Anti-Individualism and Knowledge (Contemporary Philosophical Monographs)

355 Pages·2004·1.22 MB·English

by  Jessica Brown

jessica brown
Anti-Individualism and Knowledge
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Contemporary philosophy of mind is dominated “Jessica Brown, one of the leading contributors
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by anti-individualism, which holds that a subject’s to the debates regarding anti-individualism’s i-
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thoughts are partly individuated by aspects of epistemological implications, has produced a book n
her environment. Despite its dominance, anti- that is both systematic and nuanced in its account d
individualism is subject to a daunting array of of these implications. Her robust defense of iv
epistemological objections: that it is incompatible anti-individualism will certainly be at the heart of id
with the privileged access each subject has to these debates in the years to come.” u
her thoughts; that it undermines rationality; and —Sanford C. Goldberg, University of Kentucky a
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that it seems to provide a new route to a priori i
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knowledge of the world, which, arguably, would be “Jessica Brown’s book will be a milestone in the m
absurd. In this rigorous and persuasive study, understanding of anti-individualism. Clearly the

Jessica Brown defends anti-individualism from outcome of considerable reflection, it makes a a
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these epistemological objections. In doing so, very strong case for thinking that although the
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she discusses the relation of discrimination and epistemological implications of this idea may be
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reliability, the importance of discrimination for radical, they do not count against its truth. It sets
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thought and knowledge, illusions of thought, a clear agenda for the next stage of the debate.”
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and the compatibility of Fregean sense and anti- —Paul Snowdon, Department of Philosophy, w
individualism. The discussion has important University College London l
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consequences for key epistemological issues such
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as skepticism, closure, transmission, and the “In this important book, Jessica Brown argues that g
nature of knowledge and warrant. anti-individualism does not, after all, have the e
epistemological consequences that many critics
Jessica Brown is Reader in Philosophy in the have thought so damaging. Along with defense
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Department of Philosophy at the University of of this main claim, there is a wealth of argument r
Bristol. and insight about reliability and discrimination o
in theories of knowledge, the possibility of w
Contemporary Philosophical
Monographs illusions of thought, the appeal to Fregean sense, n
transmission of epistemic warrant, and more.
A Bradford Book It will be rewarding reading for anyone working in
epistemology or philosophy of mind, and required
readingfor anyone working at the mind/epistemology
interface.”
0-262-52421-X
—Martin Davies, Australian National University
Anti-Individualism and Knowledge
The MIT Press
Massachusetts Institute of Technology jessica brown
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02142
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http://mitpress.mit.edu
Cover photograph:Alan Brown
Anti-Individualism and
Knowledge
Contemporary Philosophical Monographs
Peter Ludlow, editor
1. A Slim Book about Narrow Content Gabriel M. A. Segal
(2000)
2. Complex DemonstrativesJeffrey C. King (2001)
3. Words without MeaningChristopher Gauker (2003)
4. Anti-Individualism and KnowledgeJessica Brown (2004)
Anti-Individualism and
Knowledge
Jessica Brown
ABradford Book
The MIT Press
Cambridge, Massachusetts
London, England
© 2004 Massachusetts Institute of Technology
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form
by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, record-
ing, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing
from the publisher.
