Aristotle's De Motu Animalium

230 Pages·1986·18.4 MB·English

by  Martha C. Nussbaum

Aristotle s
DE MOTU ANIMALIUM
Text with Translation, Commentary,
and Interpretive Essays by
MARTHA CRAVEN NUSSBAUM
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS
PRINCETON
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Published by Princeton University Press, 41 William Street, To the memory of my father, George Craven, 1901-1972
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CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS IX
ABBREVIATIONS USED FOR WORKS OF ARISTOTLE XI
ABBREVIATIONS USED FOR JOURNALS AND REFERENCE WORKS xii
INTRODUCTION XV
NOTE TO THE PAPERBACK EDITION XXV
I AUTHENTICITY, TEXT TRANSMISSION, AND MANUSCRIPTS 1
Chapter 1. The Authorship and Dating of the De Motu
Animalium 3
Chapter 2. The Manuscripts 13
II TEXT AND TRANSLATION 19
Note on the Translation 20
Text 25
Translation 24
III INTERPRETIVE ESSAYS 57
Essay 1: Aristotle on Teleological Explanation 59
The Democritean Challenge 61
The Level of Explanation: Form and Matter 67
Teleology: The Direction of Explanation 74
Self-Maintaining Systems 76
Functions 81
Teleology and Intentionality 85
Teleology and Necessity 88
Teleology and the Universe 93
Appendix: The Function of Man 100
Essay 2: The De Motu Animalium and Aristotle's Scien­
tific Method 107
The MA and Physics VIII 114
Animal Motion and Heavenly Motion 121
Chapters 1 and 2: introductory remarks on animals 121
Chapters 3 and 4: the arguments for an external
unmoved mover 125
Essay 3: The Sumphuton Pneuma and the De Motu
Anhnaliuvfs Account of Soul and Body 143
The pneuma and hylomorphism 146
The pneuma and Aristotle's theory of matter 158
VII
CONTENTS
Essay 4: Practical Syllogisms and Practical Science 165
Necessity and the Practical-Theoretical Parallel 175
The Practical Syllogism in the De Motu 184
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The Syllogism in EN VII and DA III 201
Rules and Practical Consistency 210
Essay 5: The Role of Phantasia in Aristotle's Explana-
tions of Action 221 This book could not have been written without the Society
Phantasia in the accounts of action 232 of Fellows at Harvard, which supported me generously dur­
The use and range of phantasia 241 ing its preparation and made it possible for me to spend a
Phantasia and aisthisis 255 year in England, during which much of the work was
Phantasia and orexis 261 completed.
Phantasia and thinking 265
Aristotle wrote of philosophical studies that "it is not easy
IV COMMENTARY 271
to be continuously active in solitude; but with others and
Chapter 1 273
towards others it is easier" (EN 1170a5-7). This book owes
Chapter 2 286
an enormous debt to those whose philosophical acumen and
Chapter 3 292
Chapter 4 311 whose friendship inspired and encouraged me through many
Chapter 5 325 drafts. My first thanks are due to G. E. L. Owen, who sug­
Chapter 6 331 gested this as a thesis topic and supported me through every
Chapter 7 341 stage in my work. His dedication, his boundless energy,
Chapter 8 353 and his incisive intellect are a model for me, as they are for
Chapter 9 369 everyone working in this field. To Terence Irwin, my
Chapter 10 374 second thesis reader, I am grateful for a detachment and a
Chapter 11 379 lucidity that repeatedly engendered productive dissatisfac­
tion with current progress. My understanding of various
BIBLIOGRAPHY 387
problems connected with practical reasoning and the prac­
INDEX 401
tical syllogism owes much to conversations and corres­
INDEX OF PROPER NAMES 406
pondence with David Wiggins; the whole book owes more
INDEX LOCORUM 412
still to his insight, encouragement, and friendship. Conver­
sations with Nelson Goodman and Thomas Nagel were in­
valuable for my revisions of what is now Essay 5. In Albert
Henrichs, the text and many portions of the commentary
found a critic both diligent and acute. Gerasimos Santas
and Marianne McDonald read the entire manuscript with
great care and made a number of valuable suggestions. Dur­
ing the final stages of revision I was stimulated by conver­
sations with Hilary Putnam and John Rawls, by forceful
criticisms from Zeph Stewart, and by questions from Bruce
Altshuler and the students in my Philosophy 105. I par­
ticularly wish to thank Norman Malcolm for giving me per-
Vlll
IX
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
mission to discuss a forthcoming article of his in Essay 4.
