Anyone Who Has a View: Theoretical Contributions to the Study of Argumentation

344 Pages·2003·7.2 MB·English

by  Robert C. Pinto (auth.), Frans H. Van Eemeren, J. Anthony Blair, Charles A. Willard, A. Francisca Snoeck Henkemans (eds.)

ANYONE WHO HAS A VIEW
Argumentation Library
Volume 8
Series Editors:
Frans H. van Eemeren, University of Amsterdam
Scott Jacobs, University of Arizona
Erik C.W. Krabbe, University of Groningen
John Woods, University of Lethbridge
The titles published in this series are listed at the end of this volume.
ANYONE WHO HAS
A VIEW
Theoretical Contributions to the Study
of Argumentation
Edited by
FRANS H. VAN EEMEREN
University of Amsterdam,
The Netherlands
J. ANTHONY BLAIR
University of Windsor,
Canada
CHARLES A. WILLARD
University of Louisville,
U.S.A.
and
A. FRANCISCA SNOECK HENKEMANS
University of Amsterdam,
The Netherlands
SPRINGER-SCIENCE+BUSINESS MEDIA, B.V.
A CLP. Catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.
ISBN 978-1-4020-1456-7 ISBN 978-94-007-1078-8 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-1078-8
Printed on acid-free paper
All Rights Reserved
© 2003 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
Originally published by Kluwer Academic Publishers in 2003
No part of this work may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted
in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming, recording
or otherwise, without written permission from the Publisher, with the exception
of any material supplied specifically for the purpose of being entered
and executed on a computer system, for exclusive use by the purchaser of the work.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PREFACE 1
1. REASONS 3
Robert C.Pinto
2. THEPRAGMATICDIMENSIONOFPREMISE ACCEPTABILITY 17
JamesB.Freeman
3. RATIONALITYAND JUDGMENT 27
HarveySiegel
4. THEDIALECTICALTIER REVISITED 41
Ralph H.Johnson
5. THERABBIT INTHE HAT:THE INTERNALRELATIONS 55
OFTHE PRAGMA-DIALECTICALRULES
HansVilhelm Hansen
6. TOULMIN'S WARRANTS 69
DavidHitchcock
7. METADIALOGUES 83
ErikC.W. Krabbe
8. RELATIONSHIPS AMONG LOGIC,DIALECTICAND RHETORIC 91
J.AnthonyBlair
9. LOGICALFALLACIES,DIALECTICALTRANSGRESSIONS, 109
RHETORICALSINS,AND OTHERFAILURES OF RATIONALITY
INARGUMENTATION
DanielH.Cohen
10. APRAGMATICVIEW OFTHE BURDENOFPROOF 123
FransH.vanEemerenand Peter Houtlosser
11. THE ORDINARYPRACTICEOFPRESUMINGAND 133
PRESUMPTIONWITH SPECIALATTENTIONTO VERACITY
AND THEBURDEN OFPROOF
FredJ.Kauffeld
12. TWO CONCEPTIONS OFOPENNESSIN 147
ARGUMENTATIONTHEORY
ScottJacobs
13. MULTIDIMENSIONALITYANDNON-DEDUCTIVENESS 157
IN DELIBERATIVEARGUMENTATION
Christian Kock
14. ARGUMENTATIONSTUDIESINFRANCE: ANEW LEGITIMACY 773
ChristianPIantin
15. DISCOURSECORRESPONDENCEBETWEENARGUMENTATIVE 189
AND GRAMMATICALSEQUENCES
Sarin Stati
16. DIAGRAMMING, ARGUMENTATION SCHEMES 795
AND CRITICALQUESTIONS
Douglas Walton andChris Reed
17. LEGALARGUMENTATIONTHEORYAND THE CONCEPT 273
OFLAW
Stefano Bertea
18. ARGUERS' OBLIGATIONS: ANOTHER PERSPECTIVE 227
Joseph W. Wenzel
19. CHARLES S.PEIRCE'S THEORYOFABDUCTION 237
AND THE ARISTOTELIANENTHYMEMEFROM SIGNS
Manfred Kraus
20. RHETORIC AND DIALECTICINMARTINLUTHERKING'S 255
'LETTERFROM BIRMINGHAMJAIL'
Michael Leff
21. ONTHE ARGUMENTATIVEQUALITYOFEXPLANATORY 269
NARRATIVES
Tone Kvembekk
22. THEWILES OFARGUMENT: PROTODELIBERATION 283
AND HEROIC PRUDENCEIN HOMER'S 'ODYSSEY'
G.Thomas Goodnight
