Aristotle on the Apparent Good: Perception, Phantasia, Thought, and Desire PDF
Preview Aristotle on the Apparent Good: Perception, Phantasia, Thought, and Desire
Aristotle on the Apparent Good oxford aristotle studies GeneralEditors JuliaAnnasandLindsayJudson publishedintheseries AristotleontheApparentGood Perception,Phantasia,Thought,andDesire JessicaMoss Teleology,FirstPrinciples,andScientific MethodinAristotle’sBiology AllanGotthelf PriorityinAristotle’sMetaphysics MichailPeramatzis DoingandBeing AnInterpretationofAristotle’sMetaphysicsTheta JonathanBeere Space,Time,Matter,andForm EssaysonAristotle’sPhysics DavidBostock AristotleonMeaningandEssence DavidCharles TimeforAristotle UrsulaCoope AristotleonTeleology MonteRansomeJohnson OnLocation Aristotle’sConceptsofPlace BenjaminMorison OrderinMultiplicity HomonymyinthePhilosophyofAristotle ChristopherShields Aristotle’sTheoryofSubstance TheCategoriesandMetaphysicsZeta MichaelV.Wedin Aristotle’sDeInterpretatione ContradictionandDialectic C.W.A.Whitaker Aristotle on the Apparent Good Perception, Phantasia, Thought, and Desire Jessica Moss 1 3 GreatClarendonStreet,Oxford,OX26DP, UnitedKingdom OxfordUniversityPressisadepartmentoftheUniversityofOxford. ItfurtherstheUniversity’sobjectiveofexcellenceinresearch,scholarship, andeducationbypublishingworldwide.Oxfordisaregisteredtrademarkof OxfordUniversityPressintheUKandincertainothercountries #JessicaMoss2012 Themoralrightsoftheauthorhavebeenasserted Firstpublished2012 Impression:1 Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthispublicationmaybereproduced,storedin aretrievalsystem,ortransmitted,inanyformorbyanymeans,withoutthe priorpermissioninwritingofOxfordUniversityPress,orasexpresslypermitted bylaw,orundertermsagreedwiththeappropriatereprographics rightsorganization.Enquiriesconcerningreproductionoutsidethescopeofthe aboveshouldbesenttotheRightsDepartment,OxfordUniversityPress,atthe addressabove Youmustnotcirculatethisworkinanyotherform andyoumustimposethissameconditiononanyacquirer BritishLibraryCataloguinginPublicationData Dataavailable LibraryofCongressCataloginginPublicationData Dataavailable ISBN 978–0–19–965634–9 printedinGreatBritainby MPGBooksGroup,BodminandKing’sLynn LinkstothirdpartywebsitesareprovidedbyOxfordingoodfaithand forinformationonly.Oxforddisclaimsanyresponsibilityforthematerials containedinanythirdpartywebsitereferencedinthiswork. For Cian, who has read it all, and for Oscar and Una, who do not have to read it. This page intentionally left blank Contents Acknowledgements ix Introduction xi Abbreviations xvi PART I. THE APPARENT GOOD 1. EvaluativeCognition 3 1.1 Desireandthegood 3 1.2 Practicalcognition 9 1.3 PracticalcognitioninthedeMotuAnimalium 11 1.4 PracticalcognitioninthedeAnima 16 1.5 Non-rationalfinding-good 20 2.PerceivingtheGood 22 2.1 Practicalcognitionandpleasure 22 2.2 Pleasureasvalue-perception 29 2.3 Perceivingthegoodassuch 30 2.4 Justdeflationaryenough 41 2.5 Highermodesofcognition 46 3.PhantasiaandtheApparentGood 48 3.1 Phantasiainaction 49 3.2 Phantasia:thebasicconceptionandbeyond 51 3.3 Practicalphantasia 57 3.4 Phantasiaandthought 64 PART II. THE APPARENT GOOD AND NON-RATIONAL MOTIVATION 4. PassionsandtheApparentGood 69 4.1 Doxasticvs.phantasticaccountsofthepassions 70 4.2 Thepassionatepartofthesoul 71 4.3 PassionsintheRhetoric 75 4.4 Platonicprecedent 85 4.5 Firstdoxasticobjection:thecontentsofperception 87 4.6 Seconddoxasticobjection:acceptingvs.believing 90 4.7 AristotleandtheStoicsonphantasia,assent,andpassion 92 4.8 AristotleandtheStoicsonpassions,phantasia,andbelief 94 viii CONTENTS 5.AkrasiaandtheApparentGood 100 5.1 Apuzzleaboutakrasia 100 5.2 AkrasiaindeAnimaIII.9-10 103 5.3 Ethicalerrorandperceptualillusion 