Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965

150 Pages·1992·15.69 MB·English

ANALOGIES AT WAR
KOREA, MUNICH, DIEN BIEN PHU, AND
THE VIETNAM DECISIONS OF 1965
Yuen Foong Khong
UW'Jen:jials· und LandesblbliotMl<
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Copyright © 1992 by Princeton University Press
Published by Princeton University Press, 41 William Street,
Princeton, New Jersey 08540
In the United Kingdom: Princeton University Press, List ofFigurea and Table.
Chichester, West Sussex
All Rights Reserved Ac1mowkdgmenta
Abbreviations
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Khong, Yuen Foong, 1956-
Analogies at war: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the
Vietnam decisions of 1965 /Yuen Foong Khong.
p. cm. Chapter 1. AnalogicalReasoning in Foreign Affairs:TwoViews
Includes bibliographical references (p. )and index.
Chapter 2. The AE Framework
ISBN 0-691-07846-7 - ISBN 0-691-02535-5 (pbk.)
1. Vietnamese Conflict, 196I-I97~United States. 2. United
Chapter 3. America's Vietnam Options
States-Foreign relations-I963-196~Decision-making.
3. International relations-Decision-making. I. Title.
DS558. K55 1992 PART IT: THE CASES
959.704'3373---dc20 91-35162 CIP
Chapter 4. Containment, Analogies, and the Pre-l965
Vietnam Decisions 71
Chapter 5. Korea 97
Princeton University Press books are printed on acid-free paper
and meet the guidelines for permanence and durability ofthe Chapter 6. Dien Bien Phu 148
Committee on Production Guidelines for Book Longevity ofthe
Council on Library Resources Chapter 7. Munich and the 19305 174
PART m:THE IMPLICATIONS
Chapter 8. The Psychology ofAnalogicalReasoning 209
Chapter 9. Conclusion 251
Bibliography 265
Index 279
______ Figures and Tables ---- __
FIGURES
3.1 The Congruence Procedure Fitted with Experimental
Design 67
5.1 Total Number ofMost Frequently Used Public and
Private Historical Analogies per Quarter, 1961-1966 98
5.2 The Lessons ofKorea and the Option Chosen 139
6.1 The Lessons ofDien Bien Phu and the Option Chosen 163
6.2 Incoming Information Processed by the Dien Bien Phu
and Korean Analogies 164
6.3 How the Korean, Dien Bien Phu, and Munich Analogies
Will Resolve Conflicting Incoming Information 166
7.1 The Lessons ofMunich and the Option Chosen 186
TABLES
3.1 The Ten Vietnam Analogies Most Frequently Used in
Public, 1950-1966 60
3.2 The Ten Vietnam Analogies Most Frequently Used in
Private, 1950-1966 61
______ Acknowledgments _
IN WRITING about the role ofhistorical analogies in foreign policy deci-
sion-making, I have had the support ofmany teachers, friends and insti-
tutions. My greatest debt is to Stanley Hoffmann and Michael Joseph
Smith. They guided the project from its inception and nurtured it as it
struggled to become a book. Along the way, Stanley Hoffmann tutored
me in international politics, encouraged me to askbig questions, and was
alwaysthere asafriend and gentle critic. His erudition, wit and personal
graciousness have been, and willremain, aconstant source ofinspiration
to me. Michael Smith alsorescued me from aless tractable topic early in
my career, inculcated in me a respect for the kind of intellectual depth
he exemplifies so well, and has continued to be a valued mentor and
friend.
For two years, I pondered the detailed and incisive criticisms ofDeb-
orah Larson, Michael Shafer, and Jonathan Crystal. Among them, I in-
herited forty-five pages ofsingle spaced comments on my original man-
uscript: they were encouraging when Iwasreasonable, merciless when I
was sloppy. In this regard, I should single out Deborah Larson, whose
work convinced me ofthe possibility and richness ofusing psychological
concepts to illuminate important foreign policy decisions. I thank all
three for the care they showered on the manuscript, and I hope I have
succeeded in meeting their suggestions at least part ofthe way.
