Argument and Persuasion in Descartes’ Meditations This page intentionally left blank Argument and Persuasion in Descartes’ Meditations David Cunning 2010 Oxford University Press, Inc., publishes works that further Oxford University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education. Oxford New York Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto With offi ces in Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore South Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam Copyright © 2010 by Oxford University Press, Inc. Published by Oxford University Press, Inc. 198 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10016 www.oup.com Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of Oxford University Press. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Cunning, David. Argument and persuasion in Descartes’ Meditations / David Cunning. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-19-539960-8 1. Descartes, René 1596–1650. Meditationes de prima philosophia. 2. Methodology. 3. First philosophy. 4. God—Proof, Ontological. I. Title. B1854.C86 2009 194—dc22 2009038538 1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2 Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper To Naomi and Mira Grey This page intentionally left blank Acknowledgments I am grateful to a number of individuals and institutions for their infl u- ence and support while I was writing this book. I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Alan Nelson of the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. I am thankful for the time, attention, and advice that he offered so generously when I was his student (at UC Irvine) in the 1990s, and for the time and attention and advice that he has offered since. Alan has taught me many lessons, the most important of which (perhaps) is to read the great philoso- phers of history systematically, so that the odds are increased that they might still be great philosophers when we are done reading them. He has worked through almost everything that I have (eventually) published, and I do not know where I would be without his comments and his encouragement. I am grateful to a number of other philosophers for their help and infl uence. Lilli Alanen, John Cottingham, Daniel Garber, Paul Hoffman, Calvin Normore, and Alison Simmons have made time at conferences and other venues to talk through particular ideas and theses. Janet Broughton fi rst introduced me to early modern philosophy when I was an undergraduate at UC Berkeley, and it was her Philosophy 25B course that fi rst made me want to pursue philosophy at the graduate level. John Carriero made himself available for multiple discussions when I attended his Des- cartes seminar while on leave in 2004. Professor Carriero does not read the M edita- tions in the same way that I do, but he worked through an early version of the manuscript in its entirety and offered extremely helpful suggestions. Nicholas Jolley has been not only a teacher but a mentor. He has read everything, and I am pretty sure he knows everything, and his comments and advice over the years have been invaluable. Tom Lennon somehow made the time to read multiple drafts of this manuscript and has provided numerous detailed suggestions. I am grateful to him for pointing out to me that one of the central theses that I am defending is that Descartes is an intuitionist. I am grateful to Ed McCann. His work, his intellectual scope, and his serious yet playful attitude toward the efforts and ideas of the great system builders have been a source of inspiration. Tad Schmaltz worked through a version of my discussion of Descartes on the dubitability of the existence of self and viii Acknowledgments made time at his offi ce at Duke University to talk everything through. Chapters 3 and 4 of my manuscript have benefi ted tremendously. I want to thank Professor Schmaltz and also Professor Christia Mercer for being so generous with their time at the 2004 NEH Institute on early modern philosophy in Madison, Wisconsin. I could not have written this book without the support and feedback and encour- agement of my partner, Professor Naomi Greyser. Naomi is remarkably astute at perceiving context, subtlety, and other things that are not visible to the naked eye. She heightens the perceptual acuity of those around her, and she is extremely good company. I would like to thank my colleagues in the Philosophy Department at the Uni- versity of Iowa for making possible a space in which ideas can be pursued in any and all directions. I want to thank David Stern in particular for providing extensive comments after reading the entirety of the manuscript, and for informing me of its title. I also want to thank Jim Duerlinger, Carrie Figdor, Evan Fales, Richard Fumerton, Ali Hasan, Diane Jeske, and Gregory Landini. I would also like to thank the many graduate students at the University of Iowa who have offered very helpful feedback in seminars and discussions, and in particular Seth Jones and Kris Phillips. There are a number of other people who have infl uenced me professionally and who have helped me on this project either directly or indirectly: Laird Addis, Jason McKenzie Alexander, Jeff Barrett, Bill Bristow, Hal Brown, Sarah Buss, Phil Cum- mins, Hubert Dreyfus, Patricia Easton, Troy Fitzpatrick, De Gallow, Phyllis Hus- ton, Jan Kleinschmidt, Steve Mailloux, Genevieve Migely, Lex Newman, Larry Nolan, Tammy Nyden, Martin Schwab, John Searle, David Woodruff Smith, Kurt Smith, Nicholas Smith, Alice Sowaal, Kyle Stanford, Thomas Williams, and Andrew Youpa. F or their personal infl uence and support, I am grateful to Nic Arp, Mark Brookfi eld, Aimee Carillo Rowe, Brian Carver, Chris Cunning, Dotty Cunning, Robert Cunning, Linda Greyser, Naomi Greyser, Stephen Greyser, Mary Herndon, Beverly Klug, Kathy Kuikendal, Jim Mahoney, Jane Murphy, Linda Nelson, Emil Palacios, Steve Sanchez, Christopher Stipp, and also my late grandfather, George Przedpelski, and my late mother, Eva Cunning. Finally, I would like to express my appreciation for the community of people at Core Fitness in Iowa City, in particular: Amy Martin, Jeff Norman, Todd Simpson, and Christopher Soldat. I received a fellowship from the National Endowment for the Humanities for 2004–2005, which helped me to get the book underway. The generous fi nancial support was extremely helpful, as was the supplemental support from the Univer- sity of Iowa. For making possible the latter, I would like to express my appreciation to Linda Maxson, Raul Curto, and Joe Kearney. I would also like to thank the UCLA Center for 17th- and 18th-Century Studies and the William Andrews Clark Memo- rial Library for a residency fellowship in fall 2004. F inally, a small amount of material in the book is being reproduced from articles that I have written. Some of the material in chapter 1 is in “Rationalism and Acknowledgments ix Education,” A Companion to Rationalism, ed. Alan Nelson (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), 61–81; and some of the material from chapter 3 is in “Descartes on the Dubi- tability of the Existence of Self,” P hilosophy and Phenomenological Research 74:1 (2007), 111–31. I am grateful to Wiley-Blackwell for permission to use both of these. Some of the material in chapter 5 is in “S emel in Vita: Descartes’ Stoic View on the Place of Philosophy in Human Life,” F aith and Philosophy 24:2 (2007), 164– 83. I am grateful to the Society of Christian Philosophers and Faith and Philosophy for the permission. Some of the material in chapter 6 is in “True and Immutable Natures and Epistemic Progress in Descartes’ Meditations ,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 11:2 (2003), 235–48; and some is in “Fifth Meditation TINs: A Reply to Criticisms of the Epistemic Interpretation,” B ritish Journal for the History of Philosophy 16:1 (2008), 215–27. I am grateful to the British Society for the His- tory of Philosophy and B ritish Journal for the History of Philosophy for permission to use both of these. Finally, some of the material in chapter 8 is in “Descartes on the Immutability of the Divine Will,” Religious Studies 39:1 (2003), 79–92. I am grateful to Cambridge University Press for the permission.
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