23. FELICITYCONDITIONS FOR THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL 297
ADHOMINEM: THE CASE OF 'BUSH V.GORE'
David Zarefsky
24. THE POTENTIALCONFLICTBETWEEN NORMATIVELY-GOOD 309
ARGUMENTATIVEPRACTICEAND PERSUASIVE SUCCESS:
EVIDENCEFROM PERSUASIONEFFECTSRESEARCH
Daniel J. 0' Keefe
VI
25. THE CONCEPTOF ARGUMENT QUALITYINTHE 319
ELABORATIONLIKELIHOODMODEL: ANORMATIVE
AND EMPIRICALAPPROACHTO PETTYAND CACIOPPO'S
'STRONG' AND 'WEAK' ARGUMENTS
Renskc vanEnschot-van Dijk, Lettica Hustinxand Hans Hoeken
26. HOW NARRATIVEARGUMENTATIONWORKS: ANANALYSIS 337
OFARGUMENTATION AIMED ATRECONSIDERING GOALS
Lenore Langsdorf
LJSTOFCONTRIBUTORS 347
vii
PREFACE
This volumeof the ArgumentationLibrarycontains acollectionoftwenty-six theor
etical contributions to the study of argumentation. Together they provide an over
view of recent developments in the theory of argumentation which does justice to
the theoretical variety in the field. InAnyone Who Has a View, the subject of argu
mentation isapproached from differentangles. Both the formal and informal logical
approaches and the rhetorical and communicative approaches arc represented in
various ways. We arc convinced that the collection ofessays as a whole will be of
interestnot only to those engaged directly in the study ofargumentation, but also to
scholars from a variety of disciplines who arc interested in the recent developments
inthisfield.
The book opens with an essay by the informal logician RobertC. Pinto. For all
the differences between them, James B.Freeman, Harvey Siegel, Ralph H.Johnson,
Hans V. Hansen, and J. Anthony Blair are also prominent members of that move
ment. Some informal logicians either eschew or simply do not use formal methods
in their approach to argumentation, while others, such as David Hitchcock, use both
formal and informalmethods. Erik C.W. Krabbe isalogician who proudlydefends a
formal dialectical approachto argumentation.
Daniel H. Cohen, Frans H. van Eemeren, Peter Houtlosser, Fred J. Kauffeld, C.
Scott Jacobs, Christian Kock, ChristianPlantin, Sorin Stati, Chris Reed, Douglas N.
Walton, and Stefano Bertea, may - each in his own way - be counted among the
authors whose approach to argumentation includes logicalor dialecticalelements as
well as elements from rhetoric and the study ofcommunication and argumentative
discourse. Cohen, for one, is close to the informal logicians and Walton has some
times identifiedhimselfas one too. Van Eemeren and Houtlosserrepresentthe prag
rna-dialectical approach to argumentation. Their pragmatic approach is closely re
lated to the approaches favoured by authors such as Kauffeld and Jacobs, and - in
particular because of the influence from linguistics and discourse analysis - to the
perspectives on argumentation taken by Plantin and Statio Reed has just started a
software-assisted analysis of argumentation in collaboration with Walton, the most
prolific author in the field. Bertea links the study of argumentation up with the
philosophyoflaw.
JosephW. Wenzel, who has influenced several generations of scholars, Manfred
Kraus, Michael Leff, Tone Kvembekk, G. Thomas Goodnight and David Zarefsky
are alleminentrepresentatives of aprimarilyrhetorically-oriented approach to argu
mentation. Wenzel is the teacher who would preferto keep all the students of argu
mentation - rhetoricians, dialecticians and logicians - together in a sensible way.
