Arab–Israeli Military/Political Relations. Arab Perceptions and the Politics of Escalation PDF
Preview Arab–Israeli Military/Political Relations. Arab Perceptions and the Politics of Escalation
Pergamon Policy Studies on Internationai Poiitics Amo8 The P.LO.: Organization of a Nationaiist Movement Cannlzzo International Arms Transfers: Politics and Policies Close Europe Without Defense? 48 Hours That Could Change the Face of the World Feld Comparative Regional Systems: West and East Europe, North America, The Middle East and Developing Countries Feld Western Europe's Global Reach: Regional Cooperation and Worldwide Interests Foreign Affairs America and the World 1978 Freedman World Politics and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Hahn/Pfaltzgraff Atlantic Community in Crisis: A Redefinition of the Transatlantic Relationship Leitenberg/Sheffer Great Power Intervention in the Middle East LIndberg Inflation and Political Change LInk/Feld The New Nationalism: Implications for Transatlantic Relations PERGAMON POLICY ON INTERNATIONAL POLITICS STUDIES Arab-Israeli Military/Political Relations Arab Perceptions and the Politics of Escaiatlon John W. Amos II Pergamon Press NEW YORK · OXFORD · TORONTO · SYDNEY · FRANKFURT · PARß Pergamon Press Offices: U.S.A. Pergamon Press Inc., Maxwell House, Fairview Park, EInnsford, New York 10523, U.S.A. U.K. Pergamon Press Ltd., Headington Hill Hall, Oxford 0X3 OBW, Enigland CANADA Pergamon of Canada, Ltd., 150 Consumers Road, Willowdale, Ontario M2J, 1P9, Canada AUSTRALIA Pergamon Press (Aust) Pty. Ltd., Ρ O Box 544, Potts Point, NSW 2011, Australia FRANCE Pergamon Press SARL, 24 rue des Ecoles, 75240 Paris, Cedex 05, France FEDERAL REPUBLIC Pergamon Press GmbH, 6242 Kronberg/Taunus, OF GERMANY Pferdstrasse 1, Federal Republic of Germany Copyright © 1979 Pergamon Press Inc. Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Amos, John W 1936- Arab-lsraell political/military relations. (Pergamon policy studies) Includes Index. 1. Jewish-Arab relatlons-1967-1973. 2. Israel-Arab War, 1967—Influence and results. 3. Israel-Arab War, 1973-lnfluence and results. 4. Arab countries- Politics and government. 5. Arabs—Psychology. I. Title. DS119.7.A666 1979 327.6694O17'4927 78-31869 ISBN 0-08-023865-3 This woric was completed with α number of ooileogues and students from the Naval Postgraduate School. Many of the Ideas herein were clarified with their inteliectuai insight and criticism. It follows of course that any errors or shortcomings are solely the author's. In addition, it should be made clear that the views expressed are those of the author and do not In any way represent the opinion or policy of either the Naval Postgraduate School or the U.S. Navy. All Rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means: electronic, electrostatic, magnetic tape, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without permission in writing from the publishers. Printed in the United States of America To my wife, who does not approve of wars Note on Transliteration NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION Normally the rendering of Arab words follows their actual written nomenclature. There are, however, a number of exceptions to this practice because of the multiplicity of sources used: (a) Names of persons or places that occur in translations are spelled as they occur in the original source. For example, "Nasir" is usually rendered "Nasser" in Western sources. (b) The names of authors footnoted are spelled as they are set down in the title of the book or article. This may differ from their spelling in the text. (c) Place names that have generally accepted spelling in the West are so rendered. For example, Golan instead of al-3awlan. (d) Certain Arab proper names that have been anglicized are so spelled. (e) Some Arabic names or terms which have doubled consonants have been shortened because the doubling of these consonants confuses the Western eye: al-Qadhafi, for example, rather than al-Qadhdhafi. (f) Although Arabic does not utilize capital letters, proper nouns have generally been capitalized in conformity with English usage. (g) The silent "h" on some nouns has not been transliterated: al- sa'iqa, for example, rather than al-Sa'iqah. IX List of Abbreviations ALF Arab Liberation Front (Iraq) al-Sa'iqa Shock Forces (Egypt) al-Sa*iqa The Thunderbolt: Vanguards of the Popular War of Liberation (Syria) ASU Arab Socialist Union (Egypt) Ba'th Arab Socialist Renaissance Party (Syria and Iraq) BSO Black September Organization Fatah Palestine National Liberation Movement Frolinat Front for the Liberation of Chad IDF Israeli Defense Forces OAU Organization of African Unity PDF Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine PDRY People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen) PELOAG Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf XI Xll List of Abbreviations PFLP Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine PLA Palestine Liberation Army PLO Palestine Liberation Organization Polisario Popular Front for the Liberation of Sequia el-Hamra and Wadi al-Dhahab RCC Revolutionary Command Council (Egypt) UAE United Arab Emirates UAR United Arab Republic (Syria and Egypt, 1958-1961, but usually refers to Egypt alone) UNEF UN Emergency Force UNDOF UN Disengagement Observer Force The Israeli Army defeated militarily the Arab armies in 1967. If the enemy withdrew without a fight, this constitutes, in my opinion, the greatest insult to Arab militarism, because the enemy who stripped us of our land by force, insulted our pride....and desecrated our shrines, should not, under any condition, get out without punish- ment.... Mustafa Talas Armed Struggle Facing the Israeli Challenge 1972 So let us together regain the glory of Arabism and prove to the whole world that we are men of war, who either live proudly or die honorably.... Sa'ad al-Din Shadhili Address to Arab Chiefs of Staff Conference November 1971 You should know that we are facing an