fort country’s MBT selection, and the application of defenders who rose up to argue that the
Lewis.” There is an obvious flaw in the pur- or use of such a report. Israeli Merkava III was wholly undeserving of
suit of an interim fighting vehicle for the initial its bottom ranking. I agree. Having said that,
Main battle tanks must be designed to, and
brigade combat team. I am not sure where it should be ranked, but
be measured by, a fixed set of standard
certainly not dead last. I was sufficiently im-
Of course, future technology will permit us performance characteristics — frequently
pressed with it during my two-year tour as
to develop a combat platform with greater referred to as the “...ilities.” These range
the TRADOC Liaison to the Israeli Defense
firepower and protection while being lighter, from survivability, lethality, mobility, main-
Forces to tell folks that, if pressed, I would
more reliable, faster, etc., than the M1A2 tainability, durability, transportability, etc.,
rate it just after the Abrams and the German
SEP Abrams. Any historic reading of science etc. Each of these performance characteris-
Leopard II. To caveat that judgment, I should
and technology suggests nothing else. Work- tics, in turn, is affected by vehicle weight,
say that it is based on what I know, and
ing with Army Materiel Command and using fuel load, ammo types, sights, etc. These are
there is a lot I do not, especially with regard
the Mounted Maneuver Battle Lab along with normally weighted by the designer as to
to classified data such as armor composition
virtual prototypes and fighting them on virtual priority or importance. While some of these
etc. In fairness, I should also note that my
terrain is exactly the way the development characteristics were broadly mentioned, it
tour of duty was 1995-1997. In terms of
process is supposed to work. We’d be fool- seemed to be, as was pointed out in his
technical innovations, that could be consid-
ish to do otherwise. Even hosting a perform- questioning of the low Merkava rating, more
ered an eon ago. At that time, the Merkava
ance demonstration at Fort Knox to survey subjectively than objectively. Therefore,
IV, with its more powerful engine, was a
the capabilities of “off-the-shelf” platforms since power-to-weight ratio only affects
prototype. There is one thing I will say with
made some sense. I contend that it could mainly one minor determinant of mobility
confidence and that is this: the Merkava is
have been achieved by simply reviewing (acceleration), of only one measurable
the best tank in the world available to the
commercially published reference books, but “...ility, ” does this really move an MBT “rank-
if the “boss” needs to touch and feel before ing” from say a 5 to a 10? Israelis. It was designed based on the IDF’s
deciding, fine. combat experiences and for the conditions of
Herr Klenke briefly mentions the purchase its most probable conventional battlefield,
However, I cannot comprehend the state- of one MBT over another by a non-MBT de- the Golan Heights.
ment, “We are going to learn a great deal signing/producing country. While he sug-
I will not recount the arguments of either
from this fielding and apply those lessons gests that such decisions are additionally
the Merkava’s champions or detractors. I
toward the development of the future combat determined by business arrangements such
will, however, offer a few first-hand observa-
platform that will have the characteristics as offsets, there is the allusion that the Leo 2
already mentioned.” was compared to and outperformed the tions. Some affirm while others counter the
accolades afforded the Merkava III by LTC
“M1A1/M1A2” in the Netherlands, Switzer-
What lessons? We are already ignoring Eshel, IDF Retired, in the last issue of
land, and Sweden. In actuality, the first two
nearly a century’s worth of armored and ARMOR. I owe much to LTC Eshel; his
countries made their Leo 2 purchases in
mechanized combat experience when we works were a great source of information
March 1979 and August 1983, respectively
opt for light armored cars in lieu of main prior to my LNO assignment. I can’t say,
— well before the 120mm M1A1 was avail-
battle tanks. We can develop and practice able. however, that I have ever read a critical word
any new tactics with existing tanks, armored in any of them and I note that his publica-
fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, Lastly, as a member of the Armor Associa- tions are almost invariably reviewed by the
and tactical wheeled vehicles. By buying tion since 1972, and having previously seen IDF Spokesman’s Office. He is an Israeli
these interim armored cars now, we are the full text of the original tank “ranking” patriot. That is not a bad thing, just worth
simply squandering millions in procurement thesis, I was initially somewhat disappointed noting. Many of us, in our Army, have been
money that should be spent for the future to see it published in an abbreviated context, brought up on admiring accounts of the IDF
technology once it becomes available. and without greater editorial comment. But — they literally could do no wrong. My tour
the purpose of ARMOR Magazine is “...to with the IDF sobered me of this notion. I
Let us not fool ourselves. The rationale be-
surface controversy and debate among pro- realized that they were every bit as chal-
hind this “charge to lightness” is a perceived
fessionals in the force,” and the scope of lenged by resources, bureaucracy, and the
lack of competence in deploying and logisti-
your readership is proof of success. And the tendency to be captive to one’s own experi-
cally supporting and sustaining heavy forc-
professionals know that events like Desert ence, however real that experience may be,
es. If we send tankers and troopers into
Storm prove our tanks’ success. as any other nation and army.