Alexander George, Robert Keohane, Jorge Dominguez, and Joseph
Nye also read portions of the manuscript and gave detailed comments,
for which I am thankful. More than anyone else I know, Alexander
George has stressed the importance ofexamining the beliefs of foreign
policy elites and has gone about it with the highest standards of social
scientific rigor. Without his theoretical and methodological leadership,
this work would not have been possible. Similarly, Robert Keohane
nudged me to incorporate psychological theories into my work in more
explicit and systematic ways than I otherwise might have done. I am
grateful forhisadvice. Jorge Dominguez and Joseph Nyealsoencouraged
me by providing detailed comments and suggestions early on. Much of
this book was written at the Center for International Affairs, Harvard
University, and I would liketo thank Joseph Nye, the current director of
the Center; Samuel Huntington, the previous director; and Anne Emer-
son, executive director, fur their support and for making the Center a
congenial and stimulating place to pursue one's research. Although I
have not worked formallywith Robert Jervis and Ernest May, their work
has influenced my thinking a great deal, as the reader of the following port and unlimited patience, my task would have been much more diffi-
pages will quickly notice. From 1987 through 1989, I participated in cult. And finally, although she joined this project in the middle, Pheak
George Breslauer and Philip Tetlock's National Academy of Sciences Son Seo has lived with it daily ever since; only she and I know how cru-
project on learning in U.S. and Soviet foreign policy: I thank them and cial a co-conspirator she has become in this and hopefully other projects
other members in the project for a superb learning opportunity and for we have in mind. This book isforher.
sharing their reactions to my arguments with me.
Many others also read portions ofthe manuscript, and provided writ- Yuen Foong Khong
ten comments, or argued their points with me over numerous agreeable Cambridge, Massachusetts
lunches. Without their advice and indulgence, this would have been a
poorer book. Special thanks to Vikram Chand, Houchang Chehabi, Chin
Wei Fong, Aaron Friedberg, Jay Greene, Stephan Haggard, Eng Seng
Ho, Bill Jarosz, James Jesudason, Hock Guan Lee, Jonathan Mercer,
Andy Moravcsik, Ethan Nadelmann, Gregory Noble, Jim Read, Louise
Richardson, Deborah Spar, Beth Simmons, Edward Steinfeld, Kenneth
Thompson, Steve Weber, and Fareed Zakaria.Ted Megan, Patricia Small
and Rina Verma performed invaluable research for the book and I grate-
fullyacknowledge their assistance.
Many of the decision-makers discussed in this study agreed to be in-
terviewed; I am especially grateful to George Ball, McGeorge Bundy,
William Bundy, Roger Hilsman, Harry McPherson, John Roche, Walt
Rostow, Dean Rusk, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., William Sullivan, James
Thomson, and Leonard Unger for givinggenerously oftheir time. Clark
Clifford was also kind enough to write a detailed response to a specific
question I had.
Fellowships from the Institute for the Study of World Politics, the
Graduate SchoolofArts and Sciences, Harvard University, and the Lyn-
don Baines Johnson Foundation facilitated my research and made possi-
ble its timely completion. David Humphrey and his colleagues at the
Lyndon BainesJohnson Library, Austin, Texas, helped make archival re-
search enjoyable and rewarding.
With such good advice and friendly institutional supp6rt, the remain-
ing errors to be found in this book must be solelymine.
Portions of this book have been published previously, and they are
adapted by permission ofWestview Press from Learning in U.S. and So-
viet ForeignPolicy, edited by George W. Breslaur and Philip E. Tetlock,
published by Westview Press, 1991, Boulder, Colorado. The minutes of
the July meetings reproduced in chapter 5 are adapted from George
Kahin, Intervention: How America Became Involved in Vietnam (New
York: Alfred Knopf, 1986), pp. 370-85, copyright (c) 1986 by George
MeT. Kahin, reprinted by permission ofAlfredA. Knopf, Inc.
