Ansar al-Sharia in Libya (ASL)

20 Pages·2015·0.25 MB·English

Ansar al-Sharia in Libya (ASL)

Type of Organization: insurgent, non-state actor, religious, social services provider,
terrorist, violent

Ideologies and Affiliations: Islamist, jihadist, Qutbist, Salafist, Sunni, Takfiri

Place(s) of Origin: Libya

Year of Origin: 2012

Founder(s): Abu Sufyan Bin Qumu (founder of Ansar al-Sharia in Derna);1 Mohamed
al-Zahawi, Nasser al-Tarshani, and other Libyan Islamists (founders of Ansar al-Sharia
Benghazi)

Place(s) of Operation: Libya

Also Known As:
• Ansar al-Charia in Libya2
• Katibat Ansar al-Charia3
• Katibat Ansar al-Sharia4
• Partisans of Islamic Law in Libya5
• Partisans of Sharia in Libya6
• Supporters of Islamic Law in Libya7
• Supporters of Sharia in Libya8

Executive Summary:

Ansar al-Sharia in Libya (ASL) is a violent jihadist group that seeks to implement sharia
(Islamic law) in Libya. ASL is the union of two smaller groups, the Ansar al-Sharia
Brigade in Benghazi (ASB) and Ansar al-Sharia Derna (ASD), each formed in 2011 after
the fall of Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi’s regime. In 2012, ASB and ASD,

1 Aaron Y. Zelin, “Know Your Ansar Al-Sharia,” Foreign Policy, September 21, 2012,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/09/21/know_your_ansar_al_sharia.
2 “Security Council Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee Adds Two Entities to Its Sanctions List,” United
Nations, November 19, 2014, http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11659.doc.htm.
3 “Security Council Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee Adds Two Entities to Its Sanctions List,” United
Nations, November 19, 2014, http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11659.doc.htm.
4 “Security Council Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee Adds Two Entities to Its Sanctions List,” United
Nations, November 19, 2014, http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11659.doc.htm.
5 “Security Council Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee Adds Two Entities to Its Sanctions List,” United
Nations, November 19, 2014, http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11659.doc.htm.
6 “Security Council Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee Adds Two Entities to Its Sanctions List,” United
Nations, November 19, 2014, http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11659.doc.htm.
7 “Security Council Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee Adds Two Entities to Its Sanctions List,” United
Nations, November 19, 2014, http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11659.doc.htm.
8 “Security Council Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee Adds Two Entities to Its Sanctions List,” United
Nations, November 19, 2014, http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11659.doc.htm.
alongside other Islamist militant groups, attacked the U.S. consulate in Benghazi, killing
four Americans, including U.S. Ambassador to Libya Christopher Stevens.

The 2012 Benghazi attack was a major turning point for the two groups. Following
widespread backlash in Libya and abroad, ASB was forced out of Benghazi and ASD
disbanded. ASB then underwent a major rebranding effort, changing its name to Ansar
al-Sharia in Libya (removing from its name the word “brigade”) and publicly denouncing
violence. The group also denied its connections to the consulate attack and to al-Qaeda.
Under its new name, ASL launched a dawa (proselytizing) campaign, under which it
provided social services and charity in Benghazi. Through this campaign, ASL was able
to win back the trust of many Libyans, and in 2013 ASL opened new branches in Derna,
Sirte, and Ajdabiya.9

However, while ASL had publicly embraced peace, many remained skeptical of the
group’s intentions. Foreign and local intelligence has revealed that since 2012, ASL has
increased ties with international violent jihadist groups, including by holding clandestine
meetings with al-Qaeda affiliates in North Africa and training and exporting fighters to
conflicts in Syria, Iraq, and Mali.10 In the past, ASL’s former leader, Mohamed al-
Zahawi, had openly declared his support for al-Qaeda.11

On May 16, 2014, former Libyan army general Khalifa Haftar launched a massive
assault—codenamed “Operation Dignity”—on Islamist groups in Benghazi. Although
ASL initially maintained control of Benghazi, civilian uprisings within the city and
offensives launched by General Haftar have gradually eroded ASL’s control. In February
2015, General Haftar’s forces retook the port area of Benghazi, considered to be the last
major area of the city left under ASL’s domain. As of February 2015, estimates indicate
ASL controls less than 10% of Benghazi.12 ASL suffered another major setback when
Mohamed al-Zahawi, the group’s emir, died in January 2015 of wounds from an October
2014 airstrike.13

