Aristotle's Definition of Soul

58 Pages·2016·0.3 MB·English

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ARISTOTLE’S DEFINITION OF
SOUL AND THE PROGRAMME
OF THE DE ANIMA
STEPHEN MENN
I
' Deanimaisaveryfashionablebook.Itisfashionable
chieflybecauseAristotledevelopsadoctrineofthesoul,astheform
or ‘first actuality’ of an organic natural body, which seems to of-
fer a via media between materialism and dualism. On Aristotle’s
account,ananimal’ssoulissomethingotherthanitsbody,indeed
something of a di·erent ontological type from the body, but the
soul is not independentof the body,andno problemarises of how
soul andbodycan be united into a substantial whole: ‘there is no
needtoinvestigatewhetherthesoulandthebodyareone,anymore
thanthewaxandtheshape,oringeneralthematterofeachthing
andthatofwhichitisthematter;forwhile“one”and“being”are
saidinmanyways,theprimary[sense]isactuality’(Deanima2.1,
412B6–9).Manytwentieth-centuryphilosophershavebeenlooking
forjustsuchaviamediabetweenmaterialismanddualism,atleast
forthecaseofthehumanmind;andmuchscholarlyattention has
goneintoaskingwhetherAristotle’sviewcanbealignedwithoneof
themodernalternatives,orwhether ito·erssomethingpreferable
toanyofthemodernalternatives,orwhetheritissoboundupwith
afalsifiedAristoteliansciencethatitmustregretfullybedismissed
asnolongeraliveoption.
It seems to me, however, that the idea of a via media between
ãStephenMenn2002
IamgratefulforcommentsfromSylviaBerryman,GabrielRichardson,Charlotte
Witt,andaudiencesatUCLA(especiallySeanKelseyandMegScharle)andBerke-
ley(especiallyAlanCode),aswellasmorerecentcommentsfromSarahBroadie,
MylesBurnyeat,andDavidSedley.IamsorrythatIhavenotyetbeenabletodo
justicetoallofthesecomments.
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materialism and dualism distorts Aristotle’s aims in defining the
soulas the first actuality of an organicnatural body,and makesit
di¶culttoseetheworkthatAristotleactuallyintendsthedefinition
todo.Undeniably,Aristotleisinsomesenseproposingaviamedia
whenhesaysthat‘thesoulisneitherabodynorwithoutabody’(De
anima2.2,414A19–20).Butthisisnotaviamediabetweendualism
and materialism in the modern sense. A modern materialist says
(eliminatively) that there is no soul and the animal is simply its
body,or(reductively)thatthesoulisidenticaltothebody,andthe
states of the soul are states of the body.But the ‘materialist’ view
thatAristotleisopposinghereisthatthesoulofananimalisabody,
of fire or air or little roundatoms, not identical with the animal’s
bodybutpresentinit,movingitandbeingmovedbyit.Wemight
call this position a kind of materialist dualism.1 So if Aristotle is
steering a via media in this passage, it is between two kinds of
dualism;theonlypositiondiscussedintheDeanimathatisakinto
modernmaterialismistheviewthatthesoulisanattunementofthe
body, but Aristotle quickly dismisses this position in De anima 1
with the usual arguments from the Phaedo, and does not seem
to be concerned to reply to it in De anima 2. And Aristotle does
notusuallyrepresentPlatonicdualismandmaterialist‘dualism’as
opposite errors between which we must steer. Rather, he tries to
show that they come to much the same thing. ‘Democritus . . .
saysthat theindivisiblespheresaremoved,sinceitistheirnature
nevertorest,andthattheymovethewholebodyanddragitalong
withthem...andTimaeustoophysicizes[φυσιολογε„]thatthesoul
movesthebodyinthissameway,namelythatbybeingmoveditself
italsomovesthebody,sinceitisinterwovenwithit’(Deanima1.3,
406B20–2,B26–8).Likewise,whenXenocratessaysthatthesoulis
aself-movingnumber,then,sincenumbersarecomposedofunits,
andsinceunitsthataremovedmusthavepositionandsomust be
points, ‘it follows that the animal is moved bythe numberin just
the same way that we have said Democritus made it moved: for
what di·erencedoes it make whether we say small spheresor big
units, ormore generallyunits in locomotion?For in either case it
1 So Deborah Modrak: ‘According to Aristotle, ancient dualism took several
forms:oneformwasmaterialisticinthattheseparatepsychicalsubstancewasiden-
tifiedwithamaterialelement;theotherwasdualistinthemodernsense, i.e.,the
psychicalsubstancewasincorporeal.Aristotleissharplycriticalofalltwo-substance
viewsaswellasmaterialistmonism’(Aristotle:ThePowerofPerception (Chicago,
1987),83n.1).
