Aquinas’ Proofs for God’s Existence: St. Thomas Aquinas on: “The Per Accidens Necessarily Implies the Per Se”

207 Pages·1973·12.82 MB·English

by  Dennis Bonnette Ph.D. (auth.)

AQUINAS' PROOFS FOR GOD'S EXISTENCE
AQUINAS' PROOFS FOR GOD'S
EXISTENCE
ST. THOMAS AQUINAS ON: "THE PER ACCIDENS
NECESSARILY IMPLIES THE PER SE"
by
DENNIS BONNETTE, Ph.D .
•
MARTINUS NI]HOFF /THE HAGUE/ 1972
© I972 by Martinus Nijhoff. The Hague. Netherlands
All rights reserved. including the right to translate or to
reproduce this book or parts thereof in any form
ISBN-13: 978-90-247-1303-5 e-ISBN-13: 978-94-010-2380-1
DOl. 10.1007/978-94-010-2380-1
PREFACE
The purpose of this study is to investigate the legitimacy of the
principle, "The per accidens necessarily implies the per se," as it is found
in the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas. Special emphasis will be placed
upon the function of this principle in the proofs for God's existence. The
relevance of the principle in this latter context can be seen at once when
it is observed that it is the key to the solution of the well known "prob
lem of infinite regress."
The investigation of the principle in question will be divided into two
Parts. A preliminary examination of the function of the principle will
be made in Part I: Domains Other Than That of Creature-God. The
domains to be considered in this Part are those of accident-substance,
change, and knowledge. Employing what is learned of the function of
the principle in these areas of application, Part II: The Domain of
Creature-God will analyze the role of the principle in the proofs for
God's existence. This latter Part will constitute the greater portion of
the book, since the domain of creatures in their relation to God is the
most significant application of the principle in the writings of St.
Thomas.
In the course of this investigation, relevant analyses by St. Thomas'
commentators - both classical and contemporary - will be considered.
Finally, in light of the insights offered by St. Thomas and his commen
tators, an attempt will be made to show why St. Thomas considers that
"The per accidens necessarily implies the per se," is a genuinely meta
physical principle - universal and necessary in its application.
I am indebted to Professor Joseph Bobik of the University of Notre
Dame for the original idea of the topic to be investigated. More
importantly, I wish to express my deepest appreciation to Dr. Bobik
for his tireless and incisive criticism of my work. Only through his
fruitful suggestions - flowing from his profound grasp of the thought
VI PREFACE
of St. Thomas - has this study been brought to completion. Whatever
of value may be found herein must be ascribed to Dr. Bobik's inspi
ration and guidance. Wherever there is found failure, I freely admit
it as my own.
Further, I am personally indebted to my entire family for the sym
pathy, patience, and encouragement so vitally needed by anyone who
attempts a project of this sort. Most of all, this debt is owed to my wife,
Lois - to whom, in loving appreciation, I dedicate this book.
DENNIS BONNETTE
Niagara University
Lewiston, New York
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The author wishes to thank sincerely and Random House Inc. for
permission to quote from Etienne Gilson's Christian Philosophy of
St. Thomas Aquinas (translated by L. K. Shook),
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Preface v
Introduction
I
The Nature and Limits of the Inquiry - The Central Contexts to
be Analysed
PART I
DOMAINS OTHER THAN THAT OF CREATURE-GOD
CHAPTER I. THE DOMAIN OF ACCIDENT-SUBSTANCE 9
Accident Implies Substance - A Self-Evident Principle - Classical
Modem Objections are Irrelevant - How Accidents Depend on
Substance - A More Profound Reason
CHAPTER II. THE DOMAIN OF CHANGE 20
The Problem of Change - A Difficulty - The Per Accidens in
Change Necessarily Requires the Per Se
CHAPTER III. THE DOMAIN OF KNOWLEDGE
Sense Knowledge - The First and Second Acts of the Mind - The
Third Act of the Mind - The Necessity of a Per Se - The Nature
of the Scientific Syllogism - A Possible Confusion - The Argument
- A Clarification - New Definitions
PART II
THE DOMAIN OF CREATURE-GOD
INTRODUCTION: THE CAUSE OF PER ACCIDENS BEING 53
CHAPTER I. THE WAY OF THE DE ENTE ET ESSENTIA 56
The Way - Essence and Existence - The Argument Itself - A
Further Argument
VIII TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER II. APROPOS OF THE QUINQUE VIAE IN GENERAL 69
The Ways - The Problem of Infinite Multitude - Proper Causality
CHAPTER III. THE PRIMA VIA 80
The Way - The Principle in Question - The Arguments - Sylvester
of Ferrara - A Second Argument - A Further Argument - Con
temporary Comment
CHAPTER IV. THE SECUNDA VIA 105
The Way - Efficient Causality - The Argument - The Commen
tary on the Metaphysics - The Commentators - Contemporary
Comment - Conclusions on Efficient Causality
CHAPTER V. THE TERTIA VIA 127
The Way - The Argument - The Latter Part of the Proof
CHAPTER VI. THE QUARTA VIA 140
The Way - The Argument - The Principle in Question - Parti
cipation and Analogy - Proof from St. Thomas
CHAPTER VII. THE QUINTA VIA 157
The Way - Finality in St. Thomas - Chance - An Intelligent
Orderer - Necessity of a Per Se - The General Arguments
CONCLUSION 181
Exterior Causality - The Quinque Viae - Three Categories of
Application - The Principle in General-The Other Applications -
A Final Comment
Appendix
Bibliography
Index
INTRODUCTION
1. THE NATURE AND LIMITS OF THE INQUIRY
This book is partly historical and partly systematic. It is historical in
the sense that it arises out of the writings of an historical figure, St.
Thomas Aquinas. For St. Thomas holds as a necessary proposition the
principle that whatever is per accidens must be reduced to that which is
per se.1 And yet, although he ventures close to explicit treatment of the
topic on two occasions,2 St. Thomas never offers an ex professo analysis
of the principle.
Such an analysis is needed. For although it is immediately clear that
the per accidens or per aliud 3 necessarily requires an aliud, it is not
immediately clear that this other must be, ultimately, something per se
(and this especially in the context of proving God's existence). Although
