Armor, January-February 1997 Edition

56 Pages·2011·5.99 MB·English

Stand To
In case you missed it, vehicle identification training case of NATO and Russian equipment — once the
recently took on an added emphasis. It used to be standard used to tell foes apart — now coexisting in
that during the “good old days” of the Cold War, our the same motor pools. Other potential coalition part-
trigger-pulling gunners and pilots relied mostly on ners also are diversifying their equipment sources.
the shape of things to guide their decisions to fire or Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates both field
not to fire. If the turret looked like a frying pan and numbers of BMP-3s. Again staunch allies with
the vehicle were over on the other side of the equipment resembling that of other less-friendly
FEBA, it was fair game. Target ID was easier in states.
those days because there were basically two sets
of equipment, NATO stuff (no kill), and Warsaw pact We have every reason to expect that, for both
stuff (kill), and everything was shaped differently — business and political reasons, some of the huge
those weird-shaped French vehicles notwithstanding. surpluses of lethal, ex-Soviet military hardware, as
well as new-built equipment, will end up in the ar-
That was then. Now, it is not so easy to discrimi- mories of other friendly nations. Russian fighter air-
nate good and bad, and it is getting more difficult by craft regularly make the short list of potential planes
the day. Despite thermal and passive sights, decid- in air forces on nearly every continent. Even our
ing who is inside that shape your high velocity can- next-door neighbor, Mexico, seriously considered
non is pointing at — a good guy or a bad guy — is adopting MI-17s as their future transport helicopters.
the rub. Fratricide and near-fratricide incidents in
Desert Storm certainly helped us relearn that target Given these realities and our observations and
identification is a tough task. Complicating the iden- lessons learned in the Gulf War, the necessity of
tification task was the fact that, in this coalition war, getting spoof-proof IFF (identification friend or foe)
some of our coalition partners’ equipment was materiel into the hands of our ground forces and on
shaped the same as that of our enemy. All T-72s their vehicles takes on greater importance than be-
were not alike. We probably will never again see fore. Look at John Sack’s book, Company C: The
the Cold War battlefields, where almost everyone Real War in Iraq, to see the extraordinary and dys-
was on the correct side of the line and pointing in functional effort exerted at the lower unit level to
the proper direction. avoid blue-on-blue engagement. The challenges
posed by blue-on-gray engagements are even more
A recent addition to this battlefield complication is enormous. We need hardware that we can loan to
South Korea’s apparent decision to accept Russian our coalition partners. We need to stress exact ve-
military hardware, 30 or so T-80U tanks, as partial hicle ID. Gone forever are the days of kill/no kill an-
payment for development loans. One is hard- swers. Situational awareness, coupled with sound
pressed to think of a more staunch ally in our re- knowledge of vehicle types, what they look like in
cent history than the South Koreans. However, even day, at night, from the front, back, side, and through
they are going to have some equipment that looks thermal sights, is the only way to keep from killing
an awful lot like what our training usually tells us is ourselves and our friends.
manned by the enemy. However, this isn’t the only — TAB
By Order of the Secretary of the Army: Official:
DENNIS J. REIMER JOEL B. HUDSON
General, United States Army Administrative Assistant to the
Chief of Staff Secretary of the Army
02748
The Professional Development Bulletin of the Armor Branch PB-17-97-1
Editor-in-Chief
Features
LTC TERRY A. BLAKELY
6 Combatant Arms vs. Combined Arms
Managing Editor by Dr. George F. Hofmann
JON T. CLEMENS
14 A Sheridan Memoir: The Early Days
by Lieutenant Colonel Burton S. Boudinot (Retired)
Commandant
16 Too Late the XM8, Alternatives to the Armored Gun System
MG GEORGE H. HARMEYER
by Stanley C. Crist
ARMOR (ISSN 0004-2420) is published bi 20 Whither the 2d Cavalry?
monthly by the U.S. Army Armor Center, 4401 by Lieutenant Colonel Kevin C.M. Benson
Vine Grove Road, Fort Knox, KY 40121.
