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Aristotle's Metaphysics Alpha Symposium Aristotelicum edited by CARLOS STEEL uHth a new critical edition of the Greek Text by OLIVER PRIMAVESI OXPORD UNIVERSITY PRESS OXFORD UNrVEKSITY PRESS Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP, United föngdom Oxford Universit)' Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldvidde. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries © the several contributors 2012 The moral rights of the authors have been asserted First Edition pubUshed in 2012 Impression: 2 AU rights reserved. No part of this pubUcation may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly pemutted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organizarion. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this work in any other form and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available PREFACE The i8th Symposium Aristotelicum, dedicated to the first Book of Aristotle's Metaphysics, was held in Leuven from 7th to 13ch July 2008. The symposium was hosted by the international centre Aristoteles latiiius and the De Wulf- Mansion Centre for Ancient, Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy at the Institute of Philosophy. It was a pleasure to see the Symposium Aristotelicum return to Leuven, where the second Symposium was organized in 1960 by the late Suzanne Mansion. The seminars were held in premises of the Irish College and, on Wednesday, at the Royal Academy in Brussels. There is the list of all participants below. Michael Frede was still involved in the early preparation of this symposium, but we were alas bereft ofhis participation. The organization of the coUoquium would not have been possible without the financial support ofthe Flemish Research Foundation (FWO), the Cornelia de Vogel Foundation and theJoseph Van de Wiele Foundation. I am very pleased to have this volume published at Oxford University Press following the publication of the previous coUoquia. 1 express my gratitude to Peter Momtchiloff and to the anonymous referees ofthe Press. In the preparation ofthis complex volume for publication, I could count on the technical collaboration ofMichiel Van den Bosch (Typeface n.v., Leuven). Aristotle's book Alpha stands as the introduction ofa complex work later called Metaphysics. On the composition ofthis work, on the overall unity ofAristotle's metaphysical project and on the place of Alpha in it, there has been an long debate among scholars. Werner Jaeger, for instance, argued that Alpha was an earlier attempt by Aristotle at defining wisdom and had only later been integrated as an introduction in a much more sophisticated project ofa science ofbeing as being, - a claim not sharedby the contributors of this volume. In Alpha, Aristotle presents his philosophical project as a search for wisdom, the supreme form ofknowledge worth for its own sake. This wisdom is found in the knowledge of the first principles allowing us to explain whatever exists. As Aristotle shows, the earlier philosophers had all been seeking such a wisdom; they had, however, divergent views on what these principles are and how they are causes ofeverything. Before Aristotle sets out his own views on the principles, he examines in this first book his predecessors' views. Since antiquity, this book thus played a crucial role in all attempts to reconstruct the early history ofphilosophy. Most scholars tend to readthis text as the story ofa gradual discovery ofthe four causes culminatingin Aristotle's own doctrine. But, as Stephen Menn in his forthcoming book on the Metaphysics argues, Aristotle's reading ofthe early history ofphilosophy is much less progressive and optinustic than is mostly thought. In A 3-6, Aristotle does not show that the earlier views gradually converge in understanding wisdom as the science ofthe four causes, but rather presents them as a "series ofaspirations to wisdom, each successively disappointed". Disappointed, but not entirely, as they confront us with a series offundamental difficulties about the principles, as is clear in Aristotle's critical examination