ARMOR January-February 2002

56 Pages·2010·1.35 MB·English

Armor in Low-intensity Conflicts
See Page 6

PB 17-02-1 January-February 2002
Saddle Up... Tonight We Ride
“The test of a good religion is whether you can joke “The word, even the most contradictory word, preserves
about it.” — G.K. Chesterton contact — it is silence which isolates.” — Thomas Mann.
Some question the need for a professional dialogue or
Chesterton supplies an excellent touchstone, a telling debate; why foster or facilitate divergent views, they ask?
one. An institution, organization, or person that cannot tol- ARMOR’s raison d´être is clearly stated: “...not to reinforce
erate humor, or lacks a sense of humor, is often revealed official positions, or to act as a command information con-
as insecure or unsure. For the most part, reader comments duit, but to surface controversy and debate among profes-
on Rex Awesome’s “just plain stupid things” in the last is- sionals in the force.” Debate and discussion are hallmarks
sue were favorable. Many readers identified with one or of the mounted force’s evolution. Failure to engage in a
two items from Rex’s list and a couple suggested additional professional discussion impacts the branch’s ability to
items. But a select few took umbrage; one stated that a evolve and could result in a stagnant force relegated to the
professional journal is no place for humor. I disagree. sidelines. Ours is a history of evolution and change,
There is a place for humor in a professional journal, and change that reflects the ever-changing nature of warfare
when you look further into the pages of this issue you’ll find and technology. True, this debate and transformation has
we are blessed with some great examples via “Murphy’s often been painful, producing rancor, but certainly the end
Laws of Armor” and the accompanying cartoons by SFC result warrants the pain and effort expended.
Mark Baker.
No leader relishes having his agenda criticized, especially
As my ride nears completion, with both the Army and the in an institution like the Army, and certainly, some of the
magazine, it’s appropriate to share some thoughts on the criticism will be off the mark. But if the leader is thin-
future of this 114-year-old journal and the balance that skinned and prone to squelch discussion, he loses the
must be maintained to ensure its survival. Three forces value of those points that are valid. Discussion dries up;
battle for ARMOR’s soul: the editorial staff, senior leader- stagnation sets in, and in the minds of the led, the most
ship, and readers and contributors. For the magazine to important deadline becomes the leader’s ETS. We have
succeed and accomplish its mission, “Providing the Chief been fortunate, most of the time, in having a free hand to
of Armor with a forum to communicate with the mounted publish controversial points of view. In the rare case, or
force and provide that force with a professional journal to cases, when a viewpoint has been muzzled or suppressed,
discuss all manner of issues concerning mounted war fight- both readers and leaders have suffered. In one case a few
ing,” a delicate balance must be achieved and maintained years ago, a particularly visible controversy about an AR-
between these three interest groups. Each group of these MOR article blew up into a censorship flap. In the year that
stockholders endeavors to pull the journal in their direction. followed, ARMOR submissions dropped from 150 articles a
As long as the groups exert roughly the same amount of year to about 100, and one can infer that the submissions
force in opposing directions, the ship sails smoothly; how- we got that year were probably not the most opinionated or
ever, if one force pulls too hard or ceases to pull, the ship’s controversial. We all took casualties in that fight.
course is altered, perhaps fatally. Thus one should dis-
cover material in every issue that represents or challenges So let’s keep our minds open and relish the opportunity
each group’s agenda or viewpoint. Input to the journal via the Army journals offer. You owe us, as professionals, the
letters, articles, and reviews should represent opposing value of your opinions. We owe you a hearing.
viewpoints and originate from a variety of sources. — D2
By Order of the Secretary of the Army: Official:

ERIC K. SHINSEKI
JOEL B. HUDSON
General, United States Army
Administrative Assistant to the
Chief of Staff
Secretary of the Army
0129906
The Professional Development Bulletin of the Armor Branch PB 17-02-1

Editor-in-Chief
Features
MAJ DAVE DAIGLE
6 Employing Armor in Low-intensity Conflicts:
Managing Editor Some Lessons for the Armor Force
JON T. CLEMENS by Second Lieutenant Noah Kanter
15 Cavalry for the Interim Force, A Proposal for the 2d Cavalry Regiment
Commandant by Colonel Kevin C.M. Benson
MG R. STEVEN WHITCOMB
19 Encountering Media on the Battlefield: Will You Be Prepared?
by Captain Jeffrey P. Nors

20 Murphy’s Laws of Armor
ARMOR (ISSN 0004-2420) is published bi-
monthly by the U.S. Army Armor Center, 22 Sergeant’s Time XXI
1109A Sixth Avenue, Fort Knox, KY 40121.
