Arab states, Arab interest groups and anti-Zionist movements in Western Europe and the US

487 Pages·2017·2.79 MB·English

ARAB STATES, ARAB INTEREST GROUPS AND ANTI-ZIONIST
MOVEMENTS IN WESTERN EUROPE AND THE US
Thesis
presented to the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences
of the University of Zurich
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

By Daniel Rickenbacher

accepted in the fall semester 2017
on the recommendation of the doctoral committee:
Prof. Dr. Hans-Lukas Kieser (main supervisor)
Prof. Dr. Erik Petry
Prof. Dr. Jeronim Perović
Prof. Dr. Matthieu Leimgruber

Zurich, 2018
Abstract English
This thesis analyzes the history of the transnational pro-Arab and anti-Zionist network
in Western Europe and the US from the start of its activity in the 1920s until the mid-
1970s, when the PLO achieved several international diplomatic successes. Since the
Palestine conflict’s start, the Arab national movement led by Amin al-Husseini had
sought to involve other Arab and Islamic actors to add weight to their cause. Parallelly,
it developed an infrastructure to influence Western public opinion. The resultant
transnational advocacy network enjoyed the support of Arab states, which competed
over influence on Palestine and numerous non-Arab anti-Zionist activists motivated by
a diverse array of ideologies. After 1944, the Arab League coordinated a propaganda
campaign against Zionism, which failed to prevent the partition of Palestine. In the
1950s however, the Arab League under the sponsorship of Egypt vastly expanded its
propaganda network. Besides advocating Egypt’s foreign policy goals, it sought to
mainstream Palestinian nationalism. Fatah, which later took over the PLO, meanwhile
built its own network, closely interacting with the ascendant New Left. This network
was simultaneously involved in propaganda and terrorist activities against Israel and
Western targets. The threat of terrorism and economic repercussions by Arab states
were eventually successful in pushing Western European governments to accept
Palestinian demands and distance themselves from Israel.

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Abstract Deutsch
Diese Arbeit analysiert die Geschichte des transnationalen pro-arabischen und
antizionistischen Netzwerks in Westeuropa und den USA bis Mitte der 1970er Jahre.
Seit Beginn des Palästina-Konflikts hatte die von Amin al-Husseini geführte arabische
Nationalbewegung versucht, andere arabische und islamische Akteure einzubeziehen,
um ihrer Sache mehr Gewicht zu verleihen. Parallel dazu entwickelte sie eine
Infrastruktur zur Beeinflussung der westlichen öffentlichen Meinung. Das daraus
resultierende transnationale Unterstützungsnetzwerk genoss die Unterstützung
arabischer Staaten, die um den Einfluss auf Palästina konkurrierten, und zahlreicher
nicht-arabischer antizionistischer Aktivisten, die durch eine Vielzahl von Ideologien
motiviert waren. Nach 1944 koordinierte die Arabische Liga eine
Propagandakampagne gegen den Zionismus, die die Teilung Palästinas nicht
verhindern konnte. In den 1950er Jahren baute die Arabische Liga unter der
Schirmherrschaft Ägyptens dieses Propagandanetzwerk weiter aus. Neben dem
Eintreten für die außenpolitischen Ziele Ägyptens war es bestrebt, den
palästinensischen Nationalismus fördern. Die Fatah, die später die PLO übernahm,
baute gleichzeitig ein eigenes Netzwerk auf, indem sie eng mit der aufsteigenden
Neuen Linken zusammenarbeitete. Dieses Netzwerk war sowohl an Propaganda- als
auch an Terroraktivitäten gegen Israel und westliche Ziele beteiligt. Die Bedrohung
durch den Terrorismus und wirtschaftlichen Sanktionen der arabischen Staaten
bewegten die westeuropäischen Regierungen schliesslich dazu, palästinensische
Forderungen zu akzeptieren und sich von Israel zu distanzieren.