combat in thin-skinned, under-armored, un-
der-gunned, and road-bound wheeled vehi- J. C. HARP I had the good fortune to observe, ride, and
cles, it is because leadership is focused on Utica, Mich. fire several IDF tank variants in various field
ARMOR — July-August 2000 3
conditions. I was able to tour the Merkava’s am not sure the Israelis have gained much in ARMOR, March-April 2000) is squarely on
production facilities hosted by MG (Ret.) fire crew safety by going to an electric, ver- target. It raises many issues that go straight
Israel Tal, a man who stands among the sus hydraulic, turret. It seems that advances to the heart of the morale and combat readi-
giants in armored warfare history and who is in lubricants and other features have miti- ness of our Army. As a National Guard offi-
the driving force behind the design and pro- gated the Abrams risk. What is clear, how- cer, I would like to bring the perspective of
duction of the tank. Finally, I was present at ever, is the relatively slow slew rate of the my own National Guard service to the table.
exercises in which USMC M1A1 tankers Merkava turret. It took 12 seconds for full
trained alongside a Merkava III tank platoon. rotation. I would say 3-4 times longer than One of the true strengths of National Guard
that of the Abrams. The Merkava’s main gun units, especially combat arms battalions, is
First, I would like to randomly note some of rounds are in the rear of the hull in 49 sepa- that they are de facto organized more like
the more “nifty” attributes of the Merkava and rate canisters, a design meant to eliminate traditional regiments than any other units in
IDF tank design that I have not seen printed secondary explosions. This presents two the Army. Citizen-soldiers in these battalions
here as yet. The Merkava III was designed problems. One, having dismounts on board often serve their entire careers in a single
with survivability as priority #1. No surprise is a trade-off. They occupy the same space battalion. Noncommissioned officers have
then, it is a supremely survivable tank. Its as the removable canisters. Two, except for literally “grown-up” with their unit and feel
modular armor is easily replaced and selec- ready rounds in the turret, the main gun must personally responsible for its success. Sen-
tively upgraded. The laser early warning de- be forward positioned to access the hull ior noncommissioned officers are often re-
vices that LTC Eshel described are, in fact, ammunition. spected members of their communities and
terrific survivability enhancers. The Merkava bring a wealth of human and institutional
III has a simple, but highly effective suspen- Finally, while I was impressed with the knowledge to their military jobs, which would
sion system. It provides a smooth firing plat- “BAZ” auto-tracking fire control system, I was be impossible to match in units made up of
form. Additionally, it is cleverly designed so not overly so. At the time I served in Israel, soldiers in constant transition. Many National
that its components provide additional sur- the IDF tank corps held an annual competi- Guard soldiers enjoy the unique feeling of
vivability, especially against chemical (en- tion for the best tank platoon representing camaraderie that arises from serving with
ergy) rounds. A combined arms concept is each of its regular army tank brigades. The friends, neighbors, and even family mem-
integral to the tank’s design. The tank has IDF M60 Patton tank variants were always bers. Career progression and the need for
space for six dismounts in the rear of the competitive with the Merkava. In fact, in one varied experiences dictate that officers be
hull. It has an integrated 60mm mortar; a of my two years, the oldest M60 variant beat periodically reassigned to other companies
design common to most IDF tank variants. It out all others, to include the Merkava III tank or batteries within the battalion. However,
has a reduced thermal signature, at least in platoon. This says something about the crew most officers serve for long periods of their
comparison to the Abrams. This is due, in and training, but it also diminishes, if only a career within the same battalion or brigade.