22 Japanese Armored Vehicle Development
Disclaimer: The information contained in AR by Brigadier General Philip L. Bolte (Retired) and Iwao Hayashi
MOR represents the professional opinions of the
authors and does not necessarily reflect the offi 26 Tank Warfare During the Rif Rebellion, 1921-1927
cial Army or TRADOC position, nor does it by Dr. Jose E. Alvarez
change or supersede any information presented 29 A Framework for Peace Operations
in other official Army publications. by Major Sean B. MacFarland
Official distribution is limited to one copy for
32 Training For Maneuver
each armored brigade headquarters, armored
by Captain Robert Bateman
cavalry regiment headquarters, armor battalion
headquarters, armored cavalry squadron head 36 Software Review: TACOPS
quarters, reconnaissance squadron headquar by Captain Jerry A. Hall
ters, armored cavalry troop, armor company,
37 Making Killers, Imperatives for Tank Lane Training
and motorized brigade headquarters of the
by Lieutenant Colonel James C. Crowley (Retired)
United States Army. In addition, Army libraries,
Army and DOD schools, HQ DA and MACOM 42 TALlK: Steel Division-Six
staff agencies with responsibility for armored, di Patton Museum Ceremony Honors MG Israel Tal (Ret.)
rect fire, ground combat systems, organizations, by Major General Stan R. Sheridan (Retired)
and the training of personnel for such organiza
tions may request two copies by sending a mili 44 Fielding the Armor Force of Tomorrow:
Soldierization in the 1st Armor Training Brigade at Fort Knox
tary letter to the editor-in-chief.
by Lieutenant Colonel Eugene J. Palka and Colonel Fred A. Treyz III
Authorized Content: ARMOR will print only
those materials for which the U.S. Army Armor 47 1s t Armor Training Brigade Interactive Web Site
Center has proponency. That proponency in
52 Comments Sought on Revisions to 71-1 FM and ARTEP
cludes: all armored, direct-fire ground combat
systems that do not serve primarily as infantry
Back Mounted Water Ration Heater on the Way
carriers; all weapons used exclusively in these Cover For Tanks, Bradleys, M113s, and Howitzers
systems or by CMF 19-series enlisted soldiers; by Larry T. Hasty
any miscellaneous items of equipment which ar
mor and armored cavalry organizations use ex Departments
clusively; training for all SC 12A, 12B, and 12C
officers and for all CMF-19-series enlisted sol 2 Contacts
diers; and information concerning the training, 3 Letters
logistics, history, and leadership of armor and ar 4 Commander's Hatch
mored cavalry units at the brigade/regiment level 5 Driver's Seat
and below, to include Threat units at those lev 53 Books
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January-February 1997, Vol. CVI No.1
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Managing Editor
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COL G. Patrick Ritter 8247
E-Mail: [email protected]
U.S. Army Armor School
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COL Robert L. Westholm 4009
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Mounted Maneuver Battlespace Battle Lab (ATZK-MW)
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Office, Chief of Armor (ATZK-AR)
16th Cavalry Regiment (ATSB-SBZ) Mr. Aubrey Henley 1272
COL Gregory M. Eckert 7848 E-Mail: [email protected]
E-Mail: [email protected] FAX 7585
1st Armor Training Brigade (ATSB-BAZ) Special Assistant to the CG (ARNG) (ATZK-SA)
COL Fred A. Treyz III 6843 LTC Randall Williams 1315
E-Mail: [email protected] E-Mail: [email protected]
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2 ARMOR - January-February 1997
There Was No Rush major armaments programs is now a thing intestinal fortitude to admit that we share
of the past. the battlefield with OUR infantry, and that
To Improve Sherman Armament
there are many circumstances where we
In sum, MAJ Mansoor’s comments about
SUPPORT the infantry.
the armament of the Sherman tank are
Dear Sir: closer to the truth than COL Eddy’s. The Sheridan, with its 152mm main gun,
was the near-perfect light infantry support
COL Eddy’s critique of MAJ Mansoor’s vehicle. It could swim. It had thermal
book review in the September-October is- LTC (RET.) CHARLES M. BAILY, Ph.D. sights. It had long range armor destruction
sue of ARMOR has spurred me to com- Springfield, Va. capability equal to or greater than a Hellfire
ment. Two of the points made by COL missile (check your PH/PK classified data!).
Eddy — the discontent with the Sherman Abrams Himself Complained The Shillelagh, with its 152mm HEAT
after North Africa and the role of the user in About Tank Gun Effectiveness round, could blow a hole in a reinforced
determining requirements — are inaccu- concrete wall large enough for infantry sol-
rate, as I documented in my book, Faint diers to walk through side by side. An in-
Praise: American Tanks and Tank Destroy- Dear Sir: fantry leader could use the external phone,
ers during World War II, Hamden, Con- it boasted a fléchette round that could blast
necticut: Archon Press, 1983. 17,000 one-inch nails into enemy infantry
Dr. Eddy may be correct in stating (Let-
as close support, and, oh by the way, you
First, neither the records of Army Service ters, September-October) that it was Army
could parachute it into combat for those
Forces, Army Ground Forces, nor the Ord- users, not the Ordnance Department, who
nasty “forced entry” missions typically laid
nance Department reflect an outcry of dis- delayed upgunning of the World War II
at the feet of the paratroopers of the “Dev-
content with the Sherman tank following Sherman tank, but that was not necessarily
ils in Baggy Pants,” “Panthers,” and “Fal-
the North African campaign. A query to all the case at the working (and fighting) level.