From afar, the members ofmyfamilyhave been, asalways, aconstant
source ofencouragement and inspiration. Without their unstinting sup-
AE AnalogicalExplanation
ARVN Army ofthe Republic ofVietnam
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CINPAC U.S. Command in ChiefPaci6c
DRV Democratic Republic ofVietnam
EDC European Defense Community
FRUS Foreign Relations of the United States
GVN Government ofSouth Vietnam
ICC International Control Commission
JCS Joint Chiefs ofStaff
MPAJA Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NLF National Liberation Front
NSC National Security Council
NVN North Vietnam
POL Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants
ROK Republic ofKorea
RVNAF RoyalVietnamese Air Force
SAC Strategic AirCommand
SAM Surface-ta-Air Missile
SEATO Southeast AsiaTreaty Organization
SNIE Special National Intelligence Estimate
SVN South Vietnam
VC Viet Cong
UN United Nations
USIA United States Information Agency

Analogical Reasoning in Foreign Affairs: Two Views
ATTHEBEGINNINGofWerner Herzog's filmAguirre, the Wrath of God,
a troop of Spanish conquistadors debates whether to continue the dan-
gerous search for EI Dorado, the legendary city of gold. The leader of
the expedition urges the troop to turn back, but his assistant, Aguirre,
argues for continuing the expedition. Aguirre twice invokes the analogy
of Mexico-Cortez "founded" Mexico by defying orders to return, and
that won him riches and glory-to make his case.1 Partly through this
argument and partly through intimidation, Aguirre succeeds in persuad-
ing the entourage to continue. What he and his entourage do not know
is that EI Dorado is a fiction invented by the Peruvians to entrap their
conquerors. There is no EI Dorado. Only death and destruction await
them.
Aguirre's use ofthe Mexicoanalogybrings to mind aNational Security
Council (NSC)meeting between President Lyndon Johnson and his prin-
cipal advisers on July 21, 1965. The issue waswhether the United States
should commit one hundred thousand troops to South Vietnam. George
Ball spoke against sending the troops. When Ball finished, McGeorge
Bundy, Dean Rusk, and Robert McNamara attacked his arguments in
succession. The U.S. ambassador to South Vietnam, Henry Cabot
Lodge, delivered the coup de grace. Summarizing hiscolleagues' analysis
aswell as their impatience with Ball, Lodge blurted out, "I feel there is
agreater threat to start World War III ifwe don't goin. Can't we see the
similarity to our own indolence at Munich?"2
Lodge's use of the Munich analogy at a crucial juncture in the delib-
erative process may be unusually dramatic, but it is hardly unique.
Statesmen have consistently turned to the past in dealing with the pres-
ent. The waythey have invoked historical parallels when confronted with
adomestic or foreign policy problem has ranged from the implausible to
the prescient. In the early months ofWorld War I, for example, Wood-
row Wilson feared that Anglo-American disputes over American rights
on the seas would lead to war between the two nations. His reasoning
1Werner Herzog, Screenplays, trans. AJan Greenberg and Martje Herzog (New York:
Tanam Press, 1980),p. 38.
2Meeting on Vietnam, notes by Jack Valenti, July 21, 1965, Papers of Lyndon Baines
Johnson, Meeting Notes File. Unless otherwise noted, alldocuments cited inthe notes are
located in the Lyndon Baines John- Ubrary' Austin, Teus.
