Anarchy in International Relations Theory - Rochelle Layla Terman

33 Pages·2010·2.76 MB·English

Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate
Neorealism and its Critics. by Robert O. Keohane; Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The
Contemporary Debate. by David A. Baldwin
Review by: Robert Powell
International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Spring, 1994), pp. 313-344
Published by: The MIT Press
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Anarchyi n international
relationst heoryt: he
neorealist-neoliberadl ebate
RobertP owell
Robert0 . Keohane, editor.N eorealisma nd Its CriticsN. ew York: Columbia
UniversityP ress,1 986.
David A. Baldwin,e ditor.N eorealisma nd NeoliberalismT: he Contemporary
Debate. New York: ColumbiaU niversityP ress,1 993.
Two oft hem osti nfluentiaclo ntemporarayp proachest o internationarle lations
theorya re neorealism and neoliberalism.T he debate between these two
approaches has dominatedm uch of internationarl elationst heoryf ort he last
decade. It is now commonplacef or an articlea bout some aspect of interna-
tionalr elationst heoryt o beginb y locatingi tselfi n termso f thisd ebate. These
two approaches and the debate between them have failed to contributea s
much as theym ighth ave to internationarl elationst heoryT. hese approaches
sufferf roms erious internalw eaknesses and limitationst hat the neorealist-
neoliberald ebate oftenh as tended to obscure rathert han to clarifyO. nce we
have exposed and clarifiedt hesew eaknessesa nd limitationsw, e willb e able to
see severali mportandt irectionsf orf uturet heoreticawl ork.
Two books,N eorealisma nd Its Criticsa nd Neorealisma nd NeoliberalismT: he
ContemporarDye bate,m ake significancto ntributiontso thisd ebate. The former
offereda wide-rangingcr itiqueo f neorealismw hen it was publishedi n 1986.
The latterw, hichh as just been published,i s moren arrowlyfo cused.I t takesu p
where some of the critiquesi n Neorealisma nd Its Criticsl efto ff.A reviewo f
these twoc omplementarvyo lumesa ffordasn excellento pportunityto begint o
identifyso me of the weaknessesa nd limitationtsh att he neorealist-neoliberal
debate frequentlyh as obscured.
I am gratefutl o Carol Evans, JeffrFyr ieden,J oanneG owa, JosephG rieco, ErnstH aas, Peter
Katzenstein,R obert Keohane, David Lake, JamesM orrow,J ohnO dell, JaniceG ross Stein,a nd
KennethW altz fort heirt houghtfuclo mmentsa nd criticismosf an earlierd raft.I also thankG reg
Louden and Michael Sinatra for invaluable research assistance. I gratefullyac knowledget he
supporto f a grantf romt he National Science Foundation,n o. SES-921959.
IntemationaOl rganization48 , 2, Spring1 994,p p. 313-44
?3 1994 byT he 10 Foundationa nd the MassachusettsI nstituteo f Technology
314 InternationaOl rganization
In thisr eview,I discussf ourb road avenues of criticismt hatt hese volumes
take in evaluatingn eorealisma nd specificallyK ennethW altz's formulationof
it.' The firstt hree avenues are the originso f states' preferencest, he agent-
structurep roblem,a nd Waltz's specificd efinitionof politicals tructureT. hese
criticismgs enerallyd o notc hallenget he logicalc oherenceo f neorealism.T hey
focus instead on the limitationso f the theory.T he firstt wo centero n what
neorealismt akes forg ranted,e .g., preferencesa nd intersubjectivme eanings
and understandingTs.h e thirdc riticismf indsW altz's definitionof structurteo o
confiningT. he fourtha venue of criticismc hallenges the internall ogic of
neorealism directly.I t argues that conclusionsc laimed to follow fromt he
assumptionso f neorealisma ctuallyd o not. The neorealist-neoliberadl ebate
lies alongt hisf ourtha venue.
Three issues lie at the center of the neorealist-neoliberald ebate. In
reviewingth ese issues,I tryt o bringi mportanitm plicita ssumptionst o the fore
and showt hatt hosea ssumptionsa ccountf orm anyo f thei mportandt ifferences
betweent he two theories.M oreover,m anyo f the differencetsh ath ave been
thoughtt o be significants,u ch as the differencbe etweenr elativea nd absolute
gains, are not. The firsti ssue at the heart of the debate is the meaninga nd
implicationos f anarchyA. lthought he notiono f anarchyh as serveda s a central
organizingc onceptf orm ucho f internationarl elationst heoryt, he emphasiso n
anarchyi s misplaced.W hat have oftenb een taken to be the implicationso f
anarchyd o not reallyf ollowf romt he assumptiono f anarchy.R ather,t hese
implicationsr esultf romo ther implicita nd unarticulateda ssumptionsa bout
the states's trategice nvironment.