cons” of the 82nd.
theaters about future tanks by the War De-
While Lieutenant Colonel Creighton
partment G4 in October 1943 resulted in a Ironically, the new, better, all purpose “Ar-
Abrams was commanding the 37th Tank
mixed bag of responses, but no common mored Gun System” that was to replace
Battalion in the drive across Europe, he
view of future tanks and no evident criti- the Sheridan wasn’t half as good. OK, it
was paid a visit by an Ordnance staff offi-
cism of the Sherman (Faint Praise, pp. 92- cer from a higher headquarters. That wor- wasn’t old and out of repair parts, but it
93). There was support for mounting the thy observed that Abrams had mounted an couldn’t swim, blow holes big enough to
76mm gun in the Sherman, but that deci- Air Force .50 caliber machine gun, which walk through in walls, fire a devastating
sion had already been taken by the Ar- had a very high rate of fire, as a coaxial missile, or fléchette the enemy to death. It
mored Command in September 1943 (FP, gun on his tank. “But that uses up ammo could be used in LVAD (low velocity air-
pg. 84). too fast,” objected the Ordnance fellow. drops) operations and it could fire 105mm
antitank rounds at enemy armor. Great de-
The lack of urgency from the field about Then Abrams told the man that he would sign by tankers to be a light tank meant to
any deficiency in penetrating German ar- like to have a higher velocity main gun on kill tanks. Too bad that’s not what the 82nd
mor was underlined by the decision in his tank, because that would help him needed. The 82nd needed a tracked (noth-
Europe to defer issuing Sherman tanks knock out German tanks better. “That ing strikes fear into the hearts of the enemy
with the 76mm gun to the first waves of would wear out the gun tubes too fast,” ex- like a tracked vehicle!) vehicle capable of
troops invading Normandy because of plained the Ordnance warrior. “Well, hell,” close infantry support — like the Sheridan.
problems with muzzle blast (FP, pg. 101). Abrams responded, “now we’re using up Not a light tank designed to fight other
In large part, this lack of urgency was a tanks!” tanks. Let’s face it, the 82nd should not
result of overestimating the penetration ca-
LEWIS SORLEY (ever see A Bridge Too Far?) be dropping
pabilities of the 76mm and 3-inch guns,
Potomac, Md. in to do battle with a tank-heavy force, if it
which had the same performance and were
is, it’s in the wrong fight. It will, however,
widely available in tank destroyer units.
drop into the dead of night to secure an
Only after firing tests in Europe in July
“We Gave Away Our Seat unfriendly airfield!
1944 did a common recognition of the defi-
ciencies of U.S. firepower appear. General On a Planeload of Warriors...” Too bad the Sheridans of 3-73rd Armor
Eisenhower expressed the frustration of the go away in January 1997, without even the
troops when he commented: Dear Sir:
Why is it that I am always the last to hear LETTERS (Continued on Page 48)
about this stuff. Ordnance told me this 76 I agree with MAJ Sherman about the
would take care of anything the German value of the Sheridan to the 82nd ABN DIV
had. Now I find out you can’t knock out a in Panama. The real shame is that “they”
Correction
damn thing with it. (FP, pg. 106) (the Army money handlers) have decided
Secondly, the major developmental tank not to replace the Sheridan with a new light The following safety disclosure was
program of the U.S. Army during World tank. Why? Not force structure. Not based omitted from “Enhanced Mine Detection
War II was very much an Ordnance project. on demonstrated needs. But money. No For Limited Visibility Operations” in the
A former member of the Armored Board money. Spent it in Bosnia. November-December 1996 issue:
during the war, MG (Ret.) Louis T. Heath, So, leaders, which soldiers of the 82nd This modification is for emergency
remembered very little input to the program will we sacrifice to enemy fire because we combat use only. Other use must be
from users until a prototype T26 arrived at didn’t provide them what they needed? (re- approved with a safety release through
Fort Knox in the spring of 1944 (FP, pg. fer back to MAJ Sherman’s article and the TACOM. Permanent modification has
36). Glaring problems, such as a manifestly incident at the bridge) What leaves a nasty been submitted to the Army Suggestion
unsatisfactory ammunition stowage system, taste in my mouth is that the Armor com- Program and, when approved, will pro-
demonstrated the lack of user involvement munity let this happen. We gave it away. vide a kit for mounting the lights on a
prior to development of the prototype (FP, No guts. Parochial “them” vs. “us” trash. permanent mount with a wiring harness.
