APPENDIX THE KASHMIR WAR 1947-48 MAJOR GENERAL AKBAR KHAN, DSO (RETD.) In the

56 Pages·2015·2.43 MB·English

APPENDIX
THE KASHMIR WAR 1947-48
MAJOR GENERAL AKBAR KHAN, D.S.O. (RETD.)
In the 1971 war we lost half of Pakistan. In the 1965 war we achieved
nothing. In the struggle of 1947-1948, we acquired territory that now makes the
whole of Azad Kashmir. It is a story of success and therefore worth studying.
The difference in the three wars was that the 1971 and 1965 wars were wars of
the armed forces only-the nation was not involved, neither were the tribal
guerrillas used at all. In the 1947-48 struggles, the army was not there at all for
the first eight months, it was only the people of Azad Kashmir and the
tribesmen who acquired all the territory. The army was sent in the second half
of the struggle for the last eight months, to hold the territory against the Indian
army.
How big a part the tribesmen played on the Indian mind may be guessed
from the opinion of Mr. V.P. Menon of India who said:
Personally when I recommended to the Government of India the
acceptance of the accession by the Maharajah of Kashmir, I had in mind one
consideration and one consideration alone, viz: that the invasion of Kashmir by
the raiders was a grave threat to the integrity of India. Ever since the time of
Mahmud Ghazni, that is to say, for nearly eight centuries, with but a brief
interval during the Mughal epoch, India had been subjected to periodical
invasions from the North West. Mahmud Ghazni had led no less than seventeen
of these incursions in person. And within less than ten weeks of the
establishment of the new State of Pakistan, its very first act was to let loose a
tribal invasion through the; North West. Srinagar today, Delhi tomorrow. A
nation that forgets its history or its geography does so at its peril. (Integration
of Indian States: V.P. Menon).
At the time of partition it was expected that Kashmir, a Muslim majority
State would join Pakistan but the Maharajah was not willing to accede to
Pakistan. The population of Kashmir was mentally in a State of revolt but their
voice, their protests and their actions were fruitless, because they were
unarmed and the Maharajah had an army of 9,000 and the poUce with which to
hold them down with a strong hand of repression. Some external help to the
Kashmiris was necessary but our government could not ask the army because
the C-in-C and senior officers were British. The senior Pakistani officers were
also not known to the politicians. I, although junior to more than twenty of
these, was known to Dawat Ali Khan and others when, before partition at
Delhi, I had been a member of the Armed Forces Partition Committee and I
had prepared a note for them on how to divide the armed forces.
Thus, it came about that in the beginning of September 1947 I was asked
to prepare a plan as to how to help the people of Kashmir. I was Director of
Weapons and Equipment (DW&E) in GHQ and I found from my records that
there were 4,000 rifles due to be issued to the Punjab police. Surely these could
be diverted to the people of Kashmir. I also found from officers in the
Ordnance that the army had a lot of condemned ammunition waiting to be
dumped in the sea-this could be secretly issued to the Kashmiris. Further rifles
and ammunition could be obtained from the Frontier and abroad depending on
availability of funds. Some trained volunteers would be necessary to handle
these. I wrote a plan called 'Armed Revolt in Kashmir' based on these facts,
suggesting a distribution of weapons in various sectors. I sent twelve copies
above.
A few days later I was called to Lahore for a conference with the Prime
Minister. The plan was adopted. Khurshid Anwar was appointed commander of
the northern sector. Zaman Kiani, of the southern sector. Sardar Shaukat Hayat
was to be the overall Commander. Sometime later I was appointed Military
Adviser to the Prime Minister-to cover my absence from duty.