The second centrali ssue is the problemo f absolute and relativeg ains. I
argue that the controversysu rroundingt his problemg enerallyh as mistaken
effectsf or causes and that this mistake has handicapped analysis of the
problemo f internationacl ooperation.M ore specificallyI, tryt o demonstrate
that the internationalr elations literatureg enerallyh olds, if at times only
implicitlyso , thatt he extentt o whicha state is concerneda bout relativeg ains
depends on its strategice nvironmentf, or example, the offense-defense
balance and the intensityof the securityd ilemma.B ut if thisi s the case, then
the degree to which a state is concerned about relativeg ains is part of the
outcomet o be explained:i t is an effecta nd not a cause. The extentt o whicha
statei s concerneda bout relativeg ains,t herefored, oes not explaint he level of
internationalc ooperation.T his realization should refocuso ur attentiono n
whatd eterminest he degreeo f a state'sc oncerna bout relativeg ains.
The thirdi ssue is the tensionb etweenc oordinationa nd distributionT.h ere
are oftenm anyw ays to realize the joint gains fromc ooperation,a nd these
alternativeso ften lead to differentd istributionos f those gains. Thus, the
potentialf orj oint gains usually creates distributionadl isputes that tend to
impedec ooperation.A lthought hesed istributionaclo ncernso nlyr ecentlyh ave
1. KennethW altz,T heoryo fI ntemationaPl olitics( Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley1, 979).
Neorealisma nd neoliberalism 315
begun to receive attentioni n the debate betweenn eorealisma nd neoliberal-
ism,t heyh old the promiseo f clarifyinsgo me of the questionst hata ctuallyd o
dividet hese twoa pproaches.
Neorealisma nd the structuraal pproach
Much of the neorealist-neoliberadl ebate can be seen as a reactiont o Waltz's
Theoryo f InternationaPl olitics and a response to those reactions.A brief
discussiono ft woo f thatb ook's primaryob jectivesi s essentialt o understanding
the debate.2 One objectivew as to reiterate,r einforce,a nd refinea line of
argumentW altz began inM an, theS tate,a nd War.3T here,h e had underscored
the importanceo f third-imagee xplanations.F irst-imagee xplanationsl ocate
the causes of internationaol utcomes,s ay the cause of war, "in the naturea nd
behavior of men. Wars resultf roms elfishnessf, romm isdirecteda ggressive
impulses,f roms tupidity."4S econd-imagee xplanationsl ocate causes in the
internal structureo f the state. Imperialism,f or example, results from a
particulari nternale conomics tructureli ke capitalism;s imilarlyi,n ternational
peace resultsf roma particularf ormo fg overnmenlti ked emocracy.A5 ppealing
to Rousseau's stag hunta nd alludingt o the thenr ecentd evelopmento f game
theory,W altz argued that first-a nd second-imagee xplanationsw ere insuffi-
cient.6I n a situatione ntailings trategici nterdependences, uch as that of the
great powers, an actor's optimal strategyd epends on the other actors'
strategies.I f, thereforew, e want to explainw hat the actorsw ill do, then,i n
additiont o lookinga t the attributeso f the actors,w e must also look to the
constraintst hat definet he strategics ettingi n whicht he actorsi nteract.T he
thirdi magel ocates causes "withint he states ystem."7
A simple example from microeconomict heoryi llustratest he potential
importanceo f third-imageex planationsT. he price is highera nd the outputi s
lower in a monopolized markett han in a competitiveo ne. But first-a nd
second-imagea ccounts,w hichW altz collectivelyca lls reductivee xplanationsin
Theoryo f IntemationalP olitics,d o not explain these differencesI.n both
marketst, he attributeos f the actors,w hicha re firmsin thisc ase, are identical:
everyf irmt riest o maximizei ts profitsa nd consequentlyp roducest he level of
outputa t whichm arginalc ost equals marginalr evenue.W hat accountsf ort he
variationi n price and output between these marketsi s not variationi n the
attributeosf the unitsb utv ariationi n the environmentosr markets tructureisn
whicht heya ct. This is the essence of the thirdi mage.