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Contents

Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 6
1 Pan-Arab and Pan-Islamic Propaganda and the Arab-Jewish Conflict before
1939 .............................................................................................................................. 26
1.1 Pan-Islamism, the ‘Jewish War against Islam’ and the Crusaders ............... 26
1.2 The Arab Revolt, the AHC and Propaganda in Britain .................................. 41
1.3 Emil Ghoury and the AHC’s Christian Outreach ............................................ 48
1.4 The Revisionist Powers and the AHC Propaganda ....................................... 52
1.5 AHC Networks in Syria and Egypt, Barudi’s Arab National Bureau and the
Bludan Congress ....................................................................................................... 60
1.6 Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 72
2 Anti-Zionist Networks in the US before World War II ........................................... 74
2.1 The Missionary Network and the origins of Protestant anti-Zionism ............. 74
2.2 Arab-American lobbying against Zionism ....................................................... 81
2.3 The State Department and Zionism ............................................................... 84
2.4 The 1929 riots and the ascendancy of anti-Zionism ...................................... 88
2.5 George Antonius, Philip Hitti and the American Campus .............................. 96
2.6 The Society of the ‘American Friends of the Arabs’..................................... 102
2.7 The Arab Americans and the AHC ............................................................... 110
2.8 Arab Christians, Islam and Anti-Zionism ...................................................... 123
2.9 Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 126
3 The Arab League Propaganda Infrastructure to fight Partition .......................... 129
3.1 The Reestablishment of the AHC ................................................................. 129
3.2 The Preparation of the Propaganda Campaign ........................................... 133
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3.3 The Arab Offices ........................................................................................... 140
3.4 Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 146
4 The Campaign against a Jewish State in the United States .............................. 148
4.1 The State Department and Zionism ............................................................. 149
4.2 Arab-American Opposition to Zionism and the Institute of Arab American
Affairs ...................................................................................................................... 166
4.3 Benjamin Freedman and the League for Peace with Justice in Palestine .. 186
4.4 The Arab League’s Campaign against Zionism and the Arab Offices ........ 192
4.5 The Arabs at the UN ..................................................................................... 210
4.6 Last Stand: The Committee for Peace and Justice in the Holy Land and the
fight against Partition .............................................................................................. 216
4.7 Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 225
5 The German-Arab friendship between the First World War and the Six-Day War
228
5.1 German-Arab friendship after World War II and its origins .......................... 228
5.2 The Opposition to the Luxembourg Agreement ........................................... 234
5.3 The German Arabists and the Arabs ............................................................ 240
5.4 The Ideological Roots of the Rapprochement between Arab nationalism and
the German Far-right after the War ........................................................................ 244
5.5 Nazis in Egypt ............................................................................................... 250
5.6 The Impact of the Suez Crisis on far-right pro-Arabism .............................. 261
5.7 Liberation-Nationalism in Switzerland: Hans Fleig and Ahmed Huber ....... 270
5.8 Ahmed Huber – Social Democrat and National-Socialist Muslim ............... 277
5.9 Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 291
6 The Arab League Propaganda Infrastructure and its Partners .......................... 293
6.1 The Expansion of the Arab League Propaganda Activities ......................... 293
6.2 The Re-Establishment of the Arab League Propaganda Network in the US
and the Native anti-Zionist Network ....................................................................... 301
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6.3 The Arab League Office in Geneva, the PLO and the Arab Boycott ........... 322
6.4 Germany: A special case .............................................................................. 331
6.5 Development of the Arab propaganda strategy after 1967 ......................... 341
6.6 Case Study: Terrorism against Switzerland, the Arab League and the PLO ....
....................................................................................................................... 347
6.7 Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 363
7 The PLO Network in Europe and Palestine Solidarity ........................................ 364
7.1 Fatah and the GUPS in Germany................................................................. 365
7.2 The GUPS and the New Left Student movement ........................................ 370
7.3 The Palestine Committees Network in Western Europe and ...................... 377
7.4 Establishment anti-Zionism: The CAABU in Britain ..................................... 388
7.5 Fatah, the Swiss Palestine Committees and International Terrorism ......... 395
7.6 Seeking recognition: The PLO Office in London .......................................... 412
7.7 A PLO Office in Switzerland? The First Round of Negotiations .................. 422
7.8 A PLO Office in Switzerland? The Second Round of Negotiations ............. 435
8 Outlook and Conclusion ....................................................................................... 441
Abbreviations .............................................................................................................. 454
Bibliography ................................................................................................................ 456

