Aristotle's Case for Perceptual Knowledge

220 Pages·2016·0.84 MB·English

by  Robert Fuselier Howton

ARISTOTLE’S CASE FOR PERCEPTUAL KNOWLEDGE
by
Robert Fuselier Howton
A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Graduate Department of Philosophy
University of Toronto
© Copyright 2017 by Robert Fuselier Howton
Abstract
ARISTOTLE’S CASE FOR PERCEPTUAL KNOWLEDGE
RobertFuselierHowton
DoctorofPhilosophy
GraduateDepartmentofPhilosophy
UniversityofToronto
2017
Sense experience, naïvely conceived, is a way of knowing perceptible properties: the colors,
sounds, smells, flavors, and textures in our perceptual environment. So conceived, ordinary
experience presents the perceiver with the essential nature of a property like Sky Blue or Mid-
dle C, such that how the property appears in experience is identical to how it essentially is. In
antiquity, as today, it was controversial whether sense experience could meet the conditions
forknowledgeimplicitinthisnaïveconception. Aristotlewasapartisaninthisdebate,buthis
position is poorly understood. This dissertation examines how Aristotle’s perceptual psychol-
ogy responds to ancient challenges to the naïve conception, and so articulates his defense of
perceptualknowledge.
Aristotle’sdefensereliesonanontologyof“perceptualqualities”—acoreclassofperceptible
properties—accordingtowhichthosequalities,despitehavingaperceiver-independentessence
rooted in the physics of causation and affection, nevertheless can be present in experience as
they essentially are. Chapter 1 defends this realist and objectivist reading against competing
interpretations,whichoverlookacrucialdistinctionbetweenperceptualqualitiesandperceptual
objects. Chapter2presentsAristotle’sontologyasaphysicalismthatuncharacteristicallyallows
forperceptualqualitiestoappearinexperienceastheyessentiallyare.
ThisontologyinformsAristotle’saccountofthepsychologicalconditionsunderwhichper-
ceiversactuallyarepresentedwiththeessenceofperceptualqualities. Thelocusofthisaccount
ii
isanobscurepassagewhereAristotlepurportstoshowthatthesenses“discriminate”perceptual
qualitiesbecausethesensesare“meanstates”(An.2.11,424a5–7). Chapter3developsacompre-
hensive interpretation of the sensory mean state, which Chapter 4 uses to elucidate Aristotle’s
argumentforsensorydiscrimination. Sensorydiscriminationturnsouttobeaprocessinwhich
theessenceofaperceptualqualitycomestobepresentintheaffectionitproducesinaperceiver.
ForAristotle,thisshowsthatsenseperceptionmeetsaconditionforknowledgethathisprede-
cessors, including Plato, thought it could not meet. For in his view, but not in theirs, sense
experiencesharesinboththetruthandtheessenceofthequalitiesitperceives.
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Tothememoryofmyparents,andtoKarenHardy,
withoutwhomespeciallynot.
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Acknowledgements
Ihaveincurredseveraldebtsofgratitudeoverthecourseofmydoctoralstudies: toteachers,to
friendsandcolleagues,andtofamily.
My greatest debt is to my supervisor, Jennifer Whiting. Jennifer is a model philosopher
and an ideal mentor, whose philosophical insight and eye for detail is matched by her gift for
patient,charitablediscussionandwarmencouragement. Withoutherunwaveringsupportand
guidance,IwouldnothaveaccomplishedwhateverI’vemanagedtoaccomplishhere.
I also owe a special debt to the other two members of my dissertation committee: to Brad
Inwood,whoshowedmetheimportanceofattendingtothescholarlydetailsthatmakeancient
philosophy both difficult and rewarding; and to Lloyd Gerson, who made me appreciate the
largerpictureintowhichAristotlefits. ThanksareduealsotoJamesAllen,RachelBarney,Justin
Broackes, David Charles, and Imogen Dickie, who have each had a formative impact on my
education,andfromwhomIamhonoredtohavelearned.