Kraus and Leffboth concentrate in the first place on classical rhetoric. Kvembekk
and Goodnight develop their approaches in an ongoing dialogue with other theoret
ical contributions. With Zarefsky, argumentation theory leads in the end always to
illuminating analyses of historic cases of argumentation. Daniel J. O'Keefe and
Renske van Enschot-van Dijk, Lettica Hustinx and Hans Hoeken represent, in our
view, the best part ofthe empiricalpersuasion research tradition. LenoreLangsdorf,
who contributes the concluding essay, is an argumentation scholar whose combina-
2 PREFACE
tion of insights from various schools and traditions offers quite a distinctive per
spective.
The editors would like to thank their colleagues EvelineFeteris, BartGarssen, Peter
Houtlosser, Bert Meuffels, Leah Polcar, M.A. van Recs and Jean Wagemans for
their valuable assistance in the editorial process. We are also most grateful to Paul
Nagtegaal for taking care of thedesign ofthe book andfor his technical assistance.
Frans H. vanEcmeren J. Anthony Blair
Universityof Amsterdam UniversityofWindsor
CharlesA.Willard A.FranciscaSnoeckHenkemans
UniversityofLouisville UniversityofAmsterdam
CHAPTER 1
ROBERT C. PINTO
REASONS
1.It is a commonplace among philosophers that human actions are to be explained
in terms ofbeliefs anddesires, andthat such explanations layoutaperson's reasons
for acting. Terminologyvaries slightly from author toauthor - Fodor(1990, 4)talks
about belief/desire explanations, Dennett (1978, especially chapter 1, and 1988) of
"intentional explanation," Davidson (1963, 3-4) of the "primary reason" for an ac
tion that consists of a beliefand a "pro-attitude.") Despite the variation in termino
logy, there is wide agreement thatreasons for acting involve both cognitive elements
such asbeliefs and conative elements such asdesires.
On the otherhand, in philosophical discussions ofreasonsfor believing, or rea
sons for accepting a proposition as a premiss, conative elements - desires, hopes,
preferences, fears - are seldom counted among the reasons. A casual reading of the
literature suggests that when authors talk about reasons for beliefthey are usually
referring to thepropositionsor statements on which people base their beliefs.2How
ever, if we look at the factors that actually lead people to accept the propositions
they do accept, we will discover that conative factors often to play a crucial and
legitimaterole, even when even whenpeople arebasing their beliefs onevidence.
This paper was prompted by puzzlement over whether there is an asymmetry
between reasons for acting and reasons for believing, and by the suspicion that it
might prove valuable to count certain sorts of conative elements among the reasons
beliefand/or acceptance. Accordingly, thepaper proceedsasfollows:
a) I review some ofthe ways in which conative elements appear to be crucial in
theprocessingofarguments andevidence(part I)
1Seealsothe discussionofreasonsinRescher(1988, chapter l). Roscher(p.3)recognizesthreetypeof
rationalityor rational deliberation- cognitiverationality(whose"product"is factual contentionsor
beliefs), practicalrationality(whose"product"is action recommendations orinjunctions), and eval
uativerationality(whoseproductis evaluation or appraisal). Note especially p.12, where "practical
rationality"- unlike cognitiveandevaluativerationality-hasaction directivesamongitsinputs.
2For example, the concept of reasons is central in Siegel 1988. And although I can't find a succinct
explanationinthat book ofwhat preciselySiegel takes reasonstobe, themostnaturalinterpretation
is to take him to be referring to propositions - see for example p. 26. Another example: when
O'Keefe(1982, 13-15) explains"makinganargument"in terms of"overtlyexpressed reasons" itis
prettyclear that the reasonshe istalkingabout are claims.Finally,note thatfor Rescher(1988, 12)
the inputs to"purelyfactual" reasoning are "purported facts" - naturallyconstrued,Tthink, aspro
positions.
It'sperhapsworthnotingthatwhen MichaelGilbert(1997)wants tocall attentiontotheimport
ance ofconative elementsinargumentation,heseems tosuggestthat concentrationon reasons(con
centrationonCRCs orclaim/reasoncomplexes)gets inthe wayofseeingthe importanceofconative
factors. Ifso, thenGilbertmust beassumingthatthose whoconcentrateonreasons forclaimsintend
toexcludeconativefactors fromthecategoryofreasons.
3
Ell.vanEemerenetal.(eds.),
AnyoneWhoHasaView. Theoretical Contributions totheStudyofArgumentation, 3-16.
©2003 KluwerAcademicPublishers.