2. For a summaryo f Waltz's goals, see p. 323 of Kenneth Waltz, "Reflectionso n Theoryo f
IntemationaPl olitics", in Keohane, Neorealisma nd Its Criticsp, p. 322-45.
3. KennethW altz,M an, theS tatea nd War( New York: ColumbiaU niversityPr ess,1 959).
4. Ibid.,p . 16.
5. Ibid.,p p. 80-164.
6. Ibid.,p p. 172-86 and 201-5.
7. Ibid.,p . 12.
316 InternationaOl rganization
It is importantt o emphasize two points about the divisiono f explanations
intor eductivea nd systemicac counts.T he firstis an assumptionin herentin this
divisionn: amely,t hatw e can usefullyc onceiveo f the actorso r unitsi n a system
as separate and distinctf romt he constrainttsh atd efinet he strategics ettingin
whicht he unitsi nteractT. he second importantp ointi s the kindo f conceptual
experimenta nd explanationt hat naturallyf ollowsf romt his division.O nce a
systemh as been decomposedi ntou nitsa nd constraintsi,t is naturalt o ask one
of two questions;o r, to put it differentliyt, i s naturalt o considert wot ypeso f
thoughte xperimentF. irst,h ow would some aspect of the units'b ehavior,s ay
thep robabilityof startinga war,v aryi fw e conceptuallyc hanges ome attributes
of the unitsw hileh oldingt he constraintcs onstant?W hat,f ore xample,w ould
happen to the probabilityo f war if a state's form of governmentw ere
democraticr athert han authoritarian?F ixing constraintsa nd varyingu nits'
attributesc ompriset he essentialc onceptuale xperimentu nderlyingr eductive
explanationsS. econd, howw ould behaviorc hangei ft he attributeos f the units
remained constanta nd the constraintsw ere changed? What, for example,
would happen to the probabilityo f war if the attributeso f the units were
unchangedb utt hed istributioonf p owerc hangedf romb ipolarityto multipolar-
ity?F ixingt heu nitsa' ttributeasn dv aryintgh ec onstraintfsa cingt heu nitsc omprise
thef undamentcalo nceptuale xperimenut nderlyinsgy stemice xplanations.
After emphasizing the general importance of third-imageo r systemic
explanations,W altz turns to a second objective in Theoryo f Intemational
Politics.H e sees structuraes a "set of constrainincgo nditions."8B ut statesm ay
be constrainedb y manyt hings-like the distributionof power,t he natureo f
militaryte chnologyo,r the state'sc omparativee conomica dvantage.A second
goal forW altz is to specifya restrictedse t of constrainttsh atp rovidea way of
conceivingo f a political systema nd then to demonstratet he power of this
formulationb y showingt hati t tells "us a small numbero f big and important
things."9H e restricttsh iss et to threee lements,d efininga politicals tructurien
termso f its orderingp rinciple,t he distributionof the units' capabilities,a nd
thef unctionadl ifferentiatioonr nondifferentiatioofn t he units.10
Two criterias eem to have guided the selectiono f these elementsa nd this
definitionof politicals tructureT. he firstis pragmaticT. his definitionap peared