ISIS also poses a major threat to ASL. Although the two groups do appear to cooperate to
an extent, ASL has not sworn allegiance to ISIS’s leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. As of
April 2015, ISIS controls the previously ASL-dominated cities of Derna and Sirte but

9 Aaron Y. Zelin, “Libya’s Jihadists Beyond Benghazi,” Foreign Policy, August 12, 2013,
http://mideastafrica.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/08/12/libyas_jihadists_beyond_benghazi; Aya Elbrqawi,
“Slow Death of Derna,” AllAfrica, February 28, 2014, http://allafrica.com/stories/201403031054.html;
Aaron Y. Zelin, “Libya’s Jihadists Beyond Benghazi,” Foreign Policy, August 12, 2013,
http://mideastafrica.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/08/12/libyas_jihadists_beyond_benghazi.
10 Thomas Joscelyn, “UN recognizes ties between Ansar al Sharia in Libya, al Qaeda,” Long War Journal,
November 19, 2014, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/11/un_designates_ansar.php; Aaron Y.
Zelin, “New Evidence on Ansar Al-Sharia in Libya Training Camps,” Al-Wasat, August 8, 2013.
https://thewasat.wordpress.com/2013/08/08/new-evidence-on-ansar-al-sharia-in-libya-training-camps/.
11 Faisal Irshaid, “Profile: Libya’s Ansar Al-Sharia,” BBC News, June 13, 2014,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-27732589.
12 Lucy Westcott, “Libyan Army Reportedly Has Taken Back Benghazi Port,” Newsweek, February 6,
2015, http://www.newsweek.com/libyan-army-reported-have-taken-back-benghazi-port-305113.
13 Nadia Radwan, “Libya: Ansar Al-Sharia in Libya Leader Dead,” AllAfrica, January 26, 2015,
http://allafrica.com/stories/201501270208.html.
ASL has been able to maintain a presence in those municipalities.14 Further, ASL has
suffered numerous prominent defections to ISIS. Finally, ISIS’s attacks within Libya,
including the beheading of 21 Egyptian Christians, have triggered renewed international
support for eradicating extremism within Libya. Some analysts, including Michael
Horowitz of Max Security Solutions, think ASL will likely pledge allegiance to ISIS in
the near future.15

Doctrine:

ASL’s primary objective is to institute sharia (Islamic law) in Libya. As the group’s
former leader, Mohamed al-Zahawi, said, “Our brave youths will continue their struggle
until they impose [sharia].”16

Like Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia, ASL advances its agenda through dawa (proselytizing),
hisba (commanding right and forbidding wrong through sharia, which can include
enforcement of modesty laws through violence), and jihad (in this case, armed
struggle).17 Like many other Islamist groups, ASL opposes achieving change through, the
democratic system. The group believes democracy subverts sharia by giving man the
power to make law—a power ASL considers reserved to God alone. This belief separates
ASL from other Islamist groups in Libya, including Libya Dawn, that support exploiting
democracy in order to achieve implementation of sharia.18

ASL’s hisba enforcement has included destroying Sufi shrines that the group considers
idolatry. Al-Zahawi described removal these shrines as “a religious duty” because
“people worship the deceased and this is prohibited. It is not me who says so but rather
our religion.”19 The group also confiscated anatomy books from the European School in
Benghazi after deeming that they were “pornographic” in nature.20 Similarly, in February
2015, gunmen from an “al-Qaeda inspired militia” seized radio and television stations in
Sirte after ASL “warned the station to stop broadcasting music.”21