I also have many colleagues, both at the University of Toronto and elsewhere, for whose
friendshipandintellectualcommunityIamespeciallygrateful. Theyinclude: DominicAlford-
Duguid, Mike Arsenault, Juan Pablo Bermudez, Alessandro Bonello, Elena Cagnoli Fiecconi,
Willie Costello, James Davies, Marion Durand, Brian Embry, Mark Fortney, Marc Gasser-
Wingate, Reier Helle, Sukaina Hirji, Dhananjay Jagannathan, Emily Kress, Kevin Kuhl, Katy
Meadows,EmilyPerry,LarkinPhilpot,JuanPiñerosGlasscock,AllisonPiñerosGlasscock,Evan
Rodriguez,JacobStump,DaveSuarez,BenjaminWald,andDanielWodak. Specialthanksgoes
toLauraTomlinson,anableinterlocutorandeditoraswellasadearfriendandcompanion.
Finally,Iamgratefultomyfamily: tomysiblings,BrianandLeslie;tomyextendedfamily,
theFuseliers,theFontenots,andAmelandHarrisHowton;andtoKarenHardy. Toher,andto
thememoryofmyparents,Idedicatethiswork.
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Contents
AbbreviationsofAristotle’sWorks ix
Introduction x
1 PerceptualObjects,PerceptualQualities,andAristotle’sRealism 1
1.1 Perceptualqualitiesasperceiver-independentattributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2 Aconcessiontoirrealism? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.3 Dualactualitiesofsenseandperceptualquality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.4 Areperceptualqualitiesessentiallyperceptible? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.5 Isthereasecondactualityofperceptualqualities? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.6 Samecause,differenteffects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.6.1 Affectionofthemedium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.6.2 Affectionoftheperceiver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
1.7 Objectivityandexperience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2 TheNatureofPerceptualQualities 41
2.1 Review: perceptualqualitiesinDeAnimaandinDeSensu . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.2 Thenatureofcolor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.3 Extendingthemodel: presence,absence,and“agentnatures” . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.4 A“chemicalanalysis”modelofperceptualqualities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.5 Thenatureofperceptualqualities: apreliminaryaccount . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.6 Aproblemconcerningtheactualityofperceptualqualities . . . . . . . . . . . 58
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2.7 Interlude: acompositionalapproachtointermediacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
2.8 Thedeterminacyofperceptualqualityspecies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
2.9 Perceptualmotionsonthechemicalanalysismodel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
2.9.1 Principle1: contrariesproducecontrarymotions . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
2.9.2 Principles2and3: theinteractionofcontrarymotions . . . . . . . . . 70
2.9.3 Themean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
2.10 Physicalismandthenatureofphenomenalqualities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3 TheSensoryMeanState 80
3.1 Twomodelsofsense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
3.2 Senseasameanstate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
3.2.1 Aristotleonthetactile“blindspot” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
3.2.2 Whymusttheorganoftouchinstantiatethemean? . . . . . . . . . . . 92
3.2.3 Thenon-tactilesensesasmeanstates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
3.3 Senseasratioinactualperceiving . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
3.3.1 “Alterationofasort” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
3.3.2 Receivingperceptualformwithoutthematter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
3.3.3 Adifficultyfornon-literalistmaterialisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
3.3.4 Literalismwithoutordinaryalteration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
3.4 Concludingremarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
4 Aristotle’sDoctrineoftheDiscriminativeMean 121
4.1 Background: thesensesasmeanstates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