to lead to interestingin sights,w hich,o f course, is the goal of all positive
theories.T he second criterionis less general and reflecteda trade-offW. altz
triedt o definep oliticals tructureso that" it would showu s a purelyp ositional
picture.""1T he advantageo f a positionalp icturei s thatm anys ystemsc an be
seen as similarr egardlesso f the particulars ubstantivec ontexti n whicht he
units interact." Structure,p roperlyd efined,i s transposable."12T hus, firms
8. Waltz,T heoryo fI ntemationaPl olitics,p . 73.
9. Waltz," Reflectionso n Theoryo fI ntemationaPl olitics,"p . 329.
10. Ibid.,p p. 79-101.
11. KennethW altz," A Response to My Critics,"i n Keohane, Neorealisma nd Its Criticsp, . 330.
12. Ibid.
Neorealisma nd neoliberalism 317
facinga highr isko f bankruptcyin an oligopolisticm arketm ayb e seen to be in
an anarchical,s elf-helps ystemin mucht he same wayt hats tatesf acinga high
risko f war in the internationasly stema re in an anarchical,s elf-helps ystem.13
If, therefore,a narchyi mplies certain behavior, such as the tendencyf or
balances of power to form,t henw e would expectt o see thisb ehavioro btain
"whethert he systemis composedo ft ribes,n ations,o ligopolisticf irmso,r street
gangs."'1T4h e potentiala dvantageo f a spare definitionof a politicals tructuries
thati tm ayh elp us see similaritieisn whati nitiallyap peared to be veryd ifferent
domains.T he potentiald isadvantageo f thiss pare definitionis thati ft he three
dimensionsW altz uses to characterizes ystemsd o not sufficientclyon straint he
units'i nteractiont,h enu nitsi n similars ystemms ayn oti nteractin similarw ays.
If thisi s the case, thenw e shall have to look elsewheref ore xplanationso f these
variationsR. ecognizingt hist rade-offW, altz opts fora spare definition.
Four avenueso fc riticism
Structuralt heories decompose a systemi nto units and constraints.T his
decompositionm akes these theories vulnerable to two broad avenues of
criticismT. he firstc riticisma ccepts thisd ecompositionb ut stressest he need
for a theoryo f preferencef ormationt o supplementt he structuralt heory.
Because the units'p referencesa re exogenouslys pecifiedi n a structuratlh eory,
we need a theoryt hat explainst heiro rigins.T he second avenue rejectst his
decompositionI.t emphasizest he agent-structurper oblem,a rguingt hata gents
and structurea re inseparable.I n additiont o these firstt wo broad avenues of
criticisma,n yp articulars tructuratlh eoryl,i ke Waltz's formulationof neoreal-
ism,i s also subjectt o a thirda nd fourtha venue of criticismT. he thirdf ocuses
on and questionst he specificd efinitiono f structuree mployedi n the theory.
The fourthq uestions whethert he conclusionsc laimed to follow fromt he
theoryd o indeed follow.
Preferencesa re given exogenously
The firsta venue of criticismc enterso n preferencesS. tructuraal pproaches
take the units'p referencesa s given.T hat is, thesep referenceas re exogenously
specified.T hey become inputs into the analysis rathert han the subject of
analysis.T his may be an importantw eakness of the structuraal pproach. As
Robert Jervisc autions," By takingp referencesa s given,w e beg what mayb e
the most importantq uestiono n how theyw ere formed.... Economic theory
treatst astesa nd preferenceass exogenous.A nalysisi s thereforfe acilitatedb, ut
13. Waltz,T heoryo fI ntemationaPl olitics,p p. 105 and 111.
14. The quotationi s fromp . 37 of KennethW altz, "Realist Thoughta nd NeorealistT heory,"
Joumalo fI ntemationalAffai4r4s (Spring/Summe1r9 90), pp. 21-37.
318 InternationaOl rganization
at the cost of drawinga ttentiona wayf roma reas thatm ayc ontainm ucho f the
explanatory'a ction' in whichw e are interested."'15
The firsstt epi n assessingt hef orceo ft hec riticismth ats tructuraalp proaches
lack a theoryo f preferenceiss to clarifyth ec riticismb yd istinguishintgw ot ypes
of preferences.T he firstt ype is preferenceso ver outcomes; the second is
preferenceos vera ctionso r policies.T o differentiatteh eset wot ypes,c onsidera
game in payoff-matrfixo rm.T he cells in the matrixc orrespondt o potential
outcomes.T he utilitiest hat appear in each cell in the matrixr epresentt he
players'p referenceso ver these potentialo utcomes.T hat is, a player'su tilities
reflecti ts preferencer ankingo f the possible outcomes.G iven its preferences
over outcomesa nd itsb eliefsa bout whatt he otherp layersa re doing,a player
can rank its potentiala ctions fromm ost to least preferredI. n a two-person