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Aristotle’sDefinitionofSoulandtheDeanima 85
isnecessarythat[thesoul]movestheanimalthroughthesethings’
beingmoved’(Deanima1.5,409B7–11;cf.1.4,409A6–15).
In these texts, and systematically in De anima 1, Aristotle is
trying to reduce a Platonic or Academic theory of the soul to a
materialist theory, and trying to show that the Platonists should
rejectthistheoryforthesamereasonsthattheyrejectthematerialist
position. For Plato and Xenocrates, as for Democritus, the soul
movesthebodybyfirstmovingitselfandthencommunicatingits
ownmotiontothebody,andthisexplanationdependsonthesoul’s
being moved with the same kind of locomotion that the body is:
the soul must be coextended or ‘interwoven’ with the body, and
attached to it in such as way as to communicate locomotions to
the body in voluntary motion and pick up locomotions from the
body in sensation (cf. esp. Tim. 36d 8–e 5, 37a 5–b 8, 43b 5–
44c1; Phileb. 33d 2–34a 5). Aristotle takes these descriptions to
showthatthePlatonistsareconceivingthesoulasbody-like—that,
although they formally deny that it is a body, they have no other
modelforconceivingitscausality,andsofallbackondescriptions
whichwouldinfactbeappropriateonlytobodies.Thefundamental
criticism of Democritus’ theory that the soul moves the body by
‘dragging it along’ with its own motion is that ‘the soul seems
to move the animal, not in this way, but by choice and thinking
[ν¸ησις]’ (De anima 1. 3, 406B21–2, 24–5), recalling the Phaedo’s
critique(98c2–99b2)ofAnaxagoras’explanationofwhySocrates
issittingonthisbenchinprison.ButtheTimaeusisalltoosimilar.
Aristotle recognizes that the world-soul’s circular motions of the
Same and the Di·erent are supposedto beactivities of ν¸ησις(cf.
De anima 1. 3, 407A2–6), but he thinks that Timaeus’ description
ofthese‘circuits ofνοÓςintheheavens’(Tim. 47b7),onemoving
in the plane of the equator and seven in the plane of the ecliptic,
all bearingtheheavenlybodiesalongwith them, ine·ect reduces
thispsychicmotiontosomethingcorporeal,‘asifthelocomotions
oftheheavenswerethemotionsofthesoul’(Deanima1.3,407A1–
2). In these passages of De anima 1 Aristotle’s approach to the
soul appears not as a via media between the Platonists and the
physicists, but as an internal critique, by Platonist standards, of
PlatoandXenocrates.