14 Thomas Joscelyn, “Ansar Al Sharia Libya Relaunches Social Media Sites,” Long War Journal, April 9,
2015, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/04/ansar-al-sharia-libya-relaunches-social-media-
sites.php.
15 Thomas Joscelyn, “Spiritual Leader of Libya’s Biggest Jihadi Group Pledges Allegiance to ISIS,”
Newsweek, April 8, 2015, http://www.newsweek.com/top-judge-libyas-biggest-jihadi-group-pledges-
allegiance-isis-320408.
16 Ahmed Maher, “Meeting Mohammad Ali Al-Zahawi of Libyan Ansar Al-Sharia,” BBC News,
September 18, 2012, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-19638582.
17 Aaron Y. Zelin, “The Terrorist Threat in North Africa,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, July
10, 2013, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/testimony/ZelinTestimony20130710-
v2.pdf.
18 Ahmed Maher, “Meeting Mohammad Ali Al-Zahawi of Libyan Ansar Al-Sharia,” BBC News,
September 18, 2012, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-19638582.
19 Ahmed Maher, “Meeting Mohammad Ali Al-Zahawi of Libyan Ansar Al-Sharia,” BBC News,
September 18, 2012, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-19638582.
20 Aaron Y. Zelin, “The Terrorist Threat in North Africa,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, July
10, 2013, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/testimony/ZelinTestimony20130710-
v2.pdf.
21 “Islamic Militants Seize Radio, TV Stations in Central Libya,” New York Times, February 14, 2015,
http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2015/02/14/world/middleeast/ap-ml-libya.html.
Aaron Zelin, a fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, wrote that the
creation of ASL, as well as Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia, emerged from the ideology of
Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, who “has attempted to steer the jihadi community to a more
‘pure’ jihad” in order to offset the brutal image of jihad as popularized by deceased al-
Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.22

According to Zelin, Maqdisi has tried to draw a distinction between the idea of qital al-
nikayya (fighting to hurt or damage the enemy) and qital al-tamkin (fighting to
consolidate one’s power). Zelin writes that “the former provides only short-term tactical
victories… whereas the latter provides a framework for consolidating an Islamic state.”
According to Zelin, ASL’s practices appear to be in accord with qital al-tamkin.23

Since the backlash following the 2012 attack on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi, ASL has
rebranded itself with a new focus on missionary outreach, including offering services
normally provided by local governments. ASL engages in road maintenance, street
cleaning, security patrols, garbage collection, and establishing medical clinics and
hospitals.24 To promote religion, ASL runs Quranic competitions, provides food to the
poor during the Muslim holidays of Eid and Ramadan, confiscates drugs and alcohol, and
opens religious schools and centers. In the absence of a strong local government, the
services ASL provides have become integral to daily life in Benghazi.25 In media
campaigns, ASL has highlighted its outreach and charity efforts, portraying themselves as
defenders and promoters of Islam and sharia.26

Leadership Structure:

ASL is led by an emir but the current emir is unknown. Mohamed al-Zahawi was the
group’s until January 2015, when he died from wounds sustained in an October 2014
airstrike.27 Unlike many other jihadist groups, ASL’s leadership structure remains opaque
to outside observers, with members of senior leadership, councils, and committees mostly
unknown.28

22 Aaron Y. Zelin, “Maqdisi’s Disciples in Libya and Tunisia,” Foreign Policy, November 14, 2012,
http://mideastafrica.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/11/14/maqdisi_s_disciples_in_libya_and_tunisia.
23 Aaron Y. Zelin, “Maqdisi’s Disciples in Libya and Tunisia,” Foreign Policy, November 14, 2012,
http://mideastafrica.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/11/14/maqdisi_s_disciples_in_libya_and_tunisia.
24 Aaron Y. Zelin, “Libya’s Jihadists Beyond Benghazi,” Foreign Policy, August 12, 2013,
http://mideastafrica.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/08/12/libyas_jihadists_beyond_benghazi.
25 Aaron Y. Zelin, “Libya’s Jihadists Beyond Benghazi,” Foreign Policy, August 12, 2013,
http://mideastafrica.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/08/12/libyas_jihadists_beyond_benghazi.
26 Library of Congress Federal Research Division, “Al-Qaeda in Libya: A Profile,” Federation of American
Scientists, August 1, 2012, http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/aq-libya-loc.pdf.
27 Nadia Radwan, “Libya: Ansar Al-Sharia in Libya Leader Dead,” AllAfrica, January 26, 2015,
http://allafrica.com/stories/201501270208.html.
28 Thomas Joscelyn, “Ansar Al Sharia Libya Relaunches Social Media Sites,” Long War Journal, April 9,
2015, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/04/ansar-al-sharia-libya-relaunches-social-media-
sites.php.
ASL is based in Benghazi and operates branches in Derna, Sirte, and Ajdabiya.29 ASL
also operates a highly professional and organized media wing, al-Raya Media
Productions Foundation.30