ofhis predecessors' views, ending up with a lengthy discussion ofPlato's doctrine ofthe Forms, in A7—10. In book Beta (which was the subject ofa previous Symposium) Aristotle will discuss the aporiai about the concept ofultimate wisdom in a systematic way. This first book, however, is a unique opportunity to discuss the difficulties not in an abstract manner, but in confrontation with different positions defended by the first sophoi. Book Alpha is notjust a fundamental text for reconstructing the origin ofGreek philosophy, it sets itselfthe agenda ofAristotle's own project ofwisdom after what he learned from his predecessors, and in particularly from Plato. Metaphysics Alpha is undoubtedly one of the most studied texts of Aristotle, as it is also used as the obligatory starting point for all studies on early Greek philosophy. Yet the discussion at the Symposium of the whole text, section by section, in an international group of scholars, reading the text primarily from Aristotle's intention, and not taking it as a 'Fundgrube' of earlier doctrines, has provided original approaches to well-trodden texts. In comparison to the previous volumes ofthe Symposium Aristotelicum, this volume has the privilege of presenting a new critical edition ofthe text which was central in all discussions. Oliver Primavesi not only contributed to the Symposium a paper on one section, but also offered the participants a new edition of Metaphysics Alpha, with an impressive apparatus, based upon an exhaustive investigation of the whole manuscript tradition, the medieval translations and the indirect tradition. His introduction to the edition reveals new insights into the question which has haunted editors of the Metaphysics since Bekker, namely the relation between the two traditions of the texts (a and β). The contributors were grateful to have this text at their disposal in their discussion at the Symposium and in the final redaction oftheir respective chapters. Primavesi himselfprofited from the input of the expert readers of the new edition. The symposium thus offered a wonderful laboratory for this major editorial project. I am convinced that all scholars working on this celebrated text ofAristotle will be delighted to have not just 'proceedings' of a symposium, but also appreciate having this new edition included in this volume. Carlos Steel Leuven, 2 May 2012 CONTENTS i8th Symposium Aristotelicum, Leuven, 7-1j July 2008 List Of Participants ix 1. The Oesire to Know {Metaphysics A1) 1 GlUSEPPE CAMBIANO 2. A Science of First Principles {Metaphysics A2) 43 SARAH BROADIE 3. History and Dialectic (Metaphysics A3, 983*24-984^8) 69 RACHEL BARNEY 4. 'The Next Principle' iMetaphYsicsA3-4, 984^8-985^22) 105 GÄBOß BETEGH 5. Pythagoreanism: emergingfrom the Presocraticfog {MetaphysicsAs) 141 MALCOLM SCHOFIELD 6. Plato as seen hy Aristotle (Metaphysics A 6) 167 CARLOS SXEEL 7. Critique of Earlier Philosophers on the Good and the Causes (MetaphYsicsA7-A8g89^1S) 201 STEPHEN MENN 8. Second thoughts on some Presocratics (MetaphysicsAB, 989*18-990*32) 225 OLIVER PRIMAVESI 9. The Doctrine of Forms under Critique — PART r (MetaphysicsAg, 990*33-991^9) 265 DoHOTHEA pREDE 10. The Doctrine of Forms under Critique - PART 11 (Meiep/iy5!oA9,99i^9-993*io) 297 MlCHEL CRUBELLIER 11. Conclusion - and Retrospect (Metaphysics A10) 335 JOHN M. CoOPER 12. Bibliography 365 VIII ARISTOTLE, METAPHYSICS A: A NEW CRITICAL EDITION WITH INTRODUCTION 385 OLIVER PHIMAVES1 Introduction: The Transmission of the Text and the Riddle of the Two Versions 387 OLIVER PRIMAVESI Bibliography 459 Text ofMetaphysics A (and of the corresponding parts ofM 4-3) 4o5 OLIVER PHlMAVESI Index of Names 517 Index locorum 521 General Index 534 IX 18TH SYMPOSIUM ARISTOTELICUM, LEUVEN, 7-13JULY 2008 LIST OF PARTICIPANTS Contributors Rachel Barney, University ofToronto Gabor Betegh, Central European University, Budapest Sarah Broadie, University of St Andrews Giuseppe Cambiano, Scuola Normale Superiore, Pisa John M. Cooper, Princeton University Michel Crubellier, Universite Lille III Dorothea Frede, Universität Hamburg Stephen Menn, McGill University and Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin Oliver Primavesi, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München Malcolm Schofield, StJohn's College, Cambridge Carlos Steel, University ofLeuven Otherparticipants Keinipe Algra, University ofUtrecht Enrico Berti, University ofPadova Myles Burnyeat, All Souls College, Oxford Elisabetta Cattanei, University of Genova Alan Code, Stanford University Pierre Destree, Universite de Louvain Gail Fine, Cornell University Frederic Gain, Universite de Lille III Daniel Graham, Brigham Young University Terry Irwin, Keble College, Oxford Andre Laks, Universite Paris Sorbonne Geoffrey Lloyd, Darwin College, Cambridge Hendrik Lorenz, Princeton University Claire Louguet, Universite de Lille III Jaap Mansfeld, University ofUtrecht Ben Morison, Princeton University Carlo Natali, University of Venice ChristofRapp, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München Cristina Rossitto, University ofPadua David Sedley, Christ's College, Cambridge Annick Stevens, Universite de Liege Gerd Van Riel, University of Leuven SYMPOSIUM ARISTOTELICUM ΐ· (i957) Aristotle and Plato in the Mid-Fourth Century, edited by I. Düring and G. E. L. Owen, Göteborg 1960. 2. (1960) Aristote et les prohlhmes de mithode, publie par S. Mansion, Louvain- Paris: Nauwelaerts 1961. 3. (1963) Aristotle on Dialectic: The Topics, edited by G. E. L. Owen, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1968. 4. (1966) Naturphilosophie bei Aristoteles und Theophrast, herausgegeben von I. Düring, Heidelberg: Lothar StiehmVerlag 1969. 5. (1969) Untersuchungen zur Eudemischen Ethik, herausgegeben von P. Moraux und D. Harlfinger, Berlin: Walter De Gruyter 1971. 6. (1972) Etudes sur la Metaphysique d'Aristote, publiees par P. Aubenque, Paris: Vrin, 1979. 7- (1975) AristotleonMindandtheSenses,tditedhyG.E.TL.Lloydind G. E. L. Owen, Cambridge University Press 1978. 8. (1978) Aristotle on Science: The Posterior Analytics, edited by Е. Berti, Padova: Antenore 1981. 9. (1981j Zweifelhaftes im Corpus Aristotelicum. Studien zu einigen Dubia, herausgegeben von P. Moraux undJ. Wiesner, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 1983. 10. (1984) Mathematics and Metaphysics in Aristotle = Mathematik und Metaphysik bei Aristoteles, herausgegeben von A. Graeser, Bern-Stuttgart: P. Haupt 1987. 11. (1987) Aristoteles Politik, editedby G. Patzig, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1990. 12. (1990) Aristotle's Rhetoric. Philosophical Essays, edited by D. Furley and A. Nehamas, Princeton University Press 1994. 13· (1993) OnAristotle'sDeinterpretatione[notpublished]. 14. (1996) Aristotle's Metaphysics Lambda, edited by M. Frede and D. Charles, Oxford University Press 2000. 15· (1999) Aristotle's On Generation and Corruption, Book I, edited by F. de Haas andJ. Mansfeld, Oxford University Press 2004. 16. (2002) Aristotle's Metaphysics Beta, edited by A. Laks and M. Crubellier, Oxford University Press 2009. 17. (3005) Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, Book VII, edited by C. Natali, Oxford University Press 2009. 18. (2008) Aristotle's Metaphysics Alpha, edited by C. Steel, Oxford University Press 2012, 19. (2011) Aristotle's De Motu Animalium, in preparation by 0. Primavesi and Ch. Rapp. 1 The Desire to Know Metaphysics A1 GIUSEPPE CAMBIANO The first chapter ofAristotle's Metaphysics begins with the celebrated sentence that "All men by nature desire to know (τοί3 εΙδέναν όρέγονταν φύσει)" and ends with the claim that "clearly wisdom (σοφία) is science (έπιοττήμη) about certain causes and principles". How does Aristotle reach this conclusion? At tempting to reconstruct Aristotle's argument, I will divide the chapter into six parts - 980*21-27; 980*27-^25;980^25-981*12; 981*12-^13; 981^13-25; 981^25- 982*3 - each characterized by peculiar topics and modes ofargument. But the conclusion ofA 1 leaves indeterminate the causes and principles which are the objects of sophia, and therefore I will end with both a short analysis of some points of the second chapter, which explain that it is a matter of first causes and principles, and some briefremarks about