part, to the manner in which exhaust is little, my estimation of the Merkava III. I have This gives National Guard officers a similar
channeled from the front-mounted engine. no doubt, whatsoever, that the advance rep- sense of camaraderie as that enjoyed by
The gunner and TC may fire the coaxial resented by the 2nd generation FLIR on the enlisted soldiers. I can personally attest that
machine gun simultaneously with or sepa- M1A2 SEP will do more to revolutionize in trying times the unique camaraderie, the
rate from the main gun. The computer solu- lethality than any automatic target tracker feeling of being a respected member in a
tion is for the main gun, however, which may ever can. “band of brothers,” is what has kept me in
make for some erratic machine gun fire uniform. This mutual reliance and trust can
I must conclude by restating my admiration
when fired simultaneously. IDF tank variants only translate into superior unit cohesiveness
for the Merkava III. The fact that a young and
have separate daylight and thermal sights. and enhanced combat power. I should add
resource-poor nation like Israel could build a
The thermal image is very high quality al- that the system is not impermeable. People
revolutionary tank product line is an amazing
though I believe Israelis train less with it than sometimes relocate for personal reasons or
feat in itself. There is no equal in SWA, save
we do and discourage its use except when because of their civilian careers. But this
the Abrams tank, to the Merkava tank, and
limited visibility requires it. There is a “TV” “natural” attrition coupled with retirements
that is enough. I am not a technical expert
sight that allows an impressively broad and and occasional reassignments outside the
and so I am unable to speak that language
clear view outside the tank from within the battalion or brigade keep the units from be-
with the authority of a well researched indi-
turret. In the event of intercom loss, the TC coming too ingrown and stale.
vidual like LTC Eshel, nor am I smart enough
can pass instructions to the driver using
simple indicator lights to include speed up/ to program the computer inputs to obtain Another intangible morale-builder is the
down, turn right/left, and reverse. The auto- tank comparisons like the study that ignited sense of history maintained by National
matic target tracker works as advertised, I all this discussion. I am, however, confident Guard units. The flags of the two infantry
watched a Merkava destroy a drone helicop- in the accuracy of what my eyes observe battalions and one artillery battalion in which
ter in flight at a simulated range of 3,000 and what my simple brain, trained to assess I have been privileged to serve have been
meters. MG Tal reported that it had achieved training, concludes. literally covered by campaign streamers
80-90% first round hits against moving tar- MAJ KEVIN WRIGHT ranging from the Civil War to World War II.
gets at ranges in excess of 3,000 meters. Former LNO to the IDF Many soldiers recall when their fathers,
The Merkava IV prototype was fitted with a HQ, USAARMC grandfathers, or uncles served in the very
much needed, more powerful 1400-hp en- Fort Knox, Ky. units in which they now serve. Frequently,
gine of German manufacture. MG Tal mementos of the hometown unit’s war ser-

claimed the tank was revolutionary versus vice, such as captured cannon or public
(The Editor is declaring a unilateral cease-
evolutionary in design. When fielded, he memorials, are prominently displayed at
fire on further comments about the tank
said, it would look like a new tank and actu- town squares or local museums.
ranking survey article in our July-August
ally be a lighter tank. All this was not appar-
1999 issue. – Ed.) All these positive points do not mean that
ent from a casual observation of the proto-
there are no problems in the system. Yes,
type, but I have no reason to doubt it.