229
HARI SINGH FLEES SRINAGAR
The first shots were fired and the movement of the people gathered
weight. On the 24 of October 1947, the tribesmen crossed the border and
successfully attacked Muzaffarabad and Domel from where the Dogra troops
withdrew in complete disarray. The tribesmen in their lorries moved forward in
the Srinagar road the next day and again beat the Dogras at Uri. On the 27"
they captured Baramula and sacked it. They were now only 30 miles from
Srinagar and the Maharajah decided that was enough. He left his capital and
went to Jammu, from where he sent his papers of accession to Delhi asking for
help. He was so despondent that he instructed his ADC that if by the next
morning help did not come from India, he was to shoot him in his sleep. The
Maharajah, however, was not destined to be shot because at the moment a
hundred aircraft in India were getting ready to fly over troops to Kashmir the
next day.
GRACEY'S 'NO' TO QUAID
On the evening of the 27*. the Prime Minister held a conference at
Lahore to consider the situation arising out of Kashmir's accession and India's
military intervention. I proposed that an attempt should be made to liquidate
Jammu in order to block the only road along which India could send
reinforcements. I suggested that tribesmen should be sent there, and I offered to
go with them. This was not agreed to on the ground that it would lead to war.
This did not make sense because the tribesmen were already at Baramula and
India had accused us of aggression. How important Jammu was may be judged
from the fact that the same night, when we were in conference, the Quaid-e-
Azam himself had also ordered an attack by the army upon Jammu. According
to Allan Campbell in 'Mission with Mountbatten' the order had been given to
General Gracey, the acting C-in-C. Gracey had refused on the ground that he
could not issue such an order without approval of the Supreme Commander in
Delhi.
230
I returned in Rawalpindi and next day proceeded to Bramula to see how
the tribesmen were doing. When I reached them at night they were just four
miles from Srinagar and they had just finished an attack. At the 4^ milestone,
there was a road-block with machine guns, which had checked their advance.
The tribesmen had crept forward using the broken ground but the whole area
was permanently under water, rain, marsh, lake, river and paddy fields all
contributing. I stayed overnight and the next day carried out a thorough
reconnaissance of the whole area. The tribesmen needed help to overcome the
road-block. The block was not of concrete pillars but just a barbed wire
obstruction, which a single armoured car might be able to break through. That
was the answer. I rushed back to Pindi and was immediately able to find
Colonel Masud who volunteered to take a troop of armoured cars of his unit.
His men, he said, would go in plain clothes without official permission and at
their own risk. I rang up Karachi but the proposal was stoutly opposed. Thus,
the armoured cars did not go to the assistance of the tribesmen and the
tribesmen could not find some other way of entering Srinagar.
The atmosphere in Pakistan was full of great expectations. News of the
tribal success was still spreading and assuming legendary proportions with
every hour. But the Indians had been landing troops fast in Srinagar. A week
later news came that the Indians were coming out of Srinagar and the tribesmen
were falling back without offering resistance. They withdrew totally first to
Baramula and then to Uri. Their actions consisted of mobile and aggressive hit
and run tactics, which were successful in the attack. But they were not prepared
to sit in defensive positions along the road. In their own country, they did take
up defensive positions but there the locals were there to help. Here they wanted
that either the locals or the army should hold these defensive position. But none
of these were available. So they withdrew to the safety of Uri and refused to go
back to the front.
231
SHOW MUST GO ON!
At this stage, I was asked to take over responsibility. But what was there
that I could do? I was only a staff officer, having no troops or guns to rush
forward. But the show was to go on at all costs. So I decided to go to Uri. I
took with me a wireless set and volunteer signallers and a junior staff officer
and arrived at Uri on the 7 of November 1947. Twenty-four hours of desperate
arguments with the tribal chiefs failed to convince them and two thousand
tribesmen left Uri for Abbottabad. I was left with a dozen volunteers only. For
me the die was cast. I decided to carry on against the Indians until the locals
rose and we armed them or until the tribesmen returned to the front. We had
burnt our boasts behind us as it were, like Tariq twelve centuries earlier. So for
myself, I adopted the name of General Tariq. We had two jeeps and plenty of
weapons. We bunt a bridge at Uri and for ten days fired at the Indians giving
the impression that the tribesmen were still there. We raised 75 local volunteers
and armed them with rifles, 300 tribesmen came back and we re-established the
front at Chakothi.
