Apology as an Indispensable Practice of Moral Repair

173 Pages·2016·0.85 MB·English

University of Colorado, Boulder
CU Scholar
Philosophy Graduate Theses & Dissertations Philosophy
Spring 1-1-2011
Apology as an Indispensable Practice of Moral
Repair
Barrett Matthew Emerick
University of Colorado at Boulder, [email protected]
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APOLOGY AS AN INDISPENSABLE PRACTICE OF MORAL REPAIR
by
BARRETT MATTHEW EMERICK

B.A., University of Richmond, 2002
M.A., University of Houston, 2005

A thesis submitted to the
Faculty of the Graduate School of the
University of Colorado in partial fulfillment
of the requirement for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Philosophy
2011
This thesis entitled:
Apology as an Indispensable Practice of Moral Repair
written by Barrett Matthew Emerick
has been approved for the Department of Philosophy

Professor Alison Jaggar

Professor David Boonin Associate Professor Claudia Mills

Professor Robert Hanna Assistant Professor Benjamin Hale

Date

The final copy of this thesis has been examined by the signatories, and we
find that both the content and the form meet acceptable presentation standards
of scholarly work in the above mentioned discipline.
ABSTRACT

Emerick, Barrett Matthew (Ph.D., Philosophy)
Apology as an Indispensable Practice of Moral Repair
Thesis directed by Professor Alison Jaggar

Apology is a common moral practice at both the interpersonal and institutional level.
However, many critical issues concerning apology are unaddressed by the philosophical
literature. In this project, I develop and defend a number of fundamental theses regarding the
moral practice of apology and the work it can do to satisfy duties of reparation. Specifically, I
argue that: (1) sincere apologies can be obligatory and legitimately coerced, which entails that
doxastic and affective voluntarism are true; (2) it is possible to apologize on behalf of another for
wrongs one did not commit, including historical wrongs; (3) one can accept an apology on behalf
of another, including the dead; (4) accepting an apology is a prima facie obligation that all
wronged parties bear. I conclude by arguing that, while forgiveness is necessary for a wrongdoer
to achieve full moral redemption, apology is itself intrinsically partially redemptive and indeed
indispensable for achieving full redemption.

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This work is dedicated to the memory of my friend, Scott Langley Murphy.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The opportunity to pursue a career in philosophy is a privilege, of which I am constantly
aware and for which I am constantly thankful. I am therefore very grateful to the Department of
Philosophy at the University of Colorado at Boulder for providing me with that opportunity.
Additionally, I am indebted to the Center for Humanities and the Arts, from which I received the
Florence Husted Lowe and F. Rex Lowe Dissertation Fellowship during the 2010-2011 academic
year and which proved to be indispensable in writing and finishing my dissertation.
In addition to financial support, this project would not have been successful without the
guidance, help, and encouragement of many people. Words can never express adequately how
profoundly appreciative I am for that support. As a result, my efforts below reflect only a small
measure of my gratitude.
First, thanks to my advisor and mentor, Alison Jaggar, for her guidance and insight,
critical eye and patience over the last six years. Her amazing generosity with her time and
energy quite simply made me the philosopher that I am today. I am terrifically proud to be her
student and incredibly grateful to have had the opportunity to work with and learn from her.
Many thanks also to the members of my dissertation committee – David Boonin, Bob
Hanna, Claudia Mills, and Ben Hale – each of whom played pivotal roles in my development as
a philosopher and as a teacher. I am very proud to see their influence reflected throughout these
seven chapters. Thanks also to Chris Heathwood and Graham Oddie, who served on my
prospectus committee. They, along with Michael Tooley, gave me invaluable feedback at the
start of this project.
Special thanks to Cory Aragon and Amandine Catala, with whom I took part in a
dissertation writing group for the last several years. They helped me to form and refine the
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content of my dissertation as well as to provide the moral support necessary to write it. In many
ways, I feel as if they are co-authors of this project.
Jason Wyckoff served as the best graduate student mentor and friend I could have hoped
for. He has been both a stalwart supporter and demanding interlocutor since I first arrived in
Colorado. Additional thanks to my friends Tom Metcalf, Shane Gronholz, Tyler Hildebrand,
Annaleigh Curtis, Kelly Vincent, Amber Arnold, Scott Wisor, Dave Woessner, Kendy Hess,
Peter Higgins, and Eric Chwang, some of whom gave me feedback on an earlier draft of Chapter
2, and all of whom let me bounce ideas off them and generally supported my philosophical
development over the last several years.
I would not have pursued a career in philosophy if not for Geoff Goddu, Ladelle
McWhorter, and James Hall, my philosophy professors at the University of Richmond. Their
classes gave me the desire to go on in philosophy, while their support and encouragement made
it possible for me to do so.
Many thanks also to Karen Sites and Maureen Detmer for their consistently excellent
administrative support over the last six years, as well as their genuine commitment to helping me
succeed.
I am deeply grateful to my parents, Craig and Trudy Emerick, who have always believed
in me, supported me, and enabled my educational pursuits. Thanks also to my sister, Shannon
Emerick. This project would not have been possible, much less successful, without all their love
and constant encouragement.
And finally, to my partner Karen Lewis, I give unending thanks for encouraging,
listening, waiting, celebrating, understanding, and loving.