by Command Sergeant Major James L. DePriest
Disclaimer: The information contained in AR-
24 Making Art Out of Digits
MOR represents the professional opinions of
the authors and does not necessarily reflect by Lieutenant Colonel John Hadjis
the official Army or TRADOC position, nor
26 Answering the 9-11 Call
does it change or supersede any information
presented in other official Army publications. A New York National Guard Unit Rushes into Manhattan’s Chaos
by Major Eric Durr
Official distribution is limited to one copy for
each armored brigade headquarters, armored 32 Designating Targets with “God Guns”
cavalry regiment headquarters, armor battalion by Captain Michael S. McCullough
headquarters, armored cavalry squadron head-
quarters, reconnaissance squadron headquar- 33 Troop Leading Procedures at Company Level
ters, armored cavalry troop, armor company, by Captain Mike Henderson
and motorized brigade headquarters of the
United States Army. In addition, Army libraries, 35 Edwin M. Wheelock and the “Skeleton Tank”
Army and DOD schools, HQ DA and MACOM by Major Dennis Gaare
staff agencies with responsibility for armored,
direct fire, ground combat systems, organiza- 39 The Military Decision-making Process:
tions, and the training of personnel for such Integrating Analog and Digital TTPs
organizations may request two copies by by Captain Timothy S. Jacobsen
sending a request to the editor-in-chief.
47 Armor Captain’s Career Course – Distance Learning (AC3-DL):
Authorized Content: ARMOR will print only
Update on the Spearhead to the Future
those materials for which the U.S. Army Armor
Center has proponency. That proponency
Back Installation of Under Armor Auxiliary Power Unit
includes: all armored, direct-fire ground com-
Cover Finally Begins on M1A2 SEP Tanks
bat systems that do not serve primarily as
infantry carriers; all weapons used exclusively
in these systems or by CMF 19-series enlisted Departments
soldiers; any miscellaneous items of equip-
ment which armor and armored cavalry or-
2 Contacts
ganizations use exclusively; training for all SC
3 Letters
12A, 12B, and 12C officers and for all CMF-
5 Commander’s Hatch
19-series enlisted soldiers; and information
concerning the training, logistics, history, and 50 Reviews
leadership of armor and armored cavalry units
at the brigade/regiment level and below, to
include Threat units at those levels.
Material may be reprinted, provided credit is
given to ARMOR and to the author, except
where copyright is indicated.
Periodicals Postage paid at Fort Knox, KY, and additional mailing offices. Postmaster: Send address changes to Editor, ARMOR,
ATTN: ATZK-ARM, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5210.
Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
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January-February 2002, Vol. CXI, No. 1
Points of Contact
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Commercial prefix– (502) 624-

ARMOR Editorial Offices U.S. Army Armor Center
Editor-in-Chief Commanding General (ATZK-CG)
MAJ Dave Daigle 4087 MG R. Steven Whitcomb 2121
E-Mail: [email protected] E-Mail: [email protected]
Managing Editor Deputy Commanding General (ATZK-DCG)
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Editor Chief of Staff (ATZK-CS)
Vivian Oertle 2610 COL Robert T. Gahagan 1101
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Staff Illustrator Command Sergeant Major (ATZK-CSM)
Mr. Jody Harmon 3923 TBA 4952
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Directorate of Force Development (ATZK-FD)
Production Assistant COL Henry Joe Hughes III 5050
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E-Mail: [email protected]
Mounted Maneuver Battlespace Battle Lab (ATZK-MW)
COL Dennis J. Szydloski 7809
ARTICLE SUBMISSIONS: To improve speed and accuracy in E-Mail: [email protected]
editing, manuscripts should be originals or clear copies, either typed
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or printed out double-spaced, with a 3½-inch disk in Microsoft
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COL James H. Nunn 7955
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SUBMISSION POLICY NOTE: Due to the limited space per
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accepted for publication by, other Army journals. Please submit
E-Mail: [email protected]
your article to only one Army journal at a time.
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GRAPHICS AND PHOTOS: We prefer conventional photo prints,
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but will accept electronic graphic and photo files. (Please do not
LTC J. B. Iddins 3519
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vice, address changes, and delivery problems, or for awards in-
formation, contact Connie Stiggers or Darlene Kennedy, United
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ARMOR MAGAZINE ONLINE: Visit the ARMOR magazine COL John Antal 7848
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ARMOR HOTLINE — DSN 464-TANK: The Armor Hotline is a 1st Armor Training Brigade (ATSB-BAZ)
24-hour service to provide assistance with questions concerning COL John L. Ballantyne 8736
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2 ARMOR —January-February 2002
Real Readiness Depends An Author Responds computer on a tank or scout platoon’s list of
On Stabilizing Soldiers in Units Regarding Kubinka Museum Article basic issue items. As yet, no TACLAN (Tac-
tical Local Area Network) has material-
ized on the screen line. Our often-abused
Dear Sir: Dear Sir: mechanics must now master the task of
keeping the FRH (Flame Resistant Hydraulic
I'd like to thank Steve Zaloga for his com-
I found CPT Henderson’s article about fluid) off one last finger to save the com-
ments about my article, “The Secret Museum
training focus to be insightful and practical puter mouse pad. Sure, we could print out
at Kubinka” (ARMOR, September-October
(Nov-Dec ’01). The need to focus training on the needed pages on the unit’s single stutter-
2001). Since he has visited the museum and
a limited number of tasks, to use battle drills ing ink jet, but we’ll have to predict the need-
written about the vehicles in the collection,
and, in general, to keep things simple in this ed pages in advance. Probably more than
his viewpoint is a valuable one. I do, how-
high-OPTEMPO world are all right on target. 300 pages will require another $30 ink car-
ever disagree with his comments concerning
I would suggest, however, that until the Army tridge and more than 5,000 pages a new
a “lack of interest” in the post-war U.S. vehi-
fixes the personnel turbulence problem in printer. Shifting the cost to the unit budget is
cles in the collection. On the contrary, de-
our tactical units, efforts such as those advo- neither fair nor efficient in terms of printing
scriptions and photo confirmation of U.S.