Guided by these clues from the critical De anima 1, I shall try
to readAristotle’s positive treatmentof soulbeginningin Deani-
ma 2. 1—his definition of soul and his programme, implicit in
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this definition, for studying the particular powers, activities, ob-
jects, and instruments of souls—as the result of such an internal
critiqueofPlatonicapproachestothesoul.ButtoseewhatinAris-
totle’streatmentofsoulneedstobeexplained,andtoseewhether
it canbeexplainedinthis way,we mustfirstseewhereAristotle’s
approach is distinctive, that is, where it diverges from the back-
groundassumptionsaboutthesoulthatAristotleandhisaudience
would originally have taken for granted; and so we must first see
what these assumptions were. While it is always generally plaus-
ible,sinceAristotlewasPlato’sstudent,thatviewswefindinPlato
wouldbeAristotle’sstarting-pointforinternalcritique,we areon
much firmer ground if we can find the Platonic views expressed
in Aristotle himself, and then compare the De anima to see how
it agrees and disagrees. And there are indeed many texts in Aris-
totle that, if taken at face value, express an interactionist dualism
about soul and body. In some cases, we could without too much
violenceharmonizethesetextswiththetheoryofsoulinDeanima
2.1·.,bysayingthatAristotle,incontextswherethesoul’sonto-
logicalstatusandcausalrelationsarenotthemaintopicofenquiry,
speakswiththevulgar,usingtermswhichcouldbeliterallyjustified
onlyon moreexoteric theoriesof soul and not onAristotle’s own
views. However, there aretexts that cannot be ‘saved’ in this way
without violence, and I shall briefly mention some passages here
which seem to require a developmental solution: Aristotle was at
one point an interactionist dualist, and only later worked out the
distinctivepositionoftheDeanima.2Formypurposeshereitisnot
actually all that important whether Aristotle, in these apparently
dualist and interactionist texts, is expressingan opinionwhich he
later modified, or whether he is speaking with the vulgar; either
way, the texts would reflect the background default assumptions
aboutthesoulwhichAristotlewouldbestartingfromandmodify-
ingintheDeanima,andwhichhewouldalsobetryingtopersuade
his audience to modify.But there would be nothingsurprising in
Aristotle’shavingbeenatonepointaninteractionistdualist,since
almost everyone who had written about the soul before him had
been such a ‘dualist’, whether of a materialist or anti-materialist
variety.
The fragments of Aristotle’s lost works are best known in this
2 I shalldiscuss these texts in detailin‘TheOrigins of Aristotle’s Concept of
öΕν›ργεια:öΕν›ργειαandΚflνησις’,indraft.
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connection. The Eudemus argued for the soul’s immortality and
separability fromthe body,and, notoriously,the Protrepticussays
that ‘as they say the Etruscans torture their captives by binding
corpsesfacetofacewiththeliving,attachingeachpart tothe cor-
responding part, so too the soul seems to be stretched out and
fastenedtoallthesensitiveparts[i.e.sense-organs]ofthebody’(B
107Du•ring).Buttherearealsomanytextsinapparentlyearlyparts
of the transmitted Corpus Aristotelicum that seem to maintain an
interactionistdualism.Inparticular,Aristotlesaysinseveralplaces
thatinsensationor(sensory)pleasurethesoulismovedbythebody.
ThusPhysics7.2–3saysthat‘sensationasanactivityisamotionvia
thebody,whenthesenseisa·ectedinsomeway[ô αÊσθησιςô κατö
Úν›ργειαν κflνησflς Úστι δι! τοÓ σ˛µατος,πασχο˝σης τι τ¯ς α˘σθfiσεως]’
(7.2,244B11–12),andtheDesomno,repeatingthesameformulaal-
mostverbatimbutspellingoutthatitisthesoulthatismoved,says
that‘sensationinthesenseoftheactivityisamotionofthesoulvia
thebody[ôλεγοµ›νηαÊσθησις(cid:189)ςÚν›ργειακflνησflςτιςδι!τοÓσ˛µατος
τ¯ς ψυχ¯ς Úστι]’(454A8–10);Magnamoralia2. 7saysthat pleasure
isamotionofthesoul,andPhysics7.3,247A6–19,specifiesthatin
sensorypleasurethesensitivepartofthesoulismovedbythesen-
siblethings.Inthesetextsthecatchphraseκflνησιςδι! τοÓσ˛µατος,
‘motionvia the body’,signalsreferenceto, andacceptance of, the
Philebus–Timaeusaccountofsensationsasκινfiσεις δι!τοÓ σ˛µατος
Úπ" τ¬νψυχ¬νφερ¸µεναι(Tim.43c4–5,slightlyrearranged),thatis,
as motions (whether locomotions or otherwise) that begin in the
bodyandarecommunicatedtothesoul.3
Whenscholars have noticed these Aristotelian texts at all, they
generally say that Aristotle is speaking loosely, and that he really
meansjustthatthesoulacts(Úνεργε„)ontheoccasionofsomething
thathappensinthebody,notthatthesoulismovedbythebodyor
thatitisinmotionatall.But,inthefirstplace,thisbegsthequestion
whether Aristotle, at the time when he wrote these texts, had the
notion of an Úν›ργεια that is not a κflνησις; in at least some of the
3 For more Platonic texts elaborating this theory of sensation see Phileb. 33d
2–34a5andTim.43b5–44c1,andspecificallyonvision45c–dandonhearing
67b(andcf.Theaet.186b11–c2).Forthecatchphraseκflνησιςδι!τοÓσ˛µατοςsee
alsotheparallelRep.9,584c4–5,account ofpleasure(everything exceptκflνησις,
mentionedearlierat583e9–10),andalsoArist.Top.4.5onwhetherαÊσθησιςisa
κflνησιςδι!τοÓσ˛µατος(AristotlerejectsthishereonlyonthegroundthatanαÊσθησις
isaåξιςandaκflνησιςisanÚν›ργεια,sohewouldapparentlyacceptitasanaccountof
ôαÊσθησιςôκατöÚν›ργειαν).