This book was set in Palatino by SNPBest-set Typesetter Ltd., Hong Kong,
and was printed and bound in the United States of America.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Brown, Jessica.
Anti-individualism and knowledge / Jessica Brown.
p. cm.—(Contemporary philosophical monographs ; 4)
“ABradford book.”
Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index.
ISBN 0-262-02558-2 (hc. : alk. paper)—ISBN 0-262-52421-X
(pbk. : alk. paper)
1. Knowledge, Theory of. 2. Individualism. I. Title. II. Series.
BD161.B765 2004
121¢.3—dc21
2003054115
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Contents
Preface ix
1 Anti-Individualism 1
1 Content and the Environment 2
2 Natural Kind Anti-Individualism 9
3 Singular Anti-Individualism 13
4 Illusions of Thought 15
5 Social Anti-Individualism 17
6 Fregean and Non-Fregean Anti-Individualism 20
7 APriori and Empirical 22
8 Outline of the Book 25
2 Knowledge and Discrimination 33
1 Privileged Access 33
2 The Discrimination Argument 37
3 Discrimination and Reliability 45
4 Knowledge and Reliability 59
5 Other Compatibilist Responses—Falvey and Owens,
and McLaughlin and Tye 64
6 Conclusion 71
3 Thought and Discriminative Abilities—Evans 75
1 Introduction 75
vi Contents
2 Evans’s Account of Singular Thought 77
3 Evans and the Discrimination Argument 83
4 Perceptual Demonstrative Thoughts 86
5 Possible Compatibilist Responses 90
6 Recognition-based Thoughts 96
7 Comparison of Evans’s Account and the Modified
Account 106
8 Conclusion 110
4 The Illusion Argument 113
1 Introduction 113
2 Relevance and Reliability 117
3 Two Notions of Reliability 119
4 Local or Global Reliability? 124
5 The Illusion Argument Reconsidered 129
6 Conclusion of the Illusion Argument 133
7 The Illusion and Discrimination Arguments 135
8 Social Anti-Individualism and Twin Situations 138
9 Natural Kind Anti-Individualism and Twin
Situations 142
10 Singular Anti-Individualism and Twin
Situations 145
11 No-Reference Situations 147
12 The Relevance Strategy and Alternatives 152
13 Conclusion of Chapters 2 through 4 155
5 Anti-Individualism and Reasoning 157
1 Introduction 157
2 Transparency of Sameness of Content 161
3 Transparency of Difference of Content 166
4 Slow Switch and Conceptual Change 170
5 Two Concepts and Inference 176
Contents vii
6 Rationality and APriority 182
7 Conclusion 191
6 Anti-Individualism and Fregean Sense 193
1 Introduction 193
2 The Contrast between Fregean and Non-Fregean
Anti-Individualism 197
3 Fregean Anti-Individualism and Transparency of
Sameness 204
4 Fregean Anti-Individualism and Transparency of
Difference 210
5 Fregean Anti-Individualism 225
7 The Reductio Argument: Transmission of
Warrant 233
1 Introduction 233
2 Closure and Transmission 239
3 Wright and Conditional Warrant 244
4 Begging the Question 258
5 Warrant and Ruling Out Alternatives 259
6 Conclusion 269
8 The Reductio Argument: Entailments between
Thought and the World 271
1 Introduction 271
2 Natural Kind Anti-Individualism 274
3 Singular Anti-Individualism 289
4 Social Anti-Individualism 294
5 Combined Views 300
6 Conclusion 301
Appendix to Chapter 8: Comparison with Davies and
Wright 303
viii Contents
9 Conclusion 309
Notes 313
References 327
Index 335
Preface
This book examines the epistemological consequences of a
view that dominates contemporary philosophy of mind—
anti-individualism. According to this view, a subject’s
thought contents are partly individuated by her environ-
ment. By contrast, individualists deny this and argue that a
subject’s thought contents are wholly individuated by her
“internal” states, such as her brain states. Many have taken
anti-individualism to have radical consequences for our
knowledge of our minds, our ability to reason, and our
knowledge of the world. In this book, I investigate whether
anti-individualism does have such radical consequences.
The discussion weaves together central topics in the philos-
ophy of mind, such as rationality, psychological explanation
and the nature of thought, with general issues in episte-
mology such as skepticism and the nature of knowledge and
warrant.
If, as anti-individualism suggests, what a subject thinks
depends partly on her environment, it may seem that a
subject can know what she thinks only by investigating the
nature of her environment. But this seems deeply counter-
intuitive. Asubject may use empirical evidence in forming
a belief, but, once the belief is formed, it seems she can know