Annals of Theoretical Psychology

242 Pages·1990·13.245 MB·English

by  Daniel N. Robinson (auth.), Daniel N. Robinson, Leendert P. Mos (eds.)

Annals of
Theoretical
Psychology
Volume 6
EDITORIAL BOARD
D. Bakan, York University, Canada
J. S. Bruner, New School for Social Research
D. T. CampbeD, Lehigh University
R. B. CatteD, University of Hawaii at Manoa
H. J. Eysenck, University of London, England
C. F. Graumann, Universitiit Heidelberg,
Federal Republic of Germany
R. L. Gregory, University of Bristol, England
M. Henle, New School for Social Research
F. Klix, Der Humboldt Universitiit Zu Berlin,
German Democratic Republic
S. Koch, Boston University
K. B. Madsen, Royal Danish School of
Educational Studies, Denmark
D. Magnusson, University of Stockholm, Sweden
G. Mandler, University of California, San Diego
G. A. Miller, Princeton University
K. Pawlik, University of Hamburg,
Federal Republic of Germany
K. Pribram, Stanford University
G. Radnitzky, Universitiit Trier,
Federal Republic of Germany
R. Rieber, The City University of New York
D. N. Robinson, Georgetown University
J. F. Rychlak, Loyola University, Chicago
J. Smedslund, University of Oslo, Norway
P. Suppes, Stanford University
O. K. Tikhomirov, Moscow University, USSR
S. Toulmin, The University of Chicago
W. B. Weimer, Pennsylvania State University
B. B. Wolman, New York
A Continuation Order Plan is available for this series. A continuation order will bring delivery of
each new volume immediately upon publication. Volumes are billed only upon actual shipment. For
further information please contact the publisher.
Annals of
Theoretical
Psychology
Volume 6
Edited by
DANIEL N. ROBINSON
Department of P5ychologtJ
Georgetown Univer5ity
Washington, D.C.
and
LEENDERT P. MOS
Center for Advanced Study in Theoretical Psychology
University of Alberta
Edmonton, Alberta, Canada
Plenum Press • New York and London
The Library of Congress has catalogued this title as follows:
Annals of theoretical psychology.-Vol. 1--New York, N.Y.: Plenum Press.
1984-
v.: ill.; 23 cm.
Annual.
ISSN 0747·5241 = Annals of theoretical psychology.
l. Psychology-Philosophy-Periodicals.
BF38.A53 150'.5-dc19 84-644088
Ubrary of Congress [8501J AACR2 MARC-S
ISBN-13: 978-1-4612-7901-3 e-ISBN-J 3:978-1-4613-0631-3
DOl: 10.1007/978-1-4613-0631-3
© 1990 Plenum Press, New York
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1990
A Division of Plenum Publishing Corporation
233 Spring Street, New York, N.Y. 10013
All rights reserved
No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted
in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming,
recording, or otherwise, without written permission from the Publisher
Contributors
Jeff Coulter, Department of Sociology, Boston University, Boston,
Massachusetts
Reuven Dar, Department of Psychology, Tel-Aviv University, Ramat
Aviv, Israel
Harwood Fisher, School of Education, City College, City University of
New York, New York, New York
Rom Harre, Department of Philosophy, Oxford University, Oxford,
England
James T. Lamiell, Department of Psychology, Georgetown University,
Washington, D. C.
Joseph Margolis, Department of Philosophy, Temple University,
Philadel phia, Pennsylvania
Peter Manicas, Department of Philosophy, Queens College, City
University of New York, Flushing, New York
George A. Miller, Department of Psychology, Princeton University,
Princeton, New Jersey
Daniel J. Ozer, Department of Psychology, University of Boston,
Boston, Massachusetts
Daniel N. Robinson, Department of Psychology, Georgetown
University, Washington, D. C.
Paul E Secord, Department of Psychology, University of Houston,
Houston, Texas
Ronald C. Serling, Department of Educational Psychology, University
of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, Wisconsin
C. Terry Warner, Department of Philosophy, Brigham Young
University, Provo, Utah
v
Preface
Early in 1986 I invited Professor Robinson to collaborate on a
volume of the Annals devoted to the theme of the 'person' in
psychology. He accepted my invitation later that year suggesting,
instead, that the volume be devoted to the theme of explanation in
psychology. I gladly compromised for, as I knew from his exterisive
writings on the history and philosophy of psychology, the concept of
explanation is firmly rooted in philosophical anthropology.
The contributions by Rom Harre, James Lamiell, Joseph Margolis,
and George Miller were available in June, 1988, and the commentaries
and replies to commentaries early in 1989. Fortunately, foundational
papers wear well, as the content of the present volume so aptly testifies.
Beginning with Volume 6, the Annals will be entirely edited and
prepared using the computer facilities at our Center. Thanks to the
dedicated effort of my colleague, Professor William Baker, this is the