There are many others whose contributions have been
ABBREVIATIONS USED FOR WORKS OF
valuable to me, and I hope they will forgive this list, a
ARISTOTLE
totally inadequate gesture of appreciation: J. L. Ackrill,
D. M. Balme, J. Cooper, D. J. Furley, R. Kassel, C. Kirwan,
A. C. Lloyd, Paul Moraux, Malcolm Schofield, Peter M.
Smith, Richard Sorabji, Bernard Williams. Bckker nos.
Cat. Categories 1-15
Translations from the Greek (including the Homer
Dl De Interpretatione 16-24
translation in Essay 1) are my own, unless otherwise
APr Prior Analytics 24-70
acknowledged.
APo Posterior Analytics 71-100
Martha Craven Nussbaum Top. Topics 100-164
SE De Sophisticis Elenchis 164-184
Ph. Physics 184-267
DC De Caelo 268-313
GC De Generatione et Corruptione 314-338
Meteor. Meteorologica 338-390
DA De Anhna 402-435
PN Parva Naturalia 436-486
Sens. De Sensu 436-449
Mem. De Memoria 449-453
Somn. De Somno 453-458
Insomn. De Insomniis 458-462
Div. Somn. De Divinatione per Somnum 462-464
Long. De Longitudine Vitae 464-467
Juv. De Juventute 467-470
Resp. De Respiratione 470-480
HA Historia Animalium 486-638
PA De Partibus Animalium 639-697
MA De Motu Animalium 698-704
IA De Incessu Animalium 704-714
GA De Generatione Animalium 715-789
Probl. Problemata 859-967
Metaph. Metaphysics 980-1093
EN Nicomachean Ethics 1094-1181
MM Magna Moralia 1181-1213
EE Endeviian Ethics 1214-1249
Pol. Politics 1252-1342
Rhet. Rhetoric 1354-1420
Po. Poetics 1447-1462
x
XI
ABBREVIATIONS USED FOR JOURNALS AND ABBREVIATIONS
REFERENCE WORKS
RPh Revue de philologie, de litterature, et
d'histoire anciennes
AbhBerl, AbhMainz Abhandlungen of Berlin and Mainz Aca­ ZDMG Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenldndis-
demies chen Gesellschaft
AGP Archiv fiir die Geschichte der Philoso­ ZOG Zeitschrift fiir die osterreichischen Gym-
phic nasien
AJP American journal of Philology
AntCl L'Antiquke classique
APQ American Philosophical Quarterly
BfP British Journal of Psychology
BJPS British Journal of the Philosophy of
Science
CAG Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca
CIMed Classica et Mediaevalia
CQ Classical Quarterly
CR Classical Review
HSCP Harvard Studies in Classical Philology
JHB Journal of the History of Biology
JHS Journal of Hellenic Studies
JOBG Jahrbuch der osterreichischen byzantinis-
chen Gesellschaft
JPhilol Journal of Philology
JPhilos Journal of Philosophy
MusHelv Museum Helveticum
PAS Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
PASS Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,
Supplementary Vol.