pg. 122). Hopefully, lack of user input to Too bad we (Armor officers) don’t have the
ARMOR — January-February 1997 3
MG George H. Harmeyer
Commanding General
U.S. Army Armor Center
Focus on the Triad of Excellence
It is indeed a privilege for me to re- families a comfortable and just envi- and their complementary tactics, tech-
turn to Fort Knox as the 37th Chief of ronment whether at home or abroad. niques, and procedures to fight effec-
Armor. Since my last assignment at tively on future battlefields. Providing
As trainers throughout the mounted
Fort Knox, our Army has undergone the proper equipment for the mounted
force, we owe our people only the best
vast changes. We have successfully de- force is clearly a priority!
preparation for combat available. The
fended the frontiers of freedom in
world-class training at our Combat Our opposition today has many faces.
Europe, causing the Iron Curtain to
Training Centers (CTCs) continues to Unlike the monolithic threat we trained
fall, and deployed overseas to partici-
be the centerpiece of our preparation to fight in the past, we face an enemy
pate in several differently demanding
for future wars and military operations whose size, capabilities, and tactics are
operations, such as Operation Just
other than war. The National Training ever-changing. We must be prepared to
Cause, Operation Desert Shield/Storm,
Center, Combat Maneuver Training fight a large or small enemy, with either
and Operation Joint Endeavor. Through-
Center, Joint Readiness Training Cen- high or low technical capability, and
out this continuum of operational envi-
ter, and Mounted Warfare Simulation beat him regardless of his preference to
ronments, the mounted force has
Training Centers throughout the world fight a linear or non-linear conflict.
fielded and fought on six versions of
provide our soldiers and their leaders Alongside this warfighting spectrum
tanks and five versions of personnel
training that is unmatched anywhere lies the environment of stability opera-
carriers/fighting vehicles. Despite the
else on the face of the globe. The ob- tions, peace support operations, and op-
diversity of operational environments,
server/controllers at these facilities erations other than war. In these types
the mounted force continues to achieve
shape our future achievements by pro- of operations, the missions could range
success in all of its endeavors.
viding the best possible coaching and from the challenges of separating mul-
teaching, through candid feedback after tiple warring factions, where the threat
Our success comes from many
each mission. We must continue to use of combat is always present, to provid-
sources, I will talk about three of those
these training centers to provide the ing disaster relief in Africa or to our
sources — a triad of excellence —
toughest and most realistic training own citizens.
starting with our people. Soldiers, civil-
available to maintain an edge over all
ians, and their families are the founda- The challenges facing the mounted
of our opponents. However, this triad
tion for all of our success in the past, force of the future are many. This is
of excellence is not complete without
and they will continue to be that foun- our force, and I’m taking a personal
the right equipment to provide the
dation in the future. Our soldiers con- stake in its future. I challenge all sol-
means to achieve our goals.
tinue to prove how smart they can be, diers and civilians of our force to claim
regardless of the conditions or environ- Currently, the equipment available to their own stake, whether it be provid-
ment. We are continuing to build the our mounted warfare soldiers is second ing for the needs of our fine soldiers
force with the most intelligent recruits to none. Continual developments in and their families, in finding ways to
in the history of the Army. Every weapon system survivability, lethality, enhance our training, or in improving
leader’s charter in the mounted force mobility, and digital capability are our equipment. I want your ideas.
should be to provide the most challeng- keeping our soldiers out front on the
I am honored with this opportunity to
ing environment available to these sol- modern battlefield. We are making un-
lead the mounted force into the future.
diers — they deserve it! However, let precedented achievements in the devel-
us not forget that we must provide our opment of these new weapon systems FORGE THE THUNDERBOLT!
4 ARMOR — January-February 1997
DRIVER’S SEAT
CSM Ronnie W. Davis,
Command Sergeant Major,
U.S. Army Armor Center
A Reflection of Success:
The Excellence in Armor Soldier
The Excellence in Armor (EIA) pro- EIA soldiers maintained by the Office is enrolled, his DA Form 2-1 is anno-
gram identifies outstanding Ar- of the Chief of Armor, Fort Knox. His tated to reflect this. The end result is
mor/Cavalry soldiers during One Sta- DA Form 2-1 is annotated on line 19, the identification of soldiers who repre-
tion Unit Training (OSUT) and during reflecting his EIA enrollment and the sent the elite of the Armor Force.
service in Armor/Cavalry units. The effective date. His PCS orders will in-
NOTE: Should a soldier fail to main-
purpose of the program is to fill the dicate his membership in the EIA pro-
tain the required standards, the com-
commander’s hatches of tanks and gram, and a letter will accompany him
mander must remove him from the EIA
Bradleys with highly motivated, intelli- to his gaining commander, announcing
rolls, and the soldier may never be re-
gent soldiers whose performance is his successful completion of the EIA
enrolled, regardless of his future
consistently outstanding. program during OSUT. The impact is
achievements.
