Appeasement in Crisis: From Munich to Prague, October 1938–March 1939 PDF
Preview Appeasement in Crisis: From Munich to Prague, October 1938–March 1939
Appeasement in Crisis palgrave macmillan This page intentionally left blank Appeasement in Crisis From Munich to Prague, October 1938–March 1939 David Gillard palgrave macmillan © David Gillard 2007 Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2007 978-0-230-50040-2 All rights reserved.No reproduction,copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced,copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright,Designs and Patents Act 1988,or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency,90 Tottenham Court Road,London W1T 4LP. Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted his right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright,Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2007 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Houndmills,Basingstoke,Hampshire RG21 6XS and 175 Fifth Avenue,New York,N.Y.10010 Companies and representatives throughout the world PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St.Martin’s Press,LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan®is a registered trademark in the United States,United Kingdom and other countries.Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN 978-1-349-35256-2 ISBN 978-0-230-59574-3 (eBook) DOI 10.1057/9780230595743 This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources.Logging,pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 09 08 07 To My Family This page intentionally left blank Contents Acknowledgments viii 1. Diplomacy by Guarantee 1 2. The Outlook from Whitehall 14 3. The Challenge of Barbarism 35 4. The Prospect of War 56 5. Resolving to Resist 74 6. Continental Commitment 95 7. The Challenge of Annexation 116 8. The Quest for Coalition 137 9. The Guaranteeing of Poland 157 10. Diplomacy by Drama 178 List of Abbreviations 188 Notes 189 Bibliography 201 Index 210 vii Acknowledgments I am grateful for the assistance afforded me by staff and the following institutions, holding official and private papers. Birmingham University Library Bodleian Library, Oxford Cambridge University Library Churchill College, Cambridge India Office Library Kend Archives, Maidstone National Archives of Scotland, Edinburgh National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh National Maritime Museum Public Record Office Robinson Library, University of Newcastle Every attempt has been made to contact copyright holders but if any have inadvertently been overlooked, the publisher will be pleased to make the appropriate arrangement at the first opportunity. viii 1 Diplomacy by Guarantee At the end of March 1939, those responsible for British foreign policy took a decision which none of them had anticipated a fortnight earlier. They committed their country to war in support of Poland if the latter fought to preserve its independence. The commitment was public and it was not hedged round by conditions offering an escape. Even what cynical observers thought to be half-hidden escape routes had been explicitly ruled out by ministers in private exchanges prior to the announcement. One lay in the absence of any reference to the integrity of Poland’s frontiers. Certainly, their eventual revision by diplomatic means was still anticipated in London, but Neville Chamberlain told his Cabinet that confining the guarantee thus to Poland’s independence was not intended to limit its effect. If German military action against, say, the disputed territory of Danzig was viewed by Polish leaders as a threat to their country’s independence which they had to resist, the British Government should accept that interpretation and go to Poland’s aid.1Similarly, Lord Halifax had turned down the suggestion of his Ambassador in Warsaw that only an ‘unprovoked’ action by Germany should trigger British intervention. The Foreign Secretary told Sir Howard Kennard that ‘the German technique of aggression is so var- ied and so insidious that it might well be that Poland might in certain circumstances be driven to commit a technical act of provocation’.2 This readiness to fight for Poland’s independence appeared to mark a radical break with the traditions of British foreign policy. In the past, British governments had been very sparing of pledges to fight, and then only if the obligations could be met by direct use of military and espe- cially naval power. Nor had they ever been at ease in using the ‘guaran- tee’ as a diplomatic device. That particular unease had been manifest only six months before during the Commons debate on the Munich 1
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