there are cases of cronyism, the proverbial
Now, I will pass a few rounds of ammo the A “Regimental System” of Sorts “good ol’ boy” networking, and cases where
way of the Merkava’s detractors. Notwith- Thrives in the National Guard sub-standard, or problem soldiers are re-
standing LTC Eshel’s defense, the Merkava tained or tossed from one company to an-

is grossly under-powered; and it accelerated other. But, in my experience, these have
Dear Sir:
slowly, especially on inclines. Our Abrams been few and far between. In addition, the
tankers easily outpaced the Merkava platoon The article by COL Guy C. Swan III (“It’s constant enforcement of “the Army standard”
in a road march across the desert. Second, I Time for a True Regimental System” in all things, from the APFT to battle drills to
4 ARMOR — July-August 2000
the staff Military Decision Making Process 2000 issue of ARMOR. His article is well for the whole Army.... The authors suggested
(MDMP), has served as an objective quality written and researched. I must add — and I that regiments could actively recruit only
control tool that has served to increase the emphasize I am not correcting Lieutenant within their own areas and should supply
professionalism of units immeasurably. An- D’Amato’s article — that Starry attempted recruiting personnel as part of the U.S. Army
other, subtler, quality control measure is the more than a revolution of the Army with doc- Recruiting Command in these regions. In
genuine desire of the overwhelming majority trinal, technological, and educational re- each region, the regimental headquarters
of soldiers to live up to the highest traditions forms. He also attempted to evolve the latter would be established and colonels of regi-
of their battalion/regiment and not “lose face” three institutions that compose the Army with ments would be authorized. The study did
amongst one’s peers. This internal motiva- dramatic changes in the personnel system.... support the current, centralized recruit train-
tion is often far more powerful than any ex- It was a system that Starry stated was an ing system.
ternal coercion because once an officer or “anachronism,” and the last remaining Army
The study emphasized the adoption of the
NCO loses the respect of his/her regimental institution that needed to be “fixed.”
regimental system, which makes the regional
peers he or she loses all moral authority.
Starry was doing this as he had done with basing of units more significant. If building
Again, I applaud COL Swan for raising a doctrine: he brought smart people in, gave regiments with a strong tradition and a sense
much-needed and often unwanted or un- them a mission-style order with a clear end of history is important, regional recruiting or
heeded voice on behalf of the need to substi- state, and continually checked it. Unfortu- regional defense districts should be consid-
tute the Army’s faceless individual replace- nately for the Army, the personnel system ered. Otherwise, regimental pride and asso-
ment system for a working regimental sys- was the one institution that was so en- ciation with a specific headquarters are not
tem. From my perspective, I would like to trenched that even the energy and brilliance important in a system with nationwide re-
see the National Guard leadership officially of Donn Starry could not penetrate it.... By cruiting and where units are arbitrarily head-
solidifying and cementing the traditions of the end of the 1970s, and in the beginning of quartered.
our regimental system. Furthermore, I invite 1980s, the Army, led by Chief of Staff Gen-
The proposed regimental system would
my Active Component (AC) colleagues to eral “Shy” Meyer, began extensive studies to
also have a strong tie to the Army National
dialogue with members of the National implement a unit-based personnel system....
Guard and Army Reserve, where regiments,
Guard on our experiences with our “regimen- The first study was conducted at TRADOC
brigades, and divisions have been linked to
tal” system. The “lessons learned” from under the direction of General Starry. The
regions for years. Specific units have oper-
these experiences may well benefit the mo- second one was conducted with the guid-
ated in specific areas for over a hundred
rale and combat effectiveness of the Total ance of General Meyer by the Inspector
years. (The 29th Infantry Division, which
Army. General, Lieutenant General Richard Trefry.
served proudly in World War II, is composed
MAJ PRISCO R. HERNANDEZ, ARNG (Starry’s) proposal was a copy of a Euro- of units from Virginia and Maryland and can
4th Bde, 75th Div (TS) pean regimental system adapted for the trace its origin to the Civil War. The three
Ft. Sill, Okla. United States, but the latter program at- regiments of the Massachusetts Army Na-
tempted to establish a smaller program tional Guard have existed since 13 Decem-
within the larger, individual-focused person- ber 1636.)
