Animal ethics and philosophy : questioning the orthodoxy PDF
Preview Animal ethics and philosophy : questioning the orthodoxy
Animal Ethics and Philosophy Animal Ethics and Philosophy Questioning the Orthodoxy Edited by Elisa Aaltola and John Hadley London•NewYork PublishedbyRowman&LittlefieldInternational,Ltd. UnitA,WhitacreMews,26-34StannaryStreet,LondonSE114AB www.rowmaninternational.com Rowman&LittlefieldInternational,Ltd.isanaffiliateofRowman&Littlefield 4501ForbesBoulevard,Suite200,Lanham,Maryland20706,USA WithadditionalofficesinBoulder,NewYork,Toronto(Canada),andPlymouth(UK) www.rowman.com Copyright©2015byElisaAaltola,JohnHadleyandContributors Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthisbookmaybereproducedinanyformorbyany electronicormechanicalmeans,includinginformationstorageandretrievalsystems, withoutwrittenpermissionfromthepublisher,exceptbyareviewerwhomayquote passagesinareview. BritishLibraryCataloguinginPublicationInformationAvailable AcataloguerecordforthisbookisavailablefromtheBritishLibrary ISBN:HB978-1-78348-181-1 ISBN:PB978-1-78348-182-8 LibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationData Animalethicsandphilosophy:questioningtheorthodoxy/editedbyElisaAaltolaandJohnHadley. pagescm Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex. ISBN978-1-78348-181-1(cloth:alk.paper)—ISBN978-1-78348-182-8(pbk.:alk.paper)— ISBN978-1-78348-183-5(electronic) 1.Animals(Philosophy)2.Animalrights.3.Animalwelfare.I.Aaltola,Elisa,1976–editor. B105.A55A5452015 179'.3—dc23 2014036000 TMThepaperusedinthispublicationmeetstheminimumrequirementsofAmerican NationalStandardforInformationSciencesPermanenceofPaperforPrintedLibrary Materials,ANSI/NISOZ39.48-1992. PrintedintheUnitedStatesofAmerica Contents Introduction:QuestioningtheOrthodoxy 1 JohnHadleyandElisaAaltola PartI:IntrinsicValueandMoralStatus:RethinkingSentience 13 1 AMetalevelProblemforAnimalRightsTheory 15 JohnHadley 2 AgainstMoralIntrinsicalism 31 NicolasDelon 3 BeyondSentience:BiosemioticsasFoundationforAnimal andEnvironmentalEthics 47 MortenTønnessenandJonathanBeever 4 AnimalAgency:WhatItIs,WhatItIsn’t,andHowItCan BeRealized 63 ZipporahWeisberg PartII:Epistemology:KnowingandSpeakingforNonhuman Animals 81 5 EnchantedWorldsandAnimalOthers 83 WayneWilliams 6 “TheFleshofMyFlesh”:Animality,Difference,and “RadicalCommunity”inMerleau-Ponty’sPhilosophy 99 JonathanD.Singer 7 TheProblemofSpeakingforAnimals 117 JasonWyckoff 8 DoingWithoutMoralRights 133 ElizabethForeman PartIII:MoralPsychology:EmotionsandMetaethics 149 9 DisgustandtheCollectionofBovineFoetalBlood 151 RobertWilliamFischer 10 HumeonAnimalsandtheRestofNature 165 AngelaCoventryandAvramHiller 11 ThePoliticizationofAnimalLove 185 TonyMilligan v vi Contents 12 TheRiseofSentimentalismandAnimalPhilosophy 201 ElisaAaltola FurtherReading 219 Index 223 NotesonContributors 227 Introduction Questioning the Orthodoxy John Hadley and Elisa Aaltola InBourgeois Dignity:WhyEconomicsCan’tExplainthe ModernWorld,Uni- versityofIllinoiseconomistDeirdreMcCloskeydrawsattentiontoadis- tinction between, on the one hand, original research and, on the other hand, innovative research.1 According to McCloskey, original research is the application of existing knowledge to pressing problems and issues, and innovative research is the creation of altogether new knowledge. McCloskey’sthesisisthattheextraordinaryimprovementinlivingstan- dardsbetween1800tothepresentdaycannotbeexplainedbythework- ingsofmarketsalone;instead,progressistheproductofhumaningenu- ity—that is, innovative research in a wide range of fields including the artsandhumanities. If McCloskey’s distinction between original research and innovative research is sound, then there has been relatively little innovation in the field of animal ethics. Indeed, even the most respected and widely cited philosophersinthefield,suchasPeterSingerandTomRegan,havenot