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textswherehedescribessensationorpleasureasaκflνησις,thereare
strongreasonstothinkthathedidnothavesuchanotion.4Second,
at least Physics 7. 2–3 just cannot be read as speaking ‘loosely’ in
this way. Aristotle is taking extraordinary care here to be precise
about what can properly be called a κflνησις and what cannot. In
Physics7.2hehasarguedthateverythingthatismovedis‘together
with’ (i.e. immediately touchedby) its proximatemover, whether
themotionisalocomotionoranaugmentationordiminutionoran
alteration.Butinmakinghisargumentforthecaseofalterationhe
hasassumedthepremissthat‘everythingwhichisalteredisaltered
bysensiblethings,andalterationoccursonlyinthosethingswhich
aresaidtobea·ected[π‹σχειν]persebysensiblethings’(7.3,245B3–
5), which 7. 3 arguesfor at length. To prove this thesis Aristotle
goes exhaustively through all possible changes in the category of
quality (e.g. the acquisition of a science or a virtue or vice), and
argues either that the alteration is produced by a sensible thing,
orthatthechangeisnotreallyaκflνησις(andsonotanalteration).
But Aristotle carefully avoids saying that the only things which
arealtered aresensiblethings: hemaintains instead that thereare
alterations in the two kinds of things which are per se a·ected by
sensiblethings,namely‘insensiblethingsandinthesensitivepart
of the soul’ (248A7–8). ‘Pleasures and pains are alterations of the
sensitive [part of the soul]’ (247A16–17),andAristotle goesout of
hiswaytoassertthatpleasuresandpainsandsensations,unlikethe
acquisitionofsciencesandvirtues, aregenuineκινfiσεις,produced
by sensible things (by the body, or by external sensible things or
sensiblequalities)butnotinasensiblething.Physics7thusasserts,
not just that sensation is a κflνησις and alteration of the soul, but
also that the soul is moved by the body, and also that the soul
and its bodily mover are in spatial contact. These theses are all
contradictedbytheDeanima,butAristotleis,nonetheless,clearly
anddeliberatelymaintainingtheminPhysics7.5
4 EspeciallyProtrepticusB80andMM2.7;Ishallgiveadetaileddiscussionin
‘TheOrigins of Aristotle’s Concept of öΕν›ργεια:öΕν›ργειαandΚflνησις’.It would
not be surprising if Aristotle had started by assuming that all Úν›ργειαis κflνησις,
sincethishadbeenthenormalbackgroundassumptionbeforehistimeandwould
continuetobesoforcenturiesafter(seen.13below).Everyone,includingAristotle,
continuestoassumethatallκflνησιςisÚν›ργεια;theonlyquestioniswhetherthereare
alsootherÚν›ργειαιthatarenotκινfiσεις.
5 Against R. Wardy, The Chain of Change (Cambridge, 1990), 222n.: ‘But of
courseifinanun-Aristotelian spiritonedistinguishesbetweensoulandensouled
body,thenitnolongermakesanysensetosaythatthesoulundergoesalteration.So
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Aristotle’sDefinitionofSoulandtheDeanima 89
I realize that the developmentalist approach to Aristotle’s psy-
chologyis often thought to have been discredited. Certainly Nu-
yens,andRossfollowinghim,statedtheirdevelopmentalistviews
in crude and unconvincingforms;but the quickdismissals of de-
velopmentalismthatoneseesthesedaysarenotconvincingeither.
