Argentina, 1946–83: The Economic Ministers Speak

227 Pages·1990·21.62 MB·English

by  Guido di Tella

Argentina, 1946--83: The Economic Ministers
Speak
Argentina, 1946-83:
The Economic Ministers
Speak
Guido di Tella
Professor of Economics
University of Buenos Aires and the Catholic University of Argentina
Associate Member, St Antony's College, Oxford
and
Carlos Rodriguez Braun
Professor of History of Economic Thought
University Complutense of Madrid
Editor, Espana Econ6mica
Palgrave Macmillan
ISBN 978-1-349-11758-1 ISBN 978-1-349-11756-7 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-11756-7
© Guido di Tella and Carlos Rodriguez Braun 1990
Softcover reprint ofthe hardcover 1st edition 1990
All rights reserved. For information, write:
Scholarly and Reference Division,
St. Martin's Press, Inc., 175 Fifth Avenue,
New York, N.Y. 10010
First published in the United States of America in 1990
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Argentina, 1946-83: the economic ministers speak/ Guido Di Tella and Carlos
Rodriguez Braun. [editors).
p. em.
Proceedings of the symposium on Argentina's economic policy,
1946-1983, held in Toledo, Spain, in 1984.
ISBN 978-0-312-03620-1
1. Argentina-Economic policy-Congresses. 2. Argentina-Economic
conditions-1945-1983-Congresses. I. Di Tella, Guido, 1931-
II. Rodriguez Braun, Carlos.
HC175.A833 1990
338.982'009'045-dc20 89--48069
CIP
Contents
Foreword vii
Presidents and Economic Authorities in Argentina,
1946-83 ix
Introduction
Guido di Tel/a and C. Rodriguez Braun 1
1 Alfredo Gomez Morales 31
2 Rogelio Frigerio 47
3 Alvaro Alsogaray 60
4 Roberto T. Alemann 66
5 Carlos Garcia Tudero 75
6 Adalbert Krieger Vasena 85
7 Jose Maria Dagnino Pastore 104
8 Aldo Ferrer 111
9 Jorge Wehbe 117
10 Carlos Raul Gabriel Leyba 120
11 Alfredo Gomez Morales 139
12 Guido di Tella 146
13 Jose Alfredo Martinez de Hoz 151
14 Lorenzo Juan Sigaut 181
15 Domingo F. Cavallo 191
16 Jorge Wehbe 199
Statistical Appendix 204
Index 218
v
Foreword
This is an unusual book. It deals with economic matters but it has not
been written by economists selected as such, but because of their
having been Economic Ministers (or other authorities) and having
exerted a considerable influence over the economic policies applied
by the Argentine Republic in nearly forty years.
This book stems mainly from the symposium on Argentina's Econ
omic Policy, 194fr.83, held in Toledo, Spain, in 1984, sponsored by
the Fundaci6n Jose Ortega y Gasset, for whose support we are
thankful as well as for the aid received from the Fundaci6n Simon
Rodriguez. The Toledo meeting has brought forward the book edited
by Guido Di Tella and Rudiger Dornbusch, The Political Economy
of Argentina, 1946-83, which includes the academic analyses, pre
sumably dispassionate. But this was only one feature of the Toledo
conference. A fundamental and distinctive part was the participation
of several ministers and other economic authorities of Argentina,
who gave the meeting a flavour unattainable from an exclusively
academic approach. In this book we present the speeches delivered
by the authorities in Toledo and the papers requested later from
those who could not come. The book contains, therefore, the opinion
of each authority on the policy he applied and the limits and restric
tions he had to face.
The fact that so many important people have agreed to make these
'confessions' is indeed noteworthy. It is equally noticeable that in so
doing they held back their - occasionally very intense - political antag
onisms. Nevertheless, the explicit requirement of some of the authors,
and our own feelings, compel us to state clearly that their presence in
this book indicates no more than that they succeeded one another in office.
All editors of collective works face problems, but in the present
case these have been more acute than is usual. We had to deal with
differences in style: some of the papers were colloquial-even in the
first person; others were written like academic lectures, or stemmed
from interviews or from official reports, or were simply too long. We
were accordingly forced to make abridged and modified versions.
The book, then, does not reflect verbatim what was said or written,
but presents the papers with alterations, sometimes abstracts, and
a certain levelling of style. The full original versions have been
deposited in the Library of the Instituto Torcuato Di Tella, in Buenos
vii
viii Foreword
Aires, and can be freely consulted by any interested researcher.
In any event, the book includes extremely faithful reproductions of
each author's speech or paper. An additional guarantee for impar
tiality stems, moreover, from the differing political views of the
editors themselves, a discrepancy that we hope has been useful in
neutralizing any exaggerated bias.
In this English version we have added an introductory essay on the
economic evolution of the period under consideration, so as to give a
certain framework to readers who might not be particularly knowl
edgeable about Argentine economic history. The essay tries not to be
too polemical, as the purpose of the book is to let the ministers speak