producedgenuinelyinnovativeresearchtoanysubstantialdegree.After all,SingerandReganare,respectively,utilitariananddeontologicalphi- losophersfirstandanimalethicistssecond.Thatistosay,theyhaveeach applied existing theories to the problem of human relations with other animals but have not created new knowledge as such. In other words, they have produced merely original research, and they have not pro- ducedinnovativeresearch. To say that a philosopher has produced merely original research, as opposed to genuinely innovative research, sounds like casting asper- sions.Butour pointisnottoslighttheconsiderableachievementsofthe manydozensofphilosopherswhohavecontributedtoanimalethicsthe- ory; rather, we aim to draw attention to the nature of the discipline and the idea of progress within it. If McCloskey’s distinction is sound, very few philosophers create new knowledge because we all, to some extent, respondtowhatotherssayorwedisagreewithsomeoneelse’sinterpre- tation of another theorist’s work. While it is true that there is a sense in whichnewknowledgeiscreatedwhenweidentifyahithertooverlooked 1 2 Introduction implication of an existing theory, the innovativeness in such cases re- mains derivative of the initial creativity and, thus, more the product of effortratherthaningenuity. Of course, it is open to readers to reject McCloskey’s distinction, but we think it is useful for thinking about the state of play in animal ethics andthefutureofthediscipline.Itgoeswithoutsayingthattheeditorsof thiscollectionareasguiltyasanyotherphilosophersofproducingwhat McCloskeywouldsuggestismerelyoriginalresearch. BEYONDEXTENSIONISM? The creation of this volume was motivated by the nagging thought that very little of what passes for innovative research in animal ethics is de- serving of the label. As anyone familiar with the literature knows, the fieldis,byandlarge,asitefor“moralextensionism”.Moralextensionism is the extension of existing moral and political theory across the species barrier to nonhuman animals. Research in animal ethics is invariably a case of taking an established theory and applying it to the plight of ani- mals:Singer takesutilitariantheoryandextendsittoallsentientbeings; Regan extends deontological theory; Hursthouse extends virtue theory; Rowlandsextendscontractariantheory;CochraneextendsRaziantheory; DonaldsonandKymlickaextendsovereigntytheory,andsoon.Ineffect, animalethicsphilosophersareinthebusinessofpointingoutthatprevi- ousthinkershavemisunderstood,wronglyapplied,oroverlookedafea- tureofanestablishedtheory.Inallsuchinstances,assumingthatthereis someimportantinsightcapturedbyMcCloskey’sdistinction,researchin animalethicsisnotgenuinelyinnovativebutinsteadmerelyworkswith existing materials. An obvious question arises: Why do we need any moretheoryofthiskind? As well as an innovation deficit, another problem of extensionism is that any theory that is spawned by it, however original it may be, is ultimately vulnerable to the same problems as the established theory. Thus, any utilitarian animal ethics theory faces the nearest and dearest objections,suchasthescopeproblem,thatariseafterextendingthetheo- rytononhumananimals.Similarly,anydeontologicalanimalrightstheo- ry faces the familiar conflict of duties problem, and any virtue theory approachtoanimalethicsfacestheconflictofvirtuesproblem.Whileitis truethatthere are responsestotheseproblemsintheliterature,theyare bynomeansdecisiveandtheseemingintractabilityoftheproblemscasts a metalevel shadow over claims to authority in animal ethics, or more broadly animal philosophy. Most proponents of moral extensionism, withtheexceptionofTomReganinTheCaseforAnimalRights,2passover metaphilosophicalproblemsquicklyorproceedasiftheseproblemshave nobearingondebatesabouthumanandanimalrelations.Butclearly,itis
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