106 5.4 Followingappearancesagainstknowledge 112 5.5 Theillusionaccountofakrasia 118 5.6 NicomacheanEthicsVII.3 121 5.7 Ignoranceandstrugglerevisited 132 PART III. THE APPARENT GOOD AND RATIONAL MOTIVATION 6. PhantasiaandDeliberation 137 6.1 Rationaldesire 137 6.2 Starting-pointsvs.calculations 141 6.3 Phantasiaandcalculations 142 7.Happiness,Virtue,andtheApparentGood 153 7.1 Phantasiaandthestarting-pointsofreasoning 153 7.2 Virtuemakesthegoalright 155 7.3 Virtueisnon-rational 163 7.4 Makingthegoalright 174 7.5 Phronesisandends 179 7.6 Theroleofphronesis 191 7.7 Phantasiaandthegoal 198 8.PracticalInduction 200 8.1 Inductionandhabituation 200 8.2 Habituationandpleasurableperception:anargument fromfirstprinciples 201 8.3 Pleasureinperceivingthefine 206 8.4 Phantasiaofthegoal 219 8.5 Beyondphantasia:truesuppositionoftheend 223 Conclusion:Aristotle’sPracticalEmpiricism 234 Bibliography 236 Index 243 IndexLocorum 248 Acknowledgements Ihavelearnedsomuchfromsomanypeopleovertheeightyearsittookmetowrite this book that I am not sure where to start. Certainly I owe thanks for excellent comments on various chapters at various stages from James Allen, Rachel Barney, DavidBronstein,JohnCooper,KlausCorcilius,JamieDow,MalcolmHeath,Simon Keller, Gabriel Richardson Lear, Hendrik Lorenz, Wolfgang Mann, Anthony Price, Kieran Setiya, Damien Storey, Sergio Tenenbaum, Jennifer Whiting, Chris Young, and the anonymous referees for OUP; I also got lots of help from audiences at Pittsburgh, Texas, Toronto, USC, Leeds, Cambridge, and Oxford. Damien Storey wasawonderfulindexerandproofreader.MygratitudetomycolleaguesatOxfordis particularlyvividbecauseIseeup-closehowmuchelsetheyhavetodo:DavidCharles, AngelaChew,UrsulaCoope,TerryIrwin,ThomasJohansen,ChrisShieldsandRalph Wedgwood each read large chunks of the book and gave me enormously helpful comments;BenMorisonandDavidBronsteinreadanddiscussedthedeMotuAnimal- ium with me. The book owes a less direct but very large debt to my teachers: Sarah Broadie,JohnCooper,AlexanderNehamas,andAllanSilvermanguidedmethrough ancient philosophy when I was a student, and remain excellent models. I have been lucky to have great undergraduate and graduate students in my seminars, reading groups,supervisionsandtutorialsonAristotleatPittandOxford:ithasbeenapleasure to learn with all of them. I am also sharply aware of my debt to other writers on Aristotle: although I have tried faithfully to footnote them, it would take too many footnotestoconveytheextenttowhichIamheredevelopingandexpandingonand revisingideasothershavehad.WhileIhavelearnedenormouslyfromthoseIdisagree with too, I want particularly to note here some authors whose views on Aristotle’s ethicsandpsychologyIseemyselfaschampioning:DeborahAchtenberg,JohnBurnet, ThomasTuozzo,andJenniferWhiting.Thecentralclaimofthisbook,thatthereisan important connection between phantasia and the apparent good, is explored in Heda Segvic’s work; I wish very much I could have discussed these ideas with her. I am gratefultotheAHRCforagrantwhichgavemetimefinallytofinishthebook,tomy colleagues at Balliol and in the philosophy faculty at Oxford for granting me leave to use it, and to Adam Swift for handing down an excellent anti-procrastination technique so I didn’t waste it. Very special thanks are due to Oscar and Una Dorr for helping me not rush to press with the half-baked ideas I had when I first started thisprojectandatmanypointsthereafter–andforbeingwonderful.Finally,andabove all, I thank Cian Dorr. I can imagine no better philosophical critic, interlocutor, or model,andIshuddertothinkhowmuchworsethisbook(tosticktothat)wouldbe withouthim.
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