game,f ore xample,t he rowp layerc an ranki tsa ctionsf romb est to worstg iven
its payoffasn d itsb eliefsa bout whatt he columnp layeri s doing.T his induced
rankingd efinesa player'sp referenceso vera ctions.'6
Structuratl heoriesd o nott ryt o explainp referenceos f one typeb ut do tryt o
explain preferenceso f the other type. Structuralt heories take the units'
preferenceos verp ossibleo utcomesa s givena nd, consequentlyl,a ck a theoryo f
preferenceso ver outcomes. But structuratl heoriest ryt o make predictions
about the units'p referreda ctionsb y combininga ssumptionsa bout the units'
preferenceso ver outcomes with other assumptions about the structural
constraintsf acingt he units. In this sense, structuratl heoriesc laim to be a
theoryo f preferenceso ver actions. Game theoryf, or example,i s a theoryo f
preferenceos vera ctions.I t attemptst o predictt heu nits'o ptimala ctionsb ased
on theirp referenceso ver outcomes and the strategics ettingi n which they
interact.S imilarlyW, altz's formulationo f neorealismt akes the units'p refer-
ences as given. "In a microtheoryw, hethero f internationalp olitics or of
economics,t he motivationo f the actors is assumed rathert han realistically
described."'1I7n particular,W altz assumes "that states seek to ensure their
survival"a nd thena ttemptst o predictt heu nits'a ctions,a lbeiti n a veryg eneral
way,o n the basis of this assumptiona bout the units' preferencesa nd other
assumptionsa bout the politicals tructurien whicht he unitsi nteract.18
The two typeso f preferencesa re frequentlyco nflated.F or example,a fter
notingt hat" economic theoryt akes tastesa nd preferencesa s exogenous"a nd
warningt hat we may be beggingt he most importantq uestionsb y doing so,
Jervisd iscusses some of the sources of these tastes and preferenceso ver
outcomes. These sources include transnationalf orces, ideologies, beliefs,
15. Robert Jervis", Realism, Game Theory,a nd Cooperation,"W orldP olitics4 0 (April 1988),
pp. 324-25. For similarw arningss,e e JosephN ye," Neorealisma nd Neoliberalism,"W orldP olitics
50 (January1 988), p. 238.
16. The distinctionb etweenp referenceso vero utcomesa nd over actionsi s useful,b ut it should
notb e pushed too hard.A n outcomei n one game mayb e seen as a policyc hoice in a largerg ame.
17. Waltz,T heoryo fI ntemationaPl olitics,p . 91.
18. The quotationi s drawnf romi bid.
Neorealisma nd neoliberalism 319
experience,a nd knowledge.1H9 e also sees realism as a source or theoryo f
preferenceso ver outcomes,s aying," Sometimesw e can deduce preferences
fromt he structureo f the system,a s Realism suggests.B ut even a structural
theoryo f internationapl oliticsa s powerfula s Waltz's has troublep roducing
precised eductions."2J0 ervisc onfoundst he two typeso f preferencesh ere. He
correctlyo bservest hat economic theoryt akes preferenceso ver outcomes as
givenb ut thent reatsn eorealism,w hichi s a theoryo f preferenceso ver actions,
as a theoryo f preferenceso ver outcomes.R obert Keohane similarlyco nflates
the twot ypeso f preferencews hen he intendst o criticizen eorealisma s a weak
theoryo f behavior (that is, a weak theoryo f preferenceso ver actions) but
describesn eorealisma s a weak theoryo f preferenceos vero utcomes.2'
Conflatingth e twot ypeso f preferencesh as at least twon egativee ffectsT. he
firstis to suggestt hatw e cannotu se structuraol r game-theoretiacp proaches,
whicht ake preferencesa s given,t o studyt he effectos n preferenceso f changes
in beliefs,e xperience,o r knowledge.2T2h is suggestionis simplyw rongi fw hat
we wantt o studyi s how changesi n thesef actorsa ffectp referenceos vera ctions
or policies.I ndeed, one oft he primaryu ses of incomplete-informatigoanm esi s
to studyh owi nteractionaf fectps layers'b eliefsa nd, throught heseb eliefs,t heir
preferreda ctions.A ndrewK ydd,f ore xample,d evelops an interestingin com-
plete-informatiomn odel of arms races that he uses to studyJ ervis'ss piral
model of escalation.23T he basic issue in Kydd's game is whethera state will
change fromp referrinng ot to arm to preferrintgo arm because it interprets
anothers tate's arms increase as a sign of hostilityr athert han of insecurity.
Kyddu ses thism odel to studyt he circumstanceisn whicht wos tatest hath ave
no hostilei ntentm ighta rma nd eventuallyg o to war because theyf eart hatt he
otheri s hostile.T he formals tudyo f dynamicin teractionasn d the learninga nd
signalingin herentin themi s at an earlys tage in internationarl elationst heory.