Recruitment and Training:

Like many other jihadist organizations, ASL maintains a social media presence. The
organization has established Facebook, Twitter, and Google Plus accounts but they are
regularly taken down by the administrators of those social media platforms.31 In its social
media messages, ASL often features its outreach and social service campaigns. Many
recruits are drawn to the group by its charity work, preaching, and delivery of social
services.32 The Long War Journal wrote in April 2015 that ASL operates a radio station
in Benghazi and that on Twitter the group now utilizes a “‘correspondents’ or ‘reporters’
network”—a web of multiple accounts that promote ASL propaganda, similar to that
used by the Nusra Front.33

ASL has embedded recruiters within foreign countries. In the past, recruiters have
funneled Tunisian civilians who want to fight in Syria into Libyan training camps.34
Within Libya, ASL has used monetary payments to recruit young fighters.35

ASL actively hosts and trains extremists from other organizations in its own training
bases in Libya. Since the start of the Syrian civil war, ASL has trained militants seeking
to fight in Syria. In 2013, two Tunisian citizens who had trained in ASL camps were
separately captured near Derna and interrogated. The first, who wanted to perform jihad
in Syria, claimed that he trained in a camp for about twenty days alongside recruits with
civilian backgrounds. The camp included weapons training but did not have religious
education or schooling. The second fighter wanted to fight with the Free Syrian Army in
Syria and claimed to have attended a month-long camp near Benghazi on guerilla tactics,

29 Aaron Y. Zelin, “Libya’s Jihadists Beyond Benghazi,” Foreign Policy, August 12, 2013,
http://mideastafrica.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/08/12/libyas_jihadists_beyond_benghazi; Aya Elbrqawi,
“Slow Death of Derna,” AllAfrica, February 28, 2014, http://allafrica.com/stories/201403031054.html.
30 Library of Congress Federal Research Division, “Al-Qaeda in Libya: A Profile,” Federation of American
Scientists, August 1, 2012, http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/aq-libya-loc.pdf.
31 Thomas Joscelyn, “Ansar Al Sharia Libya Relaunches Social Media Sites,” Long War Journal, April 9,
2015, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/04/ansar-al-sharia-libya-relaunches-social-media-
sites.php.
32 Nadia Radwan, “Libya: Ansar Al-Sharia Intensifies Recruitment,” AllAfrica, November 15, 2013.
http://allafrica.com/stories/201311180744.html.
33 Thomas Joscelyn, “Ansar Al Sharia Libya Relaunches Social Media Sites,” Long War Journal, April 9,
2015, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/04/ansar-al-sharia-libya-relaunches-social-media-
sites.php.
34 Aaron Y. Zelin, “New Evidence on Ansar Al-Sharia in Libya Training Camps,” Al-Wasat, August 8,
2013. https://thewasat.wordpress.com/2013/08/08/new-evidence-on-ansar-al-sharia-in-libya-training-
camps/.
35 Mawassi Lahcen, “Libya: Benghazi Rejects Islamist Violence,” AllAfrica,
December 28, 2012, http://allafrica.com/stories/201212310264.html.
ambushes, and booby-trapping.36 ASL also operates camps near Derna and Jebel Akhdar
to train fighters for Syria.37

Beyond training fighters for export to Syria, ASL has also trained militants for North
African groups. For example, half of the 24 militants involved in the January 2013 In
Amenas gas complex attack had trained in ASL camps in Benghazi.38

Financing:

According to a February 2013 report by the Daily Beast, in order to clamp down on drug
dealers and crime in Benghazi, the Libyan government has provided “payments to Ansar
al-Sharia militiamen… through other Benghazi brigades, including the 17th of February
brigade, according to sources in… Libya’s new Parliament.”39 According to the report,
the former chief of staff for Libya’s ground forces, Yousef Mangoush, was “diverting
operational funds from the fledgling armed forces to the militia.”40

ASL also reportedly receives donations from Libyan expatriates for the social services
that it provides.41