cated by CPT Henderson will have only lim- costs. Let’s not even explore the rumor that
ited utility. vehicles in former Soviet hands are not only
the Army wishes to dispose of paper maps. I
very rare, but are very interesting to those
As a tanker who has led armor units from unable to visit collections like the one at can see it now, the entire troop leadership
platoon to battalion and served as an ob- Kubinka. gathered in the commander’s turret for
server-controller at the CMTC, I have seen the operations order...
While the U.S. vehicles themselves are ob-
at close hand the terrible effect of personnel I am not a Luddite. There is merit in the plan
viously well known, the interest lies in which
turnover on unit readiness. Here is just one to convert many manuals to electronic for-
vehicles are included and how they got to
example: All tankers know well the hoops we mat, and I find that I prefer ETMs (Electronic
Kubinka. In fact, the small number of books
go through to stabilize tank crews for a gun- Technical Manuals) for certain purposes.
that have been published dealing with the
nery density only to see PLDC, BNCOC, Nevertheless, hard copies (to include maps!)
vehicles at Kubinka normally include very
ANCOC, and/or the must-fill-it-now general’s furnished by a centralized publications sys-
limited information about the U.S. vehicles,
aide job screw it up. Then immediately upon tem remain a vital need at the pointy end. As
or they avoid the subject entirely. While the
return from gunnery, what happens to the my gunner put it: “Sir, I’ve never dragged a
former Soviet vehicles at Kubinka provide
unit? Roger — we emasculate it with the monitor into the can with me. People might
important information about the hardware of
summer PCS cycle, other reassignments, wonder.”
our former enemy, the non-Soviet/Russian
and changes of command just so we can
start over for the next training event. vehicles in the collection provide valuable 1LT JOSEPH BERG
insights into what that same former enemy A/1-7 Cav
History teaches us, and we know what considered to be important.
works — individuals training together over a
JIM WARFORD
long period of time develop not just their TOW-HMMWV’s Thermal Sight

individual task proficiency but also their ex-
Works Fine for Light Cavalry
pertise as a smoothly functioning team. All of Along with the Digital Gee-Whiz,
us have at one time or another served in a
Let’s Keep Our Paper Manuals
unit that has deployed for a peacekeeping Dear Sir:

mission, performed an Intrinsic Action rota-
Just finished reading the November-De-
tion or conducted a CTC rotation. We know Dear Sir:
cember issue, and I felt compelled to write in
the benefits of training a stable team for 3 to
I recently completed your November-De- response to the article, “Breaking the Re-
6 months and then “fighting” with that team.
cember magazine and was encouraged by connaissance Code,” by CPT Eric Shaw.
Anyone who has been lucky enough to be in
CSM Christian’s article on the incorporation Overall, CPT Shaw’s article was very infor-
a unit where large numbers of unit leaders
of electronic manuals in the 19-series Ad- mative, particularly his scout training plan.
have been together through more than one
vanced Noncommissioned Officer Courses. However, CPT Shaw makes some asser-
of these kinds of missions has experienced
It appears that we are taking positive steps tions in his article that need closer scrutiny.
those magical qualities we call cohesion and
to keep up with trends in civilian education. He writes about how the CFV has a distinct
teamwork. The tremendous increase in bat-
However, as a line unit user of many of the advantage over the HMMWV because of its
tlefield prowess that is possible under these
same publications, I am appalled at the con- thermal capabilities. This comment is true
conditions is significant and obvious. We
sequences of the Army’s “less-paper” poli- only if the HMMWV isn’t equipped with a
know what right looks like; we just can’t get
cies. To completely replace mass publication TOW, a weapon system common to all scout
there from here.
of hard copies, particularly of field manuals platoons in a light cavalry troop. Having been
Until the Army can find a way to stabilize and technical manuals, is simply wrong- in two light cavalry troops, the TOW was a
soldiers in tactical units in a way that takes headed. In recent months, it has become tool utilized numerous times to gather infor-
into account their training and deployment impossible to procure previously common mation on mounted and dismounted enemy
schedules, armor leaders will struggle mere- manuals such as 19-series STPs; FM 17-95, assets at the Joint Readiness Training Cen-
ly to maintain a minimal level of readiness. In Cavalry Operations; FM 22-5, Drill and ter and other training areas.
effect, the Army currently trains individuals Ceremonies; or even TMs for our M40/M42
The other point I’d like to discuss is CPT
who happen to be assigned to particular protective masks. Although some publica-
Shaw’s point that OPFOR scouts are more
units. The good of the soldiers [i.e., his ca- tions are out of circulation for regular revi-
effective than their BLUFOR counterparts
reer] is more important than the unit’s readi- sion, frequently the new versions are re-
because, “…they are afraid to die.” He then
ness to fight. Until we reverse this logic by leased only in electronic format or “on-line.” I
writes that BLUFOR scouts, “…lack…the will
training units, not just individuals, we will was astonished to learn that the new FM 17-
to wage war and do their job the proper
never be ready to fight and win on short 12, Tank Gunnery will be available almost
way.” I couldn’t disagree more. Having seen
notice. exclusively over the internet.
the OPFOR scouts from both a BLUFOR
LTC TIMOTHY R. REESE It’s a nice idea, and I am sure it saves and OC perspective, they are successful
U.S. Army War College many training dollars. Still, there is no laptop because they know how to “play the game.”