PBA Proceedings of the British Academy
PCPS Proceedings of the Cambridge Philolog­
ical Society
PPA Philosophy and Public Affairs
PQ Philosophical Quarterly
PR Philosophical Review
PS Philosophy of Science
RE Pauly-Wissowa, Real-Encyclopadie der
klassischen Altertumswissenschaft
REG Revue des Etudes grecques
RM Review of Metaphysics
Xll
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INTRODUCTION
"The unexplained should by all means be inexplicable,
the unexplainable by all means unnatural, supernatural,
miraculous—thus goes the demand in the souls of all the
religious and the metaphysicians . . .; while the scientific
person sees in this demand the 'evil principle'."
Friedrich Nietzsche, Human, All-Too-Human, 136
I
The aim of this book is to ask through a study of one of his
most complicated treatises on explanation, how far, and in
what sense, the demands of the "scientific person" are
Aristotle's. All men by nature reach out for understanding
(Metaph. 980al). What form does this episteme take, and
how far, in the various areas of human life and study, can
our need for it be satisfied? What will the most satisfactory
answers to our "why" questions be like? How are our various
answers related? How far should we press the demand for
understanding?
These are, of course, the central preoccupations of Aris­
totle's philosophical work; no comprehensive account could
be attempted here. But the De Motu Animalium, with its
cryptic and intricate attempt to formulate answers to some
of these questions, provides us with an occasion to make
some preliminary moves toward such an account, while at
the same offering a comprehensive exegesis of a little-known
source of evidence. Aristotle's treatment of these central
problems is never dogmatic. One of the great virtues that
distinguishes him from his philosophical predecessors is his
reluctance to press for a single answer when the evidence
points to several, or to apply incautiously in one area a solu­
tion that had been found promising in another. The best
way to build towards an account of his theories seems, then,
xv
ARISTOTLE'S DE MOTU ANIMALIUM INTRODUCTION
to be to begin with particular problems, or with the data of (Diog. Laert. §17). Mathemata, the texts of distinguished
a particular text, "through which we may seek the general books and of common experience, here take the place of
account as well, and with which we think it ought to be Plato's mystical vision of the Forms as our best (and only)
in harmony" (cf. MA 698a13-14). As Aristotle's treatises
source of philosophical light. Aristotle insists that we must
are related to our experience of and talk about the world,
confront great obscurities not with a prayer for sudden
so it is the aim of this commentary to stand to one of his
insight, but by "trying to say the phainomenori"—by setting
works: as a sorting-out and an interpretation that both
out clearly what we and others say; the student who has
"saves" the "appearances" and illuminates them.
a genuine thirst for philosophy will consider it a sign of
Aristotle was the first philosopher to cherish books and self-respect to attempt neither more nor less than this.4 I
reading. He believed that all genuine philosophy is com­ shall try here to describe an Aristotelian text as it appears to
mentary—on the texts of the "wise" and on the data of our me, and to show how it might be a source of learning. My
ordinary speech.1 Throughout his career, he defended com­
ideal would be to treat Aristotle with the critical rigor, the
mentary against the claims of those who insisted that the independence, and the devotion5 with which he treated
philosopher ought to seek a mystical revelation that would
those who helped him to understand the world.
set him apart from the common man, and teach a self-
contained doctrine that would make no attempt to return
to the "appearances," to the world in which we live our II
daily lives.2 It seems particularly fitting, then, that one who
We see animals moving around—walking, swimming, flying,
thinks Aristotle one of the very wisest of "the many and
the wise"3 should embrace the philosophical task that he creeping. And we ourselves are also moving animals. Why?
What role does motion from place to place play in animal
invented—and as one which can contribute not only to
lives? And what would be an adequate explanation of a par­
our understanding of Aristotle but, ultimately, to our grasp
ticular animal movement? Is there some general account we
of the questions that this wise man thought most important.
can give of these phenomena that will hold good for humans
If it was with a sneer that Plato invited students occupied
with higher matters to pay a visit to "the reader's house" and animals alike? With these questions, and with the hope
{Vita Marciana 5), we might answer the sneer with the that such a general answer will be found, Aristotle begins
"reader's" reported epigram: "As sight receives light the De Motu Animalium.
from the surrounding air, so does the soul from its studies" If the work assumes anything from the beginning, it is
that it always makes sense to ask the question "Why?" about
1 On the Aristotelian notion of the "appearances" (phainomena), a particular case of animal motion. This is not a trivial claim.
cf. Essays 2 and 5. I am indebted throughout to Owen's important
"Tithenai," which first made the vital point that the phainomena in­ 4 DC 291b25-28; this passage is discussed further in Essay 2, and
clude what we say, as well as what we see and hear. especially in n. 47, which defends the reading here adopted.