New Sensor System Will Be
Fielded in Greater Numbers nel system, and as a result was doomed to Under TRADOC Faith/Ross the entire per-
failure. Starry opposed this compromise, but sonnel system warranted reform. Manage-
the bureaucracy ground him down.... Upon ment practices would become more regimen-
Dear Sir: assuming command of TRADOC in 1979, tally oriented for both promotion and posting
General Starry began examining ways to of enlisted soldiers. The TRADOC Faith/Ross
I would like to set the record straight and
implement a regimental system and replace study recommended the elimination of the
clarify some misconceptions in the article
the individual personnel system with a unit “up-or-out” promotion system, to be replaced
“Reconnaissance and Security Forces in the
replacement system. He asked liaison offi- with an “up-or-stay” promotion system for
New Heavy Division Structure” Pages 26-29
cers from the United Kingdom and Canada both the officer and enlisted ranks. This
in the March-April 2000 issue written by
Major Michael C. Kasales. to undertake a detailed study of their coun- promotion system would be decentralized,
tries’ systems and suggest how these could with more trust being placed in the hands of
He mistakenly reported the current fielding be incorporated in the U.S. Army. After a the regimental commander.
schedule for the LRAS3, or Long-Range year of extensive study, the Allied officers —
Advance Surveillance System, as one per Lieutenant Colonel P.W. Faith of the British The TRADOC Faith/Ross study recom-
scout platoon. The correct fielding rate is one Army and Lieutenant Colonel R. I. Ross of mended that regimental commanders should
per scout platform in each mech infan- the Canadian Army — returned with an ex- play an important role in selecting enlisted
try/armor battalion scout platoon. Instead of cellent regimental plan for the U.S. Army personnel for assignments away from the
a scout platoon only receiving one LRAS3 called the “Application of the Regimental regiment, such as serving on higher staffs,
per platoon there will be a total of six per System to the United States Army’s Combat recruiting, or as an instructor at a branch
platoon (one per platform). Arms,” referred to as the TRADOC Faith/ school. Increased personal attention to indi-
Ross Study.... This proposal was a true reg- viduals in a decentralized system would lead
The LRAS3 is a superb sensor and will give imental system that involved more than rotat- to better retention rates, and foster an at-
scouts a great advantage on the battlefield. ing units: it concentrated on unit cohesion, mosphere where the best individual, not the
with all its inherent complexities of recruiting, best file, would be promoted.
SSG DANIEL R. GASTELUM
sustaining, training, personnel policies, and
Directorate of Force Development, Ft. Knox Finally, the TRADOC Faith/Ross plan ad-
tradition.
LRAS3 Project NCOIC dressed officer management interwoven with
The TRADOC Faith/Ross study suggested the regimental system, instead of separate
a grouping of regiments from all combat from it. Like the enlisted promotion system, it
Starry Also Attempted
arms by state, or states. Each grouping had recommended abolishing the “up-or-out” pro-
Personnel Reform on His Watch
to ensure a minimum population base of five motion system because of its disruption of
million supporting four regiments. A more cohesion. It also stated that “up-or-out” cre-
Dear Sir:
detailed study would have been required to ated a lack of experienced officers by con-
My compliments to First Lieutenant Martin adjust the base figure to national recruiting stantly moving them from one position to
J. D’Amato’s article “Vigilant Warrior: Gen- trends. The regimental system would create
eral Donn A. Starry’s AirLand Battle and an image of the regiment that could not fail
Continued on Page 54
How it Changed the Army,” in the May-June to improve community and public relations
ARMOR — July-August 2000 5
Major General B. B. Bell

Commanding General

U.S. Army Armor Center

Getting There From Here:
The Mechanized Force Modernization Plan
The Army, and our mechanized force ing to identify the way ahead for the deployability, sustainability, and flexi-
in particular, face a modernization/ mounted force. The ICT developed a bility of lighter forces. This moderniza-
transformation program that is un- strategic framework, proposed a mod- tion strategy has three key tenets:
precedented in history. Meeting the ernization plan in the context of the •
Transform now to interim capability
challenges to America’s national inter- Army transformation, and laid out the
in order to meet immediate war-fight-
ests demands a robust set of land power way forward. This was a significant
ing requirements, particularly in small-
options to face the uncertain opera- undertaking, and was accomplished
scale contingencies.