ARMOR — January-February 2002 3
From covering their MILES head halos with Success in combined arms operation pre- and dumped individual platoons to fend for
the front flap of the boonie caps to using rifle supposes skillful proficiency among the vari- themselves and be broken up even further
sights to using Vaseline on their torso sen- ous participants. It’s wonderful when re- by infantry company commanders who are
sors, the OPFOR are good because they sources permit realistic combined arms train- focused on completely different training
train on the same ground month after month ing, but this is obviously not the case at Fort tasks.
and year after year. They have the opportu- Lewis as tankers lose their MOS skills while
Ideally, there should be an MGS battalion
nity to create and hone field SOPs because being retrained as dismounted infantry.
within the IBCT. Combined arms battalions,
they spend two weeks out of every month
I do not wish to dwell on tactics, but some each with an MGS company, might work.
implementing them. They face the same
of the items mentioned in the article are Regardless, the MGS companies should be
scenarios month after month. Most BLUFOR
plainly wrong. Using the sole MGS to breach organized identically to tank companies. If
units don’t have the ability to spend that
barbed wire with a grappling hook while the armor will not or cannot provide the company
much time in the field. While this might
infantry platoon’s squad IAVs are standing commanders, then the MGS platoons should
sound like whining to some, my only point is
by makes no sense. Neither does dismount- be handed over to Infantry branch, since
that the OPFOR have several advantages to
ing the MGS NCOs to lead infantry squads. that’s who is in fact commanding and training
begin with and that is the main reason they
them.
have success. In 1978-79, I was a tank platoon leader at
Fort Lewis. My platoon habitually supported CHESTER A. KOJRO
A true test of a unit’s proficiency would be
a mechanized infantry company. We were LTC, AR, USAR (Ret.)
to take them and a unit from a CTC and
frequently misused, and over time performed
have them fight on a neutral piece of ground.
similar ill-conceived tasks and reorganiza-
While this isn’t very realistic, we as leaders Tank Guns on a Howitzer Chassis
tions to those discussed in the article and
must be careful not to fall prey to the idea encountered most of the very same prob- Might Be Incompatible
that training center units are that much better
lems. [One time, I was actually told to dis-
tactically than their counterparts.
mount my platoon and assault a MOUT facil- Dear Sir:
T.J. JOHNSON ity on foot (20 men with .45 cal pistols and
CPT, Armor 10 M3 “grease guns” between us). It was I heartily second Mr. Douglas’ motion that
Fort Knox, Ky. supposed to be “good training,” but I flatly the M113 should be the vehicle of choice for
refused and common sense prevailed.] At the IBCT (Letters, Sep-Oct ’01). ARMOR re-
least we had a parent company and battalion viewed AIR-MECH-STRIKE: 3 Dimensional
Tankers Lose MOS Skills commander to protect us and fall back on for Phalanx for the 21st Century, which is a
When Deployed in IBCT Units training, maintenance, and support. work in progress on the subject, and gives a
conceptual framework and rationale for an
Dear Sir: Another problem with a three-MGS platoon M113-based unit. A second edition is in re-
is rank structure. Assuming an autoloader in view at present and should be published
The article “Medium Gun System Platoons” the MGS (meaning a three-man crew), we sometime in 2002.
by 2LT Brian P. Hurley (ARMOR, Sep-Oct are creating 9-man platoons. This is ludi-
’01, page 7) is fascinating in what it reveals crous and won’t last. We need to either His comments on using M109-series
about the organization. Let me begin by make the platoons larger or we will eventu- Self-Propelled Howitzers (SPHs) equipped
commending the author for a clear and con- ally see them broken up into individual vehi- with the M68 105mm tank cannon needs
cise report. He is obviously proud of his unit cles organic to the infantry IAV platoons. some background information. The field ar-
and its performance, and rightfully so. The tillery had M108 105mm SPHs until the early
MGS platoons are evidently performing well We now see armor’s role in the vaunted 1970s. They were withdrawn from service
and satisfying their infantry leaders. And Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT), and it and replaced by the 155mm, since the SPHs
that’s exactly the problem. is a sorry sight. As the proponent for the were designed to support heavy divisions. I
MGS, Armor Branch has abrogated its re- imagine, though I’m not certain, that the
A soldier spends most of his career training sponsibility to its tankers. It allowed stripping M108 turrets were removed and M109 tur-
for the short, brief experience spent in battle. away battalion and company commanders rets were placed on the chassis, along with
the necessary plumbing and other changes.