A thousand more tribesmen came and I sent 500 of these to surround
and isolate Poonch. In the weeks that followed the tribesmen went into the
other areas too. The locals rose at Bagh and everywhere else and were armed
with rifles. Volunteers came from Pakistan too. Among them were ex-
servicemen who were suitable for a defensive role. A dozen volunteer army
officers were allowed to come and these went into different areas as
Commanders. Azad Kashmir Government was formed and Sardar Ibrahim
appointed as its President. We received a great deal of publicity. Foreign
correspondents also came to the front and the claim of the Azad Kashmiris
received world recognition. In the winter, snow fell heavily and our actions
were confined to the roads. But the claim of Pakistan for the accession of
Kashmir was at last admitted at the United Nations.
232
PANDU TAKEN
In February 1948 I had to go back to the army, as I had to take over a
brigade at Kohat. In April, the Indians concentrated a division for a summer
offensive to advance on Muzaffarabad. Pakistan at last decided to send troops
into Kashmir to prevent the Indians from advancing further. I was ordered with
my brigade to the same area where I had been before, the Uri-Chakoti Area on
the Srinagar road. In May the Indians began their offensive from Uri on both
sides of the river. They had twelve battalions to do this with. I had only three
battalions but also the tribesmen and Azad Kashmiris. They captured Pandu but
in six weeks on the main road we bought them to a standstill at Chakoti where
our original position was. The Indians abandoned the offensive. But we
attacked Pandu and re-captured 90 square miles. Our army's role was defensive
and in this we were successful except in the southern sector where we lost
Poonch to the Indians due to negligence. However, at the United Nations our
claim was accepted and a cease-fire was ordered which was to be followed by a
plebiscite in Kashmir.
At midnight on 31 December 1948, both sides ordered a cease-fire and
the war came to an end. The right of a plebiscite now stood accepted. That was
all right. But to some of us it was the line along which the cease-fire took place
that appeared unsatisfactory, because as it stood now it left India virtually
everything that she wanted for the security of the valley. There was no pressure
point or compelling factor in our possession with which we could discourage
India from delaying the plebiscite.
233
APPENDIX
U.N. RESOLUTION AUGUST 13,1948
(Resolution Adopted by the Commission at its 40* Meeting,
13 August 1948)
The United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan.
Having given careful consideration to the points of view expressed by
the representatives of India and Pakistan regarding the situation in the State of
Jammu and Kashmir; and
Being of the opinion that the prompt cessation of hostihties and the
correction of conditions, the continuance of which is likely to endanger
international peace and security are essential to implementation of its
endeavours to assist the Governments of India and Pakistan in effecting a final
settlement of the situation;
Resolves to submit simultaneously to the Governments of India and Pakistan
the following proposal:
PART-I: CEASE-FIRE ORDER
A. The Governments of India and Pakistan agree that their respective High
Commands will issue, separately and simultaneously, a cease-fire order to
apply to all forces under their control and in the State of Jammu and
Kashmir, as of the earliest practicable date or dates to be mutually agreed
upon within four days after these proposals have been accepted by both
governments.
B. The High Commands of the Indian and Pakistani forces agree to refrain
from taking any measures that might augment the military potential of the
forces under their control in the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
(For the purpose of these proposals, forces under their control shall be
considered to include all forces, organised and unorganised, fighting or
participating in hostilities on their respective sides.)
C. The Commanders-in-Chief of the forces of India and Pakistan shall
promptly confer regarding any necessary local changes in present
dispositions, which may facilitate the cease-fire.
D. In its discretion and as the Commission may fmd practicable, the
Commission will appoint military observers who, under the authority of the
Commission and with the cooperation of both Commands will supervise the
observance of the cease-fire order.