Many legitimatec riticismcsa n be made of thisw ork.24B ut the claim thatt his
work has nothingt o say about learninga nd changes in preferences( over
19. Jervis",R ealism, Game Theory,a nd Cooperation,"p p. 324-29.
20. Ibid.,p . 325.
21. Robert Keohane, "Theoryo f World Politics,"i n Keohane, Neorealisma nd Its Criticsp, p.
175-76. One factorc ontributingto this conflationm ay be that both Jervisa nd Keohane focus
primarilyon thep risonersd' ilemma.T here is no strategicin terdependencien a one-shotp risoners'
dilemma:a playera lwaysd oes strictlyb etterb y playingD rathert han C regardlesso f what the
otherp layerd oes. In cases in whicha player'so ptimala ctioni s independento f whato thersd o, a
theoryo f preferenceso ver outcomes also serves as a theoryo f preferenceso ver actions. The
distinctionb etweent he twot ypeso f preferencesis meaningfuol nlyi ft he game entailsa situation
of strategicin terdependencien whicha player'so ptimals trategyd ependso n whati tb elieveso thers
willd o.
22. Jervis",R ealism, Game Theory,a nd Cooperation,"p . 327.
23. AndrewK ydd," The SecurityD ilemma, Game Theory,a nd WorldW ar I," paper presented
at the annual meetingo f the American Political Science Association,W ashington,D .C., 2-5
September 1993. For Jervis'si nsightfudl iscussiono f the spiral model, see his Perceptiona nd
Misperceptioinn InternationaPlo litics( PrincetonN, .J.:P rincetonU niversityPr ess,1 977).
24. For an excellentr eviewo f some of the limitationosf thisa pproach,s ee David Kreps,G ame
Theoryan d EconomicM odelling(N ew York: OxfordU niversityPr ess,1 990).
320 InternationaOl rganization
actions) because it takes preferences( over outcomes) as giveni s not one of
thesec riticisms.
The second negativee ffecto f conflatingth e twot ypeso f preferencesis that
doing so confoundst wo objectionst o structuraal pproaches that need to be
evaluateds eparatelyT. he firsot bjectioni s thatt hesea pproachest ake theu nits'
preferencesa s given.T he second is that these approaches offera t best very
weak theorieso f preferenceso vera ctionsa nd at worstm isleadingt heories.A s
will be seen, the firsto bjection is not very importantt o the neorealist-
neoliberald ebate,w hilet he second objectionl ies at the hearto f it.
The significancoef t akingt heu nits'p referenceass giveni n a theoryo r model
depends verym ucho n the theoryo r model and the purposesf orw hichi t has
been constructedI.n some models of nuclear crisisb argainingf, or example,
therea re onlyt hreeo utcomes:a state prevailsi n the crisis,i t backs downb ut
avoidsa nucleare xchange,o r the crisise nds in nuclearw ar.25P referenceso ver
these outcomes are exogenouslyg iven in these models, but it would seem
bizarren ot to assume thata state preferst he firsto utcomet o the second and
the second to the third.M any situationsh, owever,a re muchm orec omplicated
and what to assume about preferenceso ver outcomesi s not obvious.I t is not
clear, for example,w hat to assume about a state's preferenceso ver possible
trade arrangementsH. ere the worko f JeffrFyr ieden,P eter GourevitchP, eter
Katzenstein,D avid Lake, Helen Milner, Ronald Rogowski, and others in
developinga n understandingof the originso f preferencesis veryi mportant.26
Similarlya, state's preferenceso ver potentialn ationals ecuritya rrangements,
for example, possible arms control agreements,m ay not be obvious, and
theoriesm ayb e needed to explaint hesep references.27
That neorealismt akest he units'p referencesa s giveni s of littlec onsequence
fort he neorealist-neoliberadl ebate. As will be developed more fullyb elow,
thisd ebate largelyf ocuseso n the likelihoodo f cooperationi n anarchya nd on
the role of institutionisn facilitatingco operation.N eorealismm aintainst hat
cooperationw illb e difficulitn an anarchics ystemc omposedo fu nitst hatp refer
survivalo ver extinctionN. eoliberalismq uestionst his conclusionb ut not the
25. See, fori nstance,t he models of nuclearb rinkmanshiipn Robert Powell,N uclearD eterrence
Theory(C ambridge:C ambridgeU niversityPr ess,1 990).