The dual-purpose use of an M68 cannon
might be difficult, since tank rounds are fixed
cartridges (large rifle rounds) and 105mm
howitzer rounds are semi-fixed (a hand-fuzed
projectile sits on a casing with individual pow-
der increments inside, which are removed to
change the range of the projectile). Tank
guns change range by elevation; howitzers
change range by elevation and the amount
of powder behind the projectile, much like
Navy main gun rounds. Tank rounds are
fired electrically; howitzers by percussion
caps, like black powder cap and ball weap-
ons. There are, or used to be, HEAT rounds
for the 105mm howitzer, but the problem
is/was acquiring the target and getting the
correct range to target for first-round hits. A
laser rangefinder (LRF), a ballistic computer
Correction
(BC), and an AT round (HEAT, HESH and/or

APFSDS) would be a great addition to any
On page 10 of the November-December 2001 issue, we incorrectly identified the
SPH basic load.
officer at the far right of the photo as MAJ Robert Grow. The officer at the far right
facing the camera is the future MG E. N. Harmon.
Continued on Page 49
4 ARMOR — January-February 2002
Major General R. Steven Whitcomb
Commanding General
U.S. Army Armor Center

Written in Blood
The M1-series tank is designed to kill. The tank is not forgiving and it doesn’t motor pool, we will still operate safely.
It is an equal opportunity killer that give you a second chance. Recently, a However, if we ignore the safety fea-
doesn’t distinguish between friend and mechanic was permanently disabled in tures and warnings when we train, we
foe or between training and combat. a breech accident because the standards will continue to lose more soldiers to
This tank can be your best friend if you and procedures were also ignored. accidents.
take care of it and follow its rules. If
Webster’s Dictionary defines an acci- Leaders must train and set examples
you don’t, it can be your worst enemy.
dent as “an unforeseen and unplanned for their soldiers and must always ad-
Since 1990, we’ve had 14 non-combat
event or circumstance” or as “an unfor- here to the standards. According to the
fatalities and two permanent disabilities
tunate event resulting especially from U.S. Army Safety Center, there is a
that are directly attributable to the tank.
carelessness or ignorance.” About 80 dangerous trend appearing. The most
The majority of these accidents were
percent of Army accidents, both in common violators that we see from
caused by crewmen not paying atten-
peacetime and combat, involve human accident investigations are sergeants,
tion to what they were doing, such as
error. Often accidents cause more loss- staff sergeants, and young officers. For
drivers being caught by the turret or by
es in soldiers and equipment than the example, in June 2000, during tank
a failure to adhere to standards, such as
enemy does. All accidents are prevent- gunnery, a lieutenant allowed his driver
not using the gun travel lock.
able. We must focus on doing the job to drive the tank in an unsafe manner,
Every time we have a fatal or crip- correctly, safely, and by the book. We “power-sliding” around a concrete turn
pling accident, we re-evaluate the warn- must use safety devices and pay atten- pad. The NCOIC of the range spoke
ings, standards, procedures, and me- tion to warnings. We must provide with the lieutenant about the driver’s
chanical interlocks to see if changes leadership that focuses on proper safety recklessness and the fact that the lieu-
could prevent a similar accident. The control measures and train our subordi- tenant needed to keep himself at name-
number of mechanical interlocks and nates to do the same. tag defilade while acting as a tank
safety features seem to increase daily. commander.
Today’s NCO is the front-line trainer
We’ve all seen the numerous safety
and role model for our soldiers and the The following day, the lieutenant
warnings in the technical manuals.
motivating force to eliminate accident failed to heed the warning of the
They are not put there to slow you
losses. Each hour of each day, an NCO NCOIC, and his driver once again at-
down or make your work harder. Un-
somewhere in the world enforces a tempted to power-slide around the turn
fortunately, most of them have been put
standard, provides leadership, and in- pad. Unfortunately, the tank slid on
in place because someone was hurt or
stills the discipline that may prevent a some loose gravel, left the road, and
died; they’re “Written in Blood.”
future accident. If the NCO refuses to rolled 360 degrees. The lieutenant was
This past September, we lost a tank follow the standards or tells his crew, not at nametag defilade and the tank
commander in a breech accident. It “Just do as I say, not as I do,” he fails crushed him as it rolled. What could
appears that the accident was caused by in his duty as a leader and more impor- have prevented this accident? What
the failure to engage any of the four tantly, he fails his crewmembers. Doing would a good leader have done? What
existing mechanical interlocks, any something the right way has got to be- should the crew have done?