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CONTENTS

CHAPTER

1 – On Moral Repair p. 1

2 – The Sincerity Condition and Coerced Apologies p. 23

3 – Intentions about the Future and Attitudes About the Past p. 52

4 – Who Can Apologize? p. 73

5 – Who Can Accept an Apology? p. 109

6 – Apology and Forgiveness p. 138

7 – Conclusion p. 157

BIBLIOGRAPHY p. 161

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CHAPTER 1

ON MORAL REPAIR

On June 18, 2009, the United States Senate apologized1 for American slavery. It did so,
despite the fact that none of its members were alive while slavery was practiced, nor were any
American slaves still alive. It apologized, in other words, for a historical atrocity. The Senate‘s
apology was unanimously approved, although there was some dissent both within and without
about how the apology was worded. Some worried that the apology was too strong, and that by
apologizing the Senate had exposed the U.S. government to lawsuits from descendents of slaves
demanding monetary reparations for the wrong that the Senate was acknowledging it had
committed. In order to ward off such lawsuits, the apology itself came with the caveat that by
apologizing the Senate was not opening itself to such lawsuits. It was that caveat that caused
others to think that the apology was too weak, in that words by themselves, the objection went,
were not enough, and could in fact serve as an excuse for the government not to do anything
further to repair the wrong of slavery. It is my view that the apology, though not doing enough
to remedy racial injustice that was rooted in slavery and persists today, was still a necessary
component of what any successful remedy would entail. So, while I share the concern that the
apology was not sufficient to remedy the great wrong of American slavery, I believe that it was
necessary.
In the months leading up to the Senate‘s apology, former Massachusetts governor and
former presidential candidate Mitt Romney publicly and repeatedly objected to President
Barrack Obama‘s trip to the Middle East, calling it a ―tour of apology.‖ Romney objected to the
fact that Obama, although never actually publically uttering the words ―I apologize‖ while on his

1 Samuel, 2009.
1
trip, admitted that the United States had acted wrongly during the previous eight years (and
before). Romney said in response, ―This is the time for strength and confidence, not for
apologizing to America's critics.‖2 He further fleshed out this position in his book, No Apology:
The Case for American Greatness.3
One way of reading Romney‘s objections to Obama is that he disagrees with Obama‘s
approach to foreign policy, and thinks that the U.S. should not accept responsibility for having
acted wrongly, nor should we make commitments about how the U.S. should act in the future,
presumably because both betray what Romney sees as weakness at precisely the time when the
U.S. need to appear strong. It is worth noting that in so objecting he cashed out his concerns in
terms of offering an apology, seemingly equating apologizing with a position of weakness that
the U.S. should not embrace. Many members of Romney‘s political party agreed with him.
It seems, then, that there is a conflict in judgments about when apologies are justified and
what role they can play within both domestic and international policy. On one hand we have the
Senate unanimously issuing an apology for wrongs which occurred generations ago. On the
other we have the President apologizing for wrongs which were committed within the last few
years. The former entails much more complicated metaphysical implications, but the repugnance
of such acts is much less controversial. The latter is fairly clear cut metaphysically, but the acts
involved are much more morally complicated, and are accompanied by many more opinions and
conflicting beliefs. Does Romney‘s objection that apologies signal weakness apply to the
Senate‘s action? Or, should the Senate‘s apology serve as a guide for future policy efforts, both
domestically and abroad?

2 Cillizza, 2009.
3Romney, 2010.
2