An Externalist Approach to Epistemic Responsibility: Intellectual Norms and their Application to Epistemic Peer Disagreement PDF
Preview An Externalist Approach to Epistemic Responsibility: Intellectual Norms and their Application to Epistemic Peer Disagreement
Synthese Library 411 Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science Andrea Robitzsch An Externalist Approach to Epistemic Responsibility Intellectual Norms and their Application to Epistemic Peer Disagreement Synthese Library Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science Volume 411 Editor-in-chief OtávioBueno,UniversityofMiami,DepartmentofPhilosophy,USA Editors BeritBrogaard,UniversityofMiami,USA AnjanChakravartty,UniversityofNotreDame,USA StevenFrench,UniversityofLeeds,UK CatarinaDutilhNovaes,VUAmsterdam,TheNetherlands The aim of Synthese Library is to provide a forum for the best current work in themethodologyandphilosophyofscienceandinepistemology.Awidevarietyof different approaches have traditionally been represented in the Library, and every effortismadetomaintainthisvariety,notforitsownsake,butbecausewebelieve thattherearemanyfruitfulandilluminatingapproachestothephilosophyofscience andrelateddisciplines. Specialattentionispaidtomethodologicalstudieswhichillustratetheinterplay of empirical and philosophical viewpoints and to contributions to the formal (logical,set-theoretical,mathematical,information-theoretical,decision-theoretical, etc.) methodology of empirical sciences. Likewise, the applications of logical methodstoepistemologyaswellasphilosophicallyandmethodologicallyrelevant studiesinlogicarestronglyencouraged.Theemphasisonlogicwillbetemperedby interestinthepsychological,historical,andsociologicalaspectsofscience. BesidesmonographsSyntheseLibrarypublishesthematicallyunifiedanthologies and edited volumes with a well-defined topical focus inside the aim and scope of the book series. The contributions in the volumes are expected to be focused and structurally organized in accordance with the central theme(s), and should be tied togetherbyanextensiveeditorialintroductionorsetofintroductionsifthevolume isdividedintoparts.Anextensivebibliographyandindexaremandatory. Moreinformationaboutthisseriesathttp://www.springer.com/series/6607 Andrea Robitzsch An Externalist Approach to Epistemic Responsibility Intellectual Norms and their Application to Epistemic Peer Disagreement 123 AndreaRobitzsch UniversityofOsnabrück Osnabrück,Germany SyntheseLibrary ISBN978-3-030-19076-7 ISBN978-3-030-19077-4 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-19077-4 ©SpringerNatureSwitzerlandAG2019 Thisworkissubjecttocopyright.AllrightsarereservedbythePublisher,whetherthewholeorpartof thematerialisconcerned,specificallytherightsoftranslation,reprinting,reuseofillustrations,recitation, broadcasting,reproductiononmicrofilmsorinanyotherphysicalway,andtransmissionorinformation storageandretrieval,electronicadaptation,computersoftware,orbysimilarordissimilarmethodology nowknownorhereafterdeveloped. Theuseofgeneraldescriptivenames,registerednames,trademarks,servicemarks,etc.inthispublication doesnotimply,evenintheabsenceofaspecificstatement,thatsuchnamesareexemptfromtherelevant protectivelawsandregulationsandthereforefreeforgeneraluse. Thepublisher,theauthors,andtheeditorsaresafetoassumethattheadviceandinformationinthisbook arebelievedtobetrueandaccurateatthedateofpublication.Neitherthepublishernortheauthorsor theeditorsgiveawarranty,expressorimplied,withrespecttothematerialcontainedhereinorforany errorsoromissionsthatmayhavebeenmade.Thepublisherremainsneutralwithregardtojurisdictional claimsinpublishedmapsandinstitutionalaffiliations. ThisSpringerimprintispublishedbytheregisteredcompanySpringerNatureSwitzerlandAG. Theregisteredcompanyaddressis:Gewerbestrasse11,6330Cham,Switzerland ToAlexander, toourdaughterMathilda, ourlittlestarinthesky, andtooursonKarl, whomakesuslaugh everyday. Acknowledgments This book is based on my doctoral thesis. I could not have completed this book without the support of many different people. First and foremost, I would like to thank the supervisor of my doctoral thesis, Heinrich Wansing, for his thoughtful andthoroughcommentsonmanypartsofthisbookandforhisphilosophicalsupport throughout my philosophical studies. I would also like to thank Sanford Goldberg forhiscriticalfeedbackonmanyphilosophicalideaswhichhavebeendevelopedin thisbook. AspecialthankyougoestoAmyFlowerree,AnneMeylan,ShaneRyan,Dunja Sˇesˇelja,andChristianStraßerwhoseenthusiasticandcriticalfeedbackonmywork encouragedmeenormouslyandhelpedmetodevelopmyideasmorethoroughly. Manyotherpeopleenrichedthisthesisbytheirfeedback.Iwouldliketothank ThomasGrundmann,NikolaKompa,CharlesLowe,SebastianSchmoranzer,Daniel Skurt, Matthias Steup, and Caroline Willkommen