clear; the new soldier will arrive at his
Approved in October 1987, the pro-
first duty station with additional skills EIA soldiers have the opportunity to
gram has grown into a model that other
through training that could prove vital receive special incentives:
branches attempt to emulate. Soldiers
from PV1 to SFC are eligible for selec- to the overall success of the unit’s mis- •• OSUT commanders have the author-
sion.
tion and enrollment, which can take ity to promote 10% of the class to
place either in OSUT or at a permanent Not all soldiers become enrolled dur- PV2 upon the completion of the ba-
duty assignment. Presently, 3,190 Ac- ing OSUT. A soldier can earn enroll- sic training phase, and that 10% may
tive Duty soldiers and 876 Reserve ment anytime during his career through be promoted to PFC upon comple-
Component soldiers are on the rolls. the recommendation of his commander tion of the MOS-specific phase.
and the successful completion of the •• A sergeant who is a BNCOC gradu-
The selection process in OSUT starts
following: ate may request to take the SCCT/
with the drill sergeant. He will recom-
TCCT II test through the local educa-
mend a soldier during the tenth week •• Receive a commander’s evaluation
tion center. This is a comprehensive
of training, based on performance, mo- emphasizing his technical proficiency
two-hour examination on Skill Level
tivation, and leadership potential. The and his potential for leadership
3 and 4 tasks. Upon achieving a
soldier’s eligibility is then confirmed •• Score 260 points or higher on the
score of 70 points or higher, he is eli-
by a battalion or squadron board. Upon APFT
gible to receive fifty points toward
confirmation of eligibility, the soldier •• Pass all elements of the CTT
promotion under the military educa-
will receive fifty hours of additional •• Pass the Scout Commander’s Certifi-
tion area for his staff sergeant pro-
training in Skill Level 1 and 2 tasks. cation Level I (19D SCCT I) test
motion packet.
Prior to graduation from OSUT, the •• Pass the Tank Commander’s Certifi- •• All senior NCO selection boards are
soldier must meet the following criteria cation Level I (19K TCCT I) test
briefed about the EIA program and
to be enrolled in the EIA program: - M1 Series Tank/FM 17-12-1-2/TCGST
that soldiers who are enrolled should
- M3 Bradley/FM 21-1/GST
•• Score 230 points or better on the be considered a “cut above” the rest
- M998 (HMMWV)/FM 17-12-8/GST
•• AQPuaFlTify Sharpshooter or better with •• Qualify Sharpshooter or better with •• oIdf etnhteif sicoaldtiioenrs ooff thEeI Asa mseo lgdriaedres . im-
assigned weapon.
individual weapon proves their morale and allows them
•• Pass all end of block tests NOTE: OSUT soldiers have one year to be recognized as outstanding per-
•• Pass all Armor Crewman Tests to meet the above standards. Should formers by their leaders, peers, and
(19K) ACT I, II, III, or the Scout they fail to do so, they must be subordinates.
Gunnery Test (19D) with no more dropped from enrollment. Under spe-
Although, the program is barely ten
that one no-go per test cial circumstances, the battalion com-
years old, a trend in the selection rate
•• Pass all Armor Stakes mander may request a waiver for a de-
of EIA members is taking shape. The
•• Possess a high school or equivalent serving soldier who fails to meet the
selection rates on the last three promo-
diploma (this can be waived by the standards through no fault of his own,
tion boards are listed at Figure 1.
battalion or squadron commander) for example if the soldier has a tempo-
Upon successful completion of all ar- rary profile which prohibits him from
eas, the soldier is placed on the rolls of taking a record APFT. Once the soldier Continued on Page 50
ARMOR — January-February 1997 5
Combatant Arms vs. Combined Arms
The U.S. Army’s Quest
For Deep Offensive Operations
And an Operational Level of Warfare
by George F. Hofmann
“If the military persists in thinking out tactical
problems in terms of cavalry, infantry, and
artillery, then we shall render our minds rigid
to all new ideas.” 1 Christie-based Combat Car T-4 climbs log ramp during tests in 1934.