the question ofthe relationships between A 1-2 and the lost Aristotle's Protrepticus. I. The human desire ofknowing АЦ men by nature desire to know. A sign of this is the deHght men take in having perceptions; for even apart from their usefulness they take deKght in these percep tions for themselves, and above аП in perception by sight. For not only with a view to action, but even when we are not going to do anything, we prefer seeing to almost everything eke. The reason is that this, most of aU the senses, makes us know and brings to Hght many differences'. (980*21-27) ' The translatiom ofAristotelian texts are taken from the Revised OxfordTranslation (edited by J. Barnes), with some minor changes, and those ofAlexander ofAphrodisias &om Dooley's transktion. 2 GIUSEPPE CAMBlANO The initial statement, both universal and affirmative, is strengthened by phusei. Sometimes, for example in the Physics, Aristotle takes this expression to be equivalent to "always or for the most part". But clearly 'all men' excludes that only most men desire to know.^ If we assume that there is a connection be tween temporality and modality or that they are not distinguished in Aristotle's thought, we can assert that the desire to know belongs always and necessarily to aU men. Maybe in Aristotle's choice the verb oregesthai, instead of epithumein, for example, or similar verbs, aims at emphasizing that it is a desire for something regarded as objectively good, rather than a merely impulsive desire. From this standpoint oregesthai appears to be synonymous of ephiesthai, which expresses a natural tendency towards something.^ By the words 'all' and phuseiAii^toUs un derlines that this desire belongs to human nature in general and, consequently, to every man individuaUy.+ But how can we know and state that aU men by nature desire to know? Aristotle does not introduce this universal statement as an endoxon, namely as a reputable opinion wluch is accepted "by everyone or by the majority or by the wise — i.e. by aU, or by the majority, or by the most notable and reputable ofthem" {Topics i i. ioo^2i-23;i io. 104^8-11), and which accordingly can be assumed as the premise in developing an argument. Nor does he present the content ofhis statement as a phainomenon in the strict sense ofan observed fact (as, for example, the existence ofmovement). Nor does he discuss it by means of the method described in NE vii 1, 1145^2—7, where he says that we must "set the phenomena before us and, after first dis cussing the difficulties, go on to prove, ifpossible, the truth ofall the reputable opinions about these affections or, failing this, of the greater number and the most authoritative, for ifwe both resolve the difficulties and leave the reputable opinions undisturbed,we shaU have proved the case sufficiently". On the other hand, that our universal statement is neither an endoxon nor an observed fact is confirmed by the circumstance that Aristotle thinks that it requires a justifica tion. What he produces is a sign, from which the truth ofthe initial statement can be inferred. It seems to be presupposed here that a sign is more evident ^ On present tense sentences as referring not only to the time they are uttered, but as timeless sentences, meaiüng that things are always in the way the sentence states them to be, that is in an omni- temporal sense,see Hintikka 1973, 80—4. 3 The verb ephiesthai is frequendy used in Met. A,but see also Pol. vii 13, i33i^39-4i:"the happiness and weU-being which аИ men manifestly (phanerdn) desire (ephientm), some have the power ofattaining, but to others, from some accident or defect ofnature, the attaitmient ofthem is not granted". This is a phainomenon (see phanerdn) and, consequently, needs not to be proved by a sign inference or by a deduc tion from premises. * If we apply the distinction between universal predicarion katä pantos and universal predication kath' hautb [ЛРо i 4, 73"26-31), then the result will be that such an oiexis tou eidenai pertains both to each member ofthe class 'man' and to the essence ofman. On this distinction, see Le Blond 1996,75-8; Sorabji 1980,183-208.