St. Thomas does employ the principle in question as self-evident in
several of the contexts we shall investigate,4 nevertheless it will have to
be determined at some later point whether such "self-evidence"
depends solely on the particulars of those contexts or whether, rather,
it can be established in virtue of something proper to the universal
nature of the per accidens in relation to the per se.
It is with respect to this problem that this study becomes systematic.
And the systematic task becomes to show whether the principle at
issue, as such, must function in each and every order. St. Thomas does
not explicitly undertake such a task. The reason why the phrase,
1 Cf. S.T., I-II, 35, 7; De Prin. Nat., 3, n. 352; In I Phys., 14, n. 7; In I Post. Anal.,
7, n. 8; 37, n. 5. See Appendix for a list of Latin editions employed for the works of St. Thomas
Aquinas cited.
2 In I Post. Anal., 7 and In II Meta., 3 and 4.
3 That the term "per aliud" is frequently substituted for "per accidens" will be seen later.
See below, p. 10, footnote 8.
4 See below, pp. 9-37.
2 INTRODUCTION
"principle ... as such," is employed here is that there are two occasions 5
on which St. Thomas does explicitly treat a somewhat different topic,
the problem of infinite regress, which when viewed from the proper
perspective, illuminates the relationship of the per accidens to the per
se.
Although such portions of the book are termed "systematic," insofar
as they do not merely elucidate the explicit arguments of St. Thomas,
nonetheless, every attempt will be made to remain faithful to the
thought of St. Thomas by grounding each argument in his writings and,
where absolutely necessary, by building new insights in a manner which
accords with these writings.
Although St. Thomas frequently cites the proposition in support of
an argument,6 he never explicitly defends the principle: And, as noted
above, even indirect defense of the principle is offered by him on very
few occasions. This explains the otherwise perhaps surprising fact that
relatively few texts of St. Thomas will be quoted. In fact, since the
choice of contexts to be investigated will be deliberately systematic,7
appropriate use of the selected portions dictates a limited presentation
of their texts. Of course, parallel citations will be taken from parts of
St. Thomas' writings which fall outside the selected sections wherever
useful or illuminating.
Further, the contributions of St. Thomas' commentators will be
noted in those contexts to which they are applicable. And, although
according to the best available information there are virtually no formal
treatments of this topic by contemporary writers, the thought of these
writers will be consulted when advantageous to the development of the
study.
As expressed earlier, the purpose of this book is to investigate the
legitimacy of the principle, "The per accidens necessarily implies the
per se," as it is found in the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas. Special
emphasis is placed upon the function of this principle in the proofs for
God's existence. The relevance of the principle in the latter context can
be seen at once when it is observed that it is the key to the solution of
the well known "problem of the infinite regress." 8
It is noteworthy that competent scholastic philosophers,9 in present
ing the proofs for God's existence, do not succumb to the temptation to
5 Cf. In I Post. Anal., 7 and In II Meta., 3 and 4.
6 Cf. In I Phys., 14, n. 7; S.T., I-II, 35, 7; C.G., III, 52.
7 See below, pp. 4-6.
8 See below, pp. 74-75, 84-85.
9 See below, pp. 71-72.
INTRODUCTION 3
reject the possibility of infinite regress out of hand by relying on St.
Thomas' "argument against an infinite multitude in act." 10 For, since
an infinite regress in act would constitute such an "impossible" multi
tude, no infinite regress in act would be possible. But rather than rely
on any such argument, these philosophers prescind from such reasoning
entirely and insist that even deeper reasons require that the regress
come to a First, which is God - regardless of whether the intermediate
elements in the series are finite or infinite in multitude.
The wisdom of contemporary writers in this regard is witnessed by
the fact that it is rather debatable whether any argument against in
finite regress based upon the impossibility of an infinite multitude in
act can be definitively grounded in the writings of St. Thomas, since at
best it must be admitted that he demonstrated some degree of vacilla
tion and hesitation on the question of the possibility of an infinite multi
tude in act.H It will be shown later, in the context of the quinque viae,
that some other principle - indeed, the one which this book in
vestigates - is employed by St. Thomas, and, that the principle involved
is legitimate.12
The need for this investigation, as noted above, lies in the fact that
St. Thomas does not explicitly analyze the universal function of the
principle as such. The importance of this inquiry will be seen when it is
shown that the principle in question is a crucial premise in other major
contexts, and not only with respect to the proofs for God's existence.
I t is not the proper function of this book to test the legitimacy of all
of the many terms and principles of St. Thomas which may be intro
duced in the development of the topic, e.g., accident, substance, form,
matter, privation, etc. Nor are such concepts simply accepted on the
authority of St. Thomas. Rather, since the purpose of this book is to
examine the function of the principle, "The per accidens necessarily
implies the per se," such terms will be accepted with the sole intention
of seeing whether, given some per accidens principle such as accident,
there must necessarily be some corresponding per se, such as substance.
And thus, in the proofs for God's existence, the intention is not to
prove the existence of any per aliud, e.g., beings in motion, caused
causes, contingent beings, etc. Rather, the proper concern of this book
is simply to show that, assuming some such per aliud, then something
per se is necessarily required.
10 Cf. S.T., I, 7, 4.
11 See below, pp. 72-74.
12 See below, pp. 84-126.