* Cf. DC 293*27-30, 306*5 ff.; GC 316*5-14, 325*13 ff.; and notes to "Aristotle (if it was, indeed, he) wrote that Plato was a man
chapter 1, 698*4 ff. Dialectic may, of course, require us to abandon "whom it is not right for base men even to praise" (Olympiadorus
or alter some of our initial beliefs (Top. 101*33, EN 1145b2-6); but if In PL Gorg. 41.3, emphasis mine)—thus succinctly indicating that
the argument is not merely eristic (cf. 160*33 ff.), it will show that the independent critic can be more truly reverent than the disciple.
our most basic beliefs and sayings require the change. Many attacks on Aristotle's reputation as a historian of philosophy
'Top. 100*21, 104*8-10. neglect this point.
xvi XVII
INTRODUCTION
ARISTOTLE'S DE MOTU ANIMALIUM
I am not saying that I do not know the explanation; I
To see this, let us imagine that two Greek biologists are
am saying that I know that there is no explanation.
conversing—somewhere in Asia Minor, by the side of a
Animals, especially tortoises, are arbitrary creatures.
large fresh-water pond.
There are some cases (though not terribly many)
B.: Why did that tortoise cross the mud? (cf. MA 698b16) where they move this way or that, jump in the air or
A.: To get to the other side. cross the mud, for no reason at all. It is a mistake to
B.: (triumphantly) Wrong. suppose that all cases can be forced into your pattern;
A.: Well, what was the reason then? some are simply intractable, and any good theory of
B.: No reason at all. animal motion must acknowledge this. To say that all
A.: What do you mean? Didn't he go to get something? motions can be—even potentially—understood and
Wasn't there something he wanted, something he explained is just a fashionable dogmatism.
couldn't get without crossing the mud?
B.: No. You can see that there's nothing over there but B.'s position is not at all absurd or indefensible6—though
more mud. there is, of course, danger in retreating to such a position too
A.: Well maybe he is running away from something. If soon in any particular problem case. We will want to be very
his feet weren't slipping so much (cf. MA 698b17), sure that he has not simply overlooked some relevant piece
he would be going rather fast. The origin of motion of evidence, or failed to develop the best kind of explana­
can be an object either of pursuit or of avoidance tory theory. It is not through researchers like B. that sci­
(cf. 701b33-34). ence has progressed. Still, we seem to have no way of re­
B.: No, there is no reason. On your instructions I have futing him in general. Even if he does accept as adequate
been sitting beside this pond studying these tortoises many explanations we now use, for example those that allow
every day for three years now. So you had better us to make consistently successful predictions, it is hard to
write in your Historia Animalium that they have been imagine that there will never be a piece of recalcitrant evi­
known to move for no reason. dence he can use against us. And even if he does not see any,
A.: I see. You mean that there isn't any ordinary ideolog­ he may insist on holding it open as a conceptual possibility
ical account in terms of the tortoise's goals and de­ that there might be. He will tell us that it is simply a preju­
sires. As part of your research you've planted some dice, connected with our modern optimism for science, that
mechanical device in his heart that simply triggers the every motion can be explained and that nothing is random
motor activity. or arbitrary.