single one of which, if engaged, would come second nature; that is why we
A common phrase that has stood for
have prevented breech movement. The must “train like we fight.” We must
many years has been “soldiers will fo-
tank commander failed to follow nor- train correctly and follow the safety
cus only on what the commander
mal safety procedures highlighted in procedures outlined in the -10 technical
checks.” Given this, commanders must
the tank -10 manual and reinforced manuals. We must train safety proce-
demonstrate the knowledge for all
repeatedly in training. Bypassing safety dures to become second nature and
safety requirements inherent to their
interlocks or ignoring standards in a habitual, so whether in a high-stress
tank can mean death or serious injury. situation or in the comfort of our own Continued on Page 14
ARMOR — January-February 2002 5
Employing Armor in Low-intensity Conflicts:
Some Lessons for the U.S. Armor Force

by Second Lieutenant Noah Kanter
Much has been written about low- win; it must only keep from
intensity conflict (LIC) — what it is losing. The stronger force, on
and what it is not — but there is very the other hand, will lose if it
little literature on how to fight one. does not win. In that sense, the
This is probably because no nation has stronger force has a much
done so successfully, except possibly tougher job than the weaker
the British in Northern Ireland.1 Many force. To right this balance,
countries fighting a guerrilla war have some armies have used mecha-
tried to use the weapons and tactics nized forces to help them win.2
they know best to defeat an inferior
The Soviet invasion of Af-
enemy, and when these nations had
ghanistan and the Israeli inva-
modern, mechanized armies, those
sion of Lebanon offer good
weapons have included tanks and ar-
examples of mechanized forces
mored vehicles.
engaged against guerrillas. I
On the surface, tanks would seem to have chosen these examples
be a good choice to fight guerrillas. because both mechanized ar-
Tanks carry a lot firepower, are mobile, mies seemed militarily far supe-
and are much better protected than in- rior to the guerrillas they en-
fantry in the open. However, upon gaged. In fact, they both were;
closer examination, tanks and other however, both armies were ul-
armored vehicles have not fared well timately forced to withdraw.
against guerrillas, even lightly armed Both armies made heavy use of tanks, and China. Most of the country is very
ones. One reason is that armor units armored personnel carriers (APCs), mountainous, with the Hindu-Kush
have been unable to employ the deci- infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), and range covering about half the nation’s
sive maneuver they enjoy in conven- mechanized infantry (infantry who ride territory. These mountains are steep,
tional war in the restricted terrain of to battle in APCs or IFVs).3 Yet, both with peaks rising as high as 17,000
low intensity fights. Moreover, they are armies seemed at a loss to effectively feet. In contrast, around Herat, in the
vulnerable to well placed anti-tank employ these awesome weapon sys- western part of the country, the topog-
rockets, anti-tank guided missiles tems in LIC conflict. raphy flattens out into a plain.
(ATGMs), and mines, all of which are
Let’s examine how each army em- At the time of the Soviet invasion,
available to guerrilla forces. Finally,
ployed its mechanized forces in LIC, Afghanistan had very few major roads,
the high visibility of an armor opera-
and analyze the problems they encoun- the few hardball roads having been
tion, which includes the logistics sites,
tered and their more successful tech- built earlier with Soviet assistance. The
the road marches, and the combat op-
niques against guerrillas. Then we can climate is arid, with very hot summers
erations themselves, make it hard to
compare the lessons they learned with and very cold winters. Most Afghanis
surprise guerrilla forces with armored
the U.S. Army’s preparations for fight- were engaged in agriculture and illiter-
units. Thus, armor struggles to gain the
ing a low-intensity conflict with its acy ran as high as 90 percent.4
initiative in LIC.
armored forces, arguably the best in the
The Soviets invaded Afghanistan in
A low-intensity conflict is not about world. This comparison will reveal that
two phases. First, an airlift of para-
quickly engaging the enemy’s army, the lessons learned by the Russians and
troopers from the 105th Airborne Divi-
pinning him, and then using your re- the Israelis in Afghanistan and Lebanon
sion assaulted the Kabul Airport with
serve to flank him and decisively win. suggest weaknesses in the U.S. concept
their BMDs; their mission was to seize
Rather, these conflicts tend to be long for using its armored forces in similar
control of the capital and start securing
drawn-out affairs, where there are usu- battles.
the countryside.
ally no front lines and nothing to deci-
Afghanistan: 1979-1980
sively engage and flank. Moreover, the Meanwhile, a two-pronged thrust of
guerrilla enemy seeks to avoid being On December 24, 1979, the Soviet armored and motorized troops, about
decisively engaged. Using terrain to Union invaded Afghanistan to “stabi- three divisions, thrust overland from
mask his movements, the guerrilla will lize” the country for pro-Moscow the Soviet Union. One group moved
strike the stronger force before the forces. Afghanistan is a land-locked south from Termez down the Salang
stronger force can respond. In a LIC, country in central Asia, bordered by the Highway, while the second group
the weaker force is not obligated to former Soviet Union, Pakistan, Iran, moved southwest from Kushka.5 The
6 ARMOR — January-February 2002
motorized force’s mission was to take meant that NCOs had, at most, a year The majority of engagements were
control of key cities and routes in order or so more experience than the men fought with captured small arms and
to secure supply lines. This invasion they were supposed to be leading. The light anti-tank weapons.