their minds and give their ideas as freshly as possible.
We hope that this book will help explain what was their intention,
what they tried to achieve and what in their view was achieved.
Unfortunately, taken as a whole, the book has a certain self
justifying tone, written as it is by the authors of the economic
policies. The aggregate impression produces a better picture than did
Argentina's actual performance during those four decades, in which
the country had a weak growth - less than 1 per cent per year in per
capita figures - and in which it lost relative position with regard to
virtually any set or subset of other countries. Even if we bear in mind
the difficulties of measurement involved in any comparison, the
overall performance indicates that the real story was different from
the one which emerges from the actors' aggregate assessment.
Although the economy is the main target of the book, it is widely
acknowledged that the political dimension is an indispensable comp
lement. No one appreciates better the truth of such an assertion than
the Economic Ministers. Accordingly, and considering the disap
pointing economic performance of Argentina in those 40 years, it
must be stressed that the recurrent political interruptions that shaped
this period have obstructed the fructification of all the policies. A
different situation could be envisaged, according to which if even
some of the policies had been applied consistently for at least the six
years contemplated in the Constitution for each president, the results
might have turned out to be substantially better.
But in any case the following pages will tell the story; if it is not the
real one, it is at least the one witnessed by its major protagonists.
G. di Tella
C. Rodriguez Braun
Buenos Aires and Madrid
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Presidents and Economic Authorities in Argentina (cont.) Period Ministers and economic authorities 1976/March 1981 J. A. Martinez de Hoz (2) 29 Mar. 1976/28 Mar. 1981 19811November 1981 Lorenzo Sigaut (2) 29 Mar. 1981121 Dec. 1981 ber 1981/June 1982 Roberto Alemann (2) 22 Dec. 1981130 Jun. 1982 J. M. D8a2/gnNionvoe Pmabsetr or1e9 8(3 2) 2 Jul. 1982124 Aug. 1982 Domingo Cavallo (9) 2 Jul. 1982124 Aug. 1982 Jorge Wehbe (2) 25 Aug. 198217 Dec. 1983 Titles used: (1) Minister of Finance (Ministro de Hacienda) (2) Minister of Economy (Ministro de Economia) (3) Secretary of Finance (Secretario de Finanzas) (4) Secretary of Public Finance (Secretario de Hacienda) (5) Minister of Economy and Labour (Ministro de Economfa y Trabajo) (6) Minister of Public Finances (Ministro de Hacienda y Finanzas) (7) Under-Secretary of Economic Programming and Coordination (Sub-secretario de Programaci6n y Coordinaci6n Econ6mica) (8) Secretary of Economic Programming and Coordination (Secretario de Programaci6n y Coordinaci6n Econ6mica) (9) President of the Central Bank (Presidente del Banco Central) y Volumen prion cidep alE caonnd omAincea,x o HaA,c ieDnedpa artaFimneanntzoa s, Bi1b8li5o4t--1978, Buenos Aires, 1981.
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Introduction
This is a book on economic history or, rather, a history of economic
policies, written by some of the people responsible for them. It does
not therefore claim to be an objective account. Readers may feel that
the ministers have presented the story perfectly well and that no
introduction is necessary.
However, for those readers unacquainted with Argentina we have
included this short essay on a complex period of Argentina's econ
omic development.
By dividing the period between 1946 and 1983 into ten different
'acts' and giving some information, our aim is to provide the reader
with the background against which our authors had to struggle.
The story begins in the immediate aftermath of the Second World
War, in 1946, when Juan Domingo Peron was elected President of
Argentina, and ends in 1983 with the election of Raul Alfonsfn.
JUAN DOMINGO PER6N, 1946--55
In October 1946, soon after the accesion of Juan Domingo Peron, the
new government presented a much-heralded Five Year Plan, intro
ducing the concept of programming, then popular in post-war Eu
rope. On the one hand, the plan emphasized a huge programme of
state investment in the economic and social infrastructure including
buying some foreign-owned investments considered to be strategic,
as well as the development of a wide range of industrial sectors. On
the other hand, it emphasized distribution, trying to transfer more
than ten percentage points of GDP from property owners to wage
earners. The sources of accumulation were obscure, probably
consistent with the new industrial quasi-rents, but the role of the state
was clear, as well as the much greater weight assigned to industry and
the emphasis on social welfare projects. The plan was like a political
manifesto: well-meaning and highly voluntarist, it made extremely
optimistic projections with few suggestions as to how they were to be
achieved.
The new role of the state can be seen in its inroads into the
financial and foreign trade sectors and in the enlargement of public
ownership. The so-called 'nationalization' of bank deposits was the
1