tional environment of the 21st century. only because we had the full participa-
•
Decreased in size since the Persian tion of each schoolhouse, TRADOC, Maintain legacy war-fighting capa-
Gulf War, the U.S. Army remains the and the Army staff. bility through overmatch, digitization,
premier land force in the world today and re-capitalization as a strategic
Army Transformation and Mod-
and plays a pivotal role in carrying out hedge while the Army undergoes the
ernization Strategy. The Army leader-
the national security strategy. Despite turbulence of modernization and trans-
ship, with our Armor and Cavalry forces
the Army’s preeminence, our leader- formation.
at the core, is pursuing “a strategically
ship has recognized the need to trans- •
responsive force that is dominant Focus science and technology to en-
form the force to meet new challenges
across the full spectrum of operations.” able timely fielding of the Objective
in a world that continues to change.
The goals are lofty. Strategic respon- Force.
None of this should be news to any of siveness is defined as being able to
you. The Army vision has been widely deploy a combat-ready brigade any- The long-term goal is to field an Ob-
disseminated. We at the Armor Center where in the world in 96 hours, a full jective Force that harnesses technologi-
fully embrace the vision. We have not, division in 120 hours, and five divi- cal advances in a Future Combat Sys-
however, openly discussed the means sions in 30 days. In today’s terms, full tem (FCS) that is lighter, more strategi-
by which the Army intends to achieve spectrum dominance at every point on cally and tactically mobile, and that
transformation of our current force into the spectrum of operations requires requires less sustainment, yet offers the
the Objective Force. In the previous leveraging capabilities that are resident relative combat overmatch capabilities
issue of ARMOR, I gave you a due-out in uniquely specialized parts of today’s in lethality and survivability that heavy
on the Mechanized Force Moderniza- force (light forces must be deployed to forces enjoy today.
tion Plan (MFMP). The MFMP is in- meet time standards for responsiveness
Realization of that goal could elimi-
tended to be the bridge from today’s and heavy forces must be deployed to
nate the sharp distinction we now see
legacy force and the Objective Force. meet the dominant overmatch standard
between heavy and light forces. But
The MFMP will provide the strategic in most METT-T conditions). The
until the Objective Force and the Future
framework to synchronize mechanized Army has embarked on a transforma-
Combat System are realities, the Army
force modernization with Army trans- tion campaign that will enable its or-
must maintain both the dominant com-
formation, as well as the investment ganizations and equipment to better
bat overmatch the legacy force offers,
strategies to achieve both. meet both requirements.
and the capability to employ deploy-
For the past five months, a TRADOC At the heart of the Army’s Force able interim forces to fight wars. To do
formal Integrated Concept Team, under Modernization Vision is a new kind of so, it must retain a legacy force of the
the direction of BG James J. Grazio- force that combines the lethality, sur- right numbers of heavy platforms and
plene, the Armor Center’s Deputy vivability, and tactical agility of the organizations, modernize or re-capi-
Commanding General, has been work- heavy forces with the responsiveness, talize them, and continue to product-
6 ARMOR — July-August 2000
improve them to counter the most dan-
gerous threats to the nation’s freedom
of action and well being.
