Animalism: new essays on persons, animals, and identity PDF
Preview Animalism: new essays on persons, animals, and identity
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 06/25/2016, SPi Animalism OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 06/25/2016, SPi OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 06/25/2016, SPi Animalism New Essays on Persons, Animals, and Identity edited by Stephan Blatti and Paul F. Snowdon 1 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 06/25/2016, SPi 3 Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP, United Kingdom Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries © the several contributors 2016 Te moral rights of the authors have been asserted First Edition published in 2016 Impression: 1 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by licence or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this work in any other form and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Control Number: 2016930898 ISBN 978–0–19–960875–1 Printed in Great Britain by Clays Ltd, St Ives plc Links to third party websites are provided by Oxford in good faith and for information only. Oxford disclaims any responsibility for the materials contained in any third party website referenced in this work. OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 06/25/2016, SPi Contents List of Contributors vii 1. Introduction 1 Stephan Blatti and Paul F. Snowdon Part I 2. We Are Not Human Beings 31 Derek Parft 3. Animalism vs. Constitutionalism 50 Lynne Rudder Baker 4. Constitution and the Debate between Animalism and Psychological Views 64 Denis Robinson 5. Remnant Persons: Animalism’s Undoing 89 Mark Johnston 6. Tinking Animals Without Animalism 128 Sydney Shoemaker Part II 7. Te Remnant-Person Problem 145 Eric T. Olson 8. Headhunters 162 Stephan Blatti 9. Tinking Parts 180 Rory Madden 10. Four-Dimensional Animalism 208 David B. Hershenov Part III 11. Animalism and the Varieties of Conjoined Twinning 229 Tim Campbell and Jef McMahan 12. A Case in which Two Persons Exist in One Animal 253 Mark D. Reid OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 06/25/2016, SPi vi c ontents 13. Animalism and the Unity of Consciousness: Some Issues 266 Paul F. Snowdon 14. Animal Ethics 283 Jens Johansson 15. Te Stony Metaphysical Heart of Animalism 303 David Shoemaker Index 329 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 06/25/2016, SPi List of Contributors Lynne Rudder Baker, University of Massachusetts, Amherst Stephan Blatti, University of Memphis Tim Campbell, Institute for Futures Studies David B. Hershenov, University at Bufalo Jens Johansson, Uppsala University Mark Johnston, Princeton University Rory Madden, University College London Jeff McMahan, University of Oxford Eric T. Olson, University of Shefeld Derek Parfit, University of Oxford Mark D. Reid, Wilkes University Denis Robinson, University of Auckland David Shoemaker, Tulane University Sydney Shoemaker, Cornell University Paul F. Snowdon, University College London OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 06/25/2016, SPi OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 06/25/2016, SPi 1 Introduction Stephan Blatti and Paul F. Snowdon Te purpose of this collection is to gather together a group of chapters that are inspired by three central questions: What is animalism? What implications does it have? Is a nimalism true? Te aim is to push the debate about these questions forward. Most of the chapters are new. Te two that are not—those by Parft and by Campbell and McMahan—are recent and highly important essays that raise fundamental questions about animalism, and we feel they deserve a place in this collection. We also wanted to collect together good work from diferent intellectual centres around the world, in North America, the UK, and Australasia, but also work from philosophers of diferent ages and at diferent stages. Some chapters represent forceful and novel presentations of relatively well-known viewpoints, whereas others move the debate along totally new directions. No view is dominant, and diferent chapters focus on diferent aspects of the debate. We, the editors, are both animalists (which is not to say that we are animal- ists of precisely the same kind), but our main hope with this collection is that it will stimulate new discussion, not that we shall make converts to our own view. It takes time for debates in philosophy to deepen and to sort the wheat from the chaf, but we hope this collection will help those things to happen in the next stage of debate about animalism. In this introduction we shall sketch the background to the current debates and try to relate the chapters here to that background. It is impossible for us to pick out every issue or argument in all the chapters that we regard as important. All we can do is to highlight some of them. As with all philosophical subjects, properly sorting out the issues is a task for those who wish to think about them. One way to think of animalism is as a view about the relation between us, persons, and animals. According to it we are identical with some animals. We can, then, regard the background question as—what is our relation to animals? It is interesting to note that this general question has risen to prominence not only in the analytic philosoph- ical tradition, but also in the continental tradition (e.g. in the work of Derrida) and in various areas of interdisciplinary inquiry (e.g. animal studies). Te issues discussed here, then, provide one example of intellectual convergence between multiple philo- sophical traditions and areas of investigation.
The list of books you might like