NuyensandRosscontrastthe‘instrumentalist’theoryofsoulthat
theyseein(somepartsof)thebiologicalworksandtheParvanatu-
ralia,accordingtowhichthesoulisanimmaterialsubstanceusing
the body as its instrument, with the hylomorphic theory of soul
presentintheDeanima(orrather,asRosssays,inpartsoftheDe
anima,foritisclearlystatedonlyat2.1–4and2.12);andtheypro-
poseachronologicalsolution,supposingthat thebiologicalworks
andParvanaturaliaare early,andthat Aristotle comestohis ma-
turehylomorphictheoryofsoulonlyintheDeanima.Morerecent
writers(Block,Lefe›vre, Modrak,Nussbaum)pointoutthat Aris-
totledescribestheanimalbodyanditspartsasinstrumentsofthe
soulintheDeanimatoo(evenat2.1–4,thecoretextsforhylomor-
phism);theyrightlyconcludethatweshouldtrytounderstandhow
hylomorphistandinstrumentalistlanguagecanbecompatible,and
that the mere presence of instrumentalist language in a text does
notshowthat Aristotle did notbelievein hylomorphismwhen he
wroteit.SotheytrytoharmonizeatleasttheParvanaturaliawith
the De anima, by saying that the texts that Nuyens and Ross had
taken to express instrumentalist dualism are either just loose ex-
pressionsor else areliterally compatiblewith hylomorphism;and
then, if nothingin the Parvanaturaliacontradicts hylomorphism
outright,theyproposetointerpretthesetextsfromthestandpoint
of the De anima.ButI donot thinkthis last stepcan be justified.
WhilenothingintheParvanaturaliaexplicitlydeniesthatthesoul
is the form of the body, the texts of the De somno and Physics 7
describingsensationsasκινfiσεις τ¯ς ψυχ¯ς δι! τοÓ σ˛µατοςdofor-
mally andflagrantly contradictanothercentral doctrine ofthe De
ifAristotledoesallowhimselftosaythis,itmustbebecauseheischaracteristically
thinkingintermsofananimateσ˝νολον,inwhichtheindividualα˘σθfiσεις/α˘σθητfiρια
collectivelyarethesensitivepartofthesoul.’Itisnotun-AristotelianevenintheDe
animatodistinguishbetweenthesoulandtheensouledbody,andPhysics7makes
it perfectly clear that the sensitive soul, whichis not a body or a sensible thing,
undergoesalteration.IdonotknowwhyWardythinksthat‘ofcourse’suchasoul
couldnotundergoalteration;Platocertainlythought thesoulcouldbemovedby
thebody,andPhysics7,whilecriticizingtheTimaeus’theoryofsoulonsomepoints
(notablyindenyingthatν¸ησιςisacircularmotionintheintellectualsoul—moreon
thisbelow),remainsclosetoitonothers.
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anima (that the soul is not moved, and specifically, not moved in
sensation);andIdonotunderstandhowaformcanbe‘moved’by
its matter (except per accidens because the composite is moved).6
RatherthanforcingthesetextstoharmonizewiththeDeanima—
andratherthanignoringthemorathetizingthem—weshouldtreat
themaspartofthebackgroundfromwhichtheDeanimaemerged.
TherightlessontodrawisthatAristotleneverrepudiatedinstru-
mentalism,andthatweshouldseethehylomorphictheoryofsoul
(which need not contradict instrumentalism, but does contradict
the interactionisttheoryofsensation) asanimmanent critique, of
Plato and of Aristotle’s own early views, growing out of the dif-
ficulties of instrumentalist interactionism. In what follows I shall
notdwellonAristotle’searlyviewsonthesoul,orontheproblems
of dating di·erent texts;7 rather, I want to use these background
textstobringoutwhatisdistinctiveaboutthehylomorphistreform
programmeoftheDeanimaandwhatmayhavemotivatedit.