wasbased on acurious analogy:"Madison and I are the only two Prince- ser's seizure ofthe Suez Canal in 1956. Eden, who was more prescient
ton men that have become President. The circumstances of the War of than most in sizing up the true Hitler in the 1930s, was quick to apply
1812and now run parallel. I sincerely hope they willnot gofurther."3 the same schema to Nasser. This perception ofthe stakes, among other
Less idiosyncratic but more egregious learning from the past includes things, convinced him that a British-French response was imperative. 9
the "no more summers of1914"mindset ofEuropean leaders. British and President Dwight Eisenhower and his secretary of state, John Foster
French leaders sawWorld War I asa mistake that resulted from overre- Dulles, did not accept Eden's characterization of Nasser. Indeed, the
action and rigid diplomacy. This assessment contributed to aconciliatory Americans were more concerned about antiquated British and French
policy toward Germany throughout the 1930s, culminating in the ap- imperial pretensions. The result was that the United States applied
peasement ofHitler at Munich.4 In the United States, the same attitude strong pressure to force the British and the French to withdraw from
took the form of"no more 1917s": many believed that the country was Egypt. Misapplying the lessons of history cost Eden and the nation he
"duped" into World War I, whether by British propaganda or by private led dearly.
financiers and arms merchants. Toavoidbeing drawn into another war in Ahappier instance oflearning from the past occurred during the Cu-
Europe, Congress enacted, from 1935through 1939,four neutrality acts ban missile crisis. President John F. Kennedy rejected the adViceofhis
that sought to prevent the United States from followingthe 1917path to more hawkish advisers to remove Soviet missiles in Cuba by an air strike
war.5 President Franklin Roosevelt shared the public's aversion to Amer- and opted instead for a naval blockade ofthe island. He rejected the air
ican involvement in another war. He did little to strengthen British or strike in part because he was worried about repeating the mistakes of
French resolve at Munich, and he may have inadvertently given Hitler 1914;he also did not want the action to be perceived as a Pearl Harbor
the green light to proceed with his expansionist policies.6 in reverse. to Kennedy's use ofthe 1914and Pearl Harbor analogies isan
Munich's infamous role in bringing about World War II in turn led to exception: it injected a certain cautiousness into the Executive Commit-
a"no more Munichs" syndrome in the postwar period. In 1950,the Tru- tee's deliberations and thus made possible the selection of the naval
man administration reversed its assessment that the Korean peninsula blockade, a less drastic option that turned out to be effective.
was unimportant to U.S. security because President Truman saw North More recent examples ofpolicymakers using history in their decision-
Korea's invasion ofSouth Korea asanalogous to the actions ofMussolini, making, like most earlier examples, have more ambiguous or unfortunate
Hitler, and Japan in the 1930s.7Similarly, when informed by his superi- outcomes. Aprincipal reason forthe U.S. intervention in the Dominican
ors that China might enter the war if the United States moved too far Republic in 1965 was avoiding "another Cuba"; subsequent analyses,
north, General Douglas MacArthur refused to reexamine U.S. aims and however, have raised questions about the accuracy of such a diagnosis
protested that stopping his troops short ofthe Yaluamounted to appeas- and about the impact ofthe intervention on U.S.-Latin American rela-
ing the Chinese asthe British had appeased Hitler.8 British Prime Min- tions.ll In 1975, President Gerald Ford and his secretary ofstate, Henry
ister Anthony Eden also sawacampaign ofHitlerite proportions in Nas- Kissinger, likened the seizure ofthe U.S.vessel Mayaguez by Cambodia
to the North Korean seizure of the Pueblo of 1968. Both actions were
3Charles Seymour, ed., TheIntimate Papersof ColonelHouse (Boston: Houghton Mif- interpreted as designed to humiliate the United States.12 Ford and Kis-
flin, 1926-1928), 4:303-4.
singer were anxious to avoid the protracted negotiations that Lyndon
•See Stanley Hoffmann, Primacy or World Order: American Foreign Policysince the
Cold War (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978), p. 22; and Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under
the Security Dilemma," World Politics30 (1978): 192. 8Anthony Eden, FuUCircle:TheMemoirs ofAnthony Eden (Boston: Houghton MilBin,
•Robert Schulzinger, American Diplomacy intheTwentieth Century (New York: Oxford 1960), pp. 481, 492, 5l!~-20.