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Introduction
The Civil War in Syria and the crisis in Saudi-American relations have moved the
lobbying efforts of Arab states in the US into the media spotlight. According to a
Washington Post article, lobbying in foreign capitals has become a multimillion-dollar
industry, employing analysts, PR experts and many others in recent years.1 This,
however, is not a new phenomenon. In fact, lobbying activities by foreign governments
and political organizations have a long pedigree. Arab interest groups have sought to
influence Western foreign public opinion since the 1920s, when the first anti-Zionist
and pro-Arab organizations were established in Europe and the US. Nevertheless, the
activities of Arab interest groups and local anti-Zionist activists have generally received
very limited scholarly attention apart from “cursory historical study”, as Rory Miller
concluded almost two decades ago.2 This lack of scholarly interest is especially glaring
when compared with the scrutiny dedicated to the alleged workings of the ‘Zionist
Lobby’. While these still stir both scholarly interest and exaggerated, often
conspiratorial, fantasies, evidence that pro-Arab activists have been active in similar
actions since the Balfour Declaration in 1917 has often been conveniently ignored and
is therefore missing from the narrative on the Arab-Israeli conflict.
This work is concerned with the ways pro-Arab interest groups sought to influence
public opinion and foreign policy regarding the Arab-Jewish conflict in Palestine before
and after the founding of Israel. It studies the history and evolution of a pro-Arab
network in the US, Britain, Germany and Switzerland over a period of almost 60 years.
In these countries, both pro-Arab, Zionist and later pro-Israeli activists fought to gain
the favor of the larger public in a third state. This struggle is not without precedents.

1 Ho, Catherine. “Saudi Government Has Vast Network of PR, Lobby Firms in U.S.”
The Washington Post, April 20, 2016.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2016/04/20/saudi-government-
has-vast-network-of-pr-lobby-firms-in-u-s/.
2 Rory Miller, Divided against Zion: Anti-Zionist Opposition in Britain to a Jewish State
in Palestine, 1945-1948, vol. 11 (London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2000), 2.

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Previous propaganda wars have for instance occurred in the United States during the
First World War between Germany and Britain, both powers vying for the support of
the American public.3 What distinguishes the Arab-Israeli propaganda struggle from
others is its endurance and the complexity of its actors, having involved individual
activists, non-state actors and states: Israeli, Arab and even third states. In fact, we
are speaking of an international advocacy network, which promoted the anti-Zionist
cause during this lengthy period. This international advocacy network counted several
setbacks and successes. For almost three decades, it strove to prevent the
establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine – and spectacularly failed when the UN
endorsed partition in November 1947.
The history of these activities bear evidence to the fact that, since the early mandate
period, the Arab-Israeli conflict had an international dimension and transcended the
borders of Palestine. This also resulted from the nature of the parties involved in the
conflict. Both Arab nationalism and Pan-Islamism, as well as Zionism were
transnational movements. This international dimension of the conflict raised the stakes
involved and contributed to its escalation. The first Arab-Israeli war of 1948/1949,
which started as a civil war after the UN partition decision, led to considerable
casualties on both sides. A majority of the Arab inhabitants fled the future Jewish state,
partly motivated by fear enhanced by Arab atrocity propaganda, and partly expelled by
the conquering Israeli armies. They and their descendants, who settled in refugee
camps in Israel’s neighboring countries, came to remember the events as the Nakba
(Engl. catastrophe), a source of national trauma. Palestine, a geographical concept
which had no deep historic tradition among the native Arabs and had been considered
by most to be a part of Syria, became a place of yearning – much as it had been for
the Jewish diaspora for 2000 years. This yearning stimulated the growth of a distinct
Palestinian nationalism and inspired a revisionist agenda, which sought to undo the
defeat by dismantling the nascent Jewish state, Israel. For the Palestinian Jews, now
known as the Israelis, the war, which they called the War of Independence, ended in
military triumph. Israel defeated the invading Arab armies and extended its borders