for their astute comments on writtenpartsororalpresentationsofsomeoftheideasfromthisbook. IthankClaudiaSmartandCormacBreenforproofreading. Finally, I want to thank my husband, Alexander Robitzsch; our daughter, Mathilda;andourson,Karl,towhomthisbookisdedicated,aswellasmyparents fortheircontinuoussupport,forbelievinginme,forgivingmethefreedomtofollow mydreams,andforteachingmewhatreallymattersinlife. vii Introduction Normative epistemology has long focused solely on epistemic evaluations of doxastic attitudes, such as assessments of epistemic justification and knowledge assessments, and on the epistemic norms which govern these evaluations. Some epistemologists,suchasFeldman(2000)andDougherty(2012),haveevenclaimed that epistemic normativity is solely determined by epistemic reasons. Others have characterized the realm of epistemic normativity more broadly, with the help of certain epistemic goals, epistemic aims, or epistemic value claims. However, even with a broad understanding of epistemic normativity, the main focus of normative epistemology was still restricted to matters concerning epistemic justification and knowledge, besides a few exceptions such as Goldman (1978), Kornblith (1983), and Hookway (2006). I do not doubt that epistemic justification and knowledge belongtothekeyconcernsofepistemologicalresearchingeneralandofnormative epistemology in particular. However, I think that normative epistemology should also be concerned with other topics such as epistemic melioration, epistemic responsibility assessment, intellectual norms, and intellectual conduct. This book isanattempttoshowthatsuchtopicsmatterfornormativeepistemology. The aim of this book is to show that belief-influencing actions and omissions areepistemicallysignificant(atleastundercertainconditions).Iwillargueforthis claim by presenting an approach to epistemic responsibility assessment which is groundedinindirectdoxasticcontrol.Agentsexerciseindirectdoxasticcontrolby performingcertainbelief-influencingactionsandomissions.Throughoutthisbook, Iwillassumethatepistemicresponsibilityassessmentandassessmentsofepistemic justification are independent epistemic evaluations. The approach to epistemic responsibility assessment which I present in this book evaluates the intellectual conduct of an agent with respect to holding a certain doxastic attitude. The intellectualconductofanagentinacertainsituationreferstothewayinwhichthe agentexercisesindirectdoxasticcontrolinthatsituation.Assessmentsofepistemic justification evaluate whether a certain doxastic attitude has certain features, such as being in accordance with or well-based on the evidence the agent possesses or beingthedoxasticoutcomeofareliablebelief-formingprocess.Moreover,Idoubt thatthereisanydirectconnectionbetweentheepistemicresponsibilityassessment ix x Introduction which I present in this book and the analysis of knowledge. That is why this book is concerned neither with the analysis of epistemic justification nor with the analysis of knowledge. The topic of this book belongs to the area of meliorative epistemology. The aim of meliorative epistemology is “to regulate and guide our intellectual activities” (Goldman 1978, p. 509). This branch of epistemological researchinvestigatesthefoundationsandpossibilitiesofintellectualguidance(i.e., guidanceofdoxasticandepistemicendeavors)andseekstoanswerquestionssuch aswhatanagentcandotoimproveherdoxasticandepistemicendeavorsandwhat anagentcandotoimproveherepistemicsituation. The book is dealing with questions of meliorative epistemology in general andwithquestionsconcerningdoxasticresponsibilityandepistemicresponsibility assessmentinparticular.Theexpression“responsibility”isusedinvariouswaysin oureverydaytalkbutalsoinphilosophicalresearch.Theexpression“responsibility” is used in an agentive sense, in an evaluative sense, or in a prescriptive sense in philosophicalresearch.Onecanapplytheexpression“responsibility”toindividual agentsortocollectiveagents.Throughoutthisbook,Iwillonlybeconcernedwith individualresponsibility.Agentiveresponsibilityreferstocontroloragencyofsome sort,anditisconcernedwiththeconditionsunderwhichanaction,anomission,a doxasticattitude,orastateofaffairs1 canbetracedbacktotheexerciseofagency of an agent. Evaluative responsibility refers to responsibility assessments such as blameworthiness,praiseworthiness,oraneutralevaluation.Itisoftenassumedthat responsibility assessment requires agentive responsibility. For example, it is often assumedthatanagentisblameworthyforanaction,onlyiftheagentisagentively responsibleforthataction,whichmeansthattheagenthadcontrolovertheactionor theagentperformedtheactionfreely.Thatiswhyonecanalsocharacterizeagentive responsibility as the freedom-relevant component or as the control component of evaluative