Ithinkitiswrongtolocatethedistinctive innovationoftheDe
anima in a rejection of soul-body dualism. There is a legitimate
sense in which the De anima’s theory of soul is non-dualist, but
the di·erent things that Aristotle says about the soul in di·erent
treatises do not neatly divide into dualist and anti-dualist (how
exactlydoyousay‘dualist’inGreek?):therearemanytextsevenin
theDeanimaitselfwhichifwewerenotlookingoverourshoulder
at De anima 2. 1–4 we would probably call dualist, and I think
Aristotle would besurprisedto betold that he hadbeen a dualist
up to a certain point in his life and had then become an anti-
dualist. However, the De anima di·ers sharply from earlier texts
of Aristotle, as well as from the views of Aristotle’s predecessors
6 AsfarasIknow,thescholarsIhavementionedhaveneverdiscussedthetextson
thesoul’sbeingmoved.TheonlyrecentscholarIknowwhoshowsanyawareness
of these texts is Robert Heinaman, in ‘Aristotle and the Mind–Body Problem’,
Phronesis,37(1990),83–102,whobrieflydiscussessomeofthetexts,pp.86–7,and
rightlyconcludesthatAristotlehaschangedhismindbetweenthesetextsandthe
Deanima.
7 Inmyview,theseproblemsarelargelyintractable,becauseAristotlekeptrevis-
ingearlier material.ItisnotsomuchthattheDesomno isearly,asthat thereare
somecharacteristically earlyviewsexpressedinitthatwerenotcorrectedonrevi-
sion.(Cross-references arenotmuchhelpindating:ife.g.theDesensurefersback
toaDeanima,thisneednotbetheversionoftheDeanimathatwehavenow.)Part
ofthe specialevidentialvalueof Physics 7,theEudemian Ethics,the Protrepticus,
etc.isthatthesearetextsthat,foroneoranotherreason,Aristotlestoppedrevising
(becausehereplacedthemwithPhysics8ortheNicomacheanEthics,becausehehad
alreadysentittoThemisoninCyprusanditwastoolatetodoanythingaboutit).
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Aristotle’sDefinitionofSoulandtheDeanima 91
(anddoubtlessofhiscontemporaries,andofthevastmajorityofhis
successors),indenyingthatthesoulismoved.TheAristotleofthe
De anima still thinks, like all other Greek philosophers,8that the
soul moves the body, but he is no longer an inter-actionist, since
he denies that the body moves or acts upon the soul. Aristotle’s
denial that the soul is moved seems to have come in two stages.
In Physics 7. 3, while saying that the sensitive part of soul can
be moved, he is already rejecting the view of the Timaeus that
thinking(ν¸ησις)isamotion(specifically,acircularlocomotion)of
thesoul.Physics7.3arguesthatthereisnocoming-to-be(γ›νεσις)
of knowledge(Úπιστfiµη),since onpain of aninfinite regressthere
can be no coming-to-be of motion or of rest, and knowledge is a
kindofbeing-at-rest:
The original acquisition of knowledge is neither coming-to-be nor al-
teration, since we are said to know and to understand [φρονε„ν] through
thought [δι‹νοια] having come to rest and being still, and there is no
coming-to-beofresting,norindeedofanychange,ashasbeensaidbefore.
Furthermore, aswhensomeone haspassedfrom drunkenness orsleepor
illnesstotheircontraries,wedonotsaythathehascome-to-be aknower
again,althoughhewaspreviouslyunabletousehisknowledge,soneither
whensomeoneoriginallyacquiresthestate[doeshecome-to-beaknower].
Foritisthrough thesoul’ssettlingdown fromitscongenitaldisturbance
[φυσικ¬ταραχfi]9thathecomes-to-beanunderstandingandknowingthing:
thisiswhychildrencanneitherlearnnordistinguishbymeansofthesenses
as [wellas] adults can, since there is much disturbance and motion. But
thesoulsettlesdownandisbroughttorest,insomecasesbynatureitself,
inothersbyotherthings,ineithercasewhensomethingsinthebodyare
altered,aswithuseandactivity,whensomeonebecomessoberorawakens.
(247B9–248A6)
This is very close to Tim. 43a 6–44b 7, but where the Timaeus
saysthat intheinfantthenaturalcircular motionsofsoularedis-
turbedbysensorymotions,Aristotlesaysthatthesensorymotions
disturb what would otherwise be a resting condition. Thus Aris-
totle is already denying the Platonic self-motion of soul (and the
descriptionof ν¸ησιςas the soul’sundisturbedself-motion), while
accepting that the soul is moved via the body; and still in the De
animahesaysthat‘onewouldrathersaythatthesoulismovedby
8 Except Dicaearchus and perhaps Aristoxenus, and possibly earlier harmony
theoristsiftherewereany.
