Aquinas’s theory of perception: an analytic reconstruction

372 Pages·2016·2.1 MB·English

by  Anthony J. Lisska

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 05/19/2016, SPi
Aquinas’s Theory of Perception
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 05/19/2016, SPi
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 05/19/2016, SPi
Aquinas’s Theory
of Perception
An Analytic Reconstruction
Anthony J. Lisska
1
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 05/19/2016, SPi
3
Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP,
United Kingdom
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford.
It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship,
and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of
Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries
© Anthony J. Lisska 2016
The moral rights of the author have been asserted
First Edition published in 2016
Impression: 1
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in
a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the
prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted
by law, by licence or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics
rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the
above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the
address above
You must not circulate this work in any other form
and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer
Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press
198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Data available
Library of Congress Control Number: 2016931712
ISBN 978–0–19–877790–8
Printed in Great Britain by
Clays Ltd, St Ives plc
Links to third party websites are provided by Oxford in good faith and
for information only. Oxford disclaims any responsibility for the materials
contained in any third party website referenced in this work.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 05/19/2016, SPi
To Professor Robert G. Turnbull,
who first convinced a then rather young philosopher not to abandon
his work with Thomas Aquinas but to rethink through the lenses of
linguistic analysis the philosophical chestnuts found plentifully in the
texts of Thomas, and who, with a most gracious philosophical soul
and a magnanimity of collegial spirit, encouraged this young
philosopher to attempt a refutation of his own reading of Aquinas on
phantasms, this book is gratefully and with deep appreciation
dedicated.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 05/19/2016, SPi
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 05/19/2016, SPi
Preface
This book is the result of several years spent undertaking research and writing on the
difficult issues surrounding Thomas Aquinas’s theory of sensation and perception. It
presents an attempt to ‘reconstruct’ and interpret the texts of Thomas on sense knowl-
edge. The emphasis in this inquiry, accordingly, is directed towards developing a philo-
sophical analysis of the internal and the external senses, with particular reference to
the internal sense of the vis cogitativa. Approaching the texts of Aquinas from contem-
porary analytic philosophy, this study suggests a modest ‘innate’ or ‘structured’ inter-
pretation for the role of this inner sense faculty. Furthermore, this analysis sheds light
on the workings of what Aquinas calls the ‘agent intellect’ (intellectus agens) and its
corresponding cognitive process of abstraction. Inner sense and abstraction are two
concepts in general Aristotelian epistemology and philosophy of mind that require
rethinking and tough-minded analysis.
The research that results in this book began several years ago under the thoughtful
tutelage of the late Robert G. Turnbull. It has been refined over the years by many read-
ings of papers at professional meetings, papers at all three divisions of the American
Philosophical Association, and more than several publications, along with many sum-
mers and two sabbaticals spent worrying about Aquinas on perception. Research was
partly funded by a National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Research Grant.
An earlier National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Seminar was undertaken
with the late Roderick Chisholm at Brown University.1 Robert C. Good Grants from
Denison University and the Denison Mellon Program in the Humanities enabled the
author to augment regular sabbaticals with additional time affording the possibility to
complete drafts of this book. The author acknowledges with sincere gratitude these
sources of funding, all of which were indispensable for the completion of this extended
study on Thomas Aquinas.
The author’s first attempt at providing an elucidation of the principles of intentionality
in Aquinas was written for Professor Chisholm. The analysis of phantasm and sense
datum first was read at the Eastern Division Meetings of the American Philosophical
Association. Earlier attempts at unearthing the ‘logic’ of the vis cogitativa and its role in
perception were read as papers at the Central and Pacific Division Meetings of the
American Philosophical Association with variations at other conferences. The author
expresses his gratitude for invitations to contribute papers by the late Ralph McInerny
and the late Norris Clark, SJ. The author’s 2006 Presidential Address for the American
Catholic Philosophical Association discussed in some detail several issues treated in
1 Over the last quarter of the 20th c., Professor Chisholm was known as one of the foremost contempo-
rary philosophers concerned with perception theory and the thesis of intentionality.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 05/19/2016, SPi