enemy that is beginning to set little store by us, thinking we are not capable of fighting, which makes him rampage in the region without fear of being repelled or punished.... Ahmad Isma'il 'Ali Directive to the Egyp- tian Armed Forces October 1972 It doesn't matter if the Israelis eventually counterattack and drive us back. What matters is that the world will no longer laugh at us when we threaten to fight. No longer will it dismiss our threats as a lot of bluff and bluster. It will have to take us seriously. Arab 3ournalist October 1973 1 A Perspective on October 1973: Arabs, Israelis, and War This is a study of the escalatory patterns of Arab-Israeli relations. As such it is concerned with the preconditions, conditions and ultimate precipitants of wars (conflicts characterized by increasing intensity and scope) which have broken out with some repetitiveness in the Middle East. In addition, it is concerned with the impact of the latest of these wars, the October 1973 War, on the United States interests in the Middle East. The October War, known as the Yom Kippur War, or the War of the Day of Judgment (1) in the West, and the Ramadan War in Arab countries, contained in its brief duration a good many surprises. The armed forces of Egypt and Syria were able to organize and execute an attack which achieved near complete strategic and tactical surprise. These forces then conducted themselves during the conflict with an unexpectedly high degree of discipline and determination. Throughout the war Arab governments inaugurated and carried out a coordinated diplomatic and economic policy vis-a-vis Western nations; a policy whose sophistication in concept and implementation was likewise completely unexpected. The 1973 War will no doubt be studied for years to come and its various aspects analyzed from different perspectives. Studies of the war have multiplied and range from highly technical accounts of the military aspects to emotional assessments of the war's political impact. (2) However, even granting the existence of this literature, some attempt should be made to put it in historical and political perspective. This war marks a significant alteration, even a reversal, from commonly accepted ideas of Arab political/military behavior in the following respects. Arab governments initiated large-scale military action against Israeli forces. In all previous wars (19^8, 1936, and 1967) Arab forces responded (unsuccessfully) to Israeli initiatives. In 1936 and 1967 especially, Arab forces were in defensive positions, dug into static emplacements with few units deployed for offensive purposes. In each 1 2 Arab-Israeli Military/Political Relations case these forces were overwhelmed by Israeli units utilizing the tactics of surprise and mobility. In 1973 the governments of Egypt and Syria coordinated an attack, forcing the Israelis to fight a two-front war. In all previous conflicts Arab countries operated without any apparent cooperation. This allowed the Israelis to defeat them on a sequential basis, and permitted the Israelis to exploit their interior lines by rapidly mobilizing and sequentially concentrating forces against selected Arab units. In 1973, Egypt and Syria managed to conceal their true purpose in building up forces along Israeli borders. Their attack was launched swiftly and with preponderant advantage in forces deployed along the ceasefire lines. In previous engagements, especially in 1967, Arab communications security was remarkably ineffective. The Israelis were able to gather extremely accurate intelligence concerning the deployment and probable missions of Arab forces. This gave them sufficient warning and time to mobilize their reserves and to attack under conditions of ádvíantage. In 1973, Arab forces aggressively attacked Israeli units, in many cases voluntarily taking heavy casualties, and maintained a surprisingly high level of discipline. In all previous conflicts Arab military units (with some exceptions, notably Jordan's Arab Legion) broke off contact with Israeli units after relatively brief exchanges of fire. During the 1967 War, in particular, some Egyptian and Syrian units either retreated or surrendered to Israeli forces without offering significant resistance. In 1973, a considerable degree of political/diplomatic coordination between Arab governments, combatant and noncombatant, was effect- ed. A coordination that was all the more impressive because of the obvious disarray of Western governments against whom it was directed. The heretofore dominant pattern had been that of each Arab government seeking its own interests without seeming to concern itself with the problems of its allies. Until the 1973 oil embargo, Arab oil stoppages had been both short lived and piecemeal, broken as the interests of each Arab government dictated. (3) During the course of the 1973 conflict, Arab reportage of military actions was remarkable (relative to earlier war reportage) for its accuracy and low keyed approach. Instead, the Israelis produced the bombast with early statements by high officials to the effect that the Israeli forces were going to "crush the bones" of Arab armies, or that Arab forces were retreating everywhere, etc., etc. In the three earlier wars the Arab media was noted for its semihysterical threats and anti- Western statements, its incredible inaccuracies, and its general lack of touch with reality. W In sum, then, the 1973 War presents a change from previous Arab behavior, both military and political. It is thus a difficult problem for Western analysts. How did numbers of Arabs, elite and mass, manage to alter their behavior to an unexpected, even incredible extent? What are the implications of this newfound ability to control heretofore semi- anarchic behavior? What are the longterm consequences of the 1973 War? Does it represent a permanent shift «η Arab-Israeli, intra-Arab, and Arab-Western power relationships? Or is it an aberration on an
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