Key Leaders:
● Mohamed al-Zahawi (leader of ASL, deceased)42
● Abu Tamim al-Libi (senior sharia jurist)43
● Abu Sufyan Bin Qumu (leader of the Ansar al-Sharia branch in Derna)44
● Nasser al-Tarshani (head of ASL religious committee)45

36 Aaron Y. Zelin, “New Evidence on Ansar Al-Sharia in Libya Training Camps,” Al-Wasat, August 8,
2013, https://thewasat.wordpress.com/2013/08/08/new-evidence-on-ansar-al-sharia-in-libya-training-
camps/.
37 “UN Blacklists Ansar Al-Sharia Armed Group,” Al Jazeera, November 20, 2014,
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/11/un-blacklists-ansar-al-sharia-armed-group-
2014112015146686102.html.
38 Agence France-Presse, “UN Security Council Adds Libya's Ansar Al-Sharia to Terror List,” I24 News,
November 20, 2014, http://www.i24news.tv/en/news/international/africa/51583-141120-un-security-
council-adds-libya-s-ansar-al-sharia-to-terror-list.
39 Jamie Dettmer, “Libyan Government Turns to Ansar Al-Sharia Militia for Crime-Fighting Help,” Daily
Beast, February 26, 2013, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/02/25/libyan-government-turns-to-
ansar-al-sharia-militia-for-crime-fighting-help.html.
40 Jamie Dettmer, “Libyan Government Turns to Ansar Al-Sharia Militia for Crime-Fighting Help,” Daily
Beast, February 26, 2013, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/02/25/libyan-government-turns-to-
ansar-al-sharia-militia-for-crime-fighting-help.html.
41 Faisal Irshaid, “Profile: Libya’s Ansar Al-Sharia,” BBC News, June 13, 2014,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-27732589.
42 “Leader of Libyan Islamists Ansar al-Sharia dies of wounds,” Reuters, January 23, 2015,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/23/us-libya-security-idUSKBN0KW1MU20150123.
43 Thomas Joscelyn, “Ansar Al Sharia Libya Relaunches Social Media Sites,” Long War Journal, April 9,
2015, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/04/ansar-al-sharia-libya-relaunches-social-media-
sites.php.
44 Aaron Y. Zelin, “Know Your Ansar Al-Sharia,” Foreign Policy, September 21, 2012,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/09/21/know_your_ansar_al_sharia.
45 Mary Fitzgerald, “It Wasn’t Us,” Foreign Policy, September 18, 2012,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/09/18/it_wasn_t_us.
● Hani al-Mansuri (spokesman)46
● Wissam Bin Hamid (military commander in the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura
Council)47

History:

● 1980s: Abu Sufyan Bin Qumu, the future founder of Ansar al-Sharia
Derna, travels to Afghanistan to fight the Soviets as one of the original “Arab
Afghans.”48
● Early 1990s: After leaving Afghanistan, Bin Qumu travels to Sudan,
where he works as a driver for one of Osama bin Laden’s construction companies.49
● Late 1990s-Early 2000s: Bin Qumu leaves Sudan and returns to
Afghanistan. There, he fights alongside al-Qaeda and the Taliban against U.S.-led
forces.50
● 2011: In Libya, Ahmed Abu Khattala reportedly forms the Abu Ubaidah
bin Jarrah rebel brigade during the uprising against Muammar Gaddafi. The brigade
allegedly disbands after Gaddafi’s fall, but Khattala maintains that he can still pull his
network of fighters together if need be. In early 2012, “several fighters” from
Khattala’s group join Ansar al-Sharia. Khattala would become a key leader in Ansar
al-Sharia Benghazi.51
● July 28, 2011: Future members of ASL assassinate rebel commander
Abdul Fattah Younes, a former minister in the Gaddafi government who had led a
crackdown on Islamists in Libya.52
● 2012: Mohamed al-Zahawi, Nasser al-Tarshani, and other Libyan
Islamists officially form the Ansar al-Sharia Brigade (katiba) in Benghazi (ASB),
“with the goal of supporting sharia as the frame of reference in Libya,” according to
al-Zahawi.53