B.: You are trying to substitute one sort of explanation for It is from the conviction that B. is wrong about the ex­
another. I am saying something entirely different: planation of particular animal motions—or, at the very least,
there just is no explanation. from the decision that the only sensible thing for the sci­
A.: (turning to go) Well, send a messenger to me when entist to do is to force him to cede as much ground as
you find it, and then we can get together and finish
"A form of it has been defended by von Wright in EU and a
those chapters.
subtler and more moderate related position is defended by Malcolm
B.: You are deliberately misunderstanding me. You are in "Intention and Behavior". Both of these, and Aristotle's view, are
looking for excuses to abuse my professional standing. discussed at length in Essay 4.
xvm XIX
ARISTOTLE'S DE MOTU ANIMALIUM INTRODUCTION
possible, that Aristotle begins the MA. I am inclined to think meal for the light it could shed on the discussion of similar
that he would find B.'s position not just pragmatically un­ questions in the ethical and cosmological works. But it is
sound, but more than that: a failure to comprehend the from a study of its entire plan and argument, rather than
meaning of our notions of action and motion. B., one might from considering it bit by bit, that one can emerge with
argue, is not even speaking our language when he talks of the most useful insights into the many problems with which
an inexplicable motion, or a random action.7 Tuche, chance, it deals. Because it is so full of allusions to other Aristotelian
is not a separate explanatory principle; all motions described works, it cannot be interpreted without extensive analysis
as coming about "by chance" have, under some description, of parallel discussions and an attempt to see the problem in
an adequate explanation. If Aristotle's vaunted optimism for question as it emerges from Aristotle's work as a whole. The
science means anything (and it does not mean everything framework of line-by-line commentary proves, in conse­
it has been taken to mean—cf. Essays 2 and 4) it does mean quence, too confining. One has to take a stand on some
that it is always appropriate to ask, "Why this motion?," major issues in Aristotle's philosophy of science, ethics, and
and to search persistently for the most adequate response. philosophy of mind before one can claim to have interpreted
Aristotle realizes, of course, that there are a number of the MA. The aim of the interpretive essays is to provide
ways this question might be answered. A main aim of the this kind of wide-ranging discussion of central problems,
treatise will be to analyze and defend a certain kind of while leaving for notes textual, historical, and less central
answer—the teleological—and to indicate its relationship to exegetical points. Sometimes the division may appear arbi­
other answers. In the process, Aristotle presents an analysis trary: a point of some philosophical importance may find
of motivation that has important implications for our under­ itself in the notes because it simply did not help the argu­
standing of his theory of soul and his account of human ment of any of the essays, or a rather technical piece of
deliberation. And the treatise addresses itself to cosmological exegesis may be found in an essay because it is crucial to its
questions as well: the conditions for motion in the universe, argument. I have tried to make cross-references as extensive
the necessity of postulating an unmoved mover. We dis­ as possible, in order to minimize this problem for the reader.
cover in some cases that its unusual combination of questions But I hope that this format will make my views on major
has suggested to Aristotle more adequate solutions for prob­ issues as accessible as possible to the reader with no knowl­
lems he had approached separately in other works. edge of Greek (none of the essays uses untranslated Greek),
and to those interested less in the MA itself than in Aristotle's
position on certain central problems in philosophy.
Ill
The first essay provides a general introductory account
The MA is cryptic and brief, occasionally obscure.8 Be­ of Aristotle's views on functional and teleological explana­
cause of its heterogeneity, it has often been studied piece- tion and, in an appendix, an analysis of the famous "man's
' Cf. Essay 4.
and Burley have recently been edited, and are occasionally useful.
* The only full-length commentaries ever written on the MA (to (On all these, see the full discussions in my doctoral thesis, Part I,
my knowledge) are the twelfth-century commentary by Michael chapter 2.) Among modern exegeses, most valuable are Farquharson's
of Ephesos and the thirteenth-century treatise De Principiis Motus notes to his Oxford Translation. Notes are also provided by Torraca
Trogressivi of Albertus Magnus. Short paraphrases were written by and Louis, and summaries of the argument can be found in Jaeger,
a number of mediaeval philosophers, among which those of Buridan "Pneuma," and During, Aristoteles, 345.
XX XXl