first volume produced from camera-ready copy. His personal support
and technical expertise made the transition to desk-top publishing
somewhat less than formidable. Mrs. Valerie Welch, our Center
secretary, entered the text and managed my personal correspondence;
Casey Boodt proofread the entire manuscript; and the University of
Alberta continues to support my involvement with this series. Dan
Robinson's commitment to scholarship also extends to the more
mundane task of editing. Every volume with a co-editor is a challenge;
he made this one a delight.
It is with sadness that I give notice of the death, on September 21,
1989, of Joseph R. Royce. Joe was the co-founder, with Ludwig von
Bertalanffy and Herman Tennessen, of our Center at the University of
Alberta in 1965. He served as its director for fifteen years and officially
retired from academic life in 1986. TheAnnals series was but one of
his many achievements in the dedicated pursuit of theoretical
psychology.
Leendert P. Mos
vii
Contents
1 Introduction: Explications of Explanations •........ 1
Daniel N. Robinson
2 On Explanation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 7
George A Miller
3 Explicating Actions • . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . .. 39
Joseph Margolis
4 The Need for a Radically New Human Science ........ 75
Paul E Secord
5 Explaining Actions •••..............•...... 89
Peter Manicas
6 Explicating Actions: Reply to Commentaries ........ 99
Joseph Margolis
7 Explanation in Psychology . . • • . . . . • . . . . . . . • . • . 105
Rom Harre
8 The Scope of Psychological Explanation . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
Jeff Coulter
9 Locating Agency ..............•.......... 133
C. Terry Warner
10 Explanation in Psychology: Reply to Commentaries ..... 147
Rom Harre
ix
x Contents
11 Explanation in the Psychology of Personality • . . • . . . . . 153
James T. Lamiell
12 For Whom the Bell Curve Toils: Universality in Individual
Differences Research ....••..••...••....... 193
Reuven Dar and Ronald C. Serlin
13 Individual Differences and the Explanation of Behavior .. 201
Daniel J. Ozer
14 Are Individual Persons Motivated to Construct Categories
or Do They Merely Intend Meanings? • . . . . • • . . . . . . 211
Harwood Fisher
15 Let's Be Careful Out There: Reply to Commentaries .... 219
James T. Lamiell
Contents of Earlier Volumes . . . . . . • • . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233
Author Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237
e , • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Subject Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241
1
Introduction: Explications of Explanations
Daniel N. Robinson
This edition of the Annals is devoted to the topic of explanation
which, since the time of Aristotle, has been a persistent preoccupation
of philosophers and scientists. Needless to say, the estimable contribu
tions to this volume will not be the last words on the subject.
What does it mean to offer an explanation of a thing or an event?
At the level of common sense, it is to identify either a causally sufficient
antecedent such that, given the antecedent, the thing or event is brought
about; or it is to supply a reason or 'rationale' such that one understands
this thing or event as a realized desideratum. At the level of common
sense, then, explanations are exhaustively supplied by the identification
of causes or reasons. It is at this point, however, that the energies and
useful scepticisms of the metaphysician are tapped, for it is at this point
that one begins to sense both the elusiveness and the circularity of
explanations framed in terms of 'causes' and 'reasons'.
Aristotle was probably the first philosopher to appreciate the full
weight of the issue of explanation, noting that his predecessors had
approached the matter rather superficially. His celebrated four-fold
model of explanation is generally depicted as a rigid and even mechani
cal calculus, whereas Aristotle's own development of the model is subtle
and supple. He fully appreciated the many contexts in which the
'formal' and the 'final' causes are the very same, and the many other
contexts in which the 'cause' of something turns out to be nothing other
than the definition of the thing itself. Nonetheless, he stood behind the
proposition that 'cause' is not a univocal term, and that a full under
standing of any phenomenon requires us to identify four distinguishable
modes of causation; the formal, the material, the efficient and the final.
Daniel N. Robinson • Department of PSYChology, Georgetown University,
Washington, DC 20057.
Annals oj Theoretical Psychology, Vol. 6 1
Edited by D.N. Robinson and L.P. Mos
Plenum Press, New York, 1990