46 Aaron Y. Zelin, “The Terrorist Threat in North Africa,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, July
10, 2013, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/testimony/ZelinTestimony20130710-
v2.pdf.
47 Thomas Joscelyn, “Ansar al Sharia Libya showcases spoils of war, key personalities in video,” Long War
Journal, December 29, 2014, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/12/ansar_al_sharia_liby_1.php.
48 Thomas Joscelyn, “Obama Administration’s Benghazi Bombshell,” Weekly Standard, January 7, 2014,
http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/obama-administrations-benghazi-bombshell_773986.html.
49 Thomas Joscelyn, “Obama Administration’s Benghazi Bombshell,” Weekly Standard, January 7, 2014,
http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/obama-administrations-benghazi-bombshell_773986.html.
50 Thomas Joscelyn, “Obama Administration’s Benghazi Bombshell,” Weekly Standard, January 7, 2014,
http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/obama-administrations-benghazi-bombshell_773986.html.
51 Mary Fitzgerald, “A Conversation with Abu Khattala,” New Yorker, June 18, 2014,
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2014/06/abu-khattala-before-his-capture.html.
52 David Kirkpatrick, Suliman Ali Zway, and Kareem Fahim, “Attack by Fringe Group Highlights the
Problem of Libya’s Militias,” New York Times, September 15, 2012.
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/16/world/middleeast/attack-by-fringe-group-highlights-the-problem-of-
libya-militias.html?_r=3&hp&pagewanted=all&.
53 Mary Fitzgerland, “It Wasn’t Us,” Foreign Policy, September 18, 2012,
http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/09/18/it-wasnt-us/.
● June 2012: ASB leaders issue the “Ansar al-Sharia First Meeting,” a
communique announcing the group’s official inauguration.54
● August 24, 2012: ASB escalates its campaign against Sufi shrines in
Libya. Militants attack a Sufi shrine in Zliten, destroying the tomb of 15th century
Sufi scholar Abdel Salam al-Asmar and burning a mosque library.55
● August 25, 2012: ASB militants deploy an excavator to central Tripoli to
destroy the Sidi Al-Sha’ab mosque, which contains the tomb of a Sufi saint.56
● September 11, 2012: The U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
reports that “Individuals affiliated with terrorist groups, including AQIM, Ansar al
Sharia, AQAP, and the Mohammad Jamal Network, participated in the September 11,
2012, attacks” against the U.S. consulate in Benghazi that killed U.S. Ambassador J.
Christopher Stevens.57
● September 21, 2012: As many as 30,000 people march to ASB’s
headquarters in Benghazi in protest of the prevalence of oppressive militias such as
ASB in post-Gaddafi Libya. Hundreds of protesters storm ASB’s compound and
force ASB militants to abandon the site.58 Simultaneously, more than 3,000 ASB
supporters attend a counter protest in Benghazi.59
● September 22, 2012 Ansar al-Sharia Derna disbands following the
backlash after the U.S. consulate attack.60
● Fall 2012: The Ansar al-Sharia Brigade in Benghazi changes its name to
Ansar al-Sharia in Libya to portray a nationalist focus and emphasis on development
of an Islamic state through social work and community, rather than violence.61
● June 28, 2013: ASL establishes a branch in Sirte, Muammar Gaddafi’s
hometown.62
● August 6, 2013: ASL establishes another branch in Ajdabiya.63
● October 2013 ASL opens a branch in Derna with the slogan, “A step
toward building the Islamic state.”64