responsibility. Two notions of evaluative responsibility have to be distinguished. The first notion of responsibility assessment assesses an agent for anaction,anomission,adoxasticattitude,orastateofaffairs.Thesecondnotionof responsibilityassessmentassessesthecharacteroftheagentortheagentasawhole. Whenwespeakaboutresponsibleagents,weareusingtheexpression“responsible” as evaluative responsibility in the second sense. Throughout this book, I will use evaluative responsibility or responsibility assessment only in the first sense. Prescriptiveresponsibilityreferstoobligationsorrequirements.Responsibilitiesof an agent are the obligations or requirements which are incumbent on the agent. Note, throughout this book, I will use the expression “responsibility” to refer to agentive responsibility; I will use the expression “responsibility assessment” to refer to evaluative responsibility (in the first sense); and I will use the expressions “obligation,”“requirement,”and“prohibition”torefertoprescriptiveresponsibility. Thefirsttwochaptersofthisbookareconcernedwithagentiveresponsibilityfor doxasticattitudes.Inthefirstchapter,Iintroducethreeintuitiveassumptionsabout our pretheoretical notion of doxastic responsibility. I use these three assumptions 1Thislistisnotsupposedtobeexhaustive. Introduction xi togetherwithintuitivecasejudgmentstoshowthattherearenoviableapproaches to doxastic responsibility which are based on direct doxastic control. I conclude fromthisthattherearenoviableapproachestodirectdoxasticresponsibilitywhich capture the three intuitive assumptions about our pretheoretical notion of doxastic responsibilityanddealwithcertaintestcasesinanintuitiveway. In the second chapter, I present an approach to indirect doxastic responsibility. According to this approach, doxastic responsibility is responsibility for doxastic consequences.IemployMeylan’sidea(2013,chapter4)toapplyFischerandRav- izza’s reasons-responsiveness approach to responsibility for consequences (1998, chapter 4) to the doxastic domain. I show that this approach to indirect doxastic responsibility captures the three assumptions about our pretheoretical notion of doxastic responsibility and deals with the test cases from the first chapter in an intuitiveway.Iconcludefromthediscussionofthefirstandthesecondchapterthat ourpretheoreticalnotionofdoxasticresponsibilityisbestcapturedwithanapproach toindirectdoxasticresponsibility–andsoIconcludethatourpretheoreticalnotion ofdoxasticresponsibilityisbasedonindirectdoxasticcontrol.Sinceagentsexercise indirect doxastic control by performing belief-influencing actions and omissions, Chaps.1 and 2 establish that belief-influencing actions and omissions matter for doxasticresponsibility. The third chapter concerns evaluative doxastic responsibility and prescrip- tive doxastic responsibility. I discuss intellectual norms, and I propose a rule- consequentialistapproachtoepistemicresponsibilityassessment.Intellectualnorms arenormswhichhavebelief-influencingactionsandomissionsastheirobjects.They guide the exercise of indirect doxastic control and govern responsibility assess- ∗∗ ments. I introduce reliability, strong meta-reliability, and weak meta-reliability ascriteriatodistinguishbelief-influencingactionsandomissionswhichconduceto produceepistemicvaluefromthosethatdonotconducetoproduceepistemicvalue. Intellectualnormswhichrequireorpermittheperformanceofreliable,strongmeta- ∗∗ reliable, or weak meta-reliable belief-influencing actions and omissions, as well as intellectual norms which prohibit the performance of belief-influencing actions and omissions which are unreliable, not strong meta-reliable, or not weak meta- ∗∗ reliable ,willbeintroducedasnormsofreliableintellectualconduct.Iwillshow that norms of reliable intellectual conduct are epistemic norms because to comply withthesenormsconducestoproduceepistemicvalue.Withthehelpofthenorms of reliable intellectual conduct, I will present a rule-consequentialist approach to epistemicresponsibilityassessmentwhichisgroundedinindirectdoxasticcontrol. Sinceanagentexercisesindirectdoxasticcontrolbyperformingbelief-influencing actions and omissions, belief-influencing actions and omissions matter for the presentedapproachtoepistemicresponsibilityassessment. In the fourth chapter, I will show that consideration of epistemic responsibility assessment and norms of reliable intellectual conduct are important to capture the epistemic significance of epistemic peer disagreement comprehensively. My argu- ment for this relies on the assumption that the epistemic significance of epistemic peerdisagreementconsistsinthefactthatanagentwhohasrecognizedthatsheis inacaseofepistemicpeerdisagreementgetsanopportunityforepistemicimprove-
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