Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy

636 Pages·1962·24.95 MB·English

by  Cherniss

ARISTOTLE'S CRITICISM OF
PLATO AND THE ACADEMY
LONDON HUMPHREY MILFORD
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
ARISTOTLE'S CRITICISM OF
PLATO AND THE ACADEMY
VOLUME I
BY
HAROLD CHERNISS
The ]ohns Hopkins University
BALTIMORE
THE JOHNS HOPKINS PRESS
1944
COPYRIGHT 1944, TUB JOHNS HOPKINS PRBSS
SECOND PRINTING, 194$
Trlnlli t»i UlbofrlmtlJ l» V S A
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To MY TEACHERS OF GREEK IN BERKELEY
JAMES T. ALLEN GEORGE M CALHOUN
ROGER M. JONES IVAN M. LINFORTH

FOREWORD
In the two volumes which will constitute this work I propose
to give a complete account and analysis of all that Aristotle
says about Plato and about Plato's pupils and associates in the
Academy.
Upon the various aspects of this subject much has been
written, much more than can be here passed m review, for in
one way or another it has been a matter of concern to all inter
preters of Academic philosophy. There remain, as will be
shown in the course of the present work, a few clear indications
of what some of Aristotle's contemporaries in the Academy
thought and said about certain of his statements concerning
Plato's doctrines. Among the later Greek commentators, a strict
Peripatetic like Alexander of Aphrodisias could accept Aris
totle's criticism of the Academy at its face value and try to
enforce it, although even Alexander's teacher, Aristocles,
appears to have maintained that the Aristotelian and Platonic
philosophies were essentially m agreement. Those commen
tators who were Neo-Platomsts, however, either charged Aris
totle with lack of understanding and worse, as Syrianus did (cf.
Zeller, Phil. Gnecb., Ill, 2, p 821), or, seeking like the earlier
eclectics to reconcile him with Platonism as they understood and
espoused it, insisted that he had never intended to criticise
Plato's real meaning, which of course he had understood, but
only to refute by anticipation the superficial meaning which
careless readers might mistakenly take from Plato's words (e. g.
Simplicius, De Caelo, p. 640, 27-32, Asclepius, Metaph., p. 166,
35-36; cf. Zeller, Phil. Gnech., Ill, 2, pp. 741-2, 911-12).
In modern times scholars have been concerned with Aristotle's
remarks about Plato chiefly as evidence of what the latter said
and meant; and yet no agreement has been reached concerning
the weight and value to be assigned to this evidence. The phi
losopher Hegel in his Vorlesungen fiber dte Geschkhte der
Philosophie attacked " der gelehrt seyn wollende Scharfsinn "
which declares that Aristotle did not rightly understand Plato.1
* G, W. F. Hegel, Sdmtltcbe Werke (Jubilaumsausgabe in wrarwlg Ba'nden von
ix
X FOREWORD
An example of the opinion attacked by Hegel is Friedrich Ast's
statement that the peculiar genius of Plato's manner of thinking
and writing obviously had remained an alien thing to Aristotle
{Platon's Leben mid Schriften, p. 390, note). In 1826 F. A.
Trendelenburg published a monograph entitled Plaionis De
Ideis Et Numer/s Doctrina Ex Aristotele lllustrata. This was
designed to repair what Trendelenburg called the neglect with
which historians of ancient philosophy had hitherto treated
Aristotle's scattered statements concerning Plato's doctrine (p.
5); and it may have been the influence of Hegel's lectures
which caused him to introduce his subject (p. 3) with the state
ment: " Aristotelem vero Platonis philosophiam recte intelle-
gere et candide tradere aufc nescivisse aut noluisse, nemo jure
contended" Nevertheless, both of these charges were later
brought against Aristotle by Teichmuller who rejected his testi
mony wholesale (Studten zur Geschichte der Begriffe, p. 322;
Literariscke Vehden [ L881], pp. 228-32); and Natorp, whose
interpretation of the theory of ideas though different from
Teichmuller's is also in conflict with Aristotle's, devoted two
chapters of his book, Platos Ideenlehre (pp. 384-456 of the
second edition, 1921) to the demonstration that Aristotle utterly
failed to understand the meaning of Plato's doctrine. Con-
stantin Ritter, approving the judgment of Teichmuller and
Natorp, declared the unreliability of Aristotle's testimony con
cerning Plato to be an established fact (Neue Unterwchungen
fiber Platon, pp. 37-8; Platon, I, p. 584); and Otto Kluge in his
dissertation, Darstellung und Beurteitung der Einwendungen
des Aristoteles gegen die Platonischen Ideenlehre, though re
jecting Natorp's interpretation of the ideas (pp. 24-6), came
to conclusions concerning Aristotle's misunderstanding of Plato
(pp. 65-74) which are substantially—and m large part even
verbally—identical with those of Natorp.2
Hermann Glockncr), XVII, p. 205 and XVIII, p 300. These passages and the
possibility of Hegel's influence upon Trendelenburg were brought to my attention
by my colleague, Dr Ludwig Edelstein
' Kluge's dissertation u more systematic but no less meager than Natorp's
treatment of the subject and does not begin to do justice to the available material