54 Faisal Irshaid, “Profile: Libya’s Ansar al-Sharia,” BBC News, June 13, 2014,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-27732589.
55 Sharron Ward, “The Battle of the Shrines,” Foreign Policy, September 12, 2012,
http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/09/12/the-battle-of-the-shrines/.
56 Sharron Ward, “The Battle of the Shrines,” Foreign Policy, September 12, 2012,
http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/09/12/the-battle-of-the-shrines/.
57 “Review of the Terrorist Attacks on U.S. Facilities in Benghazi, Libya, September 11-12, 2012,” U.S.
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (2014): 40,
http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/benghazi2014/benghazi.pdf.
58 Maggie Michael, “Libyans storm militia in backlash of attack on US,” Associated Press, September 21,
2012, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/libyans-march-against-militias-after-attack.
59 Yasmine Ryan, “Libyans Rise up against Militias' Dominance,” Al Jazeera, September 24, 2012.
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/09/201292218380199890.html.
60 Marie-Louise Gumuchian and Peter Graff, “Libyan Army Tackles Rogue Militias as Two Disband,”
Reuters, September 23, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/23/us-protests-libya-
idUSBRE88M08D20120923.
61 Aaron Y. Zelin, “Libya’s Jihadists Beyond Benghazi,” Foreign Policy, August 12, 2013,
http://mideastafrica.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/08/12/libyas_jihadists_beyond_benghazi.
62 Aaron Y. Zelin, “Libya’s Jihadists Beyond Benghazi,” Foreign Policy, August 12, 2013,
http://mideastafrica.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/08/12/libyas_jihadists_beyond_benghazi.
63 Aaron Y. Zelin, “Libya’s Jihadists Beyond Benghazi,” Foreign Policy, August 12, 2013,
http://mideastafrica.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/08/12/libyas_jihadists_beyond_benghazi.
● January 10, 2014: The U.S. government designates ASL branches in
Benghazi and Derna as Foreign Terrorist Organizations. It also designates ASL
leaders Ahmed Abu Khattala (ASL Benghazi) and Abu Sufyan Bin Qumu (ASL
Derna) as Specially Designated Global Terrorists.65
● May 16, 2014: Former Libyan army general Khalifa Haftar launches a
massive offensive against Islamist militias in Benghazi—codenamed “Operation
Dignity”—with a focus on ASL.66
● June 2, 2014: ASL launches a counterattack against General Haftar's
forces. Eighteen people are killed and more than seventy wounded in the heaviest
fighting since the start of Operation Dignity.67
● June 14, 2014: American commandos capture Ahmed Abu Khattala, who
the U.S. government claims was a ringleader of the attack on the U.S. consulate in
Benghazi, and extradite him to stand trial in Washington, D.C.68
● June 20, 2014: Islamist groups in Benghazi join together as the “Shura
Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries.” The coalition includes ASL, Libya
Shield 1, the Brega Martyrs Brigade, the Rafallah al-Sahati Brigade, and
the February 17th Martyrs Brigade.69
● Late July 2014: The number of refugees crossing into neighboring
Tunisia reportedly surpasses 6,000 people per day following intensified fighting near
Benghazi and Tripoli.70
● July 24, 2014: ASL overruns the Camp 319 and 36th Battalion bases in
Benghazi, capturing howitzers, a 2K12 Kub mobile air defense system, Strela-2
MANPAD's, ammunition, and military vehicles.71
● July 30, 2014: ASL announces that it has seized all of Benghazi and
declares the city an “Islamic Emirate.”72 More than sixty people are killed in the
previous week’s fighting.73