The prevailing attitude between “light” War I, Summerall had been a member 1927. According to historian Dr. Tim
infantry, “heavy” armor, and “can-do- of a Board of Officers detailed to Nenninger, Chaffee became interested
all” field artillery needs to be seriously evaluate French and British tanks and in mechanization shortly after he was
addressed if the Army is to move into their tactical deployment. Investigating assigned to the G-3 staff. A friend serv-
the 21st century. The purpose of this British experiences, the Board quoted ing as a military attaché in England
paper is to examine the post-World War from a future proponent for armor war- provided the inquisitive Chaffee with
I conflict between the traditional com- fare, then Lieutenant Colonel J.F.C. details of British efforts in mechanizing
batant arms concept, championed by Fuller, that the creation of a mecha- its army.5 Chaffee, the loyal cavalry-
the branch chiefs, and a combined arms nized army would-be “one of the great- man, initially wanted to revitalize the
idea based upon mechanization and est epochs in the art of war.”3 Based on horse cavalry, but in 1928, he realized
deep offensive operations. his wartime experiences,
Summerall became a
This paper will also explain why the
firm believer in tanks.
Army was unable to execute an opera-
After the war, he sup-
tional level of warfare (the theory of
ported a separate status
larger unit operations) with a combined
for the Tank Corps and,
arms mechanized force.2 The interwar
during the 1920s, was an
historical model is relevant because it
enthusiastic supporter of
has a contemporary analog in today’s
the role tanks would play
debate regarding doctrine and service
in a future war. Summer-
traditions. Is the traditional decentral-
all attempted to make
ized organization of the combatant
their development his
arms suitable for a modern modular
first priority. He told stu-
combined arms force in a technologi-
dents at the War College
cally driven army?
that the United States al-
BG Frank Parker, at left, as a colonel in WWI, and BG Adna
ways entered a war un-
* * * R. Chaffee, then a major, were key players in U.S. studies of
prepared. He cautioned
mechanization in the late 1920s and early ’30s.
At the insistence of the Army General against viewing future
Staff in 1928, the Army launched its military problems in
turbulent road to mechanization and the light of the Army’s World War I experi- the part mechanization would play in a
Armored Force. Shortly after he re- ence and warned that the next war future war. He admired the Civil War
turned from viewing the British mecha- would be different as the Army’s expe- cavalry officer, James Harrison Wilson.
nized force, Secretary of War Dwight rience was “a special case that cannot By the end of that war, Wilson had
D. Davis made two important deci- be repeated.”4 used his Union cavalry en masse,
sions. First, he ordered the creation of fought mounted and dismounted, coop-
an experimental mechanized force dur- Subsequently, Summerall delegated erated with the infantry, and used the
ing the summer of 1928. Second, he di- the study to the assistant chief of staff, best weapons available. He was a
rected the Army Chief of Staff, MG G-3 (Training and Operations), BG strong proponent of open warfare,
Charles P. Summerall, to initiate a pre- Frank Parker, who directed members of combining fire and movement with a
liminary study of the employment of a his staff to execute the secretary’s or- mounted assault when feasible. Wil-
mechanized force on the future battle- der. However, the chief architect of the son’s performance was a model of deep
field and determine how the United study, “A Mechanized Force,” was Ma- offensive operations and battle; he
States could effectively be prepared for jor Adna R. Chaffee, Jr., who had been knew how to use a combined arms
such an employment. During World assigned to the General Staff in June team. This was an example of what
6 ARMOR — January-February 1997
Professor Schneider called distributed of war, the G-1, the G-2, the G-4, and results by endorsing a combined force,
free maneuver, the essence of opera- the chief of the war plans division. In with tanks forming the backbone of the
tional art.6 addition, the branch chiefs concurred, attack. The board also proposed that
except for the chief of infantry,8 MG the infantry mechanize and that artil-
The most innovative conclusion from
Robert H. Allen, who was “heartily op- lery be self-propelled to furnish mobile
the G-3 study called for a tactical
posed” to setting up another branch fire support. In addition, it suggested
evaluation of the role of tanks in deep
with the tank as its focus. Instead, he that the mechanized force act “as a tac-
offensive operations. Fuller, one of the
recommended that tanks remain with tical laboratory for the determination of
most creative proponents of armored
the infantry, and that armored cars and the proper tactics involved in the action
warfare in the British Army, recalled
self-propelled artillery remain with of fast tanks.” However, in an apparent
meeting with Parker in August 1917.
their respective arms.9 He based his compromise with the chief of infantry,
Fuller claimed Parker held “ultramod-
opinion on the 1919 AEF Superior the board recommended “that a new
ern views” and called him a “veritable
Board, which was convened to con- and separate branch should not be set
he-man.” No doubt this was due to
sider the lessons of the war and how up.”13
Parker’s agreement with Fuller on the
they would affect tactics and organiza-
need for mechanization and tank em- At this time, J. Walter Christie dem-
tion of the combatant arms. The
ployment to end the position warfare onstrated his new, fast tank chassis, M-
Board’s report noted that “tanks were
that stalemated the Western Front. At 1940 so named because he believed it
accompanying weapons incapable of
the time, Parker shared with Fuller his represented a ten year advancement in
independent decisive action. There is
views that a combined mechanized tank technology.