either from the point of view of Aristotle or from that of Plato. Of Edgar
Freund's dissertation, Aristoteles Siellung zur Plaionisthsn Ifoenltbri, I have
FOREWORD xt
Hegel's conception of the development of philosophy caused
htm to consider Aristotle m fact the successor of Plato (op.
cit., XVIII, pp. 298, 301). In similar fashion more than a
century later Werner Jaeger, in whose eyes Plato's philosophy
was the " matter " out of which the newer and higher form of
Aristotle's thought proceeded by a gradual but steady and un-
deviating development (Aristoteles, p. 11), pronounced the
" old controversy," whether or not Aristotle understood Plato,
to be " absolut verstandmslos " [pp. cit., p. 159)- Yet this
did not prevent Leisegang from reasserting that Aristotle's own
pattern of thinking was incompatible with a proper under
standing of Plato {Denkformen, pp 216 If., cited in Leisegang's
Die Platondeutung der Gegenwart, p. 8, n. 2); and to Jaeger's
pronouncement De Vogel has replied that, on the contrary, the
question is philosophically necessary (Een Keerpunt in Plato's
Denken, p. 231). So much at least need not be debated merely
on the ground of psychological probabilities, modern theories
of the history of philosophy, or our own understanding of
Plato's writings, for, if another of Plato's students be found in
disagreement with Aristotle's interpretations, it is obvious that
both cannot be in the right, though it is possible that both may
have been mistaken. Certainly Speusippus and Xenocrates
would have been unimpressed by the much repeated modern
argument that Aristotle's long association with Plato guarantees
his correct understanding of the latter's philosophy.
Even if it be true, however, that "Aristotle is the last authority
to look to for a fair and liberal account of Platonism " (Mane
V. Williams, Six Essays on the Platonic Theory of Knowledge,
p 132), must not his reports, as distinguished from his inter
pretations, be considered unimpeachable testimony? Such is
the plausible distinction adopted by A. li. Taylor (Plato*, p.
503) and by John Burnet before him {Greek Phdosophy, I,
pp, 312-13) who say that we are bound to believe Aristotle
when he tells us that Plato said a particular thing but not when
been able to obtain only a "Teildruck" published in 1936 which contains the
first two of rive announced chapters, so far as can be judged from such a sample,
this dissertation appears to be no improvement over that of Kluge, of which it
falls short, moreover, in excluding from consideration the so-called Platonic
" number-theory."
Xii FOREWORD
he tells us what Plato meant or what the historical origin of a
doctrine was. The plausibility of this neat distinction is con
siderably diminished, however, by common experience which
teaches that in spite of the best intentions a witness' testimony
as to fact is deeply affected by his own unconscious interpre
tation of the fact. The applicability of the distinction is espe
cially impaired in the case of Aristotle who so intertwined
report, interpretation, and criticism that even von Stein, who
defended his account of Plato, asserted that his reports and his
criticisms are prejudiced by each other (Sieben Biicher zur
Geschichte des Platonismus, II, p. 77, n. 1). Moreover, other
scholars have maintained that A/istotle not infrequently puts
into the mouth 'of a philosopher what he considers the necessary
implication of that philosopher's doctrine as he interprets it
and that he gives mistaken reports, not merely interpretations,
of Platonic dialogues which are at our disposal. "With such
considerations in mmd Tannery declared: " Anstote a £te* asset
souvent pris a torturer et i rendre meconnaissables des passages
emprunt& aux Dialogues pour que ses indications les plus
precises ne soient point recues sans controle (L'Education
Platonicienne = Mimoires Scientifiques, VII, p. 89).
What has particularly exercised modern scholars is the fact
that Aristotle ascribes to Plato a form of the theory of ideas
which does not appear in Plato's dialogues. This discrepancy
was for some time explained by assuming that Aristotle's reports
and criticisms refer to an "esoteric" doctrine which Plate
reserved for his intimate associates and purposely excluded from
his published writings (e.g. Tennemann, System der Plato-
nischert Phtlosophie, I, p. 114 and Geschichte der Philosophic,
II, pp. 205-22) To help lay the ghost of this " esoteric Platon-
ism," which, attacked both by Schleiermacher (Plato's Werke,
1,1, pp. 11fl.) and by Hegel (op. cit., XVIII, pp. 179-80), has
several times been revived and each time diligently disposed of,
Zeller in 1839 published Die Darstellung der Platomschen Pht
losophie bet Aristotehs as the third essay in his Platonische
Studien (cf. pp. 199-200 and 300). Here, as later in his History
(Phil. Griech; II, 1, pp. 679-86, 750-60, 946-51), he concluded
that Aristotle's account of a theory of idea-numbers which are
derived from two ultimate principles comes not from the