64 Aya Elbrqawi, “Slow Death of Derna,” AllAfrica, February 28, 2014,
http://allafrica.com/stories/201403031054.html.
65 “Terrorist Designations of Three Ansar Al-Shari’a Organizations and Leaders,” U.S. Department of
State, January 10, 2014, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/01/219519.htm.
66 “Retired General Launches War against Islamists in Eastern Libya,” IHS Jane’s 360, July 21, 2014.
http://www.janes.com/article/41023/retired-general-launches-war-against-islamists-in-eastern-libya.
67 “More Fighting Grips Libya's Benghazi,” Deutsche Welle, June 2, 2014, http://www.dw.de/more-
fighting-grips-libyas-benghazi/a-17677091.
68 Karen DeYoung, Adam Goldman, and Julie Tate, “U.S. Captures Benghazi Suspect in Secret Raid,”
Washington Post, June 17, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-captured-
benghazi-suspect-in-secret-raid/2014/06/17/7ef8746e-f5cf-11e3-a3a5-42be35962a52_story.html.
69 Agence France-Presse, “Splits Emerge between Libyan Islamists and Jihadists,” Yahoo News, August
18, 2014. http://news.yahoo.com/splits-emerge-between-libyan-islamists-jihadists-183000425.html.
70 “Thousands Flee Libya Violence to Tunisia,” Al Arabiya, July 30, 2014,
http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2014/07/29/Islamists-overrun-Benghazi-army-base-
killing-30-.html.
71 Jeremy Binnie, “Libya's Anti-Islamist Offensive Suffers Setback,” IHS Jane’s 360, July 24, 2014,
http://www.janes.com/article/41155/libya-s-anti-islamist-offensive-suffers-setback.
72 “Benghazi Declared ‘Islamic Emirate’ by Militants,” Al Arabiya, July 31, 2014,
http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2014/07/31/Libya-s-Ansar-al-Sharia-declares-Islamic-
state-in-Benghazi.html.
73 Agence France-Presse, “Islamists Seize Key Benghazi Army Base as Tripoli Fire Rages,” Yahoo News,
July 29, 2014, http://news.yahoo.com/islamists-main-military-benghazi-004825173.html.
● August 26, 2014: Islamist group Libya Dawn rejects Ansar al-Sharia’s
offer of an alliance between the two organizations, stating it “announces its rejection
of terrorism and extremism, and stresses that it does not belong to a terrorist
organization.”74
● Summer 2014: Abu Sufyan Bin Qumu, founder of Ansar al-Sharia in
Derna and current leader of ASL Derna, swears allegiance to ISIS.75
● September 15, 2014: At least nineteen are killed in a violent, 24 hour
clash between Haftar’s forces and ASL in Benghazi.76
● October 3, 2014: Multiple suicide bombings by the Benghazi
Revolutionaries Shura Council, Libya Shield, and Ansar al-Sharia kill at least forty
Libyan soldiers and wound dozens more in Benghazi.77
● October 15, 2014: At least twelve people are killed in Benghazi during a
renewed offensive by forces under General Haftar. Haftar reportedly captures a major
military base from ASL. The offensive coincides with the “15 October Uprising.”
Inspired by posters and Twitter hashtag “#15OctoberUprising,” residents across the
region coordinate a grassroots revolt against Islamist groups.78
● October 14, 2014: A U.S. federal grand jury indicts Ahmed Abu Khatalla
for his involvement in the 2012 attacks on the U.S. diplomatic compound in
Benghazi.79
● October 17, 2014: ASL’s leader Mohamed Al-Zahawi is injured in an
airstrike in Benghazi and flown to Turkey for treatment.80
● November 19, 2014: ASB and ASD are added to the U.N.’s al-Qaeda
sanctions list, noting the groups’ connections to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
(AQIM).81
● December 29, 2014: ASL releases a video showcasing captured tanks and
heavy weapons it acquired after raiding one of General Khalifa Hafter’s camps on
December 26, 2014. The video includes two ASL leaders, Wissam Bin Hamid and
Mohammad al-Darsi.82

74 Agence France-Presse, “Libya Dawn Islamists ‘reject Ansar Al-Sharia Terror,’” Yahoo News, August
26, 2014, http://news.yahoo.com/libya-dawn-islamists-reject-ansar-al-sharia-terror-110335904.html.
75 Aya Elbrqawi, “Derna Cries for Help,” AllAfrica, December 1, 2014.
http://allafrica.com/stories/201412020345.html.
76 “Reports: Relatives of Libyan Ambassador Kidnapped in Tripoli,” Middle East Eye, December 17, 2014.
http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/reports-relatives-libyan-ambassador-kidnapped-tripoli-1500294764.
77 “Libya Suicide Blasts Leave 40 Soldiers Dead,” Al Jazeera, October 3, 2014,
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/10/libyan-soldiers-killed-benghazi-violence-
201410211526230704.html.
78 “Benghazi Residents Take up Arms as Haftar Makes Gains,” Middle East Eye, December 17, 2014,
http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/libya-1558812714.
79 Julia Edwards, “Benghazi Suspect,” Reuters, October 14, 2014,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/14/us-usa-security-benghazi-idUSKCN0I32R620141014.
80 “Ansar Al-Sharia leader ‘almost certainly’ killed in Libya,” Middle East Eye, December 14, 2014.
http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/ansar-al-sharia-leader-almost-certainly-killed-libya-2105958401.
81 “Security Council Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee Adds Two Entities to Its Sanctions List,” United
Nations, November 19, 2014, http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11659.doc.htm; Thomas Joscelyn, “UN
recognizes ties between Ansar al Sharia in Libya, al Qaeda,” Long War Journal, November 19, 2014,
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/11/un_designates_ansar.php.
82 Thomas Joscelyn, “Ansar al Sharia Libya showcases spoils of war, key personalities in video,” Long War
Journal, December 29, 2014, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/12/ansar_al_sharia_liby_1.php.