The Role of Heavy Forces in Trans-
formation. Transforming selected bri-
gades to interim capabilities will re-
solve many of the challenges facing the
Army today, but heavy forces will still
be required during transformation. No
other component of the force provides
the capabilities that they bring, particu-
larly to the higher end of the spectrum
of conflict. They represent the indisput-
able hammer for Army offensive and
counter-offensive operations. Until
their capabilities can be replaced, to-
day’s heavy forces are the nation’s in-
surance policy for deterring major thea-
ter wars and, should deterrence fail,
tion of the Army to the Objective Force required to sustain lethality overmatch
provide the dominant land force for
through recommended solutions in the through ammunition development to
winning them, decisively and quickly.
areas of Doctrine, Training, Leader De- ensure superiority against Threat pro-
This makes them a vital part of the stra-
velopment, Organizations, Materiel and tection and survivability technologies,
tegic hedge required to mitigate risk in
Soldier issues (DTLOMS). such as explosive reactive armor (ERA)
the Army Transformation Campaign
and Active Protection Systems (APS).
Plan. The Mechanized Force Moderniza-
•
tion Plan: Assesses requirements and alterna-
The most recent genesis of the MFMP
• tive solutions for command and control
was the Army’s submission of an initial Proposes adjustments to the heavy
(C2) on the move. Also, recommends
Armored Systems Modernization Re- force (M1, M2, and M3) modernization
and assesses solutions to address the
port (ASMR) to Congress in 1999. A programs consistent with acceptable
inability to negotiate complex obstacles
resulting element of that change was in levels of risk in order to preserve re-
and gaps on the battlefield due to recent
the number of vehicle systems and the sources to the Future Combat System
resource decisions affecting Grizzly
methodology the Army uses to field (FCS) Research, Development, Testing,
and Wolverine.
these systems. For example, the tank and Evaluation (RDT&E) effort.
•
fleet in 1990 was sized at over 13,000 • Assesses re-capitalization efforts
Identifies prudent risk in recom-
platforms, while ASMR specified a throughout the force in order to reduce
mending appropriate levels for our ar-
requirement of 7,640 in 1999 and an overall Operational and Support (O&S)
mored forces in the FYDP commensu-
end state of 5,526 platforms. The Army costs and assures legacy equipment
rate with transformation and refinement
has also moved from fielding individ- remains fit to fight.
of AC / RC roles and missions.
ual systems to fielding a system of sys- •
• Assesses mounted force training
tems, focusing on unit capabilities Proposes and assesses reductions in
strategy and requirements.
rather than platform capabilities. selected “out of position” Army Pre-
positioned Sets (APS) commensurate The Mechanized Force Modernization
Mechanized Force Modernization
with the Transformation Strategy and Plan provides a blueprint to ensure the
Plan (MFMP). In light of evolving
Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), United States maintains the combat
goals and objectives, the modernization
as another means of conserving re- overmatch that will deter its enemies
plan for the entire mechanized force is
sources and posturing our strategic re- from acting contrary to its interests and,
undergoing significant revision, affect-
sponse capability. should deterrence fail, ensures victory
ing all maneuver, maneuver support,
• in defense of U.S. national interests.
and maneuver sustainment elements. Assesses adequacy of current pro-
The central role of Fort Knox and the
The MFMP examines the threat faced grams to provide a suitable platform for
Armor Center in this effort provides
by the heavy force, identifies warfight- scouts and recommends a way ahead.
assurances that the lethal and decisive
ing requirements (from the Army Uni- Pays particular attention to lethality and
nature of mounted combat, along with
versal Task List or AUTL) for meeting survivability requirements.
the elan and esprit-de-corps for which
the threat and key programs that must •
Integrates ARNG divisions and En- our branch is renowned, will be imbed-
be preserved, and codifies issues where
hanced Separate Brigades (ESBs) into ded in the Objective Force, as well as
lack of overmatch or vulnerabilities
the modernization strategy commensu- in the “battle wagon” our future Armor
will place U.S. forces and interests at
rate with RC re-missioning and new and Cavalry Warriors will ride into
risk. The plan recommends adjustments
roles. combat.
to the requirements laid out in the
•
original ASMR, studies changes in as- Assesses Army efforts to produce

sumptions and requirements, and pre- the Tank Extended Range Munition FORGE THE THUNDERBOLT…
sents a program that allows transforma- (TERM) and other critical munitions AND STRIKE FIRST!