viii Preface
this monograph.2 Essays central to this topic have appeared in Analytical Thomism
(2006), Semiotica (2010), The Thomist (1973; 1976), International Philosophical
Quarterly (1976), and Thomistic Sources (forthcoming). A major paper on the Vis
Cogitativa and the perception of individuals was presented at the International
St Thomas Aquinas Society’s meeting held in conjunction with the Eastern Division
Meetings of the American Philosophical Association (1999). A sabbatical spent at the
University of Oxford enabled the author to present his work to several philosophers in
residence and to engage in productive discussions with Sir Anthony Kenny, the then
Master of Balliol College. Over the years, Sir Anthony has been warmly supportive of
this project, which overlaps in many areas with his own substantive work on Aquinas
and the philosophy of mind. The author is grateful to him for his engaging conversa-
tions in Oxford, in Granville, and more recently at his Headington retirement home,
and for his suggestions of the role of inner sense in Aquinas. The author spent part of a
Minnesota summer with a John Haldane seminar at the University of St Thomas; he
expresses his profound gratitude to Professor Haldane, of the University of St Andrews
and now of Baylor University, for stimulating conversations and astute criticisms on
several issues considered in this monograph. On several occasions, both Professors
Kenny and Haldane visited Denison University. The author has learned very much
from the astute writings of Father Fergus Kerr, the former editor of Blackfriars at
Oxford.
Over the years, Robert Turnbull, Peter Machamer, Peter McCormick, Ron Santoni,
Alan Hausman, John Boler, Joan Franks, Harry Heft, Norris Clarke, Mary Sirridge,
Alasdair MacIntyre, Kevin White, John Deely, John Rist, Henry Veatch, Jonathan
Jacobs, Douglas Rasmussen, and Ralph McInerny in the United States, Lawrence
Dewan in Canada, Anthony Kenny, Brian Davies, John Haldane, and Dorian Scaltas in
the United Kingdom, and Roger Pouviet in France have offered valuable comments
and astute criticisms. Recent conversations with two philosophers interested in
Aquinas on inner sense, James South of the Department of Philosophy at Marquette
University and Leo White of Morgan State University, have been particularly fruitful
and productive. Two younger scholars, Mark Barker and Daniel De Haan, have been
keenly interested in the topics considered in this book. In particular, the author
expresses his profound gratitude to his friends Alan Hausman and James South, both
of whom undertook the supererogatory task of reading and commenting upon earlier
drafts of this work. Professor South’s efforts are indeed noteworthy. He worked through
the entire draft manuscript with thoughtful and critical eyes, and then he and the
author undertook extensive and thorough conversations on the manuscript. Professor
South’s insights have rendered this analysis more sophisticated both philosophically
2 ‘A Look at Inner Sense in Aquinas: A Long-Neglected Faculty Psychology’, in Michael Baur (ed.),
Intelligence and the Philosophy of Mind: Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 80
(2006), 1–19. In his role as president, the author selected as a general theme of this 2006 national meeting
of the ACPA ‘Intelligence and the Philosophy of Mind’, with Sir Anthony Kenny and John Haldane along
with the late Kurt Pritzl serving as plenary speakers.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 05/19/2016, SPi
Preface ix
and historically, and have assisted in removing some serious potholes and muddles
from the arguments in this book. My Denison Philosophy colleagues as well as many
Denison academic administrators have been supportive of this ongoing project.
The author received three sets of significant and thorough insights from anonymous
reviewers for Oxford University Press; the author expresses his deep gratitude for the
thoughtful analyses these reviewers offered for an earlier draft of this book. The author
also expresses sincere appreciation to Ms Eleanor Collins from Oxford University
Press for her marvellous assistance as editor with early drafts of this study, and to Ms
Sarah Barrett for her outstanding copy-editing work. Of course, any philosophical
problems and infelicities—or downright mistaken accounts—that remain rest
squarely on the shoulders of the author. As always, the author depends on the deft
proofreading eye of Marianne Lisska in order to render his writing style more direct
and perspicuous.
The constant attention and thoughtful encouragement over the last quarter of a cen-
tury that Alan Hausman and Robert Turnbull have given to the author’s work on
Aquinas and perception theory deserve special mention. The author’s first attempt to
elucidate a consistent account of Aquinas’s theory of perception came while reading
Descartes with Alan Hausman; the question kept haunting the author—how did
Aquinas really differ on perception theory from Descartes? The first extensive study of
Aquinas on phantasms took place with Robert Turnbull; his cogent remarks have
made this work more consistent and less ridden with woolly arguments. It was
Professor Turnbull who first urged the author to use analytic philosophy in order to
look at the important texts of Aquinas through a different set of lenses. That advice
indeed has made the author’s philosophical career. It is to the late Professor Robert G.
Turnbull that this study of Aquinas on perception, covering issues so dear to his own
philosophical soul, is warmly dedicated.
Granville, OH, USA
25 March 2016