3 Ben D. Mor, “The Rhetoric of Public Diplomacy and Propaganda Wars: A View from
Self-Presentation Theory,” European Journal of Political Research 46, no. 5 (August
1, 2007): 668, doi:10.1111/j.1475-6765.2007.00707.x.
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beyond the partition lines, albeit shying away from conquering the whole of Palestine,
as many soldiers, including later peace president Yitzchak Rabin, had wished. But the
victory came at a significant material and human cost for the country’s Jews. The
conflict also affected the Jewish diaspora. The Jews in Arab and Islamic countries
suffered from increasing anti-Semitic violence and discrimination, which resulted in
their continuing flight to Western countries and to Israel, where they often received only
a lukewarm welcome. In the Soviet-dominated Eastern Bloc, which soon switched
sides in the conflict, the surviving Jews were equally subjected to increasing anti-
Semitism, which masqueraded itself as anti-Zionism.
The first Arab-Israeli war did not resolve the conflict over Palestine, as the Israelis
hoped, but only heralded the start of a new phase. Although the existence of Israel
was momentarily secured, in the mind of the Israelis, this existence remained
precarious. Faced by the overwhelming economic and demographic weight of the Arab
world, Israel’s existence had to be constantly reasserted. One central element of the
Israeli strategy was to keep the military edge. This could only be guaranteed through
the support of a Great Power. Israel’s dependence on this support presented a
permanent weak point, as its Arab opponents rightly recognized. It was therefore a
focal point of the activities of the anti-Zionist network. Since the mid-1940s, the Arab
League was the most important element of this network. It was instrumental in building
a global propaganda network to advocate the Arab and later the Palestinian cause. As
I will show in this study, this network was eventually responsible for the revolution in
the international arena in the mid-1970s, when the right of the Palestinians to their own
state was internationally recognized. This development has often astounded observers
and continues to do so. Thus, the historian Paul Chamberlin has asked: “How, for
instance, do we understand the success of the PLO? While the organization failed to
achieve many of its objectives – such as the creation of a Palestinian state, the
formation of a unified leadership – it proved surprisingly successful on the international
stage.”4 I hope that my study will provide insight into this question.

4 Paul Thomas Chamberlin, The Global Offensive: The United States, the Palestine
Liberation Organization, and the Making of the Post-Cold War Order, Oxford Studies
in International History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 21.
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There is a glossary of notions to describe the process of influencing opinions in order
to change policies. Often, this vocabulary is ill-defined and subject to fashion. In my
work, I use the notions of propaganda, public diplomacy and less often lobbying. This
warrants some definitions. Lobbying is part of the democratic system, especially in the
US, where it has a long tradition. However, many use the notion of lobbying to imply
that the activity is illegitimate. Thus, those speaking of a ‘Zionist’, ‘Israeli’ or even
‘Jewish Lobby’ have often sought to insinuate that these lobbies are manipulating US
foreign policy at the behest of a minority with detrimental consequences for larger US
interests. In this vein, John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt have alleged with regard
to US policy in the Middle East, that “the overall thrust of U.S. policy in the region is
due primarily to U.S. domestic politics and especially to the activities of the ‘Israel
lobby.’ Other special-interest groups have managed to skew U.S. foreign policy in
directions they favored, but no lobby has managed to divert U.S. foreign policy as far
from what the American national interest would otherwise suggest, while
simultaneously convincing Americans that U.S. and Israeli interests are essentially
identical.”5 In fact, both authors rehashed a narrative of events which has been put
forward by US opponents of Zionism since 1948.6 If there is ground for speaking of a
Zionist Lobby, it would make just as much sense to speak of an Arab Lobby, as one
recent author has indeed done.7 Such lobbies are best described as foreign policy
interest groups. Per definition, they strive to exert influence on the foreign policy of the
state. Interest groups may be state- or non-state actors, but often, this distinction is
difficult to make. Both states and non-state interest groups have an interest in hiding
their involvement in lobbying. Often, interest groups may therefore use other actors, or
front groups, to lobby on their behalf. They do so out of the conviction that their
arguments are more credible and more neutral when not directly tied to state interests.

5 John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, “The Israel Lobby and US Foreign
Policy,” Middle East Policy 13, no. 3 (2006): 30.
6 The foundation text of this narrative is Kermit Roosevelt, The Partition of Palestine:
A Lesson in Pressure Politics, Pamphlet 7 (The Institute of Arab American Affairs,
1948).
7 Mitchell Geoffrey Bard, The Arab Lobby: The Invisible Alliance That Undermines
America’s Interests in the Middle East (Harper New York, 2010).
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