Antisocial behavior

21 Pages·2009·0.3 MB·English

by  Ernesto Reuben

Antisocial behavior
Antisocial punishment
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Pervasiveness across societies
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Conflict and rent seeking
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The darker side of cooperation
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Homo rivalis
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Conflict and peace
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The dark side of human behavior
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Punitive games
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Experimental Economics - Ernesto Reuben
Antisocial punishment
Differences in punishment behavior
(cid:131) Gächter & Herrmann 2007
Design
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• VCM: n = 3, e = 20, MPCR = 0.5, one-shot game, costs 1 to damage
by 3, run in Switzerland and Russia
8
Switzerland P Russia
Expected Actual
=RUS
N
n12 =SWI
o 6
i
t t
u n
b e
i m
r
t
n h
o s 4
c ni

e u
g 8 p
a
n
r
e a
v e 2
A M
0
4
[-20,-2) [-2,2] (2,20] [-20,-2) [-2,2] (2,20]
Experimental Economics - Ernesto Reuben Deviation from others' mean contribution
Antisocial punishment
Antisocial punishment across societies
(cid:131) Herrmann et al. 2008
Is punishment used and does it increase contributions in other
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societies?
Design
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VCM: n = 3, e = 20, MPCR = 0.5, partners matching, costs 1 to
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damage by 3
Treatments: punishment / no punishment
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Run in various cities
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• Boston, Nottingham, Copenhagen, Bonn, Zurich, St. Gallen,
Minsk, Dnipropetrovs'k, Samara, Athens, Istanbul, Riyadh,
Muscat, Seoul, Chengdu, Melbourne
Experimental Economics - Ernesto Reuben
Punishment across societies
Antisocial punishment across societies
(cid:131) Herrmann et al. 2008
Punishment is pervasive but it does not always increase contributions
(cid:131)
• Works: Boston, Nottingham, Copenhagen, Bonn, Zurich, St. Gallen, Minsk,
Seoul, Chengdu, Melbourne
• Did not work: Dnipropetrovs'k, Samara, Athens, Istanbul, Riyadh, Muscat
Experimental Economics - Ernesto Reuben
Punishment across societies
Antisocial punishment across societies
(cid:131) Herrmann et al. 2008
Failure of punishment is
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related to the amount of
‘antisocial’ punishment
Punishment of (above
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average) cooperators
If punished, cooperators
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tend to reduce contributions
Why antisocial punishment?
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• Revenge?
• Spitefulness?
Experimental Economics - Ernesto Reuben
Rent-seeking games
Rent-seeking game
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Two (or more) parties compete for an exogenous prize P
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Both parties simultaneously exert effort e to try to win the prize
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i
Each party wins with a probability proportional to its effort share
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e
Prob(i wins) = i
e + e
i j
The (symmetric) equilibrium effort is: e = e = ¼P
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i j
The expected payoff is y – ¼P + ½P = y + ¼P
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i i
Rent-seeking model is used to analyze
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Contests (e.g. architecture), promotion tournaments, lobbying, war and
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interstate conflict, charitable fundraising
Experimental Economics - Ernesto Reuben
Rent-seeking games
The dark side of cooperation
(cid:131) Abbink et al. 2009
Design
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Rent-seeking contest in teams or individuals
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• Endowment per individual is 1000 tokens
• Price per individual is 1000 tokens
• Repeated for 20 periods, partners matching
Treatments
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• 1 vs. 1
• 4 vs. 1
• 4 vs. 4
• 4. vs 4 with punishment within teams
Experimental Economics - Ernesto Reuben
Rent-seeking games
The dark side of cooperation
(cid:131) Abbink et al. 2009
Both teams and individuals spends more effort than Nash
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Teams spend much more than individuals (remember individual marginal
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incentives are the same)
Experimental Economics - Ernesto Reuben
Rent-seeking games
The dark side of cooperation
(cid:131) Abbink et al. 2009
With punishment effort levels are even higher!
(cid:131)
• Is this due to the will of a few aggressive individuals or a team effort?
Experimental Economics - Ernesto Reuben
Homo rivalis?
Rent-seeking and antisocial preferences
(cid:131) Herrmann & Orzen 2008
Design
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Rent-seeking contest between two individuals
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• Endowment per individual is $16 and the price is $16
• One shot game (part 1) + 15-period repeated game (part 2)
Treatments
(cid:131)
• Direct: standard game
• Strategy: individuals can condition of the other’s investment
• Individual: individuals can condition of the other’s investment but the
other is a computer
Experimental Economics - Ernesto Reuben