no such thing as an independent tank
force, supported by aviation, could
attack.”10 Thus, the Superior Board es- In September 1929, Chaffee delivered
widen the breach after a breakthrough
tablished the tactical tone for the his famous lecture at the Army War
and then rapidly progress deep around
peacetime army. General John J. College, entitled “The Status of the
the German defenses in depth. Parker
Pershing supported the Board’s recom- Mechanized Combat Organization and
believed this return to mobility would
mendations during the 1919 Congres- the Desired Trend in the Future.” The
break the stalemate on the Western
sional hearings. Subsequently, the 1920 lecture was an elaboration on “A
Front because the Germans were not
National Defense Act abolished the Mechanized Force.” He held that future
capable of adopting such a plan. Fuller
World War I Tank Corps and assigned offensive operations in modern war re-
gave credit to Parker’s views and indi-
all tanks to the infantry.11 quired a self-contained, highly mobile,
cated they were “not put into practice
mechanized corps with the ability to
until 1939, and then by the Germans in General Parker responded to the chief
extend its striking power over great
Poland, when it became known as of infantry by noting that World War I
distances. For the first time, Chaffee
Blitzkrieg.”7 tanks were used as auxiliaries to the in-
discussed the impact of French and
fantry because they were slow, and that
The 1928 G-3 study called for a self- British experiments with mechaniza-
newer tanks allowed for a greater ra-
contained, highly mobile mechanized tion. The French, who had adopted a
dius of action and greater mobility.
force capable of spearheading an attack defensive and passive orientation,
This situation, he reasoned, “forces the
and holding “distant key positions.” viewed the tank as an adjunct to the in-
consideration of [tanks] as a principal
Regarding tactics and techniques, the fantry, while the British preferred to
arm under certain circumstances, as
study viewed the mechanized force re- economize their manpower by equip-
well as auxiliaries of the infantry.” By
flecting more the cavalry’s spirit of ping their army with movable armor,
continuing to acknowledge that the
mobility, rather than that of the arm of he told the audience.14 He added that
chief of infantry was better positioned
close combat, the infantry. The most the situation was different in the U.S.,
to develop tanks, he concluded, tank
controversial part of “A Mechanized while the French and British were obli-
development was tied to that branch
Force” was the plan for a balanced gated allies under the Locarno agree-
and to the speed of the foot soldier.12
combined arms force of light and me- ments, “We have no ally who can be
Limiting tanks to the role of adjuncts
dium tanks, self-propelled field artil- depended upon to furnish either the
of the infantry also obstructed creation
lery, mechanized infantry, engineers, air manpower or the armored mobility.”15
of a more efficient organizational
support, and a service detachment. This Chaffee understood and analyzed
framework, a combined arms team,
organization differed from the predomi- Fuller’s idea on a mechanized force,
rather than a combatant arms policy,
nantly tank force assembled on the but questioned, as did Parker, its de-
for the future Army.
Salisbury Plain in England in 1927. pendence on tanks, armored cars, mo-
The U.S. Army’s combatant arms at the Shortly after the G-3 study’s comple- torized machine guns, artillery, and en-
time were the infantry, cavalry, artil- tion, the War Department directed that gineers at the expense of mechanized
lery, signal corps, engineers, and air a board of officers from the various infantry or a balanced force.
service — all autonomous and control- branches be appointed “to make rec-
led by the their branch chiefs. “A ommendations for the development of The tactical principle of open warfare
Mechanized Force” was the first ra- a mechanized force within the Army and the importance of fire and move-
tional attempt to move the autonomy of and to study questions of defense ment was critical to Chaffee’s thinking
the combatant chief of arms to a force against such forces.” One of the eleven about developing a new doctrine. This
structured upon a combined arms or- officers detailed to the board was Ma- traditional American doctrine was of-
ganization. General Parker’s directed jor Chaffee, from the G-3 Troop Train- fensively oriented, the opposite of the
study met approval from the secretary ing Section. The board summarized its position warfare that characterized
ARMOR — January-February 1997 7
combat on the Western combat support for the at-
Front during World War I. tacking foot soldier.20
To restore fire and move- Thus, by the end of 1931,
ment, Parker agreed with the American doctrine of
Chaffee that a logical doc- open warfare conducted
trine that would bring the by fire and movement
Army into the future in- had created a conflict be-
volved rapid and deep at- tween the Army Staff in
tacks by fast moving tanks, the War Department and
supported by a balanced the chief of infantry. The
combined arms team of infantry believed open
mechanized infantry and warfare could be restored
self-propelled field artillery. by placing tanks with its
This would provide an op- attacking force, while the
portunity to move to an op- Army Staff concluded
erational level of warfare, a that it could be restored
theory of larger unit opera- MG Robert H. Allen, at left, and MG Stephen O. Fuqua, successive chiefs of with a combined arms
tions with a mechanized infantry, opposed a new mechanized combat arm to be created from the mechanized force.