University Press, 1984), pp. 157-61. 10Robert Kennedy, Thirteen Days(New York: New American Library, 1969), pp. 31,62.
6See Robert Divine, Roosevelt and World War II (New York: Pelican Books, 1970), p. George Ball has claimed that he was the one who flrst expressed reservations about the
22; and Stephen Ambrose, RisetoGlobalism (New York: Penguin Books, 1984), pp. 25-31. "Pearl Harbor in reverse" analogy (interview with author, New York City, New York, July
7See Harry Truman, Memoirs(Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1955-1956), 2:332- 23, 1986). Cf. "Documentation: White House Tapes and Minutes of the Cuban Missile
33. The most persuasive account of how the lessons ofthe 1930s, and of Munich in partic- Crisis," International Security 10(1985): 154-203. See also James Blight and David Welch,
ular, influenced Truman is to be found in Ernest May's "Lessons"ofthePast:The Useand On the Brinle:Americans and Soviets Reexamine theCuban MissileCrisis (New York: HIli
Misuse of History inAmerican ForeignPolicy(New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), and Wang, 1989), pp. SO,78, 141, 152, 167,215,278.
chap. 3. See also Glenn Paige, The Korean Decision:June 24-3Q, 1950(New York: Free IIAbraham Lowenthal, The Dominican Intervention (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1968), esp. pp. 114-15, 178. Press, 1972), esp. pp. 137-39, 160-62.
8Cited in James Schnabel, Policyand Direction: TheFirst Year(Washington, D.C.: Of- ISRichard Neustadt and Ernest May, Thinleing inTime:TheUsesofHistoryfor Decision-
fiee ofthe Chief of Military History, United States Army, 1972), pp. 250-51. Ma1cen (New York: Free Press, 1986), pp. 58-62.
ANALOGICAL REASONING, TWO VIEWS 7
Johnson endured; they chose to bring the United States' overwhelming more events separated in time agree in one respect, then they may
military force to bear in a rescue mission. Although the rescue team was. also agree in another.18 Analogical reasoning may be represented thus:
successful in releasing the hostages, an accident during the mission AX:BX::AY:BY. In words, event A resembles event B in having charac-
claimed the livesofmore U.S. rescuers than there were hostages. teristic X;A also has characteristic Y;therefore it is inferred that B also
In the early 1980s,the Munich analogywasback in vogue. Officialsof has characteristic Y.The unknown BY is inferred from the three known
the Reagan administration whoformulated the policyofusing Nicaraguan terms on the assumption that "a symmetrical due ratio, or proportion,
rebels, the contras, to pressure or overthrow the Sandinista regime saw exists."19The preceding examples ofhistorical analogies invoked by pol-
critics oftheir policy as"appeasers" ofthe Sandinistas. Some, like Jeane icymakers can be expressed in this form. Consider Lodge's use of the
Kirkpatrick, argued that Munich, not Vietnam, wasthe appropriate ana- Munich analogy: appeasement in Munich (A) occurred as a result of
logue for the challenge in Nicaragua.13For many Americans, however, Western indolence (X); appeasement in Vietnam (B) is also occurring as
the Munich argument had been discredited by the Vietnam War; the a result ofWestern indolence (X). Appeasement in Munich (A) resulted
argument that resonated in their minds was that of the "Vietnam syn- in aworld war (Y); therefore appeasement in Vietnam (B) willalso result
drome." Thus critics of the Reagan administration's policies in Central
in aworld war (Y).The unknown consequences ofappeasement in Viet-
America argued that they were likely to lead to "another Vietnam."I. nam (BY) are inferred through the analogyto Munich.20
A final example of political elites resorting to historical analogies can
For some, the way Lodge and the other statesmen cited earlier used
be seen in Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping's decision to crush the prode-
historical analogies is striking proof of the power of ideas-mistaken or
mocracy movement in the spring of 1989. Pirated notes from a meeting
otherwise-in influencing policydecisions. Stanley Hoffmann singles out
ofChinese leaders report Deng equating the students' demands for de-