force eventually grew into the 40th centralized nature of Soviet doctrine,
While the overall style of guerrilla op-
Army Group, which included seven coupled with ineffective small unit
erations remained the same, there was a
motorized rifle divisions, an airborne leaders, were also major hindrances
definite difference in the level of pro-
division, and five air assault brigades.6 that impacted the Soviet ability to fight
fessionalism between factions. Some
a guerrilla enemy. After 1987, this
Eventually, the Soviet Union had were merely bandits, looking to capture
shortfall was reflected in Soviet mili-
about 156,000 troops in Afghanistan. arms to sell for currency, while others
tary literature, which started calling for
were more professional. The unit lead
Although the Soviets invaded with an improvement in the quality of the
by Ahmad Shah Maasud, for example,
1,200 tanks, and later peaked at 1,750 NCO corps.9
had standing cadres of guerrilla fight-
tanks, there were only about 320-460
The Soviets faced an irregular guer- ers. His units were divided into mo-
tanks at the time of the Soviet with-
rilla force know as the Mujahideen. toraks, which were mobile striking
drawal in 1989. The number of APCs
The majority of Afghans opposed So- units of about company strength, and
and IFVs also rose and fell after a peak
viet rule, with about 90,000 in guerrilla sabets, which were local defense forces
in about 1986.7 Overall, the Soviets
groups, but of these 90,000, only about of about platoon size or slightly lar-
committed only about two percent of
20,000 were actively involved in resis- ger.12 Massud was one of the few guer-
their forces to the fight in Afghanistan,
tance at any one time, with few of these rilla leaders possessing the organiza-
compared to the commitment of 20
actually engaged in fighting.10 Subdi- tional skills required to train and sus-
percent of U.S. strength in the Vietnam
vided into opposing factions, the Muja- tain combatants in the field, away from
conflict.
hideen never fought effectively as a their homes. Most Mujahideen were
Moscow did not configure its inva- single unit; in fact, some of the Muja- poorly trained and haphazardly organ-
sion forces for specialized guerrilla or hideen factions were just as opposed to ized. Massud was able to create spe-
mountain warfare. Instead, it sent units each other as to the Soviets and the cialized units, which allowed him much
equipped and trained for combat Democratic Republic of Afghanistan greater tactical flexibility and striking
against NATO forces in Eastern and (DRA). These factions differed in eth- range.
Western Europe. These troops lacked nicity and religious belief. Some were
The Soviets did not come to Afghani-
specialized mountain training because conservative Muslims, while others
stan with the intent of fighting a guer-
it was assumed that combat would be were more moderate. Some were ethnic
rilla war. The Soviet concept was to
accomplished by prepping the area with Pushtuns, the majority, whereas some
fight a war of attrition. The Soviets
massive artillery barrages supporting were Turkic ethnic minorities. Some
would cut off supply lines, remove in-
the advancing dismounted infantry were Sunni Muslims, others were Shi-
centives for villagers to provide food
while tanks provided close-in support. ite. As a result, groups fought each
for the Mujahideen (or simply remove
Airmobile troops would seize the high other with the same fervor that they
the villagers) and whittle away the Af-
ground when mechanized troops could fought the Soviets.
ghan ability and will to fight. While
not.8 Rigidly adhering to the doctrine
this may seem an inappropriate way to
that had been tailored for a war with the An episode that illustrates their lack of
fight the war, the Soviets were able to
West, the USSR deployed numerous cohesion and cooperation occurred
control the main cities, though much of
support units with the invasion force when two DRA tank crews defected
the country through which their supply
simply because their parent units were with their tanks, and two separate fac-
routes traveled was never permanently
deployed. These included chemical, air tions claimed the surrendered tanks.
defense artillery, anti-tank, and surface- After several meetings, the compromise under Soviet control.
to-surface missile units. All of these finally reached was that one faction In the early years of the occupation,
units were recalled a short while later would get the tanks’ front halves, while the doctrine used by the Soviet Union
and replaced with more suitable units. the other faction got the tanks’ back was the same as that which was devel-
halves, thereby making it impossible to oped to fight NATO in Europe. The
The quality and composition of Soviet use the tanks in operations.11 Soviets relied heavily on mechanized
units varied greatly. While the airborne
forces and consequently were road-
unit was composed of Western Rus- Equipment and ability also differed
bound. Artillery and air support were
sians, the motorized invasion forces between groups. Most groups started
heavily centralized. Moreover, there
were composed mainly of Soviet Cen- out armed with antique rifles. As more
was very poor integration of artillery
tral-Asian reservists on 90-day call-up, outside aid reached the guerrillas in
and air support assets with ground
troops of poor quality. Later, the Cen- Afghanistan and as more weapons were
forces.
tral-Asian troops were replaced by captured or bought, the arsenal of Mu-
White Russians who were better trained jahideen arms expanded. However, Centralization of command was a re-
and considered more politically reli- throughout the war, the Mujahideen current theme in Soviet doctrine. Junior
able. Training remained an issue for the lacked anti-tank and anti-aircraft weap- officers and NCOs were discouraged
Soviet troops: until 1982, there was no ons. Many of their heavier weapons from independent action, and were
specialized mountain training for con- were Peoples’ Republic of China merely expected to fight their units in
scripts prior to their arrival in Afghani- (PRC) copies of Soviet weapons. These the ways that their commanders had
stan. Also, at the start of the conflict, included SA-7 AA missiles, RPG-7s, prescribed. Soviet tactical manuals pro-
Soviet Army NCOs were not up to the 14.5mm AA guns, some light mortars, claimed, “The lower the level, the
challenge of small unit leadership. The and some rockets. However, these greater must be the degree of central-
conscript nature of the Soviet Army weapons were few and far between. ized control.”13 But the Soviets soon
ARMOR — January-February 2002 7
discovered that counter-guerrilla war- The increase in the use of heliborne hicles.18 The 30mm autocannon of the
fare had to move faster then centralized troops did not completely eliminate the later model BMDs proved very popu-
control permitted. role of armor, which was still used, but lar, as it was more appropriate than the
only in a support role. Armor was still 73mm anti-vehicle gun.