9 φυσικfiheremustmeannot‘natural’but‘consequentonbirthandnutrition’—
seenasnotnaturaltothesoul.
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the sensibles[sc. than by itself], if it is moved at all’ (406B10–11).
TheDeanima,likePhysics7,arguesthat‘ν¸ησιςmoreresemblesa
stoppingandÚπfl-στασις10thanamotion’(407A32–3),andsaysthat
themoreplausiblegroundforthinkingthatthesoulismovedisthat
‘we[ordinarily]saythatthesoulfeelspainandpleasureanddaring
and fear and is also angry and senses and considers [διανοε„σθαι],
and all of these seem to be motions’ (408B1–4).11 But then Aris-
totlepromptlyproceedstosay—contradictingPhysics7,andgoing
much further than Physics 7 in criticizing Plato—that even these
sensationsandpassionsareinfact notmotionsofthe soul,andto
sketch an alternative analysis of these activities. One main aim of
De anima 1 is in fact to argue, against the consensus view of the
earlier philosophersthat Aristotle discusses, that ‘it is impossible
formotiontobelongto[thesoul]’(Deanima1.3,406A2).12
10 Aristotle’s point, here and in Phys. 7. 3, 247B11, turns on the etymology of
ÚπιστfiµηandistakenfromCrat.437a.
11 ThelistseemspartlytakenfromPlato’satLaws10,897a1–3:‘wishing,aiming,
caring, deliberating, opining rightly and wrongly, feeling pleasure and pain and
daring and fear, hating and loving’. Aristotle’s inclusion of διανοε„σθαι alongside
thepassionsandsensations isinitiallysurprising,andmightseemtoseparate the
doctrine Aristotle is here describing as plausible(although, as he goes on to say,
false)fromthedoctrineofPhysics7thatpassionsandsensationsaremotionsofsoul
andν¸ησιςisnot.Butδιανοε„σθαιhereisnotsupposedtomeanthesameasνοε„ν:half
a Bekker-page down,at De anima 1.4, 408B24–7, Aristotle distinguishes sharply
betweenτ3νοε„νκα"τ3θεωρε„ν,whichareactsofsomethingËπαθ›ς(thuspurelyof
some soul, not of soul and body together), andthus certainly not motions, from
διανοε„σθαι,anactnotofthisbutofacomposite,whichat408B5–18hehasdescribed
asamotion.Forwhyδιανοε„σθαιwouldbeamotionandνοε„νwouldnot,relevant
backgroundisnotonlytheRepublic,whereδι‹νοιαisreasoningfromahypothesis,
contrastedwithÚπιστfiµη,directgraspofatruth(7,533b–534a;ν¸ησιςishereused
forbothactivities),butespeciallyTheaet.189e4–190a7,whereδιανοε„σθαιisthe
soul’sdialoguewithitself,whichδ¸ξα,i.e.makingupyourmind,putsastopto.I
wouldtakeδιανοε„σθαιinDeanima1.4tomeansomethinglike‘puzzlingthrough
a problem’:it is thus the motion that ν¸ησις,the successful insight resolving the
problem,putsastopto.Thisstillseemsunlikethesensations andpassionsinnot
beingessentiallyinvolvedwiththebody;butinfactDeanima1.4,408B7–9,B13–15,
andB25–7saythatδιανοε„σθαιtooessentiallyinvolvesthebody:thusifarationalsoul
existedwithoutabody,itwouldperceiveimmediatelywhateveritwouldbecapable
ofperceiving.
12 ThispointisrightlystressedbyCharlotteWittinherarticle‘Dialectic,Motion,
andPerception:DeAnima,BookI’,inM.NussbaumandA.Rorty(eds.),Essayson
Aristotle’sDeAnima(Oxford,1992),169–83;itisalsodiscussedbyM.Tweedale,
‘Aristotle’sMotionlessSoul’,Dialogue,29(1990),123–32,byHeinaman,‘Aristotle
and the Mind–Body Problem’, and otherwise by almost nobody. Many scholars
havedi¶cultyinrecognizingthisbasicfactaboutDeanima1,andinsistonreading
as‘naturalistic’criticismsofsoul–bodydualismwhatareinfact‘anti-naturalistic’
criticismsofthethesisthatthesoulismoved.