4.2 Aristotle’s“masterargument” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
4.3 Aristotle’sconceptionofmeanness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
4.4 Theobject-relativearithmeticmean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
4.4.1 Proportionaldifference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
4.4.2 Theobject-relativemean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
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4.4.3 Whatthevirtuouspersondoesn’tdiscriminate . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
4.5 Discriminationasaperspectivalfeature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
4.6 Adoctrineofthediscriminativemean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
4.6.1 Thesensesasobject-relativearithmeticmeanstates . . . . . . . . . . . 152
4.6.2 Intellectasanobject-relativearithmeticmeanstate . . . . . . . . . . . 155
4.7 Theimportanceofdiscrimination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
4.8 Κρίσιςand‘discrimination’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
Conclusion 166
Bibliography 177
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Abbreviations of Aristotle’s Works
An. DeAnima (OntheSoul)
APo. AnalyticaPosteriora (PosteriorAnalytics)
APr. AnalyticaPriora (PriorAnalytics)
Cat. Categoriae (Categories)
Div. DeDivinationePerSomnum (OnDivinationinSleep)
EE EthicaEudemia (EudemianEthics)
EN EthicaNicomachea (NicomacheanEthics)
Ins. DeInsomniis (OnDreams)
GA DeGenerationeAnimalium (OntheGenerationofAnimals)
GC DeGenerationeetCorruptione (OnGenerationandCorruption)
HA HistoriaAnimalium (HistoryofAnimals)
Long. DeLongintudineetBrevitateVitae (OntheLengthandShortnessofLife)
MA DeMotuAnimalium (OntheMotionofAnimals)
Mem. DeMemoriaetReminiscentia (OnMemoryandRecollection)
Met. Metaphysica (Metaphysics)
Meteor. Meterologica (Meteorology)
PA DePartibusAnimalium (OnthePartsofAnimals)
Phys. Physica (Physics)
Pol. Politica (Politics)
Sens. DeSensuandSensibilibus (OnPerceptionandPerceptualObjects)
Top. Topica (Topics)
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Introduction
Whatwoulditbeforsenseperceptiontobeakindofknowledge? Oneapproachtoanswering
thisquestionlookstothecharacterofordinarysenseexperience. Whenweperceiveanobject,
weseemtobepresenteddirectlywithcertainofitsproperties. Invisionweseemtobepresented
withitscolor,shape,size,movements,andperhapsotherfeatures;inhearingweseemtobepre-
sentedwiththesoundsitmakes,perhapsalongwithitslocationandotherattributes.1 Oneway
forsenseperceptiontobeakindofknowledgewouldbeforthisnaïveconceptionofoursense
experience to be partially vindicated. It would be for the colors, sounds, and other properties
thatseemdirectlypresentedtousinexperiencetobeastheystandardlyappear,fortheretobe
nothingtowhatthesepropertiesarethatisnotevidentinstandardexperiencesasofthem. We
would thereby have knowledge of these properties because, in a well-known metaphor, their
essentialnatureswouldbefullyrevealedintheexperienceofthem.2
Whethersenseperceptionisakindofknowledgeforthosewhotakethisviewdependson
whetherperceptiblepropertiesreallyarehowtheystandardlyappearinsenseexperience. Col-
ors, for instance, look a certain way in visual experience. Consider an opaque body observed
in daylight—a ripe banana, say. The yellow of its surface looks to be qualitative through-and-
1Forinstance,wemayalsobepresentedinhearingwiththemeaningoflinguisticutterances. Ingeneral,how-
ever,itisdifficulttoidentifyconstraintsonthetypesofpropertiesweperceive,andtheboundariesarequitepossibly
vague. Fortunately,mydiscussionwillfocusonwhatwemaycall“corecases”ofperceptibleproperties—namely
colors, sounds, smells, flavors, and tangible properties such as temperatures and moistures, which for Aristotle
haveawell-definedpriorityoverotherperceptiblepropertiesinrelationtothespecialsenses—soIshallputthis
questiontooneside. Foradetaileddiscussioncenteredonthecaseofvisionanddefenseofaratherpermissive
conceptionofthepropertiesrepresentedinperceptualexperience,seeSiegel2011.
2ThemetaphorisduetoJohnston1992.Othermetaphorsemployedinthesediscussionshaveitthatsuchprop-
ertiesare“laidbare”(Johnston1992),“displayed”(Hardin1993,e.g.at66),“disclosed”(Campbell2005),or“made
transparent”(Campbell2005,cf.Campbell1997)intheexperienceofthem.
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