this propensity on the part ofU.S. decision-makers to use historical anal-
mocracy as "altogether the same stuffas what the rebels did during the
ogies as part ofthe American "national style."21In "Lessons" of the Past:
Cultural Revolution. All they want is to create chaos under the heav-
The Useand Misuse of History inAmerican Foreign Policy, Ernest May
ens."15Having lived through the horror of those chaotic years, Deng
documents many more instances ofAmerican policymakers resorting to
could not countenance their possible return. He sawhimselfassuppress-
historical analogies, argues that their analogies have almost invariably
ing anew Cultural Revolution.16
misguided them, and suggests ways in which policymakers might learn
This book isabout how and why policymakers use historical analogies to use history better.22 May's view, which may be called the analytical
intheir foreign policydecision-making and about the implications oftheir
view, because it ispremised on the idea that policymakers use analogies
doing so. It builds on previous attempts to understand the role of"learn-
ing from history" in international politics.17Learning from history issaid
18This definition isadapted from David Hackett Fischer, Historians' Fallacies (New York:
to occur when policymakers look to the past to help them deal with the Harper and Row, 1970), pp. 243-59; see also Mary Hesse, ModelsandAnalogies in Science
present; the principal device used in this process is the historical anal- (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966), pp. 57-100; and Richard PurttU,
ogy. The term historical analogy signifies an inference that if two or Logical Thinking (New York; Harper and Row, 1972), pp. 7(}"73. cr. Max Black, ModBlI
and Metaphors (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962);and George Lakoft',Metaphors We
13New York Times, April 26, 1985, p. A7. Live By (Chicago: University ofChicago Press, 1980). For an insightful political analysis of
14 See David Fromkin and James Chace, "What Are the Lessons ofVietnam?" Foreign the differences between analogies and metaphors, see Elliot Zashin and Philip Chapman,
Affairs 63 (1985): 722-46, for an interesting collection ofdifferent interpretations of "the "The Uses ofMetaphor and Analogy: Toward aRenewal ofPolitical Language," Journal of
lessons ofVietnam" asthey pertain to Central America. Politics 36(1974): 290-326.
1.Roderick MacFarquhar, 'The End of the Chinese Revolution," New York Review of IeFischer, Historians' Fallacies, p. 243.
Books (July 29, 1989):8. 10Asanother example, consider British Prime Minister Anthony Eden's communication
16 Ibid. to President Eisenhower inwhich he compared Nasser to Hitler: Hitler's occupation ofthe
17The quotation marks indicate the following: (1)the term isborrowed from others, es- Rhineland (A)and Nasser's seizure of the Suez Canal (B) are both opening gambits in a
pecially Robert JerviS, Perception and Misperception in International Politics(Princeton: larger plot (X); Hitler's actions (A)led to "acts ofaggression against the West" (1'); Nasser's
Princeton University Press, 1976), chap. 6; (2)policymakers may learn the wrong lessons actions (B) are also likely to lead to future acts of aggression against the West (1'). The.
just as frequently as they learn the right lessons; and (3)since it ispossible to argue that unknown (BY}-the consequences ofNasser's actions-was inferred via the analogy to Hit-
learning the wrong lessons is not learning at all, 1prefer to use a more neutral term to ler. See Eden, FuUCircle, pp. 519-20. This definitional exercise will alsobe performed on
denote the phenomenon I am investigating: "how decision-makers use history." Cf. Philip the Korean analogy later.
Tetlock, "Learning in U.S.and Soviet Foreign Policy: In Search ofan Elusive Concept," in 11Stanley Hoffmann, GuUiver's Troublu. or the Setting of American Foreign PolicrI·
Learning in U.S. and SovietForeign Policy,ed. George Breslauer and Philip Tetlock (Boul- New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968.
der, Colorado: Westview Press, 1991), pp. ~l. 21May, "Lessons" ofthePast,pp. ix-xiV.