force capable of deep inde- horsed cavalry. Later, chiefs of cavalry also opted to hold onto their horses.
pendent maneuver. But this At the time, the eco-
could only become a reality if the com- hanced the firing platform and speed of nomic pressures of the Depression and
batant arms were willing to relinquish the vehicle, and had the potential of in- a strong pacifist tendency in American
some of their autonomy. creasing the operational mobility of ar- politics affected military policy, activi-
mored fighting vehicles. The chief of ties, and technology. In addition, it im-
Major Chaffee also assessed the in-
staff was so impressed with its possi- periled doctrine and plans for a future
tangibles of the officers serving in the
bilities that he ordered the Infantry ground war. Factors included the notion
British mechanized force, suggesting a
Tank Board to test the Christie tank.19 that World War I was “the war to end
similar profile for officers in our
The chiefs of infantry and cavalry also all wars,” the naval limitation treaties,
mechanized or armored force. They
wanted to acquire the Christie for their the Kellogg-Briand Pact that outlawed
“must be imbued with the spirit of mo-
respective branches. This competition war, a strong pacifist element in Amer-
bility, rapidity of action, and simplicity
over the Christie system altered tank ica, and the Great Depression. By the
of control.” Furthermore, he explained:
development during the 1930s, because time General Douglas MacArthur be-
“They must be of a progressive, crea-
each arm had specific missions that came chief of staff, Congress and the
tive mind and not afraid of radical
were guarded with traditional rever- President were trying to restore eco-
changes.” Apparently he was more im-
ence. nomic stability by balancing spending
pressed with psychological motivation
with revenue, so the funds required to
than with British tank doctrine.16 Meanwhile, the Red Army, through
modernize the Army were far from
the Soviet Union’s purchasing agent in
One book that impressed Chaffee and adequate. As a result, the Mechanized
New York City, the Amtorg Corpora-
an officer who later served under him, Force created at Fort Eustis was short-
tion, contracted for two Christie tank
Major Robert W. Grow, was the award- lived.21 General Summerall’s successor,
chassis.
winning study by George T. Denison, A General MacArthur, ordered its termi-
History of Cavalry (1877). Grow re- Though costs were a constraint in nation and directed all branches to
called one impressive sentence: “A creating a suitable mechanized force, adopt mechanization and motorization
cavalry general should be possessed of the main obstruction came from the to their traditional roles. This action,
a strong inventive genius, and be self- chief of infantry, MG Stephen O. though based upon budget restraints
reliant to strike out a new line and Fuqua, who had succeeded General Al- and the cost of fielding a mechanized
adopt reforms where he sees them nec- len. The notion that the cavalry, be- force, kept the Army from developing a
essary.”17 cause of its mobility, was more suitable combined arms force for deep offen-
for managing a mechanized force was sive operations. In addition, it deprived
Shortly before he left office in 1930, rejected. “There is no such animal as the Army from establishing an opera-
General Summerall had ordered the ‘armored cavalry’ in these modern tional level of warfare. As a result, the
creation of a permanent mechanized days. Remove the ‘horse’ and there is combatant arms had retained their anti-
force to be established at Fort Eustis. no cavalry,” was the comment. General quated tactical orientation as World
Because of the new Christie tank chas- Fuqua, in a highly charged memoran- War II approached.
sis’ speed, the G-1, BG Campbell dum to the deputy chief of staff, stated:
King, visualized it as the basic maneu- “I am trying to lead infantry thought The army chief of staff’s decision to
ver weapon for this force.18 There was into the same doctrine of open warfare” decentralize mechanization caused the
considerable interest in the General that was adopted in France by General branch chiefs, especially the infantry, to
Staff in developing the Christie for Pershing. Continuing, “the dehorsing of reinforce their traditional missions and
deep offensive operations. The Christie these units [due to mechanization] will combat tactics as outlined in the 1923
system, with its long helical spring sus- mean an irretrievable loss to the Cav- Field Service Regulations: Operations.
pension, provided greater compression alry.” General Fuqua believed fire and The regulation reflected the French in-
and extension amplitude for its large movement was the infantry’s phase of fantry-dominated Instruction sur l’em-
road wheels, which noticeably en- the attack, with tanks supplying close ploi tactique des grandes Unites that
8 ARMOR — January-February 1997