26. See JeffrFyr ieden," Invested Interests,"I ntemationaOl rganization4 5 (Autumn1 991), pp.
425-51; Peter GourevitchP, oliticsi n Hard Times( Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell UniversityP ress, 1986);
Peter Katzenstein,e d., BetweenP owera nd Plenty(M adison: Universityof WisconsinP ress, 1978);
David Lake, Power,P rotectiona,n d Free Trade( Ithaca, N.Y.: CornellU niversityPr ess,1 988); Helen
Milner,R esistingP rotectionism(P rinceton,N .J.: PrincetonU niversityP ress, 1988); and Ronald
Rogowski,C ommercea nd Coalitions( Princeton,N .J.:P rincetonU niversityPr ess,1 989).
27. For example, Adler uses the concept of epistemic communitiest o explain American
preferenceasb outa rmsc ontrola greementsS. ee Emanual Adler," The Emergenceo fC ooperation,"
InternationaOl rganization4 6 (Winter 1992), pp. 101-46. For attemptst o explain a state's
preferenceso ver militaryd octrinesa nd the importanceo f civil-militarrye lationsi n determining
those preferences,s ee Barry Posen, The Originso f MilitaryD octrine (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
UniversityPr ess,1 984); JackS nyder,T heI deologyo ft heO ffensiv(eIt haca, N.Y.: CornellU niversity
Press, 1984); and Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensivea nd the Originso f the First
WorldW ar," InternationaSle curity9 (Summer1 984), pp. 58-107.
Neorealisma nd neoliberalism 321
assumptiont hat units are minimallym otivatedt o survive.I ndeed, it would
seem bizarren ot to assumet hatu nitsp refers urvivaol vere xtinctionT. hus,t he
criticismth att hesep referenceasr e specifiede xogenouslyis unimportantto the
debate about the likelihood of cooperation in anarchy. The potentially
importanctr iticismis thatt he conclusionsc laimedt o followf romn eorealism's
spare assumptiona bout units'p referencesa nd about the politicals tructurien
whicht hese unitsi nteracta ctuallyd o not follow.T his is the fourtha venue of
criticismw, hichw illb e discussedb elow.
The inseparabilityo f agents and structure
The structuraalp proachd ecomposesa systemin tou nitsa nd the constraints
facingt hem.T he second avenue of criticismd enies the separabilityo f agents
and structureD. rawing on structurationistth eoriesi n sociology,A lexander
Wendt argues that agents and structurea re "mutually constitutivey et
ontologicallyd istincte ntitiesE. ach is in some sense an effecto f the other;t hey
are 'co-determined."'2 8
If agents and structurew ere conceptuallyi nseparable,t wo consequences
would follow.F irst,t he two conceptuale xperimentus nderlyingth e structural
approach fromw hich this approach derives its explanatoryp ower would
become problematic.W e would no longerb e able to studyt he constraining
effectso f structureb y theoreticallyh oldingt he units and theirp references
constantw hile varyingt he structurei n which they interact.I f units and
structurear e inseparables o thate ach is at least partlyt he effecto f the other,
thenv ariationi n the structurwe illa lso changet he units.
Second, challengingt he separabilityo f unitsa nd structurem akes the units
an object of inquiry and directs our attention to systemicc hange and
transformationIf. units and structurea re mutuallyc onstitutivet,h en it is
natural to ask, How do they evolve, and How do they interacto ver time?
Thinkingo f the units as being endogenous shiftso ur attentiona way froma
positionalm odel to what David Dessler calls a transformationmal odel. In a
positional model like Waltz's formulationo f neorealism," structurei s an
environmenitn which action takes place. Structurem eans the 'setting'o r
'context'i n which action unfolds."29S tructurei s, in other words, a set of
constraintsI.n a transformationtahl eory",s tructuries a mediumo fa ctivityth at
in principlec an be alteredt hrougha ctivity."3S0t ructures hapes action and is
shaped bya ction.T he goal, thereforeo,f a transformationtahl eoryis to explain
how structurea nd agent interact.T o do this, Robert Cox, Dessler, John
28. See p. 360 of AlexanderW endt," The Agent-StructurPer oblemi n InternationaRl elations
Theory,"I nternationaOlr ganization41 (Summer1 987), pp. 335-70.
29. The quotationi s fromp . 426 of David Dessler, "What's at Stake in the Agent-Structure
Debate," IntemationaOl rganization43 (Summer1 989),p p. 441-70,e mphasiso riginal.
30. Ibid.,p . 461.