E. The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan agree to appeal
to their respective peoples to assist in creating and maintaining an
atmosphere favourable to the promotion of further negotiations.
PART-II: TRUCE AGREEMENT
Simultaneously with the acceptance of the proposal for the immediate
cessation of hostilities as outlined in Part-I, both the governments accept the
following principles as a basis for the formulation of a truce agreement, the
details of which shall be worked out in discussion between their representatives
and the Commission.
A.
1. As the presence of troops of Pakistan in the territory of the State of Jammu
and Kashmir constitutes a material change in the situation since it was
represented by the Government of Pakistan before the Security Council, the
Government of Pakistan agrees to withdraw its troops from that State.
2. The Government of Pakistan will use its best endeavour to secure the
withdrawal from the State of Jammu and Kashmir of tribesmen and
Pakistani nationals not normally resident therein who have entered the State
for the purpose of fighting.
3. Pending a final solution, the territory evacuated by the Pakistani troops will
be administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the
Commission.
B.
1. When the Commission shall have notified the Government of India that the
tribesmen and Pakistani nationals referred to in Part-II, A. 2, hereof have
withdrawn, thereby terminating the situation v^^hich was represented by the
Government of India to the Security Council as having occasioned the
presence of Indian forces in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and further,
235
that the Pakistani forces are being withdrawn from the State of Jammu and
Kashmir, the Government of India agrees to begin to withdraw the bulk of
its forces from that State in stages to be agreed upon with the Commission.
2. Pending the acceptance of the conditions for a final settlement of the
situation in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Indian Government will
maintain within the lines existing at the moment of the cease-fire, the
minimum strength of its forces which in agreement with the Commission
are considered necessary to assist local authorities in the observance of law
and order. The Commission will have observers stationed where it deems
necessary.
3. The Government of India will undertake to ensure that the Government of
the State of Jammu and Kashmir will take all measures within its powers to
make it publicly known that peace, law and order will be safeguard and that
all human political rights will be granted.
C.
1. Upon signature, the full text of the truce agreement or a communique
containing the principles thereof, as agreed upon between the two
governments and the Commission, will be made public.
PART-III
The Goverrmient of India and the Government of Pakistan reaffirm their
wish that the future status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir shall be
determined in accordance with the will of the people and to that end upon
acceptance of the truce agreement, both governments agree to enter into
consultations with the Commission to determine fair and equitable conditions
whereby such free expression will be assured.
The UNCIP unanimously adopted this resolution on 13-08-1948.
Members of the Commission: Argentina, Belgium, Columbia, Czechoslovakia
and U.S.A.
236
APPENDIX
RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE UNITED NATIONS
COMMISSION FOR INDIA AND PAKISTAN ON
5 JANUARY 1949
The United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan.
Having received from the Governments of India and Pakistan, in
communications, dated 23 December and 25 December 1948, respectively,
their acceptance of the following principles which are supplementary to the
Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948:
1. The question of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India
or Pakistan will be decided through the democratic method of a free and
impartial plebiscite;
2. Plebiscite will be held when it shall be found by the Commission that the
cease-fire and truce arrangements as set forth in parts I and II of the
Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948 have been carried out and
arrangement for the plebiscite have been completed;
3. (a). The Secretary-General of the United Nations will, in agreement with the
Commission, nominate a Plebiscite Administrator who shall be a
personality of high international standing and commanding general
confidence. He will be formally appointed to office by the Government
of Jammu and Kashmir.
(b). The Plebiscite Administrator shall derive from the State of Jammu and
Kashmir, the powers he considers necessary for organising and
conducting the plebiscite and for ensuring the freedom and impartiality
of the plebiscite.
(c). The Plebiscite Administrator shall have authority to appoint such staff,
assistants and observers as he may require.
4. (a). After implementation of parts I and II of the Commission's resolution
of 13 August 1948, and when the Commission is satisfied that peaceful
conditions have been restored in the State, the Commission and the
Plebiscite Administrator will determine, in consuhation with the