ARMOR — July-August 2000 7
MOUT and the 1982 Lebanon Campaign:
The Israeli Approach

by Captain James D. Leaf

MOUT (Military Operations in Urban
Terrain) is a topic much discussed cur-
rently within the profession of arms.
The growing consensus is that U.S.
forces can expect to conduct MOUT
routinely in future operations, though
there are still a few who doubt this.1
Some analysts go so far as to predict
that MOUT will dominate future opera-
tions.2
Whatever the future holds, MOUT
will be of increasing importance in
future U.S operations. Analysis of past
urban battles, therefore, is required.
Humans have fought in cites since be-
fore Joshua and the Israelites breached
Jericho’s walls. Cities are important, to
people, governments and, therefore,
armies. Americans have been fighting
in or over cities since the revolution, Early versions of the Israeli Merkava tank were used in the Lebanon invasion.
and examining U.S. operations since
the early 1980s reveals MOUT to be a
significant component of each opera- Throughout the campaign, the IDF would advance into Lebanon.7 These
tion.3 The future structure of the Army, faced a paradox: move rapidly through units would move rapidly. The advance
as envisioned by the Chief of Staff of urban and mountainous terrain to con- elements would bypass resistance and
the Army, Gen. Shinseki, ensures that form to a political timeline, yet inflict follow-on forces would reduce by-
operating in urban terrain will be a minimal casualties, minimize collateral passed enemy strongpoints. In the
common aspect of operations. The damage, and sustain few casualties.5 course of this drive north, the IDF
force envisioned will operate as a These constraints affected how the IDF would fight in three significant urban
CONUS-based, technologically ad- would conduct the campaign and espe- areas: Tyre, Sidon, and Beirut.
vanced, rapidly deployable force. It cially MOUT. Attrition battles like Ma-
The first major urban battle of the
would most likely deploy to airfields, nila or Aachen would not be possible.6
campaign was in Tyre. (See Map 1)
ports or both. This trend is already un- To achieve its objectives within the
Located on a narrow peninsula, Tyre is
derway.4 These facilities, with rare ex- parameters, the Israelis would use a
a densely populated coastal city in
ceptions, are located in cities. Soldiers combination of surprise, mass, and tac-
southern Lebanon ringed on the east
and their leaders should realize the tical flexibility. Generally, this ap-
with PLO camps, considered the most
changing status of urban terrain. No proach proved successful.
likely location of PLO resistance.
longer something to be avoided or en-
In this campaign, the IDF fought the
tered reluctantly, urban terrain will be
PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organiza- The camps and the close proximity to
like any other, possessing unique char-
tion) and the Syrian Army. The PLO Israel made Tyre a certain objective of
acteristics and requiring some special-
was a well-financed and armed guer- the IDF. Though lasting less than two
ized approaches, but no longer consid-
rilla organization. It was equipped with days, it illuminated how IDF MOUT
ered any more unusual than desert or
a variety of Western and Soviet Bloc tactics evolved.
other more “traditional terrain.”
small arms, anti-tank weapons, and
The Israeli Defense Force (IDF) 1982 various artillery pieces, mortars, and An entire division attacked Tyre, sur-
Lebanese campaign is a historical ex- even a few aging tanks. The Syrian rounding it on the first day of battle.
ample relevant to the U.S. Army. This Army was a relatively modern, Third Attacking on multiple axes in conjunc-
campaign pitted a mechanized, techno- World army equipped with Soviet tion with an amphibious landing; the
logically advanced, casualty sensitive equipment. The IDF’s goal was to drive PLO defenders were rapidly over-
First World army against conventional the PLO out of Lebanon and neutralize whelmed. Most fell back in disorder
and unconventional opponents in a me- Syria’s influence in Lebanon. To ac- offering limited resistance, and what
dia-saturated, Third World urban envi- complish this, nine heavy (tank and remained was located in the PLO
ronment. mechanized infantry) IDF divisions camps. With Tyre surrounded, the IDF
8 ARMOR — July-August 2000