Prior to 1982, the Soviets mainly used
restricted to valley floors, and moved at
road-bound motorized forces to attack The Mujahideen were not without
a slow rate of speed. Heavy armor
the Mujahideen, which led to immedi- anti-tank weapons. The most popular
(consisting of tanks and BMPs) was
ate tactical problems. The roads in Af- methods for attacking tanks were RPGs
found to be effective in forcing the en-
ghanistan pass through valleys and gor- and mines. The RPGs had a range of
emy to withdraw. A good tactic was to
ges, so heights command either side of only about 300 meters, but proved very
have the armor push the Mujahideen
the road in terrain easily infiltrated by effective against Soviet armored forces.
out of a main valley and into smaller
the guerrillas. When the Mujahideen A Mujahideen anti-armor team might
valleys and draws to escape. These
attacked from these heights, the main consist of as many as 15 RPG-7 gun-
smaller escape routes would be the site
guns on the BTRs and tanks did not ners,19 although this was rare because
of ambushes laid by troops who had
have the elevation necessary to engage RPGs were always in short supply.
been inserted by helicopter.
or suppress them. Most convoys con-
Mines were also used, by both sides,
sisted of T-55s or T-62s while the in- This tactic worked well in the Pan-
as anti-tank weapons. The Mujahideen
fantry rode in BTR-60s. While the veg- jshar 6 campaign in August-September
would acquire Italian mines or manu-
etation was sparse, the rocks, draws, 1982. The operation consisted of the
facture mines from dud Soviet bombs.
and wadis made perfect hiding places landing of a large heliborne force to-
The Soviets would search for mines by
from which to ambush or snipe at the wards which a mechanized column
sending a mine roller-equipped T-55
convoys. moved. The mechanized column moved
ahead of their troop columns. To coun-
on the valley floor, but smaller attacks
Soviet doctrine was not entirely to ter this, the Mujahideen employed mines
were conducted up the side valleys,
blame. The Soviet soldiers were often rigged with pneumatic plungers, which
where heliborne forces had laid am-
reluctant to dismount from their BTRs, gradually depressed a little more with
bushes. This pushed the guerrillas ei-
instead choosing to shoot from the fir- each vehicle. Thus, the mine would
ther out of the valley or into the waiting
ing ports of their vehicles, which pro- explode in the middle of the column,
heliborne forces. However, the smaller,
vided inadequate visibility and range of well after the mine roller passed. How-
side-valley attacks were not conducted
motion to effectively engage guerrillas. ever, the large size of anti-vehicle
with heavy armor, only by lighter vehi-
More often then not, the guerrillas mines made them hard to hide. To dis-
cles, dismounted infantry, and heli-
slipped away before the Soviets could cover mines made of plastic, the Sovi-
borne forces. The attack was successful
hit them. ets used search dogs.
in that it broke the infrastructure of the
After 1982, the Soviets started em- Mujahideen in the area.16 Five months Lessons Learned
ploying more helicopter-borne troops. later, the Mujahideen, led by Massoud,
Helicopters allowed rapid insertion of signed a truce in the valley. The Soviets did not come to Afghani-
Soviet troops onto the possible with- stan prepared to fight a guerrilla war.
drawal routes of the Mujahideen. This Another effective tactic combining Their equipment was ill-suited, their
allowed the Soviets to act as the am- armor and heliborne troops was the doctrine was inflexible, and their com-
bushers and not the ones being am- tactic of airlifting BMDs behind the mand structure cumbersome. While the
bushed. Soon, every third trooper was enemy. This combined the firepower of Soviets adapted to the situation, the
used in an air assault role, and by 1986, a mechanized unit with the rapid move- adaptation was slow. They were slow
70 percent of all Soviet operations were ment of an air assault unit. The BMD to abandon their reliance on the ar-
heliborne.14 Increased use was also allowed large volumes of firepower17 to mored formation. Even after a switch to
made of spetznaz or Soviet Special be brought to bear on a target. How- primarily helicopter forces, they did not
Forces units. These soldiers had more ever, it was lightly armored, and there- entirely get rid of the armor units. After
training and were generally considered fore vulnerable to RPGs, so the Soviets 1987, when Stinger attacks made heli-
better fighters. They could lay counter- would try to keep the Mujahideen at a borne operations too risky, the Soviets
ambushes and operate more independ- distance from the BMDs while the Mu- reverted back to the slower, but more
ently than other Soviet troops.15 jahideen would try to “hug” Soviet ve- secure, armor tactics.
The Soviets could airlift lightweight
BMDs and airborne troops behind
mujahideen positions, creating what
amounted to an armored air assault
force. The BMDs shown here had the
earlier anti-vehicle cannons, but the
rapid-firing 30mm autocannons on
later models proved very effective.
8 ARMOR — January-February 2002